'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

[Terrapin Station]

See, another remarkably stupid misunderstanding. You can't even comprehend a simple Wikipedia page about semantics.

Strawman.

No. Remarkably stupid. Straw men obtain when you misrepresent someone else's argument (as if it was the argument they gave).

[Skepdick]

No. Remarkably stupid. Straw men obtain when you misrepresent someone else's argument (as if it was the argument they gave).

So the strawman obtains then. You misrepresented my argument for my own understanding. In the direction away from charity.

It's not your fault though.

A stupid man's report of what a clever man says can never be accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something he can understand.--Bertrand Russel.

[FlashDangerpants]

No reason to bother reading beyond that point. There's the fictional, the unreal, the imaginary, and whatever your point was supposed to be. I'm bored of you again now.

That's just your pet categorisation-schema. Your own, personal model/interpretation of reality. It obtains.

All models obtain.

meh, that's some private language bullshit I cba with

[Skepdick]

meh, that's some private language bullshit I cba with

That's precisely the point, moron

To anybody who doesn't use your categories, YOUR language is a "private language". That's why you keep talking about the meaning of X IN PHILOSOPHY. Your terminology means fuckall outside of your little ivory tower. It's a controlled vocabulary.

My "private language" is only private TO YOU. It's so damn public I can index every concept in Wikipedia.

[FlashDangerpants]

Oh God this shit is dire. Here's a link, that's enough of this bollocks for me though.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_l ... %20century.

[Skepdick]

Oh God this shit is dire. Here's a link, that's enough of this bollocks for me though.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_l ... %20century.

That argument is 100 years old. Wittgenstein didn't have a theory of "coherence" and we learned a bunch about semantics since then.

There's nothing 'private" about a theoretical framework that is:

1. Explainable to a dumb machine (why the heck can't YOU "intelligent Philosophers" understand what a machine can?!?!?)
2. Used by millions of people world-wide.

A self-hosting compiler is the empirical test for coherency.
That's how meta-circular evaluators work.

Languages that can interpret their own semantics.

[FlashDangerpants]

meh

I think I will stick with that answer.

[Terrapin Station]

Oh God this shit is dire. Here's a link, that's enough of this bollocks for me though.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_l ... %20century.

I don't at all agree with the Private Language Argument either. I'm not much of a Wittgenstein fan. Or a Kant fan for that matter.

[Skepdick]

I don't at all agree with the Private Language Argument either. I'm not much of a Wittgenstein fan. Or a Kant fan for that matter.

Nobody that has ever found meaning can agree with the private language argument.

For the argument implies that meaning itself, as ineffably and holistically understood, is incoherent.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Oh God this shit is dire. Here's a link, that's enough of this bollocks for me though.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_l ... %20century.

I don't at all agree with the Private Language Argument either. I'm not much of a Wittgenstein fan. Or a Kant fan for that matter.

So which philosophers are you a fan of?
I am interested in the answer so I can know your philosophical foundation.

[Skepdick]

Agreed. It's an unpleasant and intellectually challenged troll that I try not to feed.

For somebody "less intellectually challenged", you sure can't tell that you are the troll being fed.

Ridicule. A troll-snack. --by Skepdick

[Veritas Aequitas]

5.1 The Unity-Problem
If one conceives of a state of affairs as complexes that “contain” particulars and properties, one needs to answer the unity-question
“What unifies some particulars and properties into one state of affairs?”
An answer to this question should distinguish states of affairs from other complexes.

The responses to this should be:

(1) What "other" complexes?

In the introduction to the article;
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/

Note the following;

Before pressing on a note about terminology: many philosophers follow Armstrong’s (1993: 429) terminology who uses “states of affairs” to refer to facts. (Armstrong’s book A World of States of Affairs is solely concerned with facts.)

This article is not devoted to “Armstrongian” states of affairs,
but to states of affairs in the sense that is prominent in the work of such philosophers as Reinach, Russell (at one time), the early-Wittgenstein and Plantinga.

and

(2) One is reading "state of affairs" to (need to be) countable and namely and unitary "thing" of sorts because _____?

Not sure of your question.

My point is, state-of-affairs [as defined in the article] when conflated with 'what is fact' is groundless thus ultimately false.
Worst of all, it is groundless to counter my moral facts are not state of affairs as in what is fact, feature of reality, that is the case.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Fatuous claims:

'If language is the foundation of meaning then you are already committed to anti-realism.'

Nope. That words can mean only what we use them to mean doesn't mean that language is the foundation of meaning. That claim is incoherent.
And nope. Realism and anti-realism are ontologies, and 'what exists' has nothing to do with language.

'There's nothing "outside" of language on which to base our linguistic practices. There's nothing outside of language upon which meaning could be based!'

Nope. That there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices - just means that we can't ask what we talk about to tell us what
our words mean. Dogs and trees can't tell us if they really are what we call dogs and trees. But one of our linguistic practices is to talk about dogs,
trees and other features of what we call reality.

You are the fatuous one with shallow, narrow and dogmatic thinking.

You keep banking on 'linguistic' which is OK for communication but very superficial as far as philosophy is concern.

When you talk about something, you cannot be sure whether you are talking about real things, illusions, or other falsehoods.
You could talk about the 'snake' that gave you are shock and fright last evening to the whole world [blog] but the next morning upon very near observation and verification, it turned out to be a piece of a large twisted rope.

This is why the question of reality, i.e. whether it is real is so critical in philosophy.
The best and most credible basis to verify and justify something is real is to rely upon the scientific FSR or FSK.

Then, for what is real with greater precision it has to be deliberated whether it is mind-independent or it co-entangle with the human conditions. One is ultimately more realistic [philosophical anti-realism], the other is false [philosophical realism].

'Which is precisely why all that is necessary for morality to be objective is for us to say that it is!'

Nope. The words 'truth', 'fact' and 'objectivity' mean what we use them to mean. And we don't use them to refer to matters of opinion, such as
aesthetic and moral opinions. Instead, we very specifically use them to refer to what exists or existed. And, pending evidence for the actual
existence of things such as beauty, ugliness, moral rightness and moral wrongness - belief that they exist is irrational.

'We change the meaning of the word and BOOM! Done.'

Nope. Changing the ways we use the words 'truth', 'fact' and 'objectivity' would make absolutely no difference to what actually
does and doesn't exist. Moral rightness and wrongness still wouldn't exist.

As I had stated many times, what your termed as moral opinions, beliefs, decisions and judgment, moral rightness, moral wrongness are not of 'morality-proper'.

What is morality-proper deal with moral facts that MUST be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a moral FSR/FSK which at near-credibility to the scientific FSK.
Moral Facts as oughts are not to be imposed on any individual[s] or groups but merely to be used as moral standards to guide moral unfoldment and progress of the inherent moral functions within all humans.

[Terrapin Station]

The responses to this should be:

(1) What "other" complexes?

In the introduction to the article;
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/

Note the following;

Before pressing on a note about terminology: many philosophers follow Armstrong’s (1993: 429) terminology who uses “states of affairs” to refer to facts. (Armstrong’s book A World of States of Affairs is solely concerned with facts.)

This article is not devoted to “Armstrongian” states of affairs,
but to states of affairs in the sense that is prominent in the work of such philosophers as Reinach, Russell (at one time), the early-Wittgenstein and Plantinga.

LOL re completely failing to name an "other complex." The answer to "What 'other complexes'?" would need to at least name one other complex.

and

(2) One is reading "state of affairs" to (need to be) countable and namely and unitary "thing" of sorts because _____?

Not sure of your question.

The author took "state of affairs" to be a countable, "unified" "thing" of sorts. I'm asking why the author interpreted it that way.

[Terrapin Station]

At any rate, re this:

My point is, state-of-affairs [as defined in the article] when conflated with 'what is fact' is groundless thus ultimately false.
Worst of all, it is groundless to counter my moral facts are not state of affairs as in what is fact, feature of reality, that is the case.

You're getting confused via thinking that the terminology is important or thinking that there's some stake in the terminology. The terminology doesn't matter. What matters are the upshots of how and where the phenomena question occur, regardless of what we name anything.