This I take it are the common elements of Analytic Philosophy inherited from the bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists.
While PH throws around the term 'states of affairs' as if it is of something credible within philosophy, actually it has no groundings to reality at all.
Note the conclusion in this SEP article, that there are no groundings to 'state of affairs' because of the Unity Problem;
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/
The above implies there are no sound and credible grounds for what are claimed as 'states of affairs'.5.1 The Unity-Problem
If one conceives of a state of affairs as complexes that “contain” particulars and properties, one needs to answer the unity-question
“What unifies some particulars and properties into one state of affairs?”
An answer to this question should distinguish states of affairs from other complexes.
6. Conclusion
Does one need states of affairs in addition to facts and thoughts?
Yes, there seem to be good reasons to posit states of affairs as a sui generis category of object.
If states of affairs are to be useful (i) they must exist even if they do not obtain and (ii) must involve objects and properties (relations) directly. (i) is the basic feature that distinguishes states of affairs from facts; (ii) the basic feature that distinguishes them from thoughts.
Therefore a theory of states of affairs must answer the question how a state of affairs can “involve” objects and properties (relations) and combine them, if the objects don’t exemplify the properties (stand in the relations).
Although there are promising proposals to answer it, this question [unity-Problem] is still open.
These Analytic Philosophers has problems with 'states of affairs'
Thus when PH's throw around his 'fact as state of affairs' and that this has no groundings, where did he get his arguments, authority and credibility to insist there are no moral facts in according to his fact [as per his definition].States of affairs have no place in the Fregean theory of reference.
Hence, he [Russell] tried to eliminate states of affairs.
ibid.
Can anyone justify the Analytical Philosophy version of 'states of affairs' [as discussed in the SEP article] are really real?
In contrast, note in my Empirical Realism approach, where moral-facts-as-they-are are verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a moral framework and system similar to how scientific facts are verified and justified.