'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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Skepdick
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Skepdick »

Terrapin Station wrote: Thu Feb 11, 2021 12:25 pm You're getting confused via thinking that the terminology is important or thinking that there's some stake in the terminology. The terminology doesn't matter. What matters are the upshots of how and where the phenomena question occur, regardless of what we name anything.
You keep getting confused in thinking that terminology doesn't matter. Because you think terms are labels, and not descriptions, this is reductionist horseshit.

The meaning of terms depend on multiple relations: to the referent, to terms in the sentence, to paragraphs, and ultimately - to the language as a whole. This is the part where you straw-manned me about "not understanding" semantic holism, yet here I am. Understanding it.

And I keep demonstrating why you are wrong. You literally do not understand how semantics work. The picture below shows a circle. Even though your semantics are screaming otherwise.
square-circle.png
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Veritas Aequitas
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Thu Feb 11, 2021 12:25 pm At any rate, re this:
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Feb 11, 2021 9:26 am
My point is, state-of-affairs [as defined in the article] when conflated with 'what is fact' is groundless thus ultimately false.
Worst of all, it is groundless to counter my moral facts are not state of affairs as in what is fact, feature of reality, that is the case.
You're getting confused via thinking that the terminology is important or thinking that there's some stake in the terminology. The terminology doesn't matter. What matters are the upshots of how and where the phenomena question occur, regardless of what we name anything.
NOPE! NEVER!
My reliance on the various notable philosophers and philosophical traditions do not focus on terminology as the most critical lever/pivot or foundation of reality.
I believe it is too kindergartenish to doubt that in others in a philosophical community.

I wrote the following post just before the above. I presume you did not read it since it was not addressed to you. But it is full of relevance to your point above, note [repeat];
  • You keep banking on 'linguistic' which is OK for communication but very superficial as far as philosophy is concern.

    When you talk about something, you cannot be sure whether you are talking about real things, illusions, or other falsehoods.
    You could talk about the 'snake' that gave you are shock and fright last evening to the whole world [blog] but the next morning upon very near observation and verification, it turned out to be a piece of a large twisted rope.

    This is why the question of reality, i.e. whether it is real is so critical in philosophy.
    The best and most credible basis to verify and justify something is real is to rely upon the scientific FSR or FSK.

    Then, for what is real with greater precision it has to be deliberated whether it is mind-independent or it co-entangle with the human conditions. One is ultimately more realistic [philosophical anti-realism], the other is false [philosophical realism].
What matters are the upshots of how and where the phenomena question occur, regardless of what we name anything.
'What matters" matters is dependent on the various perspectives of reality and justified within the respective Framework and System of Reality [FSR] or knowledge [FSK].

FYI, here is one ultimate claim;
In the ultimate framework and system of reality [FSR], that-thing-that-matters -which is real in most FSR - is ultimately an meta-illusion as supported by Kant [no thing in itself], Buddhist [empty-thingness].
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Thu Feb 11, 2021 12:21 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Feb 11, 2021 9:26 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Feb 10, 2021 12:27 pm

The responses to this should be:

(1) What "other" complexes?
In the introduction to the article;
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/

Note the following;
Before pressing on a note about terminology: many philosophers follow Armstrong’s (1993: 429) terminology who uses “states of affairs” to refer to facts. (Armstrong’s book A World of States of Affairs is solely concerned with facts.)

This article is not devoted to “Armstrongian” states of affairs,
but to states of affairs in the sense that is prominent in the work of such philosophers as Reinach, Russell (at one time), the early-Wittgenstein and Plantinga.
LOL re completely failing to name an "other complex." The answer to "What 'other complexes'?" would need to at least name one other complex.
You are too literal and rigid which make me wonder you may be autistic?
The article already stated it is not devoted to [/b] “Armstrongian” states of affairs
but to states of affairs in the sense that is prominent in the work of such philosophers as Reinach, Russell (at one time), the early-Wittgenstein and Plantinga.

Therefore we should focus in this case on,
states of affairs in the sense that is prominent in the work of such philosophers as Reinach, Russell (at one time), the early-Wittgenstein and Plantinga.

To deal with other complex state of affairs would be off topic.
This is why I did not bother to waste time reading Armstrong's book for his examples.
and
(2) One is reading "state of affairs" to (need to be) countable and namely and unitary "thing" of sorts because _____?
Not sure of your question.
The author took "state of affairs" to be a countable, "unified" "thing" of sorts. I'm asking why the author interpreted it that way.
I searched but there is nothing that mentioned 'countable'.

You can read the article re why unification is so critical to 'state-of-affairs.'

One interesting point which I would agree with would be;
Roughly speaking, the external unifier can bring the constituents of states of affairs together even if they don’t constitute a fact.
A psychological version of the External Theory is proposed in Valicella 2000.
According to him, the external ground of unity is the judging consciousness that brings about the unity of a state of affairs (Valicella 2000: 252).
Section 5:2
I downloaded Valicella's article, his conclusion indicated the current views of what is state of affairs are false, thus his version re consciousness as the unifer is a possibility for unifications - but his conclusion is not accepted by others.
6. Conclusion
The truthmaker argument takes us from contingent truths to their ontological grounds in worldly states of affairs.
But states of affairs are problematic entities.
They are composed of simpler entities, their constituents, and so one naturally tries to understand them as reducible to their constituents.
This reductionist attempt, however, cannot account for the unity of states of affairs and so motivates the view that states of affairs are irreducible entities distinct from their constituents.
But this view is equally unacceptable since it cannot explain how a state of affairs, a complex, can be distinct from the very constituents of which it is composed and without which it is nothing at all.
Now if these were the only two ways of construing states of affairs—if they were logical contradictories of one another—we would have to conclude that the concept of a state of affairs is internally incoherent, and that the truthmaker argument for states of affairs is unsound.
But the two ways of construing states of affairs are logical contraries of one another, and so can both be false.
There is the possibility that the unity of a state of affairs derives from an external unifier.
~And it is the only other possibility.! So if the truthmaker argument for states of affairs is sound, then states of affairs have an external unifier.
I would apply Modus Ponens at this point; others will reach for Modus Tollens.53

Three Conceptions of States of Affairs
William F. Vallicella
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Here one a representation of what is Armstrong's state of affairs;
In 1997, David Armstrong argued that the world is a world of states of affairs.

In his latest book, Truth and Truthmakers, he remains strongly committed to the existence of states of affairs, despite now advocating an ontology in which they are not needed, ‘as an ontological extra’.
States of affairs remain needed, Armstrong says, ‘to act as truthmakers for predicative truths’.

In this paper, I attempt to shed light on what Armstrong might mean by this claim. While there is a straightforward sense in which states of affairs are not needed in Armstrong's amended ontology, I suggest that Armstrong might be charitably interpreted in a manner that justifies his claim. However, in clarifying the manner in which states of affairs remain needed in Armstrong's ontology, it becomes unclear whether they are needed in any ‘deep’ sense, or rather are merely parochial to his ontology. I examine Armstrong's rejection of Resemblance Nominalism on the grounds that it does not provide adequate ‘minimal’ truthmakers. I then argue that he has significant additional work to do in explaining this concept before his rejection of Resemblance Nominalism can be justified, and thus before the need for states of affairs can be asserted generally, rather than just within particular ontologies, such as Armstrong's amended one.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10. ... ode=rajp20
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Peter Holmes »

Correspondence theories of what we call truth - including truth-maker/truth-bearer theories - are obviously tautological, even if they are popular and convenient 'shorthands' or 'ways of talking' about truth.

Criticism of what we mean by the words 'fact' or 'state-of-affairs' - and ultimately 'truth' - derives from the metaphysical delusion that abstract nouns are names of things of some kind that exist somewhere, somehow. It's the myth of propositions - of propositional knowledge - at work.
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Terrapin Station
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Feb 12, 2021 5:11 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Thu Feb 11, 2021 12:25 pm At any rate, re this:
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Feb 11, 2021 9:26 am
My point is, state-of-affairs [as defined in the article] when conflated with 'what is fact' is groundless thus ultimately false.
Worst of all, it is groundless to counter my moral facts are not state of affairs as in what is fact, feature of reality, that is the case.
You're getting confused via thinking that the terminology is important or thinking that there's some stake in the terminology. The terminology doesn't matter. What matters are the upshots of how and where the phenomena question occur, regardless of what we name anything.
NOPE! NEVER!
My reliance on the various notable philosophers and philosophical traditions do not focus on terminology as the most critical lever/pivot or foundation of reality.
I believe it is too kindergartenish to doubt that in others in a philosophical community.

I wrote the following post just before the above. I presume you did not read it since it was not addressed to you. But it is full of relevance to your point above, note [repeat];
  • You keep banking on 'linguistic' which is OK for communication but very superficial as far as philosophy is concern.

    When you talk about something, you cannot be sure whether you are talking about real things, illusions, or other falsehoods.
    You could talk about the 'snake' that gave you are shock and fright last evening to the whole world [blog] but the next morning upon very near observation and verification, it turned out to be a piece of a large twisted rope.

    This is why the question of reality, i.e. whether it is real is so critical in philosophy.
    The best and most credible basis to verify and justify something is real is to rely upon the scientific FSR or FSK.

    Then, for what is real with greater precision it has to be deliberated whether it is mind-independent or it co-entangle with the human conditions. One is ultimately more realistic [philosophical anti-realism], the other is false [philosophical realism].
What matters are the upshots of how and where the phenomena question occur, regardless of what we name anything.
'What matters" matters is dependent on the various perspectives of reality and justified within the respective Framework and System of Reality [FSR] or knowledge [FSK].

FYI, here is one ultimate claim;
In the ultimate framework and system of reality [FSR], that-thing-that-matters -which is real in most FSR - is ultimately an meta-illusion as supported by Kant [no thing in itself], Buddhist [empty-thingness].
Your response here has nothing to do with my comment in context. How we decide to use terms like "states of affairs," "facts," etc. is irrelevant to what folks like Peter and I are arguing here. What we're arguing are the upshots of where and how phenomena are occurring, regardless of what we decide to name anything.
Skepdick
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Skepdick »

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Feb 12, 2021 12:05 pm Criticism of what we mean by the words 'fact' or 'state-of-affairs' - and ultimately 'truth' - derives from the metaphysical delusion that abstract nouns are names of things of some kind that exist somewhere, somehow. It's the myth of propositions - of propositional knowledge - at work.
Strawman.

Criticism of what WE mean by the words "facts" is criticism of the notion of normative meaning.

There are no facts. Only normative interpretations.
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Terrapin Station
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

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Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Feb 12, 2021 5:27 am
You are too literal and rigid which make me wonder you may be autistic?
The article already stated it is not devoted to [/b] “Armstrongian” states of affairs
but to states of affairs in the sense that is prominent in the work of such philosophers as Reinach, Russell (at one time), the early-Wittgenstein and Plantinga.

Therefore we should focus in this case on,
states of affairs in the sense that is prominent in the work of such philosophers as Reinach, Russell (at one time), the early-Wittgenstein and Plantinga.

To deal with other complex state of affairs would be off topic.
This is why I did not bother to waste time reading Armstrong's book for his examples.
So the claim is that "other complexes" refers to states of affairs as well, but a different conception of them?
Skepdick
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Skepdick »

Terrapin Station wrote: Fri Feb 12, 2021 12:14 pm Your response here has nothing to do with my comment in context. How we decide to use terms like "states of affairs," "facts," etc. is irrelevant to what folks like Peter and I are arguing here. What we're arguing are the upshots of where and how phenomena are occurring, regardless of what we decide to name anything.
Retard.

There are no phenomena (plural) there is only a phenomenon (singular). That phenomenon is experience in its entirety. Or existence. Or being. Or any other term that encompasses ALL THERE IS in a non-reductionist manner.

Phenomena (plural) are the end product of eidetic reduction.

This has nothing to do with naming things. It has to do with manufacturing "things" from experience by cutting it up into categories. It has to do with ontological speculation and separating parts from the whole.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Fri Feb 12, 2021 12:14 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Feb 12, 2021 5:11 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Thu Feb 11, 2021 12:25 pm At any rate, re this:


You're getting confused via thinking that the terminology is important or thinking that there's some stake in the terminology. The terminology doesn't matter. What matters are the upshots of how and where the phenomena question occur, regardless of what we name anything.
NOPE! NEVER!
My reliance on the various notable philosophers and philosophical traditions do not focus on terminology as the most critical lever/pivot or foundation of reality.
I believe it is too kindergartenish to doubt that in others in a philosophical community.

I wrote the following post just before the above. I presume you did not read it since it was not addressed to you. But it is full of relevance to your point above, note [repeat];
  • You keep banking on 'linguistic' which is OK for communication but very superficial as far as philosophy is concern.

    When you talk about something, you cannot be sure whether you are talking about real things, illusions, or other falsehoods.
    You could talk about the 'snake' that gave you are shock and fright last evening to the whole world [blog] but the next morning upon very near observation and verification, it turned out to be a piece of a large twisted rope.

    This is why the question of reality, i.e. whether it is real is so critical in philosophy.
    The best and most credible basis to verify and justify something is real is to rely upon the scientific FSR or FSK.

    Then, for what is real with greater precision it has to be deliberated whether it is mind-independent or it co-entangle with the human conditions. One is ultimately more realistic [philosophical anti-realism], the other is false [philosophical realism].
What matters are the upshots of how and where the phenomena question occur, regardless of what we name anything.
'What matters" matters is dependent on the various perspectives of reality and justified within the respective Framework and System of Reality [FSR] or knowledge [FSK].

FYI, here is one ultimate claim;
In the ultimate framework and system of reality [FSR], that-thing-that-matters -which is real in most FSR - is ultimately an meta-illusion as supported by Kant [no thing in itself], Buddhist [empty-thingness].
Your response here has nothing to do with my comment in context. How we decide to use terms like "states of affairs," "facts," etc. is irrelevant to what folks like Peter and I are arguing here.
What we're arguing are the upshots of where and how phenomena are occurring, regardless of what we decide to name anything.
I am not too sure of your point re 'where' and 'how'?

I believe before we can argue about 'where' and 'how' phenomena are occurring, it is more effective to justify what and whether phenomena exists or not.
If phenomena exists, then on what basis and grounds do they exist.
Are you familiar with the issue of 'noumena' in relation to phenomena?
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Terrapin Station
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

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Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Feb 13, 2021 5:21 am I believe before we can argue about 'where' and 'how' phenomena are occurring, it is more effective to justify what and whether phenomena exists or not.
If phenomena exists, then on what basis and grounds do they exist.
Are you familiar with the issue of 'noumena' in relation to phenomena?
First, you don't need to keep being patronizing/asking patronizing questions. I have multiple degrees in philosophy.

The phenomena we're talking about, which should be clear in context here, is moral-stance phenomena--things like "One ought to help little old ladies across the street," "It is wrong to commit murder," "It is morally obligatory to protect children," etc. etc.

No one should be doubtful that such phenomena occur. Obviously people think things in the vein of the utterances in quotation marks above.

The issue is the upshots of just what such phenomena are--just where and how they occur and what that does or doesn't imply.
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sat Feb 13, 2021 4:26 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Feb 13, 2021 5:21 am I believe before we can argue about 'where' and 'how' phenomena are occurring, it is more effective to justify what and whether phenomena exists or not.
If phenomena exists, then on what basis and grounds do they exist.
Are you familiar with the issue of 'noumena' in relation to phenomena?
First, you don't need to keep being patronizing/asking patronizing questions. I have multiple degrees in philosophy.
Noted and that is good information you have multiple degrees in philosophy. There are pros and cons of academic philosophy.

You brought up the term 'phenomena' as used in the unusual way, so I have to ask.
Phenomenon- Philosophy.
an appearance or immediate object of awareness in experience.
Kantianism. a thing as it appears to and is constructed by the mind, as distinguished from a noumenon, or thing-in-itself.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/phenomenon

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenon
I see no offense in asking the above question because to me [Kantian] 'phenomena' is always corresponded with 'noumena'. Don't have to be that sensitive.
The phenomena we're talking about, which should be clear in context here, is moral-stance phenomena--things like "One ought to help little old ladies across the street," "It is wrong to commit murder," "It is morally obligatory to protect children," etc. etc.

No one should be doubtful that such phenomena occur. Obviously people think things in the vein of the utterances in quotation marks above.

The issue is the upshots of just what such phenomena are--just where and how they occur and what that does or doesn't imply.
Why don't you stick to moral dispositions [expression, descriptions, judgments and the likes] rather than the confusing 'phenomena'.
As for dispositions, my views are as below, i.e. they do not belong to morality-proper;

Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615

Hume had stated how they 'might' occur, i.e. he speculated they are linked to sympathy.
The sympathy-generated pleasure, then, is the moral approbation we feel toward these traits of character. We find the character traits — the causes — agreeable because they are the means to ends we find agreeable as a result of sympathy.
SEP https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/
But Hume [due to his time] was ignorant of the deeper facts of human nature.
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Terrapin Station
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Re: 'States of Affairs" [Analytic] [Moral].

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 3:41 am You brought up the term 'phenomena' as used in the unusual way, so I have to ask . . .
. . . as a response to a post explaining why it's the ontological upshots that matter, not the exact terms we're using for any of this stuff, not what we're calling anything, you respond only with quibbles over terminology. :roll:
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