Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jan 15, 2021 12:29 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Jan 15, 2021 7:33 am
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 14, 2021 7:05 pm
1 You haven't shown that there are moral facts, and your 'moral FSK' is nothing more than a question begging invention. But hey, keep kidding yourself.
2 All this blather about concepts demonstrates my point. They're misleading metaphysical fictions, just like the minds that are supposed to 'contain' them. And your concoction - a mental represetation represented by a neural algorithm or program - is just another nonsensical mess. There's no evidence for the existence of any of the many things described as concepts. And all talk of the mental that's anything other than metaphorical is substance-dualism.
3 There are dogs (real things). There is the word 'dog' (a real thing), that we use to talk about dogs. Now, try describing or 'analysing' the supposed thing called the concept of a dog, What does it mean to do that, and what's the result? Write down your findings, and see if it amounts to anything more than a description of a dog.
You are SO ignorant and yet SO arrogant.
Note I have done extensive research into cognitive science, neuro-cognitive-science, neuro-psychology and has sufficient exposure to the various neurosciences.
Here is a quickie clue from Oliver Sacks;
There are a ton of research supporting this theory related to concepts [neural correlates] in the brain;
- The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales is a 1985 book by neurologist Oliver Sacks describing the case histories of some of his patients. Sacks chose the title of the book from the case study of one of his patients who has visual agnosia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_W ... _for_a_Hat
In this case, there are developed neural correlates [the physical neural algorithm] of the concept of 'wife' 'face' and 'hat' in the man's brain and mind. However, since the man's brain was damaged, he was unable to match the right concept to the images from the retina and the visual cortex.
In the case of the "concept of a dog" that concept is a fact of a mental states represented by the appropriate physical neural correlates.
If the person suffers brain damage, he may see an elephant or something else, when a real dog is presented to him or he could only see lines, patches or whatever.
Is a so-called concept different from an idea or a thought? If so, in what way? If not, why use the word 'concept'?
Is a so-called concept a mental representation, object, entity, state or capacity of cognitive agents?
What's the difference between a mental thing and an abstract thing? Can an abstract thing be a mental thing?
How exactly do firing neurons 'represent' or 'correlate with' the supposed concept of a dog?
If brain damage leads to seeing an elephant rather than the actual dog, why is this a conceptual problem rather than a neurological problem? And if a conceptual problem is nothing more than a neurological problem, why bother talking about concepts? What explanatory role do they have?
What and where are the mind and the supposed mental things, states and events that the mind supposedly 'contains'? Do you think neuroscience has answered, or even can answer, those questions?
I do not want to go on a lecture tour of all the above. You'll need to do the research to find answers to the above.
Note this which is relevant;
PH: Is a so-called concept different from an idea or a thought? If so, in what way? If not, why use the word 'concept'?
These are the philosophical meanings [not conventional] of the respective terms.
is an output of the brain/mind processes that can eventually manifest through the subconscious and be recognized by the conscious mind as some thing [images, concepts, inferences, etc.].
is a thought that is related an element of the mind that is associated with empirically-related or possible
elements. Example, 'dog' which is empirically possible to be experienced, verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a specific FSK, e.g. the moral facts represented by its concept.
An idea [philosophical] is a thought that has no relation to any empirically related nor possible element. Thus an idea is something like a square-circle, soul, God, the absolute-whole-universe.
Kant in CPR wrote:There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else [ideas] of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.
These conclusions [ideas] are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational, although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title [rational], since they [ideas] are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very Nature of Reason.
They [ideas] are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself.
Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them [the illusions].
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.
While the concepts are relevant, the ideas
above are not relevant to our discussion of moral facts but more to the question of whether God exists as real or not.