What Does "Objective" Mean With Respect to Morality?

[Gary Childress]

Just some random thoughts concerning morality and objectivity:

Suppose that everything in the world is as it currently is and that it is also the case that God exists. And suppose that God has ordained that X is morally right and that Y is morally wrong. Would that alone necessarily mean that X is "objectively" right and Y is "objectively" wrong?

For example, suppose that God ordained that it was morally right to wear green on Thursdays and morally wrong to wear orange on Thursdays despite the seeming fact that it should theoretically make no significant difference in any other way, shape, or form other than being God's "personal" or "subjective" preference. If God ordained something to be the case, would that alone make it morally "objective?"

Contrast this with God ordaining that murder is wrong and that kindness is right. Could the same be said of those things, that they are simply God's preference and not somehow "objective"? For example, if you murder someone you will still burn in hell and if you are kind you will still go to heaven, however, is it possible that it could be just as much God's "subjective" preference, albeit enforced with ultimate punishments or rewards.

And if a supreme reward or else punishment is what makes something morally "objective", what if humans could contrive some kind of great reward or most gruesome punishment for doing something? Would that make something "objectively" moral or immoral?

Would it be only the existence of some ultimate reward or else ultimate punishment that makes something objectively moral or immoral?

[henry quirk]

as a deist: I'm a moral realist...I recognize what I call ownness (that a man belongs to himself) as fact, and that it's wrong to use a man as property or resource (to enslave him) as moral fact extendin' out of fact

I believe reality is an on-goin' creation and there is a creator

as I reckon it: the creator is not directly or obviously involved in creation...he envisioned it, laid the groundwork for it, initiated it, and now lets it play out as it will

as I reckon it: each man is a free will and has a conscience

there may be a there & later but the here & now is where we're at, so we best make the most of it

[FlashDangerpants]

And if a supreme reward or else punishment is what makes something morally "objective", what if humans could contrive some kind of great reward or most gruesome punishment for doing something? Would that make something "objectively" moral or immoral?

In general objectivity means little more than that which would be the case irrespective of whatever anybody believes, including God. So if there ever was a time when people believed that the Earth was flat, and everyone agreed to that, and it was considered to be a settlesd fact, and thus thought to be an objective truth, all of that stuff is mind dependent, it's a description of what people suppose to be the case. Mind independently, the world is sort of round, as things stand, that's what makes it objective.

If there is some mind independent feature of the universe that makes it objectively morally wrong to fart in an elevator and then step out just as the doors are closing, God would presumably know about that feature of reality, and thus his knowledge of it would be founded upon a mind independent fact. However, if he just has an aversion to the smell of farts and issues a decree that farting is wrong on that basis, then that's still subjective, it just so happens that the subject has greater power than we do.

This gets trickier when we use loaded terms to weight the argument. It's a tautologous truth by definition that murder is bad because the concept of murder only applies at all if the action is judged to be bad (it's not murder if it's justified), same goes for rape, same goes for genocide. This is why those are the crimes that people are always trying to prove are objectively bad, the badness is built into them before the argument begins and thus the badness can never be discovered by argument or investigation.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Just some random thoughts concerning morality and objectivity:

Suppose that everything in the world is as it currently is and that it is also the case that God exists. And suppose that God has ordained that X is morally right and that Y is morally wrong. Would that alone necessarily mean that X is "objectively" right and Y is "objectively" wrong?

A fact is specific to a Framework and System of Reality [FSR] [or FSK], thus it is objective because any judgement from a Framework and System of Reality in independent of individuals' opinion and beliefs.

Where an individual who make claims of a God and its moral on a personal basis [one person only], that would be subjective and not objective.

But, where the idea-of-God is constituted with a Framework and System, i.e. a divine ideology, a Church, religion or groups of more than one person, then whatever moral terms ordained by God are said to be objective [as defined].
But it is only objective as qualified to the specific Framework and System, which in this case is grounded on the claim that God exists are real.
The question is, is what is claimed as objective, real?

But as I had proven God is Impossible to be Real,
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

In this case, whatever the moral command by a God, it has to be acknowledge it is grounded on an illusion as such it is questionable.

But what is questionable may be true if it can be justified to be true.
Therefore whatever moral element is from God, it cannot be true until it is justified empirically and philosophically.

For example, suppose that God ordained that it was morally right to wear green on Thursdays and morally wrong to wear orange on Thursdays despite the seeming fact that it should theoretically make no significant difference in any other way, shape, or form other than being God's "personal" or "subjective" preference. If God ordained something to be the case, would that alone make it morally "objective?"

Contrast this with God ordaining that murder is wrong and that kindness is right. Could the same be said of those things, that they are simply God's preference and not somehow "objective"? For example, if you murder someone you will still burn in hell and if you are kind you will still go to heaven, however, is it possible that it could be just as much God's "subjective" preference, albeit enforced with ultimate punishments or rewards.

And if a supreme reward or else punishment is what makes something morally "objective", what if humans could contrive some kind of great reward or most gruesome punishment for doing something? Would that make something "objectively" moral or immoral?

Would it be only the existence of some ultimate reward or else ultimate punishment that makes something objectively moral or immoral?

Since God is an impossibility, a theist cannot simply claim whatever moral elements associated God is morally right because God said so in the holy text.

However whatever is claimed to be moral from God by theists should be verified and justified on the individual claims basis rather than collectively because all of them are from God.

The individual claim should be dealt within a secular Moral Framework and System rather than a theistic Moral Framework grounded on an illusory God.

Take for example,
'Thou shall not kill" - period! from the 10 commandments.

The above by itself is justified and proven to be a moral fact within a secular Moral Framework and System- thus by itself is objective with the Moral FSR.
There are Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

The point is whatever [of God's or secular] is claimed to be factual, true and real, it must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible framework and System of Reality [FSR].
Thereupon its objectivity is dependent on the quality of veracity of the FSR relative to the scientific FSR as the standard bearer.

[Terrapin Station]

Just some random thoughts concerning morality and objectivity:

Suppose that everything in the world is as it currently is and that it is also the case that God exists. And suppose that God has ordained that X is morally right and that Y is morally wrong. Would that alone necessarily mean that X is "objectively" right and Y is "objectively" wrong?

For example, suppose that God ordained that it was morally right to wear green on Thursdays and morally wrong to wear orange on Thursdays despite the seeming fact that it should theoretically make no significant difference in any other way, shape, or form other than being God's "personal" or "subjective" preference. If God ordained something to be the case, would that alone make it morally "objective?"

Contrast this with God ordaining that murder is wrong and that kindness is right. Could the same be said of those things, that they are simply God's preference and not somehow "objective"? For example, if you murder someone you will still burn in hell and if you are kind you will still go to heaven, however, is it possible that it could be just as much God's "subjective" preference, albeit enforced with ultimate punishments or rewards.

And if a supreme reward or else punishment is what makes something morally "objective", what if humans could contrive some kind of great reward or most gruesome punishment for doing something? Would that make something "objectively" moral or immoral?

Would it be only the existence of some ultimate reward or else ultimate punishment that makes something objectively moral or immoral?

"Objective"=mind-independent.

So re the question about God, it's a matter of whether God's decrees are mental phenomena of God or not. (Which is simply going to amount to just what sort of ontology for God and His edicts someone wants to fantasize.)

The whole nut of why any of this matters is this. For some utterances, we can get correct or incorrect what the world is like, assuming that that's what we're trying to do. So, for example if we say that the moon is made of green cheese, and we're trying to accurately peg the composition of the moon, we can (and will if we say the above) get that incorrect. Because there is a moon that exists independently of us, and it has a particular composition, and we can get incorrect claims that we make about that composition.

Well, if moral stances are mental phenomena only, then there's nothing to get correct or incorrect about them. It's not like a claim we make about the moon where we can fail to match what the world is like independent of us. The best we can do with moral stances is to get correct or incorrect what someone's moral stances are. So if we say, "Jones thinks it's morally right to have immigration laws," then we can get that incorrect if Jones thinks that we should not have immigration laws. What we can't get incorrect--or correct--is (the person-independent) "It's is morally right to have immigration laws." Because there's no context-independent fact to that effect.

It's also worth noting that even if there were mind/person-independent moral stances somehow, there's nothing that says that what people are supposed to be doing with their moral views is matching the mind-independent moral stances. So imagine that "It is morally right to have immigration laws" is somehow embedded in the mind-independent world, however that would work, exactly. Well, Jones need not care about that when he tells us that he is of the opinion that it's morally wrong to have immigration laws. It's not as if Jones is required to try to match the mind-independent moral stances when he tells us his own moral stance.

[Terrapin Station]

A fact is specific to a Framework and System of Reality [FSR] [or FSK], thus it is objective because any judgement from a Framework and System of Reality in independent of individuals' opinion and beliefs.

No moral judgment could get into any FSR/K in the first place aside from individuals' opinions, because that's all that any moral judgment is.

Beyond that, there's no requirement that anyone conform to any FSR/K. It's not at all as if conformity to anything is right and nonconformity is wrong.

[Skepdick]

No moral judgment could get into any FSR/K in the first place aside from individuals' opinions, because that's all that any moral judgment is.

Beyond that, there's no requirement that anyone conform to any FSR/K. It's not at all as if conformity to anything is right and nonconformity is wrong.

There's never any requirement to do anything. You have free will.

The job of any and all frameworks is to present you with the choice/option and to explain the consequences.

Choice A: Don't vaccinate your child. Your child dies from polio.
Choice B: Vaccinate your child. Your child doesn't die from polio.

And guess what? When you frame it in terms of choices-with-consequences not a whole lot of people will argue that this is even a choice.

Of course Philosophers will. But that's why nobody takes Philosophers seriously.

But lets not even pretend. First we ask politely, then we incentivise, then we ask sternly. Then we speak out against those who hold your views. Then we turn the public opinion against you. Then we ostracise you from public resources. Then we mandate it in law.

Morality.

It's not individual opinion - it's collective opinion.

[Veritas Aequitas]

A fact is specific to a Framework and System of Reality [FSR] [or FSK], thus it is objective because any judgement from a Framework and System of Reality in independent of individuals' opinion and beliefs.

No moral judgment could get into any FSR/K in the first place aside from individuals' opinions, because that's all that any moral judgment is.

Beyond that, there's no requirement that anyone conform to any FSR/K. It's not at all as if conformity to anything is right and nonconformity is wrong.

All FSR/Ks are constructed by humans in consensus.

Note the common vulgar-morality-FSK, e.g. consequentialism, deontology, theistic morality, tribal, social, etc.

I had stated, what is a morality-proper FSR/FSK is similar [not exactly] in rating of credibility to the scientific FSK and gets most of its inputs from the scientific FSK, mostly from the neurosciences, neuro-psychology, evolutionary psychology and the likes.

The critical principle is;
whatever is claimed as real must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSR/FSK.

[Peter Holmes]

What 'objective' means with respect to morality is what 'objective' means with respect to anything else - barring equivocation or an explanation of a non-standard use of the word 'objective' in relation to morality.

So since what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts, moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts.

Moral realists and objectivists just have to show that there are moral facts. And they can't, because the expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. It's a grammatical misattribution. There are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions.

[bahman]

Opinion independent.

[Terrapin Station]

A fact is specific to a Framework and System of Reality [FSR] [or FSK], thus it is objective because any judgement from a Framework and System of Reality in independent of individuals' opinion and beliefs.

No moral judgment could get into any FSR/K in the first place aside from individuals' opinions, because that's all that any moral judgment is.

Beyond that, there's no requirement that anyone conform to any FSR/K. It's not at all as if conformity to anything is right and nonconformity is wrong.

All FSR/Ks are constructed by humans in consensus.

So then what part is independent of individuals' opinions and beliefs?

[Veritas Aequitas]

No moral judgment could get into any FSR/K in the first place aside from individuals' opinions, because that's all that any moral judgment is.

Beyond that, there's no requirement that anyone conform to any FSR/K. It's not at all as if conformity to anything is right and nonconformity is wrong.

All FSR/Ks are constructed by humans in consensus.

So then what part is independent of individuals' opinions and beliefs?

Take scientific facts/truths/knowledge from the scientific FSK for example.

I have posted this example before;

• 1. When Einstein had a hunch from his prior knowledge or imagination related to relativity - that was his personal and individual opinion. This is abduction.
  
  2. When Einstein then prove the theory of special gravity to himself with 99% conviction, that was his personal belief.
  
  3. When Einstein's peers has tested his theory and confirmed with evidence it is true, and his peers within the Physics-Scientific FSK accepted the theory, it is independent of Einstein's or any individual-Physicist's opinion and belief.
  The theory is not a scientific truth/fact/knowledge conditioned upon the Physics-Scientific FSK. This is induction.
  
  4. The accepted theory whilst is independent of the individual's opinions and beliefs is nevertheless conditioned and dependent on the Physics-Scientific FSK which is constructed by human minds.

The above principles and processes are similar and applicable to the moral FSR/FSK.

[Immanuel Can]

Just some random thoughts concerning morality and objectivity:

Suppose that everything in the world is as it currently is and that it is also the case that God exists. And suppose that God has ordained that X is morally right and that Y is morally wrong. Would that alone necessarily mean that X is "objectively" right and Y is "objectively" wrong?

I think this is the wrong way to think about it, Gary. It's a kind of "Divine Command" view...namely, the idea that morality is defined on what God "commands," and the "commands" being something other than a reflection of His character...something merely arbitrary, perhaps, like the wearing of the wearing of green or orange. But whether a man wears green or orange has, so far as we can see, nothing to reveal to us about God's intrinsic nature.

The Biblical view is that God's commandments are mere aspects of the larger issue of God's character. So God commands against adultery, not merely because adultery in itself is somehow "wrong," but because God is a faithful lover of his people, and faith-breaking is the opposite of His character. Or God forbids the bearing of false witness because God is a God of truth.

So the upshot is that God's commandments are not arbitrary or random. Nor do they refer to some Platonic ideal that exists apart from God. Rather, they are revelations of aspects of the nature of God Himself -- not the only such revelatory things that exist, to be sure, (Creation and propositional revelation, or miracles or prophecies could be other such things) but revelatory nonetheless.

[Peter Holmes]

Just some random thoughts concerning morality and objectivity:

Suppose that everything in the world is as it currently is and that it is also the case that God exists. And suppose that God has ordained that X is morally right and that Y is morally wrong. Would that alone necessarily mean that X is "objectively" right and Y is "objectively" wrong?

I think this is the wrong way to think about it, Gary. It's a kind of "Divine Command" view...namely, the idea that morality is defined on what God "commands," and the "commands" being something other than a reflection of His character...something merely arbitrary, perhaps, like the wearing of the wearing of green or orange. But whether a man wears green or orange has, so far as we can see, nothing to reveal to us about God's intrinsic nature.

The Biblical view is that God's commandments are mere aspects of the larger issue of God's character. So God commands against adultery, not merely because adultery in itself is somehow "wrong," but because God is a faithful lover of his people, and faith-breaking is the opposite of His character. Or God forbids the bearing of false witness because God is a God of truth.

So the upshot is that God's commandments are not arbitrary or random. Nor do they refer to some Platonic ideal that exists apart from God. Rather, they are revelations of aspects of the nature of God Himself -- not the only such revelatory things that exist, to be sure, (Creation and propositional revelation, or miracles or prophecies could be other such things) but revelatory nonetheless.

Divine emanation theory has the same problem as divine command theory: an 'is' can't entail an 'ought' - even if a god with a certain nature does exist. There are no moral facts, because there can't be. So morality can't be objective.

[Immanuel Can]

Divine emanation theory has the same problem as divine command theory: an 'is' can't entail an 'ought'.

Actually, it doesn't. And it doesn't, because of another concept: that of telos or "end-purpose."

If the world has an end-purpose, because it was created with a Divine purpose in mind, then to be "good" is for that world to achieve the telos for which the Creator designed it, and for it to be "bad" is for it to depart from that track in any way. So if the Earth is a deliberate creation of a purposive Creator, then the terms defining the moral polarities of good and bad are intrinsic to that creation.

Consequently, Atheism, Hume's supposition, has to be taken for granted, or else the is-ought problem doesn't even actually appear. It's not even a real problem anymore.