Historical Background of the Moral-Facts-Deniers

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is a write-up on the historical background of how the moral-fact-deniers like Peter Homes, Sculptor, PantFlasher, et.al were infected with the Moral-Covid-Virus - once was a pandemic but now quite well contained but still pesky.

As I had mentioned the moral-facts-deniers are lost in the natural thickets and mazes of Morality and Ethics.

Moral-Facts-Deniers make the following claims;

• Moral Judgments and moral statements are;
  1. not moral facts
  2. not state-of-affairs
  3. not propositions
  4. not truth-apt, neither be true or false
  5. express desires, attitudes, opinions and beliefs
  6. Prescriptive [ought] not descriptive [is]
  7. Not mind independent

From their postings [facts, state-of-affair, the case] I had condemned theirs views as those inherited from the bastardized philosophy of some the logical positivists and the extremism of analytic philosophy.

Caveat: This write-up has nothing to do with morality related to a God nor Platonic universals.

Here are some clues to what I had claimed, i.e. their moral views are fundamentally Emotivism NonCognitivism.
Majority of points are from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism

• Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes.[1][2][3] Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo theory.[4]
  Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic,[5] but its development owes more to C. L. Stevenson.[6]

• Emotivism reached prominence in the early 20th century, but it was born centuries earlier.
  
  In 1710, George Berkeley wrote that language in general often serves to inspire feelings as well as communicate ideas.[11]
  
  Decades later, David Hume espoused ideas similar to Stevenson's later ones.[12]
  In his 1751 book An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume considered morality not to be related to fact but "determined by sentiment":
  
  • In moral deliberations we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects, and all their relations to each other; and from a comparison of the whole, fix our choice or approbation. … While we are ignorant whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we determine whether the person who killed him be criminal or innocent? But after every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself.
    The approbation or blame which then ensues, cannot be the work of the judgement, but of the heart; and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment.[13]

The above of where the "No Is from Ought" of Hume came to be, i.e. there are no moral facts but only beliefs, opinions, expressions of emotions and attitudes.

The "No Is from Ought" was adopted by the Logical Positivists to condemn moral judgments as fact_less and meaningless because they are incapable of empirical verifications.

• The emergence of logical positivism and its verifiability criterion of meaning early in the 20th century led some philosophers to conclude that ethical statements, being incapable of empirical verification, were cognitively meaningless.
  This criterion was fundamental to A.J. Ayer's defense of positivism in Language, Truth and Logic, which contains his statement of emotivism.

Ayer's view in more details;

• Ayer argues that moral judgments cannot be translated into non-ethical, empirical terms and thus cannot be verified; in this he agrees with ethical intuitionists.
  But he differs from intuitionists by discarding appeals to intuition as "worthless" for determining moral truths,[17] since the intuition of one person often contradicts that of another.
  Instead, Ayer concludes that ethical concepts are "mere pseudo-concepts":
  
  • The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content.
    Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money."
    In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it.
    I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.
    It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. …
    If now I generalise my previous statement and say, "Stealing money is wrong," I produce a sentence that has no factual meaning—that is, expresses no proposition that can be either true or false.… I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments.[18]

Ayer agree with Subjectivism but he is not a Moral Subjectivist because he rejected moral statements as proposition, thus Ayer is a NonCognitivist.

• Ayer agrees with subjectivists in saying that ethical statements are necessarily related to individual attitudes, but he says they lack truth value because they cannot be properly understood as propositions about those attitudes; Ayer thinks ethical sentences are expressions, not assertions, of approval.

Thus in the lingo of Morality & Ethics, the moral-facts-deniers are Moral Emotivists under the umbrella of Moral NonCognitivism. Onus is on them to justify if otherwise.

The above is the historical background on how the moral-facts-deniers were infected with the Moral-Covid-Virus to claim Morality cannot be objective.
What could make morality objective? by Peter Holmes
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=24601

[Veritas Aequitas]

A relevant post to the above OP,

To repeat: the logical positivists were wrong to claim 'that ethical statements, being incapable of empirical verification, were cognitively meaningless'.
But that non-factual assertions - moral or aesthetic - are indeed empirically unverifiable and unfalsifiable is a fact.

The logical positivists comprised of philosophers with different views on morality but they all have these common views of morality, i.e.

• Moral statement, judgments are;
  1. not moral facts
  2. not state-of-affairs
  3. not propositions
  4. not truth-apt, neither be true or false
  5. expressing desires, opinions and beliefs
  6. Prescriptive [is] not descriptive [oughts]
  7. Not mind independent

Note I omitted the "meaningless" element which were claimed by SOME of the LPs, e.g. Ayer and others.

Yours views on morality are of the above [1-7] which were agreed by all the logical positivists, thus were inherited from the LPs with their notable "fact = state-of-affairs".

Rather than endlessly rehearse and regurgitate your research, why not concentrate on the actual question, and produce an example of a moral fact, showing why it's a state-of-affairs, rather than merely the expression of a moral opinion?

I have done that a '1000' times as gleaned from my extensive research into the subject of Morality and Ethics.
I am still researching into the deeper depths of Morality and Ethics. Previously I'd spent a lot of time focusing mainly on Kantian Ethics but now I have acquired a wider and deeper perspective on the subject.

As with the above, you have inherited the bastardized version of 'what is fact' 'state-of-affairs' from the LPs and is being very dogmatic about it. Thus my '1000' times demonstration that moral facts exist is not likely to get into your thick dogmatic skull due to very aggressive confirmation bias.

Note my argument on
'What is Fact?"
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486

The above is the general definition of 'what is fact' and there is no way it can be disputed.
So with a moral FSK,

There are Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Btw, your path to what is morality - the nonCognitivists' view is severely hindered and is not tenable because of;

Frege-Geach Problem Destroyed NonCognitivism
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30150

Thus,

What is most plausible is the default;
Moral Realism is the Default Within Morality
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30483

[Veritas Aequitas]

Yeah, as I've pointed out to him repeatedly, it's just the same old "this is how things (normally) are, therefore this is how they should be" crap, without realizing that nothing justifies the "therefore this is how they should be" part. There's an unanalyzed assumption that things should be as they normally are or as they have been.

The reason why you cannot understand my views is because you are ignorant and is dogmatically stuck with the bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists and classical analytical philosophers.

Note:

• The members of the Vienna Circle—which included Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Gödel—did not all agree in detail but they shared a conviction that all philosophical metaphysics and most ethics to date was not so much wrong as meaningless nonsense.
  https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/phil ... of-aj-ayer

Note the above views had been crushed long time ago and yet you are still a stooge of the LPs in the above stance.

Point is you, Peter, Sculptor, Pantflasher had been brainwashed into the LPs paradigm and will spontaneously deem moral realists claims as meaningless nonsense. You will suffer a cold turkey if you were to think otherwise.

As stated I am not expected you & et.al. to change your dogmatic views but I am merely using you & et. al. as sparring partners in a philosophical ring/arena purely for my own personal selfish interests.

[Terrapin Station]

You're like the "philosophical" equivalent of a conservative talk radio host.

At any rate, sure, I'd be an example of a moral noncognitivist or emotivist (as well as a relativist, subjectivist, etc.). I'm not a positivist, though (not that I'd have any problems with that, but I just don't agree with views required to be a positivist in the conventional sense), and I disagree with the idea that moral utterances are meaningless.

[Peter Holmes]

Straw man. I don't think moral assertions are meaningless nonsense. Like aesthetic assertions, they express judgements, beliefs or opinions. That an assertion is non-factual - and therefore has no truth-value, because nothing in reality can verify or falsify it independently from opinion - doesn't make it meaningless. Where could such a strange idea come from? Ah - it's the flip-side of logical positivism.

[Skepdick]

You're like the "philosophical" equivalent of a conservative talk radio host.

At any rate, sure, I'd be an example of a moral noncognitivist or emotivist (as well as a relativist, subjectivist, etc.). I'm not a positivist, though (not that I'd have any problems with that, but I just don't agree with views required to be a positivist in the conventional sense), and I disagree with the idea that moral utterances are meaningless.

Well, then you are in a perfect philosophical position to resolve the Frege–Geach problem.

Show us.

[Terrapin Station]

This would probably be better in a different thread, but if we go by the Wikipedia description of "positivism," for example , we get:

Positivism is a philosophical theory that states that "genuine" knowledge (knowledge of anything that is not true by definition) is exclusively derived from experience of natural phenomena and their properties and relations. Thus, information derived from sensory experience, as interpreted through reason and logic, forms the exclusive source of all certain knowledge.[1] Positivism therefore holds that all genuine knowledge is a posteriori knowledge.

Verified data (positive facts) received from the senses are known as empirical evidence; thus positivism is based on empiricism.[1]

Positivism also holds that society, like the physical world, operates according to general laws. Introspective and intuitive knowledge is rejected, as are metaphysics and theology because metaphysical and theological claims cannot be verified by sense experience. Although the positivist approach has been a recurrent theme in the history of western thought,[2] the modern approach was formulated by the philosopher Auguste Comte in the early 19th century.[3] Comte argued that, much as the physical world operates according to gravity and other absolute laws, so does society.[4]

So:
(1) I would never agree with any "genuine knowledge" versus "not genuine knowledge" distinction.
(2) I'd never say that all knowledge is empirical or a posteriori.
(3) I'd never say there is any certain knowledge or that that's even something to worry about.
(4) I not only do not buy that there are "social laws," I don't buy that there are physical laws, either. I'm an antirealist on the notion of natural laws period. I rather believe that there are statistical commonalities or tendencies, that are as they are via brute facts of particular properties, that serve as the basis of us "thinking in terms of natural laws." But there aren't literally laws somehow "behind" or embedded in natural phenomena.
(5) I've always thought that the positivist rejection of metaphysics didn't make the slightest lick of sense, and rather it suggests that they're imbeciles who somehow aren't even aware that the bulk of metaphysics is ontology, which is simply philosophy about (the nature of) what exists.

And although it's not mentioned above:

(6) I've always thought that the positivist account of meaning was rather stupid. It doesn't at all capture what meaning conventionally is, in functional terms, or how it works.

[Skepdick]

(1) I would never agree with any "genuine knowledge" versus "not genuine knowledge" distinction.
(2) I'd never say that all knowledge is empirical or a posteriori.

That's sufficient to reject your entire philosophy and not listen to another word you have to say.

Wouldn't you say that self-knowledge is empirical? How could you possibly know that you are thirsty before you experience thirst?

And if you are happy to accept that self-knowledge is empirical/a posteriori knowledge then what sort of knowledge are you talking about that isn't?

[Peter Holmes]

Someone who thinks it impossible to explain why we call something a red circle can have nothing interesting or even coherent to say. What would the words mean?

[Skepdick]

Someone who thinks it impossible to explain why we call something a red circle can have nothing interesting or even coherent to say.

Ahhhh, look at this continued strawman. I guess Peter thinks that if he repeats that lie enough number of times it becomes truth.

The possibility or impossibility of explaining WHY THIS COLOR IS RED is presently unknown (and Peter is working overtime to avoid furnishing an explanation)

Maybe it's possible. Maybe it's not possible. This has no bearing on the fact that THIS COLOR IS OBJECTIVELY RED.

What would the words mean?

I have no idea what you are asking.

How are you using the word "mean"? What is it intended to convey, refer to or signify?

[Veritas Aequitas]

You're like the "philosophical" equivalent of a conservative talk radio host.

At any rate, sure, I'd be an example of a moral noncognitivist or emotivist (as well as a relativist, subjectivist, etc.). I'm not a positivist, though (not that I'd have any problems with that, but I just don't agree with views required to be a positivist in the conventional sense), and I disagree with the idea that moral utterances are meaningless.

I did not assert YOU ARE a logical positivists [L. Positivism now defunct] but I stated you are influenced by its ideology of anti-moral-realism, arrogance and superiority over those who are non-believers, thus creating a very thick wall in your mind to the detriment and progress of your philosophical thoughts.

If you researched into the origins and traditions [since Hume Is-Ought] of how you arrived at your present stance on morality [noted the authors you have read], you will definitely see the LPs' influence [the psychology] is very critical.

[Peter Holmes]

Where claims and arguments come from - and why people make them - can be interesting. But what matters is whether those claims are true and those arguments are valid and sound.

So who cares where moral non-cognitivism, anti-realism, subjectivism or relativism come from historically? It's as irrelevant as stats about how many philosophers support which meta-ethical positions. It just doesn't matter - unless you have to deflect attention from the failure of your own claims and arguments.

[Terrapin Station]

You're like the "philosophical" equivalent of a conservative talk radio host.

At any rate, sure, I'd be an example of a moral noncognitivist or emotivist (as well as a relativist, subjectivist, etc.). I'm not a positivist, though (not that I'd have any problems with that, but I just don't agree with views required to be a positivist in the conventional sense), and I disagree with the idea that moral utterances are meaningless.

I did not assert YOU ARE a logical positivists [L. Positivism now defunct] but I stated you are influenced by its ideology of anti-moral-realism, arrogance and superiority over those who are non-believers, thus creating a very thick wall in your mind to the detriment and progress of your philosophical thoughts.

If you researched into the origins and traditions [since Hume Is-Ought] of how you arrived at your present stance on morality [noted the authors you have read], you will definitely see the LPs' influence [the psychology] is very critical.

Moral antirealism isn't limited to logical positivism. So, in other words, one being a moral antirealist doesn't imply one is influenced by logical positivism.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You're like the "philosophical" equivalent of a conservative talk radio host.

At any rate, sure, I'd be an example of a moral noncognitivist or emotivist (as well as a relativist, subjectivist, etc.). I'm not a positivist, though (not that I'd have any problems with that, but I just don't agree with views required to be a positivist in the conventional sense), and I disagree with the idea that moral utterances are meaningless.

I did not assert YOU ARE a logical positivists [L. Positivism now defunct] but I stated you are influenced by its ideology of anti-moral-realism, arrogance and superiority over those who are non-believers, thus creating a very thick wall in your mind to the detriment and progress of your philosophical thoughts.

If you researched into the origins and traditions [since Hume Is-Ought] of how you arrived at your present stance on morality [noted the authors you have read], you will definitely see the LPs' influence [the psychology] is very critical.

Moral antirealism isn't limited to logical positivism. So, in other words, one being a moral antirealist doesn't imply one is influenced by logical positivism.

Agree, Moral antirealism isn't limited to logical positivism.

• Logical positivism, later called logical empiricism, and both of which together are also known as neopositivism, was a movement in Western philosophy whose central thesis was the verification principle (also known as the verifiability criterion of meaning).

Note logical positivism is not related to any specific philosophical theory rather it is more towards an ideology of psychological stance on language, logicism, empiricism.
Empirical Verification is common everywhere, but the LPs take it as an ultimate standard to what is knowledge towards scientism, i.e. my way or the highway.
The LPs has the same attitude with language, logicism, morality i.e. my way or the highway.

In your case, your LPs influence is that of 'what is fact' from the linguistic perspective of the LPs which had been crushed by Sellars, Quine and others, but yet you [Peter, Sculptor, et. al.] are still clinging to it like there is no tomorrow without countering [or pulling out] Sellars & Quine's last nail on the coffin of analyticity.

It is likely you are ignorant of the above counters by Sellars, Quine and other post analytic philosophers?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Where claims and arguments come from - and why people make them - can be interesting. But what matters is whether those claims are true and those arguments are valid and sound.

So who cares where moral non-cognitivism, anti-realism, subjectivism or relativism come from historically? It's as irrelevant as stats about how many philosophers support which meta-ethical positions. It just doesn't matter - unless you have to deflect attention from the failure of your own claims and arguments.

I agree and I have always insisted,
whatever is fact/knowledge/truth must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK.

Thus the onus is on those who make factual claims to provide their justifications for critiques.

I have provided sufficient and reasonable [not yet of the highest quality] justifications empirically and philosophically within a credible moral FSK.

But one must be aware there are a continuum range of philosophical critiques from the very philosophical stupid [1/100] to the highly competent [99/100].

What is of concern here and my complain is you and others of your like have merely <20/100 philosophical competence but yet talk as if you are of 75/100 competence.
The word for such people like you is Ultracrepidarian. (Definition: one who is presumptuous and offers advice or opinions beyond one's sphere of knowledge.).
This is why understanding the history and background of the critiques are very important.

As I had suggested many times, you need to raise your real philosophical competence to say >50/100 before your views are credible.