- Speech Acts: An Essay in Philosophy of Language,
Cambridge University Press in 1969
"to call an argument valid is already to evaluate it", see details below;
It is on this basis that "All Valid Arguments Entailed Evaluation" Searle was able to use the conclusions of his illocutionary acts in chapter 3 to transpose factual premises with evaluative groundings via a series of premises to an evaluative conclusion.One of the oldest of metaphysical distinctions is that between fact and value.
Underlying the belief in this distinction is the perception that values somehow derive from persons and cannot lie in the world, at least not in the world of stones, rivers, trees, and brute facts.
For if they did, they would cease to be values and would become simply another part of that world.
One trouble with the distinction in the history of philosophy is that there have been many different ways of characterizing it, and they are not all equivalent.
Hume is commonly supposed to have been alluding to it in a famous passage in the Treatise where he speaks of the vicissitudes of moving from "is" to "ought".1
Moore saw the distinction in terms of the difference between "natural " properties like yellow, and what he called "non-natural" properties, like goodness.'
Ironically, Moore's successors, reversing the usual order of meta-physical progression, have read this metaphysical distinction back into language as a thesis about entailment relations in language.
So construed it is a thesis
that no set of descriptive statements an entail an evaluative statement.
I say "ironically" because language, of all plates, is riddled with counter-instances to the view that no evaluations can follow from descriptions.
As we saw in chapter 6, to call an argument valid is already to evaluate it and yet the statement that it is valid follows from certain 'descriptive' statements about it.
The very notions of what it is to be
-a valid argument,
-a cogent argument,
-a good piece of reasoning
are evaluative in the relevant sense
because, e.g., they involve the notions of what one is justified or risk in concluding, given certain premisses.
The irony, in short, lies in the fact that the very terminology in which the thesis is expressed—the terminology of entailment, meaning, and validity—presupposes the falsity of the thesis.
For example,
the statement that p entails q entails, among other things,
that anyone who asserts p is committed to the truth of q,
and that if p is known to be true then one is justified in concluding that q.
And the notions of commitment and justification in such cases are no more and no less 'evaluative' than they are when we speak of being committed to doing something or being justified in declaring war.
In this chapter I want to probe deeper into the alleged impossibility of deriving an evaluative statement from a set of descriptive statements.
Using the conclusions of the analysis of illocutionary acts in chapter 3, I shall attempt to demonstrate another counter-example to this thesis.'
Note evaluative groundings [as mentioned above] do not mean evaluative elements were included in the premises used in his argument.
Searles' Is-Ought Argument
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