Moral Realism

[Veritas Aequitas]

Since are are discussing Morality, it is imperative to understand the various thoughts with Morality.
Here is what is Moral Realism, the whole article is from Wiki;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Note this point:

• A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).[7]

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Quote
Moral realism (also ethical realism)[1] is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.
This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of ethical cognitivism (which accepts that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be evaluated as true or false) with an ontological orientation, standing in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism[2] and moral skepticism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true); and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all).
Within moral realism, the two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism.[3]

Many philosophers claim that moral realism may be dated back at least to Plato as a philosophical doctrine,[4] and that it is a fully defensible form of moral doctrine.[5]

A delineation of moral realism into

• 1. a minimal form,
  2. a moderate form, and
  3. a robust form

1. The Minimal Model
The minimal model, i.e. moral universalism, leaves off the metaphysical thesis [of Robust Model], treating it as matter of contention among moral realists (as opposed to between moral realists and moral anti-realists).
This dispute is not insignificant, as acceptance or rejection of the metaphysical thesis is taken by those employing the robust model as the key difference between moral realism and moral anti-realism.
Indeed, the question of how to classify certain logically possible (if eccentric) views—such as the rejection of the semantic and alethic theses in conjunction with the acceptance of the metaphysical thesis—turns on which model we accept.[18]
Someone employing the robust model might call such a view "realist non-cognitivism," while someone employing the minimal model might simply place such a view alongside other, more traditional, forms of non-cognitivism.
In the minimal sense of realism, R. M. Hare could be considered a realist in his later works, as he is committed to the objectivity of value judgments, even though he denies that moral statements express propositions with truth-values per se.

2. Moderate Position
Some readings of evolutionary science such as those of Charles Darwin and James Mark Baldwin have suggested that in so far as an ethics may be associated with survival strategies and natural selection then such behavior may be associated with a moderate position of moral realism equivalent to an ethics of survival.


contd..next post...

[Veritas Aequitas]

Moral Realism . cont...

3. The Robust Model
The robust model of moral realism commits moral realists to three theses:[17]

• The semantic thesis: The primary semantic role of moral predicates (such as "right" and "wrong") is to refer to moral properties (such as rightness and wrongness), so that moral statements (such as "honesty is good" and "slavery is unjust") purport to represent moral facts, and express propositions that are true or false (or approximately true, largely false, and so on).
  
  The alethic thesis: Some moral propositions are in fact true.
  
  The metaphysical thesis: Moral propositions are true when actions and other objects of moral assessment have the relevant moral properties (so that the relevant moral facts obtain), where these facts and properties are robust: their metaphysical status, whatever it is, is not relevantly different from that of (certain types of) ordinary non-moral facts and properties.

The robust model and the minimal model also disagree over how to classify moral subjectivism (roughly, the view that moral facts are not mind-independent in the relevant sense, but that moral statements may still be true).
The historical association of subjectivism with moral anti-realism in large part explains why the robust model of moral realism has been dominant—even if only implicitly—both in the traditional and contemporary philosophical literature on metaethics.[18]


Advantages of Moral Realism

Moral realism allows the ordinary rules of logic (modus ponens, etc.) to be applied straightforwardly to moral statements.
We can say that a moral belief is false or unjustified or contradictory in the same way we would about a factual belief.
This is a problem for expressivism, as shown by the Frege–Geach problem.

Another advantage of moral realism is its capacity to resolve moral disagreements: if two moral beliefs contradict one another, realism says that they cannot both be right, and therefore everyone involved ought to be seeking out the right answer to resolve the disagreement.
Contrary theories of meta-ethics have trouble even formulating the statement "this moral belief is wrong," and so they cannot resolve disagreements in this way.

End- Quote

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is a note the the above topic re the essential feature of Moral Objectivism which is similar to Moral Realism:

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By [Moral] 'objectivism' Mackie refers to a position defined by several theses:

• First, the semantic thesis that moral judgments are either true or false.
  Their logic is thus distinguishable from the logic of the expression of merely subjective feelings.
  
  Second, the ontological thesis that moral value exists as an object or property of objects among the entities of the actual world.
  Given a correspondence theory of truth, moral judgments have truth-value in virtue of moral reality.
  
  Third, the epistemological thesis that objective values are the object of moral knowledge.
  Moral ignorance and false belief can be explained by reference to objective value.
  
  Fourth, the motivational thesis that moral judgments seem to be categorical imperatives or prescriptions whose claim on a person's will is not based on any appeal to the desires of that person.

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[Veritas Aequitas]

Many philosophers* consider moral realism the default position because it appears best to capture many central features of ordinary moral thought:

• • the assertoric surface character of ordinary moral discourse,
  • the phenomenology of moral experience,
  • our claim to have moral knowledge, and
  • the possibility (and nature) of genuine moral error, progress, and
  • disagreement even among sincere, open-minded, and well-informed people (Dancy 1986; Brink 1989; Shafer-Landau 2003).

Pekka Väyrynen University of California, Davis

Supported by [see OP]:

• • A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).[7]

[Skepdick]

The "ism" doesn't matter!

Eventually, philosophers will converge on one of those "isms" (the one that they like most). This will permeate in academia and society will follow within a generation. There will come a time when majority of people will end up call themselves "moral realists" and the old "ism" will become unfashionable.

And it won't matter because we won't be living in utopia, society will have new problems in need of new solutions.
And the narrative will be "Moral realism failed to deliver on its promise".

And we'll invent a new moral "ism" to supersede "moral realism" so progress can continue. And this new "ism" will be like some old "ism", but with a new name. And you won't be allowed to use the old name (even though you used all of its ideas) because going back to old 'isms' seems like regress, not progress.

Changing moral narratives is like changing nappies. It's part and parcel of moral progress.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The "ism" doesn't matter!

Eventually, philosophers will converge on one of those "isms" (the one that they like most). This will permeate in academia and society will follow within a generation. There will come a time when majority of people will end up call themselves "moral realists" and the old "ism" will become unfashionable.

And it won't matter because we won't be living in utopia, society will have new problems in need of new solutions.
And the narrative will be "Moral realism failed to deliver on its promise".

And we'll invent a new moral "ism" to supersede "moral realism" so progress can continue. And this new "ism" will be like some old "ism", but with a new name. And you won't be allowed to use the old name (even though you used all of its ideas) because going back to old 'isms' seems like regress, not progress.

Changing moral narratives is like changing nappies. It's part and parcel of moral progress.

Ideally and Preferably there is no "ism."

But in the current situations [. I believe for many more generations] the 'pigeon holes' method of 'ism_s' is the most effective to sort them out for philosophical and other discussion.

[Peter Holmes]

So, there's the rub.

'Moral realism (also ethical realism)[1] is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.'

There's no evidence for the existence of moral features of the world - things whose existence is independent of subjective opinion. Every attempt to identify such a feature of reality involves projecting a moral judgement into or on to it - and then 'discovering' its moral rightness or wrongness.

Moral realism is as deluded as any supernaturalism - such as theism - with which it shares many irrational elements.

[Veritas Aequitas]

So, there's the rub.

'Moral realism (also ethical realism)[1] is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.'

There's no evidence for the existence of moral features of the world - things whose existence is independent of subjective opinion. Every attempt to identify such a feature of reality involves projecting a moral judgement into or on to it - and then 'discovering' its moral rightness or wrongness.

Moral realism is as deluded as any supernaturalism - such as theism - with which it shares many irrational elements.

As I had claimed your philosophical knowledge is shallow, narrow, dogmatic, ignorant and lack intellectual integrity as demonstrated by how quickly you just brush off the above article.

If you read more to the link you will note;

A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).[7]

Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink,[8] John McDowell, Peter Railton,[9] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,[10] Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,[11] Russ Shafer-Landau,[12] G. E. Moore,[13] John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,[14] Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.[15] Moral realism has been studied in the various philosophical and practical applications.[16]

The above notable philosophers' Moral Realism are not theistic based.

If you have any intellectual integrity you should read the works of those philosophers and note what they are talking about before you simply brush off what you don't know or what you are mistaken for Moral Realism.

[Peter Holmes]

So, there's the rub.

'Moral realism (also ethical realism)[1] is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.'

There's no evidence for the existence of moral features of the world - things whose existence is independent of subjective opinion. Every attempt to identify such a feature of reality involves projecting a moral judgement into or on to it - and then 'discovering' its moral rightness or wrongness.

Moral realism is as deluded as any supernaturalism - such as theism - with which it shares many irrational elements.

As I had claimed your philosophical knowledge is shallow, narrow, dogmatic, ignorant and lack intellectual integrity as demonstrated by how quickly you just brush off the above article.

If you read more to the link you will note;

A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).[7]

Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink,[8] John McDowell, Peter Railton,[9] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,[10] Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,[11] Russ Shafer-Landau,[12] G. E. Moore,[13] John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,[14] Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.[15] Moral realism has been studied in the various philosophical and practical applications.[16]

The above notable philosophers' Moral Realism are not theistic based.

If you have any intellectual integrity you should read the works of those philosophers and note what they are talking about before you simply brush off what you don't know or what you are mistaken for Moral Realism.

Read my words: moral realism is as deluded as any supernaturalism - such as theism. I didn't say all moral realists are theists. Try to engage your basic reading comprehension skills.

As you agree, which philosophers have said what has no bearing on the actual claims and arguments. They stand on their own merits. And I ask you to produce the goods.

Please produce a moral assertion that you think is a fact. And I'll show you why it isn't. Or produce an argument with a factual premise that entails a moral conclusion. And I'll show you why it doesn't.