There are Moral Facts

[Belinda]

Every concept and belief of every person exists in nature. Every feeling about rightness or wrongness of slavery exists in nature. Dreams and halllucinations exist in nature. All feelings exist in nature. All judgments exist in nature. There is nothing that exists that does not exist in nature.

Some judgments are better than other judgements because the better judgements are more reasoned and more knowledgeable. Claims that slavery is wrong are better than claims that slavery is right, and this is because there is well reasoned and experienced judgement, and more and wider accurate knowledge that support claims that slavery is wrong.

Our judgements matter because we humans have conscious intentions and are able to make things happen. Because humans can exercise judgement and reason it's our duty to nature and to ourselves to improve our knowledge, experience, and judgement.

There is no judgement, or knowledge outside of nature , and since our remit is limited to humans there is no judgement or knowledge that is not human judgement and knowledge.Therefore the moral wrongness of slavery of slavery and the moral rightness of slavery each exist in nature however the moral wrongness of slavery is a better judgement than the moral rightness of slavery.

Wow.. that is a great answer.

One point is the moral facts [within a moral FSK] of ought and ought-not are inbuilt within nature, i.e. human nature.

• For example, DNA/DNA wise all humans are "programmed" with the ought-not to touch things within certain degrees of hotness or be exposed to heat in excess of what is bearable by any normal human being.
  This 'ought-not' in relation to heat is programmed via a complex neural algorithm [pain, emotions, motion, reflex actions, etc.] that is connected with the sense of touch, sight, and perhaps smell [burnt] or even hearing [thunder and the raging of fires].
  
  Whilst the ought-not of heat is inherent in all humans, if this is not activated instinctively, the person will soon learn from experience of what degree of heat must be avoided to avoid endangering their life.
  So avoiding hot objects is not purely learning from experience [nurturing], but the underlying factor is the inherent [nature] ought-not regarding heat.
  
  Obviously the above is a fact of nature, i.e. human nature

The above example is similar to the moral ought and ought-not.
I have justified the moral fact,
"all humans ought-not to kill another"
is programmed as a neural algorithm within all human beings.
Since this is a very critical moral ought-not, this instinct is very strong in the majority of people, thus easily triggering their intuition on this issue.

For a percentile of humans, the above ought-not "program" is not very active or had been damaged [e.g. psychopaths] thus they are prone to kill, but that do not mean the moral ought-not to kill 'program' is not existing within them.

What I am doing is using reason to abstract the above moral fact from empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning and to justify the existence of the above moral ought-not or ought [depending on how we phrase it] within nature, i.e. human nature.

So I agree with your point "every concept and belief of every person exists in nature", there are moral facts with nature, i.e. human nature [as justified to be true].

What? Of course all judgements exist in nature. Who ever rationally thought otherwise? (Supernaturalists therefore excluded.)

So of course moral judgements exist in nature. Humans make moral judgements, and express them using moral assertions, such as 'slavery is morally wrong' - or, in the past, 'slavery is not morally wrong'.

Why humans make those moral judgements, and why they have changed and are changing, have no bearing on the actual nature of a moral judgement - which is that it is and can only be a judgement, and therefore subjective. A moral assertion can't be a fact.

But that a dropped apple falls is a fact - not a matter of judgement or opinion. And that's the difference. In nature.

There are only empirical 'facts'. Empirical 'facts' are assertions of working hypotheses. Working hypotheses are the best indicators we have of how best to act. And every moral tenet is a working hypothesis.
I keep asserting that as a determinist I believe every event is a necessary event. These assertions of mine are quasi religious , a matter of faith, and have to do with my rationalising the ethics and hence the political stance I prefer.

[Peter Holmes]

There are only empirical 'facts'. Empirical 'facts' are assertions of working hypotheses. Working hypotheses are the best indicators we have of how best to act. And every moral tenet is a working hypothesis.
I keep asserting that as a determinist I believe every event is a necessary event. These assertions of mine are quasi religious , a matter of faith, and have to do with my rationalising the ethics and hence the political stance I prefer.

I disagree that empirical facts are assertions of working hypotheses. 'Atm I'm sitting on a chair' is not a working hypothesis. To say it is is to say that what we call truth and knowledge are not what we say they are.

But even if you're right - that an empirical fact asserts a working hypothesis - and that a moral assertion is a working hypothesis - that doesn't mean that a moral assertion is therefore a fact.

[Belinda]

There are only empirical 'facts'. Empirical 'facts' are assertions of working hypotheses. Working hypotheses are the best indicators we have of how best to act. And every moral tenet is a working hypothesis.
I keep asserting that as a determinist I believe every event is a necessary event. These assertions of mine are quasi religious , a matter of faith, and have to do with my rationalising the ethics and hence the political stance I prefer.

I disagree that empirical facts are assertions of working hypotheses. 'Atm I'm sitting on a chair' is not a working hypothesis. To say it is is to say that what we call truth and knowledge are not what we say they are.

But even if you're right - that an empirical fact asserts a working hypothesis - and that a moral assertion is a working hypothesis - that doesn't mean that a moral assertion is therefore a fact.

But the definition of chair is a social construct. Actually chairs at one time did not exist. I know someone who calls a heap of breeze blocks her chair.

[Peter Holmes]

There are only empirical 'facts'. Empirical 'facts' are assertions of working hypotheses. Working hypotheses are the best indicators we have of how best to act. And every moral tenet is a working hypothesis.
I keep asserting that as a determinist I believe every event is a necessary event. These assertions of mine are quasi religious , a matter of faith, and have to do with my rationalising the ethics and hence the political stance I prefer.

I disagree that empirical facts are assertions of working hypotheses. 'Atm I'm sitting on a chair' is not a working hypothesis. To say it is is to say that what we call truth and knowledge are not what we say they are.

But even if you're right - that an empirical fact asserts a working hypothesis - and that a moral assertion is a working hypothesis - that doesn't mean that a moral assertion is therefore a fact.

But the definition of chair is a social construct. Actually chairs at one time did not exist. I know someone who calls a heap of breeze blocks her chair.

Again, so what? Any use of language is contextual and conventional. Why does that mean that what we call a fact is merely a working hypothesis?

[Belinda]

I disagree that empirical facts are assertions of working hypotheses. 'Atm I'm sitting on a chair' is not a working hypothesis. To say it is is to say that what we call truth and knowledge are not what we say they are.

But even if you're right - that an empirical fact asserts a working hypothesis - and that a moral assertion is a working hypothesis - that doesn't mean that a moral assertion is therefore a fact.

But the definition of chair is a social construct. Actually chairs at one time did not exist. I know someone who calls a heap of breeze blocks her chair.

Again, so what? Any use of language is contextual and conventional. Why does that mean that what we call a fact is merely a working hypothesis?

It means all true facts are relatively, not absolutely, true.

[Peter Holmes]

But the definition of chair is a social construct. Actually chairs at one time did not exist. I know someone who calls a heap of breeze blocks her chair.

Again, so what? Any use of language is contextual and conventional. Why does that mean that what we call a fact is merely a working hypothesis?

It means all true facts are relatively, not absolutely, true.

What could absolute truth possibly be? With what metaphysical entity are you comparing what we call truth?

[Belinda]

Again, so what? Any use of language is contextual and conventional. Why does that mean that what we call a fact is merely a working hypothesis?

It means all true facts are relatively, not absolutely, true.

What could absolute truth possibly be? With what metaphysical entity are you comparing what we call truth?

I compare absolute truth with relative truth. I don't know if absolute truth exists or not, and I will never known nor will you. In which case let our philosophising be about how we should live despite the sad absence of any sign post.

[Peter Holmes]

It means all true facts are relatively, not absolutely, true.

What could absolute truth possibly be? With what metaphysical entity are you comparing what we call truth?

I compare absolute truth with relative truth. I don't know if absolute truth exists or not, and I will never known nor will you. In which case let our philosophising be about how we should live despite the sad absence of any sign post.

Okay. Truth isn't a 'thing' of any kind - that's a metaphysical delusion - the myth of abstract 'things' - so absolute truth isn't a 'thing' that may or may not exist. This is all talk down the rabbit hole.

And that a truth-claim is relative to, or dependent on, a context is both true and inconsequential.

But I sense we'll never agree about what this means. Thanks for the conversation.

[Luxin]

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[Veritas Aequitas]

Here's your argument, as I understand it.

1 A system and framework of knowledge can produce facts - true factual assertions.
2 Therefore, the system and framework of morality can produce facts.
3 Therefore, there are moral facts.

Now, 1 is true. But 2 doesn't follow, because it assumes that moral rightness and wrongness are things that can be known, so that morality is an epistemological matter. And that begs the question. And since 2 doesn't follow, neither does 3.

Do you understand this refutation? If not, I'm happy to explain it yet again.

Nope, I am not assuming anything with moral principles.

Just like what we do with scientific facts derived from the Scientific Framework and System, and other F/S,
the moral facts are justified with empirical evidences and philosophical reasoning within the Moral Framework and System as such are objective.

In this case, the justified true moral facts must be factual state-of-affairs within reality.

Hello angels and gods Veritas Aequitas and Peter Holmes,

I'm curious about "the Moral Framework and System" spoken of. Is it in writing? If it's already in the thread, please pardon me; there's a lot to go through. Thank you!

There is no specific threads on 'the Moral Framework and System' but I have actually explained it many times to Peter Holmes all over the place.

I have an explanation of it in the following;
viewtopic.php?p=457945#p457945

[KLewchuk]

Let's say that when people jump off buildings, they fall. Assuming they are human, they fall regardless of race, creed or culture (i.e. it is universally true). That humans fall when jumping off buildings is a factually true statement. However, it is not a "moral" statement.

The moral question would ask, "should humans desire to jump off buildings"? Assuming that we ought to desire that which is good for us, and jumping off buildings is bad for us, it is a morally true statement to say that humans ought not desire to jump off buildings.

This is a moral truth / fact.

[Luxin]

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[Veritas Aequitas]

Let's say that when people jump off buildings, they fall. Assuming they are human, they fall regardless of race, creed or culture (i.e. it is universally true). That humans fall when jumping off buildings is a factually true statement. However, it is not a "moral" statement.

The moral question would ask, "should humans desire to jump off buildings"? Assuming that we ought to desire that which is good for us, and jumping off buildings is bad for us, it is a morally true statement to say that humans ought not desire to jump off buildings.

This is a moral truth / fact.

At one level that is an empirical fact and also a moral fact but at a deeper level we still need to justify why 'killing oneself' by jumping off buildings is wrong and not right.
I have presented empirical and philosophical reasoning why it is wrong to kill oneself, i.e. commit suicide.

[Belinda]

Let's say that when people jump off buildings, they fall. Assuming they are human, they fall regardless of race, creed or culture (i.e. it is universally true). That humans fall when jumping off buildings is a factually true statement. However, it is not a "moral" statement.

The moral question would ask, "should humans desire to jump off buildings"? Assuming that we ought to desire that which is good for us, and jumping off buildings is bad for us, it is a morally true statement to say that humans ought not desire to jump off buildings.

This is a moral truth / fact.

At one level that is an empirical fact and also a moral fact but at a deeper level we still need to justify why 'killing oneself' by jumping off buildings is wrong and not right.
I have presented empirical and philosophical reasoning why it is wrong to kill oneself, i.e. commit suicide.

Others justify suicide. Can one culture of belief be better than another? If so what is the criterion that includes every possible culture of belief?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Let's say that when people jump off buildings, they fall. Assuming they are human, they fall regardless of race, creed or culture (i.e. it is universally true). That humans fall when jumping off buildings is a factually true statement. However, it is not a "moral" statement.

The moral question would ask, "should humans desire to jump off buildings"? Assuming that we ought to desire that which is good for us, and jumping off buildings is bad for us, it is a morally true statement to say that humans ought not desire to jump off buildings.

This is a moral truth / fact.

At one level that is an empirical fact and also a moral fact but at a deeper level we still need to justify why 'killing oneself' by jumping off buildings is wrong and not right.
I have presented empirical and philosophical reasoning why it is wrong to kill oneself, i.e. commit suicide.

Others justify suicide. Can one culture of belief be better than another? If so what is the criterion that includes every possible culture of belief?

This is leading to the debate between Moral Realism versus Moral Relativism.
I have been reading into the above debates recently and well verse with the pros and cons of both sides.

I am for Moral Realism but not of the Divine or Platonic Form types.

Due to the size of the Earth and varied variables, it is obvious there will be a diversity in cultures, traditions, etc. and note the diversity in gathering and production of food, preparing, cooking and eating of food. This diversity and relativity is indisputable.

BUT if we dig deeper the diversity in gathering and production of food, preparing, cooking and eating of food is reducible to one unique human digestion system and the need for the primary nutrients [carbohydrates, proteins, fats, minerals, vitamins] critical to ensure the basic necessity for survival.

Whilst some humans under different restricted conditions cannot have access to certain critical food, say certain essential nutrients, they may be able to survive for sometime, but NOT in the long run and they will all die. Thus that is the fact of human nutrition.

It is the same with the superficial moral diversity and relativism. Such moral diversity which are necessary upon its specific conditions, they are reducible to some common moral principles that are inherent within all humans.

Other than mental illness, some cultures may have to permit suicide or even kill the weaker ones due to resources constraints, but the principle [like the essentiality of basic nutrients] that the justified moral principle "no normal person ought to commit suicide" is a moral fact regardless of the cultural differences.

The logic is if there is no such inherent principle, then the human species could be extinct if and when the population is reduced below its critical mass to sustain itself.
Thus if the constraints are removed, no human tribe nor group will permit suicide in alignment with their inherent moral sense.

The cons of Moral Relativism is no one can judge cultures like Nazism and other evil ideologies, so morally no one can condemn what they want to do because there is no objective standard of right or wrong.

So Moral Realism is the better bet [some Moral standards is better than no Moral standard at all], provided the moral standards set are justified empirically and philosophically plus being fool proof.