Peter Singer: The Triviality of Is-Ought in Morality

[Immanuel Can]

First, ethics (a system of understanding morality); must be for the good of everyone involved, not an arbitrary subset.

Subsets are not arbitrary. There are real differences between people, and societies react to, and make use of, those real differences. For a benign example, we don't treat children the same as adults. For a (frequently less benign) further example, women are different from men. Societies are not crazy...they know there are differences. There's nothing "arbitrary" there.

Second, it must have explicit shared understandings

You mean that if children or low IQ adults don't have these understandings, then they're "arbitrary"? Not likely.

Third, it must prove by prediction and replication that it produces the intended effects.

Child slavery does produce cheap labour: that's proven. And if the intended effect is to make men dominant, then marginalizing or making use of women also works. Happy with that criterion now?

[Skepdick]

First, ethics (a system of understanding morality); must be for the good of everyone involved, not an arbitrary subset. Second, it must have explicit shared understandings or it's likewise arbitrary. Third, it must prove by prediction and replication that it produces the intended effects. And so forth. These are non-arbitrary criteria. I'm not here to solve ethics in toto but to provide the framework for understanding which is Necessary in order to do so.

Arguments/conflicts are never about the intended direct/primary effects.

They are always about the forseen and unforeseen 2nd, 3rd, 4th and N-th order side-effects.

Human activities lack the surgical precision necessary to do ONLY one thing at a time. The opposite is always true. In a complex system such a society you can NEVER do "just one thing"

In the language of economics: Fucking externalities!
In English: You don't live in a vacuum!

[Immanuel Can]

In English: You don't live in a vacuum!

That's a really good point, actually.

Ethics is always about what we do to/with other persons and things. It's always about "externalities," as you put it. And it only matters in a situation in which there is more than one moral counter (i.e. person or thing "that counts") in play. In that sense, it's about relations, not merely the isolated feelings of the solipsistic individual.

Well put.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I shall argue that the differences between the contending parties are terminological,

Nope. Peter Singer is wrong here. He's touting the old Wittgensteinian nonsense about terminological versus substantive disagreements.

It follows that the disputes over the definition of morality and over the "is-ought" problem are disputes over words which raise no really significant issues.

Wrong.

The dispute between the neutralist and the descriptivist, therefore, is a dispute about where, within a limited framework, morality shall be placed. – i.e. fact or action.

No, wrong again. He's not even capturing the basic issue of the is/ought problem.

philosophers could, I believe, "agree to disagree" about the "is-ought" problem,

They could, but I'm not about to "agree to disagree." My position instead is "Get your shit straight and don't pretend that is's can imply oughts."

Introduction
Two Extreme Views on Morality
1. Neutralism
........Neutralist’s Moral Principles are Overriding
........Moral Principle Held = Way he Acts - Actions
2. Descriptivism [naturalism]
........Links Moral Principles to Action
Reconciliation of the Two Views
........Neutralism Do Not Differ with Descriptivism on how Facts are connected with Reason
A Middle Position [3]
Above are Three Positions Considered
Conclusion[/list]

The categorical distinctions he's making there aren't even representative of the actual range and content of positions held.

Singer isn't always worthless, but this appears to be a crap article.

Can you present a summary of your argument with reference why No Ought Can Be Derived from IS.
No need for details, a skeletal summary would do.

You are likely to start from Hume?
Note I mentioned Hume admitted his ignorance in another reply to you.
The most he [in his time] could blurt was to state morality emerged from sympathy [empathy] and could go no further.
Since then neuroscientists has traced empathy to mirror neurons and there are many other advances knowledge related to morality.

Note I presented another thread;
Hume Not Consistent with his No IS from OUGHT
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31638

[Veritas Aequitas]

Peter Singer: The Triviality of Is-Ought in Morality [proper].

I shall argue that the differences between the contending parties are terminological, and that there are various possible terminologies, none of which has, on balance, any great advantage over any other terminology.

Singer's just wrong. That's all that can be said about him.

He's personable and friendly seeming. But inside that, he's a crass utilitarian with a stunted understanding of philosophical ethics and very little mental dexterity in sorting out the theory behind what he claims. For example, he thinks killing children and the elderly is just fine, under the "right" conditions. When says that the is-ought is merely a matter of language, then nobody can have a duty to anything. In other words, he treats morality by simply saying, pretend it doesn't exist, and carry on pragmatically.

He doesn't even understand, so far as we can see, the problem that so many other modern moral philosophers recognize as fundamental. Like many, he simply thinks his "common" sense is everybody's.

Marc Singer can also says, 'you are just wrong',
but I don't think he will do that without justifications.

Point is you have not read his argument thoroughly but merely jump to conclusion about him based on hearsays.

Read up on Peter Singer;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Singer

Edited

[Terrapin Station]

Can you present a summary of your argument with reference why No Ought Can Be Derived from IS.

This is probably way too long to be useful here, but here's the idea in a nutshell:

For normatives (oughts, shoulds, etc.) to make sense as a behavioral modality, there need to be at least two options for behavior in a given scenario. For example, for "You should not stab Joe" to make sense as a behavioral modality, it needs to be possible to either stab Joe or to refrain from stabbing Joe in the scenario at hand. So in terms of "is's," it needs to be the case that it IS possible to stab Joe and it IS possible to refrain from stabbing Joe. If that's not what the world is like, and only one action or the other is possible, then normatives make no sense, because it doesn't matter what anyone "ought" to do--they'd only be able to do the one action that's possible.

So the question then, is what we should/what we ought to do. What is the case re stabbing or not stabbing Joe doesn't tell us this. It's just two things that are the case, and there's no recommendation embedded in them as two things that are the case. We can choose either option.

So then we can move to things like consequences. For example, if we choose to stab Joe, then maybe we'll wind up imprisoned or murdered by Joe's brother. Those are possibilities. And it's also possible to not wind up imprisoned or murdered by Joe's brother (possibilities we increase by choosing not to stab Joe). Do any of those sorts of possibilities tell us what we should do? Well, that they're possibilities doesn't tell us this. There would need to be something more there than possibilities. It's possible to choose any possible options (or to choose to increase the probability of certain things happening we could say).

No matter where we look, it quickly becomes apparent that the only thing that tells anyone what they should or ought to do are dispositions that individuals have--dispositions a la preferences as well as brute normative dispositions. Different individuals have all sorts of different dispositions when it comes to this, and that's fine insofar as it goes, but even that Frank has a disposition to stab/not stab Joe doesn't tell Frank that he ought to stab/not stab Joe and it certainly doesn't tell anyone in general that Joe or anyone in general ought to be stabbed/not stabbed.

Frank can have the disposition "I ought to stab Joe," but that doesn't imply that he ought to act on his disposition. It's possible for him to act on it and it's possible for him to not act on it. And Frank or someone else can have the disposition "One ought to act on one's normative dispositions," but again, that doesn't tell us that one ought to--it's still possible to do so or to not do so. The is's--that it is possible to act on normative dispositions and that it is possible to not act on normative dispositions don't somehow say which option we should choose.

[Skepdick]

For normatives (oughts, shoulds, etc.) to make sense as a behavioral modality, there need to be at least two options for behavior in a given scenario. For example, for "You should not stab Joe" to make sense as a behavioral modality, it needs to be possible to either stab Joe or to refrain from stabbing Joe in the scenario at hand. So in terms of "is's," it needs to be the case that it is possible to stab Joe and it is possible to refrain from stabbing Joe. If that's not what the world is like, and only one action or the other is possible, then normatives make no sense, because it doesn't matter what anyone "ought" to do--they'd only be able to do the one action that's possible.

This farming is idiotic because you run into problems of determinism vs free will. You can't possibly know whether an alternative outcome is or was possible at the individual scale. You are missing the forest for the trees.

There's not enough statistical signal to distinguish a difference. This is why we do science with large sample sizes, so that we gain some degree of certainty/distinction between the two outcomes. This is called A/B testing.

And so it may or may not be possible for You to not stab Joe, but it is possible to reduce the prevalence of stabbings in society. And it's possible to measure this improvement.

[Advocate]

Ethics is clearly not just making changes in the world. It is trying to create progressive changes in the world, or at least prevent preventing them. The fact that people disagree on those points seems as likely to come from having incorrect information as incorrect logic, not to mention potentially incompatible goals, especially when they're unspecified, so discussing how ethics might play out is contingent and Not the same subject as what ethics is from a functional perspective.

[Skepdick]

Ethics is clearly not just making changes in the world. It is trying to create progressive changes in the world, or at least prevent preventing them. The fact that people disagree on those points seems as likely to come from having incorrect information as incorrect logic, not to mention potentially incompatible goals, especially when they're unspecified, so discussing how ethics might play out is contingent and Not the same subject as what ethics is from a functional perspective.

From a functional perspective ethics is (fulfils?) a function.

What function does it fulfil?

[Immanuel Can]

Peter Singer: The Triviality of Is-Ought in Morality [proper].

Singer's just wrong. That's all that can be said about him.

He's personable and friendly seeming. But inside that, he's a crass utilitarian with a stunted understanding of philosophical ethics and very little mental dexterity in sorting out the theory behind what he claims. For example, he thinks killing children and the elderly is just fine, under the "right" conditions. When says that the is-ought is merely a matter of language, then nobody can have a duty to anything. In other words, he treats morality by simply saying, pretend it doesn't exist, and carry on pragmatically.

He doesn't even understand, so far as we can see, the problem that so many other modern moral philosophers recognize as fundamental. Like many, he simply thinks his "common" sense is everybody's.

Marc Singer can also says, 'you are just wrong',

Who's "Marc" Singer? You were quoting Peter.

Point is you have not read his argument thoroughly but merely jump to conclusion about him based on hearsays.

Heh. Your assumption is wildly wrong. I know Singer. However, you don't seem even to know which "Singer" you want to talk about.

[Advocate]

[quote=Skepdick post_id=495702 time=1613058195 user_id=17350]
[quote=Advocate post_id=495701 time=1613056703 user_id=15238]
Ethics is clearly not just making changes in the world. It is trying to create progressive changes in the world, or at least prevent preventing them. The fact that people disagree on those points seems as likely to come from having incorrect information as incorrect logic, not to mention potentially incompatible goals, especially when they're unspecified, so discussing how ethics might play out is contingent and Not the same subject as what ethics is from a functional perspective.
[/quote]
From a functional perspective ethics is (fulfils?) a function.

What function does it fulfil?
[/quote]

The purpose of all knowledge, wisdom, and understanding is actionable certainty. Ethics provides us a framework within which to pursue our own goals while minimizing the negative impact on others, sufficient for society as a whole to progress.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Who's "Marc" Singer? You were quoting Peter.

Point is you have not read his argument thoroughly but merely jump to conclusion about him based on hearsays.

Heh. Your assumption is wildly wrong. I know Singer. However, you don't seem even to know which "Singer" you want to talk about.

Admitting it was an error.
Now edited.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Can you present a summary of your argument with reference why No Ought Can Be Derived from IS.

This is probably way too long to be useful here, but here's the idea in a nutshell:

For normatives (oughts, shoulds, etc.) to make sense as a behavioral modality, there need to be at least two options for behavior in a given scenario. For example, for "You should not stab Joe" to make sense as a behavioral modality, it needs to be possible to either stab Joe or to refrain from stabbing Joe in the scenario at hand. So in terms of "is's," it needs to be the case that it IS possible to stab Joe and it IS possible to refrain from stabbing Joe. If that's not what the world is like, and only one action or the other is possible, then normatives make no sense, because it doesn't matter what anyone "ought" to do--they'd only be able to do the one action that's possible.

So the question then, is what we should/what we ought to do. What is the case re stabbing or not stabbing Joe doesn't tell us this. It's just two things that are the case, and there's no recommendation embedded in them as two things that are the case. We can choose either option.

So then we can move to things like consequences. For example, if we choose to stab Joe, then maybe we'll wind up imprisoned or murdered by Joe's brother. Those are possibilities. And it's also possible to not wind up imprisoned or murdered by Joe's brother (possibilities we increase by choosing not to stab Joe). Do any of those sorts of possibilities tell us what we should do? Well, that they're possibilities doesn't tell us this. There would need to be something more there than possibilities. It's possible to choose any possible options (or to choose to increase the probability of certain things happening we could say).

No matter where we look, it quickly becomes apparent that the only thing that tells anyone what they should or ought to do are dispositions that individuals have--dispositions a la preferences as well as brute normative dispositions.
Different individuals have all sorts of different dispositions when it comes to this, and that's fine insofar as it goes, but even that Frank has a disposition to stab/not stab Joe doesn't tell Frank that he ought to stab/not stab Joe and it certainly doesn't tell anyone in general that Joe or anyone in general ought to be stabbed/not stabbed.

Frank can have the disposition "I ought to stab Joe," but that doesn't imply that he ought to act on his disposition. It's possible for him to act on it and it's possible for him to not act on it. And Frank or someone else can have the disposition "One ought to act on one's normative dispositions," but again, that doesn't tell us that one ought to--it's still possible to do so or to not do so. The is's--that it is possible to act on normative dispositions and that it is possible to not act on normative dispositions don't somehow say which option we should choose.

So you are banking on 'disposition' to support the 'is-ought' dichotomy?

FYI, the disposition theory came from Hume.

As mentioned in the earlier post [repeat],

• Note I mentioned Hume admitted his ignorance in another reply to you.
  The most he [in his time] could blurt was to state morality emerged from sympathy [empathy] and could go no further.
  Since then neuroscientists has traced empathy to mirror neurons and there are many other advances knowledge related to morality.
  
  Note I presented another thread;
  Hume Not Consistent with his No IS from OUGHT
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31638

Here is Hume's reference;

• In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs;
  when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
  
  This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.
  For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.
  But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.
  
  Treatise of Human Nature. p. 469-470

Hume's focus was more on the oughts from a God and various vulgar systems of morality.

• 'Vulgar'-Morality versus Morality-Proper
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31903

In the current discussion of morality, Hume's is-ought is seldom leveraged as critical to moral claims.

[Peter Holmes]

Claim: In the current discussion of morality, Hume's is-ought is seldom leveraged as critical to moral claims.

False. The is/ought barrier, being insuperable, is the defeater for moral objectivism.

[Terrapin Station]

Can you present a summary of your argument with reference why No Ought Can Be Derived from IS.

This is probably way too long to be useful here, but here's the idea in a nutshell:

For normatives (oughts, shoulds, etc.) to make sense as a behavioral modality, there need to be at least two options for behavior in a given scenario. For example, for "You should not stab Joe" to make sense as a behavioral modality, it needs to be possible to either stab Joe or to refrain from stabbing Joe in the scenario at hand. So in terms of "is's," it needs to be the case that it IS possible to stab Joe and it IS possible to refrain from stabbing Joe. If that's not what the world is like, and only one action or the other is possible, then normatives make no sense, because it doesn't matter what anyone "ought" to do--they'd only be able to do the one action that's possible.

So the question then, is what we should/what we ought to do. What is the case re stabbing or not stabbing Joe doesn't tell us this. It's just two things that are the case, and there's no recommendation embedded in them as two things that are the case. We can choose either option.

So then we can move to things like consequences. For example, if we choose to stab Joe, then maybe we'll wind up imprisoned or murdered by Joe's brother. Those are possibilities. And it's also possible to not wind up imprisoned or murdered by Joe's brother (possibilities we increase by choosing not to stab Joe). Do any of those sorts of possibilities tell us what we should do? Well, that they're possibilities doesn't tell us this. There would need to be something more there than possibilities. It's possible to choose any possible options (or to choose to increase the probability of certain things happening we could say).

No matter where we look, it quickly becomes apparent that the only thing that tells anyone what they should or ought to do are dispositions that individuals have--dispositions a la preferences as well as brute normative dispositions.
Different individuals have all sorts of different dispositions when it comes to this, and that's fine insofar as it goes, but even that Frank has a disposition to stab/not stab Joe doesn't tell Frank that he ought to stab/not stab Joe and it certainly doesn't tell anyone in general that Joe or anyone in general ought to be stabbed/not stabbed.

Frank can have the disposition "I ought to stab Joe," but that doesn't imply that he ought to act on his disposition. It's possible for him to act on it and it's possible for him to not act on it. And Frank or someone else can have the disposition "One ought to act on one's normative dispositions," but again, that doesn't tell us that one ought to--it's still possible to do so or to not do so. The is's--that it is possible to act on normative dispositions and that it is possible to not act on normative dispositions don't somehow say which option we should choose.

So you are banking on 'disposition' to support the 'is-ought' dichotomy?

FYI, the disposition theory came from Hume.

As mentioned in the earlier post [repeat],

• Note I mentioned Hume admitted his ignorance in another reply to you.
  The most he [in his time] could blurt was to state morality emerged from sympathy [empathy] and could go no further.
  Since then neuroscientists has traced empathy to mirror neurons and there are many other advances knowledge related to morality.
  
  Note I presented another thread;
  Hume Not Consistent with his No IS from OUGHT
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31638

Here is Hume's reference;

• In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs;
  when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
  
  This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.
  For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.
  But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.
  
  Treatise of Human Nature. p. 469-470

Hume's focus was more on the oughts from a God and various vulgar systems of morality.

• 'Vulgar'-Morality versus Morality-Proper
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31903

In the current discussion of morality, Hume's is-ought is seldom leveraged as critical to moral claims.

So first off, my comments above weren't anything at all about Hume. I had made that explicit to you already. Try rereading what I wrote for what it says instead of assuming that it's some sort of secondary literature about Hume.