Moral Fact Deniers Has Cognitive Deficit in Morality

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is an interesting point from the following;

• HOW TO BE A MORAL REALIST
  Richard N. Boyd 1982
  Chapter 9 in
  Essays on Moral Realism (Cornell Paperbacks) 1st Edition
  by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Editor),

https://www.amazon.com/Essays-Moral-Rea ... 0801495415

The author [Boyd] therein claimed those who deny moral facts has a cognitive deficit in moral sense just like perceptual deficit in perception.

I agree with the above point because, moral facts [moral propensities] are inherent in ALL human beings, whilst active in some minority.
Those with an active moral impulse [mirror neurons, etc.] will naturally recognize there are moral facts intuitively and for some, thereupon seek evidences and reasons to justify their existence.
Meanwhile, the majority recognize there are moral facts by virtue of God given moral facts.

The moral facts deniers [e.g. Sculptor, Peter Holmes, Flasher..] are the minority who has a cognitive deficit in moral sense and impulse.

in [..] = mine

[The Moral Deniers argues:]

• Mere facts (especially mere natural facts) cannot have this sort of logical connection to rational choice or reasons for action.
  Therefore, so the objection goes, there cannot be moral facts;
  Moral Realism (or at least naturalistic Moral Realism) is impossible.

..the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.

I think that there is a deep insight in the view that people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.

If we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people a [Moral] deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

It is also very probably right, as Hume insists, that the operation of sympathy [empathy] is motivationally important: ...

The psychological mechanisms by which all this takes place may be more complicated than Hume imagined, but the fact remains that one and the same psychological mechanism—sympathy [empathy]—plays both a cognitive and a motivational [moral] role in normal human beings.

• We are now in a position to see why the morally unconcerned person, the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, probably suffers a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning.
  
  Such a person would have to be deficient in sympathy [empathy], because the motivational role of sympathy [empathy] is precisely to make moral facts motivationally relevant.
  
  In consequence, she or he would be deficient with respect to a cognitive capacity (sympathy [empathy]) which is ordinarily important for the correct assessment of moral facts.
  
  The motivational deficiency would, as a matter of contingent fact about human psychology, be a cognitive deficiency as well.

The full resources of naturalistic epistemology permit the moral realist to acknowledge and explain this important insight of moral anti-realists [moral facts deniers].

Agree/Disagree??

eta: View from ChatGpt
viewtopic.php?p=678348#p678348

[Veritas Aequitas]

My definition of moral fact is along the line of "What is Fact" as in this OP;

What is Fact?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486

I do not agree with the absolute moral facts from God and those related to Plato's forms and universals.

[Peter Holmes]

Here is an interesting point from the following;

https://www.amazon.com/Essays-Moral-Rea ... 0801495415

The author therein claimed those who deny moral facts has a cognitive deficit in moral sense just like perceptual deficit in perception.

I agree with the above point because, moral facts [moral propensities] are inherent in ALL human beings, whilst active in some minority.
Those with an active moral impulse [mirror neurons, etc.] will naturally recognize there are moral facts intuitively and for some, thereupon seek evidences and reasons to justify their existence.
Meanwhile, the majority recognize there are moral facts by virtue of God given moral facts.

The moral facts deniers [e.g. Sculptor, Peter Holmes, Flasher..] are the minority who has a cognitive deficit in moral sense and impulse.

in [..] = mine

[The Moral Deniers argues:]

• Mere facts (especially mere natural facts) cannot have this sort of logical connection to rational choice or reasons for action.
  Therefore, so the objection goes, there cannot be moral facts;
  Moral Realism (or at least naturalistic Moral Realism) is impossible.

..the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.

I think that there is a deep insight in the view that people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.

If we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people a [Moral] deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

It is also very probably right, as Hume insists, that the operation of sympathy [empathy] is motivationally important: ...

The psychological mechanisms by which all this takes place may be more complicated than Hume imagined, but the fact remains that one and the same psychological mechanism—sympathy [empathy]—plays both a cognitive and a motivational [moral] role in normal human beings.

• We are now in a position to see why the morally unconcerned person, the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, probably suffers a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning.
  
  Such a person would have to be deficient in sympathy [empathy], because the motivational role of sympathy [empathy] is precisely to make moral facts motivationally relevant.
  
  In consequence, she or he would be deficient with respect to a cognitive capacity (sympathy [empathy]) which is ordinarily important for the correct assessment of moral facts.
  
  The motivational deficiency would, as a matter of contingent fact about human psychology, be a cognitive deficiency as well.

The full resources of naturalistic epistemology permit the moral realist to acknowledge and explain this important insight of moral anti-realists [moral facts deniers].

Agree/Disagree??

Disagree. Pretentious and offensive codswallop.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Agree/Disagree??

Disagree. Pretentious and offensive codswallop.

As usual you did not offer any justified nor rational counter argument.

[Peter Holmes]

Agree/Disagree??

Disagree. Pretentious and offensive codswallop.

As usual you did not offer any justified nor rational counter argument.

You haven't demonstrated the independent existence of moral rightness and wrongness, and therefore the existence of moral facts. So you haven't shown that morality is a matter of knowledge or cognition in the first place. So your claim that those of us who deny moral objectivity are cognitively deficient is laughable.

Here's your claim: people who deny the existence of moral facts just aren't thinking straight.

And you think that deserves a rational counter argument?

[FlashDangerpants]

It's also lazy and stupid and Veritas has misread his source material, which blatantly does not accuse "moral fact deniers" of any cognitive deficit.

[Skepdick]

You haven't demonstrated the independent existence of moral rightness and wrongness, and therefore the existence of moral facts.

It's the default position - it requires no proof.

So you haven't shown that morality is a matter of knowledge or cognition in the first place.

If they aren't a matter of "knowledge" or "cognition" then how do you have any thoughts on morality?

So your claim that those of us who deny moral objectivity are cognitively deficient is laughable.

The burden of falsification is yours. It's a significantly simpler burden than the burden of proof and you are still unwilling to undertake it.

What's laughable is your disregard for Occam's razor.

[uwot]

The burden of falsification is yours. It's a significantly simpler burden than the burden of proof and you are still unwilling to undertake it.

Popper argued that since the problem of induction means that no positive proposition can be logically sound (with the usual Parmenides/Descartes caveat) 'All swans are white' being an example, those who seek THE TRUTH, will only find it in negative propositions. Cor blimey, there's a black swan, therefore 'Not all swans are white' is true - capitalise any of those letters as you see fit. 'The burden of falsification' is simply to accept that there is some conceivable evidence that would kibosh a theory.

What's laughable is your disregard for Occam's razor.

Generally stated as something like 'Do not multiply entities beyond necessity.' Moral facts are not logically necessary - it's you that's multiplying unnecessary entities.

[Skepdick]

Popper argued that since the problem of induction means that no positive proposition can be logically sound (with the usual Parmenides/Descartes caveat) 'All swans are white' being an example, those who seek THE TRUTH, will only find it in negative propositions. Cor blimey, there's a black swan, therefore 'Not all swans are white' is true - capitalise any of those letters as you see fit. 'The burden of falsification' is simply to accept that there is some conceivable evidence that would kibosh a theory.

Well understood.

Without diving into the full extent of the Raven paradox, before you can accept that "All swans are white" you have to accept that a non-white swan falsifies your hypothesis, and you also have to accept that a black, red, green, pink, purple or orange swan is the same thing as a non-white swan.

The same with morality. If you claim that "Morality exists" as a falsifiable claim then you have to (at least) conceptualise non-morality.

Which was Feynman's favourite question: Suppose morality didn't exist - how would the world be different?

Generally stated as something like 'Do not multiply entities beyond necessity.'

Moral facts are not logically necessary - it's you that's multiplying unnecessary entities.

ALL logic necessitates a logician.

Or as my favourite saying goes... you need to be alive to do logic, but you don't need to do logic to be alive.

Morality is the necessary conditions for your existence - ala anthropic principle.

[Peter Holmes]

Moral objectivists claim that moral rightness and wrongness exist, so that there can be moral facts.

So theirs is the burden of proof. Those of us who reject the claim have no 'burden of falsification'. That aint how it works.

The abject failure of moral realists and objectivists to meet their burden of proof may not mean they're wrong. But it does mean they're irrational.

[Skepdick]

Moral objectivists claim that moral rightness and wrongness exist, so that there can be moral facts.

The objectivism/subjectivism distinction is a red herring. Not playing that game with you again.

Ontologically - either morality exists or it doesn't. Its location is moot. If morality doesn't exist - you should probably shut up.

So theirs is the burden of proof. Those of us who reject the claim have no 'burden of falsification'. That aint how it works.

It's exactly how it works. I reject your existence.

Since rejectionism carries no burden, I guess it's on you to prove that you exist.

[Peter Holmes]

Abstract nouns - such as morality, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty, identity, concept, proposition, and so on - are not names of things that do or don't exist - things which, if they do exist, can be described. The myth of abstract things is an ancient and persistent metaphysical delusion. Evidently.

[Skepdick]

Abstract nouns - such as morality, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty, identity, concept, proposition, and so on - are not names of things that do or don't exist - things which, if they do exist, can be described. The myth of abstract things is an ancient and persistent metaphysical delusion. Evidently.

Abstract ideas either have concrete referents; OR they affect concrete behavior thus they have traceable consequences.
If abstract ideas are inconsequential then they are empirically irrelevant - they are not even testable, never mind falsifiable.

It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insignificance the moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can be no difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere – no difference in abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen. The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one. --William James

Language IS metaphysics. Sounds like you want to shut up, but your Philosophical moronism is preventing you from doing so.

[Skepdick]

For the (ongoing) record. Peter Holmes does not exist until he provides us with proof of his existence.

[uwot]

If you claim that "Morality exists" as a falsifiable claim then you have to (at least) conceptualise non-morality.

Have I missed something? Has anyone here made such a claim? Who has proposed an experiment the null result of which would show morality doesn't exist?

ALL logic necessitates a logician.

Well, you know there are logical realists out there who will argue with an empty room that 2+2=4 regardless of whether anyone thinks it.

Or as my favourite saying goes... you need to be alive to do logic, but you don't need to do logic to be alive.

Morality is the necessary conditions for your existence - ala anthropic principle.

So...you need to be alive to do morality, but you don't need to do morality to be alive is necessarily untrue?