Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 17, 2019 11:57 am
Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Jun 17, 2019 11:10 am
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jun 14, 2019 7:54 am
Fair enough. I think the great danger of moral objectivism is that people can think their own moral opinions are facts and therefore undeniable. It leads to inquisitions and persecutions, abortion practitioners being murdered, homosexuals being thrown off tall buildings, and so on.
Would it be fair to say that your entire argument is agenda-driven? You have simply chosen to classify morality as "subjective" because in your mind this would lead to less abortionists being murdered; less homsexuals being thrown off buildings etc.
That is - once the "self-righteous" recognize their moral assertions are "just opinions" we ought to see less persecution and murders.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jun 14, 2019 7:54 am
The problem with utilitarianism and consequentialism is that what actually is 'the greatest good for the greatest number', or 'a good consequence' is and can only ever be a subjective moral judgement - never a fact. (NONSENSE !)
Yet just in the previous paragraph you were making a consequentialist argument. You were warning of the dangers of moral objectivism by pointing out its undesirable consequences: persecution and murder.
Surely, this begs a question: Why is the opinion of a moral subjectivist any less dangerous than the opinion of moral objectivist?
Why is your opinion better?
I haven't 'simply chosen to classify morality as "subjective"'.
I'm arguing that it is subjective - and showing why that's the case. If you disagree, please refute my argument by citing a moral fact and showing why it's true, independent of opinion. (I CERTAINLY WILL DO !)
And I think you miss the point about consequentialism - which also applies to utilitarianism. It's because there are no moral facts that both theories merely defer the question: what are the 'greatest good' and 'good consequences'?
And I'm not saying my moral opinion on any issue is (factually) better than any other.
That's what objectivists say. I'm arguing the exact opposite - that because there are only moral opinions, that's all we have - and I have mine. Perhaps you haven't been following the discussion.
( MORE NONSENSE !)
A shadowy figure approached Holmes ( the famous sleuth and self-annointed philosophy forum guru) outside the Baker Street Underground exit and slipped him an envelope. Passing him the envelope the mysterious stranger, whispered ...
"I must say, old man, it seems to me that in "The Perilous Case of the True Nature of Morality", you've not picked up too many clues to date. I suspect that diabolical genius, Professor Moriarty, is behind it all: leading you down the subjectivist garden path - throwing you off the objective ethical scent! Take this message back to Baker Street and ponder it carefully my dear fellow. When you have read the contents - destroy it. The game is afoot, man, and this time all is at stake. Need I say, Holmes, we must always defend it to the death if needs be: the great moral integrity, the luminous rectitude of... this island...this fortress...this ENGLAND !" For should the forces of subjectivist evil prevail, the New Jerusalem we have here built ... will fall.
(The contents of the letter were as follows...)
My dear Holmes,
The key to cracking this case lies in the notion of "objective moral progress". If we can deduce that there has been objective moral progress in the world, then we can be sure that an objective moral standard exists.
Let me be very clear about the meaning of the term "objective moral progress". Firstly, by "objective", I mean that moral facts are mind-independent. The truth or falsity of moral facts is independent of people's opinions on these facts. A moral objectivist like myself is someone who thinks morality is "part of the fabric of this world", so to speak. The point I am emphasising is solely concerned with ONTOLOGICAL morality ( not epistemological morality). To explain. Just like there is SOMETHING that makes it the case "Watson is a medical doctor" (who, by the way, strongly disapproves of your cocaine habit) and just like there is something that makes it the case you are (i know) smoking a Calabash pipe as you read this, or 2+3 = 5, there is also SOMETHING that makes it the case that "Professor Moriarty is an evil genius - indeed, 'the Napoleon of crime' ", and SOMETHING that makes it the case that "slavery is wrong."
As for "moral progress", this term also requires clear and careful definition. I thus define it as follows; "Moral progress occurs when a subsequent state of affairs is better than the preceding one, or when right acts become increasingly prevalent." This conception of "moral progress" is consistent with most normative views in moral philosophy, and it also seems intuitively correct. (Progress is a positive change over time, and in the case of moral progress, the positive aspect concerns the change of moving closer to the morally good).
So, given these definitions, it seems clear that there has to be some kind of moral standard which is used to determine whether a person or society is changing progressively (morally speaking) or regressively ( i.e. where moral regress means that one moves closer to bad or evil over time). If moral progress is objective, then this moral standard must also be objective. Before I continue, let me reiterate that I am primarily concerned here with the ONTOLOGICAL status of such a moral standard. To use a couple of analogies, the unit of length called the metre ("m") is the base unit length of the International System of Units (SI). The SI currently defines the metre as the length of the path travelled by light in a vacuum in 1/299, 792, 458 of a second. The base unit of time used by the SI is the second ("s"). One second is defined as the time that elapses during 9, 192, 631, 770 cycles of the radiation produced by the transition between two levels of the Caesium - 133 atom.
In the same way, right and wrong have to be ontologically grounded in SOMETHING. When one progresses from holding one moral proposition to another moral proposition that is closer to to the standard, then one can speak of moral progress. Take slavery, for example. If the abolishment of slavery is considered to be an example of objective moral progress, then one can ask the question what GROUNDS this as being moral progress ? One can ask this because there have certainly been those who have claimed that the abolishment of slavery was itself morally wrong, or was a sign of moral regress. If one wishes to hold the view that the abolishment of slavery is is objective moral progress, then it seems to me that one has to hold the view slavery is wrong and there is some mind-independent fact about the world that makes it the case slavery is wrong. THEREFORE, there has to exist in the world some "thing" which makes it the case that abolishing slavery is moral progress and not moral regress. This is what I take to be a MORAL STANDARD.
With these definitions in hand, we can quickly move on. (Time is off the essence, Holmes; Moriarty and his subjectivist-relativist henchmen will stop at nothing in their evil attempt to corrupt the ethical values we cherish here in Albion - stop at nothing, I tell you - in their wicked bid to crush the virtuous moral fibre of this green and pleasant land !)
The question that concerns us now is:
"Has there indeed been objective moral progress in the world ?"
Well, I put it to you that the answer is a resounding: "Yes, there has, old man !"
Consider the abolishment of of slavery, especially, the trans-Atlantic slave trade. It's no surprise, (of course), that it was an Englishman who was the chief driving force behind the extirpation of this heinous moral blight on the world..."
God Almighty has set before me two great objects, the suppression of the slave trade and the reformation of manners !" Thus spake the goodly William Wilberforce in London on the 26th day of October, 1787; and as history records, he went on to play an instrumental political role in the subsequent prohibition of slavery in Britain which became law in 1807.
More examples of cases that can surely be viewed as moral progress are plentiful. They include (but are not limited to):
* the abolishment of fossil fuels, and other arrangements to decrease climate change
* the remarkable decrease of violence across the globe
* the advent of animal rights
* the acceptance of universal human rights and equality of dignity for all persons
* the abolishment of child conscription
* the encouraging, ongoing (and steady) increase in standards of living (income/person, health, education, housing, etc.) both within and between ALL nations of the world , particularly over the past 30 years
So, are these examples of objective moral progress ? Well, in a sense it would appear that these are instances of conventions, agreements between humans or groups of humans. But these agreements are far from arbitrary. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) for instance begins with the following words in the preamble...
"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity (moral value/worth) and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world..."
The foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world is not, according to the composers of this declaration, due to any kind of convention, but it is something that is INHERENT in human persons. Furthermore, the main normative, ethical theories presuppose morality to be objective. Whether one holds to utilitarianism, deontological or virtue ethics; the roots of these three ethical theories are all based on some kind of objective principle. Therefore, one can account for the list of moral progress (above) by accepting that there is moral progress based on an objective standard.
But I ask you, Holmes, can the moral subjectivist account for moral progress ? It seems to me that s/he would encounter some serious problems ! Here are a couple that come to mind...
The first is that, on moral subjectivism, the notion of moral PROGRESS seems incoherent. As I set out in my earlier group of definitions, "moral progress" means a positive change towards some kind of standard. For the objectivist, like myself, this standard is mind-independent. But what kind of standard would suffice for the moral subjectivist ? An examination of different moral subjectivist positions will show that the different kinds of subjectivist standards are incompatible with the notion of moral progress. An
individual subjectivist (or individual relativist) believes that one's own opinions are the moral standard. But since people often disagree on what is moral, two individual subjectivists with opposing views will have the problem of both having to affirm their own ethical beliefs while also having to affirm that the other person has good reasons to affirm his/her own ethical beliefs. This consequence of individual subjectivism would make it impossible to talk about moral progress, since the notion would simply be a matter of personal taste (like my personal opinion that vanilla ice cream is delicious !). A
cultural subjectivist (cultural relativist) would argue that morality is based on the history and practices of a culture that one lives in. But this view would also prevent moral progress. Since what is right is that which is currently morally acceptable within a culture, any type of change would be a transition to something that is different from the current culture. Therefore, a cultural subjectivist must hold that there is no such thing as moral progress, since any kind of change would be in contradiction to the culture in which one has been brought up.
Finally, it appears that those who claim to hold that moral facts are subjective (or even non-existent) have a difficult time in accepting the consequences of this view. Many proponents of subjectivism appear to be making statements that seem to be about objective moral facts. Take, for instance, Richard Dawkins. Throughout his work we find propositions such as ...
"Do not indoctrinate your children. Teach them how to think for themselves, how to evaluate knowledge and how to disagree with you."
Dawkins does not seem to suggest that "indoctrination is wrong" relative to one's own subjective attitudes, or those of one's culture, but rather "indoctrination IS wrong." How would such an idea fit with moral subjectivism ? Or take another notable quote from Dawkins about the Judeo-Christian God...
"The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty, ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sado-masochistic, capriciously malevolent bully."
Notice that Dawkins does not make the statement just to give his own personal opinion: he notes that this IS the case, and apparently he has arguments to support his position. It seems to me that Dawkin's attitude does not befit one who does not believe in the existence of good and evil !! These are moral statements that appear to be objective, and the best explanation for them appearing to be objective is that they in fact are objective.
Dawkins is not the only person who seems to be unable to act according to his own ethics: it seems to be very difficult to live a life devoid of seemingly objective moral statements. Similarly, when making statements about moral progress, such as "the abolishment of slavery was good", it is theoretically unusable for moral subjectivists; what they would have to say would be closer to:
"It is my personal opinion/ cultural opinion/ evolutionary sentiment that the abolishment of slavery was good."Obviously it is quite possible to utter such sentences. But in practice not many of those concerned with moral progress use this kind of language. Mostly objective language is used and this is another reason to think that the proposition: "There is objective moral progress." is more likely to be true than false.
That'a all for now, Holmes, I have much more to tell you on this matter, - much more (!) -, and my next communication should reach you at 221b Baker Street anon. In the meanwhile, are there any queries you have regarding what I have said above to which you would wish to draw my attention ? If so, you will find me in the Stranger's Room at the Diogenies Club on Friday at 3:30 pm sharp. I will be standing near the north widow in a brown trench coat, wearing dark spectacles, a red carnation and carrying a copy of "The Times."
Signed
"The Grey Spider", OHMSS. (On Her Majesty's Secret Service)