"NEVER MIND THE BOLLOCKS", HERE'S THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT ABORTION

[Peter Holmes]

Belinda

You talk confidently about 'the moral law'. And you say there's no codified 'sacred law' about abortion.

Do you think there's a codified moral law? And if so, what and where is it - and who codified it?

More to the point, I don't see how morality - judgements about the rights and wrongs of behaviour - and law have any necessary connection. A legal system may try to enforce moral judgements, but they're (importantly) different things, which is why there can be bad laws, such as laws oppressing homosexuality and forcing women to carry a pregnancy to term.

[henry quirk]

"Your argument seems to be: people don't want to die, so killing people is morally wrong."

Well, if 'morality' is subjective, has no grounding in reality, is just consensus or is just majority-determined: then 'morality' literally is what the majority sez it is, yeah? If the majority choose to respect what seems to be the natural and normal desire of individuals to 'be', then killing folks (without just cause) will deemed 'wrong' or 'immoral'.

If that same majority, however, chooses to disregard the individual's desire to 'be': killing folks may be viewed neutrally, or even as beneficial; might be taken as 'moral'. Not seein' how such a community can survive, but people in masses are sometimes the worst kind of jackasses.

That's how it seems to me (but, I'm a moral objectivist lookin' in from outside, so I might be wrong in how how I assess these things).

#

"The assertion 'if we all kill each other, there'll be no people left' is not a moral claim whatsoever."

I agree, but if reality has no moral dimension, then that's all folks got (assertions, opinions dressed up sunday-go-to-meetin' finery).

So: in a morally neutral or amoral universe, 'morality' ain't nuthin' but what folks cobble together and choose to adhere to (or are forced to adhere to). In a morally dimensionless reality, 'morality' is pretty much anything that can be foisted up on folks and sustained over the long haul.

In morally neutral universe: a man no intrinsic value. His value is what others deem it to be, or what he can assert and cram down the other guy's throat.

And: in an amoral reality, the value of what a pregnant woman carries, and whether she must carry it or is allowed to flush it, all that's gonna be decided by what the pervailing 'morality' is. With a subjective 'morality', ain't no one can legitimately bitch about their right to reproductive freedom, cuz -- sorry to say -- the majority (or, mebbe, the politburo) will tell each and everyone what their 'rights' are.

[Belinda]

Peter: Koran, Ten Commandments, Litany of Curses( Deuteronomy 27:15-26),Code of Hammurabi, Lex Talionis for examples. Civil law is usually founded upon religious moral codes.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter: Koran, Ten Commandments, Litany of Curses( Deuteronomy 27:15-26),Code of Hammurabi, Lex Talionis for examples. Civil law is usually founded upon religious moral codes.

No doubt. But what and where is 'the moral law', and who codified it? You've just listed various moral codes, some claiming divine sanctification. And some of them contain disgustingly immoral 'laws', in my opinion. So who says if a law is morally good?

[Peter Holmes]

"Your argument seems to be: people don't want to die, so killing people is morally wrong."

Well, if 'morality' is subjective, has no grounding in reality, is just consensus or is just majority-determined: then 'morality' literally is what the majority sez it is, yeah? If the majority choose to respect what seems to be the natural and normal desire of individuals to 'be', then killing folks will deemed 'wrong' or 'immoral'.

If that same majority, however, chooses to disregard the individual's desire to 'be': killing folks may be viewed neutrally, or even as beneficial; might be taken as 'moral'. Not seein' how such a community can survive, but people in masses are sometimes the worst kind of jackasses.

That's how it seems to me (but, I'm a moral objectivist lookin' in from outside, so I might be wrong in how hiw I assess these things).

Why does 'subjective' mean 'having no grounding in reality'? Isn't the social reality we all subjectively experience real? What a strange idea.

Subjective morality doesn't mean majoritarianism. Again, what a strange idea. Why should it? Why should what any people think is morally good necessarily be morally good?

You claim to be a moral objectivist, which I assume means you think there are moral facts or truths, independent of opinion. Please can you produce an example and show how it describes a feature of reality correctly, independent of opinion - which is what a fact does? If you can't - and I don't believe you can - then I don't understand why you think there are moral facts.

We can think there are moral facts because, first, our moral opinions matter deeply to us; and second, our moral opinions are usually universal - not restricted to place and time - if we think slavery is wrong, then we think it always was and will be wrong.

[Immanuel Can]

No, it doesn't make it clearer.

Oh, sorry. I'll try again.

The good is that which is in harmony with a god's nature, and the not-good is that which isn't in harmony with a god's nature.

But this is circular. A god is good. What is goodness? Harmoniousness with a god's nature. It doesn't explain what goodness is. It's vacuous.

It's not actually circular. It's recursive. And there's all the difference in the world.

If I ask a question like, "Are you single, or are you a bachelor?" I have asked a nonsense question, because of recursion. I've presented the two (potential) synonyms as if they were a dichotomy, an "either-or," when they are a "both." Or if I say, "Is this figure curvilinear or circular?" I've made a similar error: the answer is simply "both."

The answer to the question "Is God's nature good, or is good God's nature?" can only be "Yes." Anything else is nonsense -- but not because of any fault in the answer. The fault is in the supposition of the question.

To put it as clearly as I can: "good" is a property that does not exist apart from the Creator of all things. And that just makes sense, if you think about it: if He's the Creator of all things, how can "good" be anything by a property defined by relation to His intention? Yet, your question supposes a kind of "good" that is NOT a synonym for "harmonious with the character of the Creator."

But if you believe, as I do, in the Creator and His goodness, you can only realize that they are coextensive concepts, like "single" and "bachelor."

[henry quirk]

"Please can you produce an example and show how it describes a feature of reality correctly."

I can tell you what I think.

I believe myself to be a free will (of the libertarian agent causation variety). My experience of myself, in the world, convinces me of this.

Thing is: reality seems to be deterministic, seems to disallow free will (particularly the agent causation I adhere to).

So: cause & effect, in some way, is wrong or I'm wrong.

I don't think C & E is wrong, don't think I'm wrong, so -- seems to me -- there must be some element to me, some lil extra 'sumthin' wedged deep down into the meat of me that makes me a C & E defyin' free will.

And if there's a lil sumthin' extra wedged deep into the meat of me, it must have a supra-natural quality (cuz if it were wholly of nature, I wouldn't be defyin' C & E, would I?).

So: I surmised this spark, this soul, this non-deterministic algorithm, the lil sumthin' extra, comes from somewhere, mebbe from someone.

I settled on 'someone', a Prime Mover (makin' me, a formerly indifferent agnostic, a somewhat less indifferent deist).

Now: as a free will, there are things that seem natural and normal for me. For example: I believe I own 'me', believe I have a natural and normal right and desire to preserve myself, use myself, and defend myself, and an obligation to offer defense to folks who want it (hence my repeated inquiry 'person or meat?'). And since my being a free will is a gift of Crom (the face, name, and personality I hang on Prime Mover), my bein a free will, my bein' my first and best property, is intrinsic to me and not an issue to be determined by community or government.

So: me, as free will (and you as free will too), is an objective truth, a moral fact, and from that moral fact extend other moral facts.

Anyway: that's how I see it.

#

"We can think there are moral facts because, first, our moral opinions matter deeply to us; and second, our moral opinions are usually universal - not restricted to place and time - if we think slavery is wrong, then we think it always was and will be wrong."

Sure, but in an amoral universe, that's just opinion, not moral fact.

That is: A moral 'fact' is only a 'fact' if it exists independent of what you or I think. Slavery is wrong cuz individuals own themselves, not 'slavery is wrong cuz I think individuals own themselves'. The first is fact; the second, just an opinon.

[Immanuel Can]

I think you rely overmuch on intuition.

I'm not talking about intuition. Not at all. I'm talking about genuine encounter. That's quite different.

One has some power of regulation over one's intuitions. But when one meets someone in reality, then one's intuitions have no power. In fact, the reality of the One confronting you dispels whatever intuitions you may have.

God is an important idea , and moderns want and need to have God presented in explicit language or in poetic language but not in the ritualistic old time language game .

Perhaps. But as the great theologian Mick Jagger once intoned, "You can't always get what you want."

Modern man may prefer a weak and neutral "god," a mere conceptual toy with which to play, or a pretty poem he can quote. Whether or not that's what he can have in reality is quite a different question.

I note that Jesus of the Gospels was poetic in his use of parables suited to his audience and which still resonate meaning.

Indeed so. But Jesus Christ was no poem. He was a reality. And when people forgot that, they encountered an unmatched firmness. The reality of him pushed back against all their expectations and destroyed them. Again, you have that phenomenon of the personal encounter destroying the merely intuitive.

There is no codified sacred law about abortion.' Thou shalt not murder' applies to both the pros and the cons regarding clinical abortion.

No, actually. It pretty clearly forbids murder.

It's not "Thou shalt not murder unless thou choosest so to do," it's "Thou shalt not..."

[Dachshund]

Instead, moral assertions express value-judgements, which are subjective.

A thing's value is determined by its relationship to some end, purpose, goal, or objective. If a thing supports, furthers, or favors some particular end or purpose it has a positive value, such as good or right. If thing undercuts, inhibits, negates some particular end or purpose it has a negative value, such as bad or wrong.

Since only human beings have ends, purposes, goals, or objectives, values only pertain to human choices and actions. While there is no metaphysical predetermined life goal any individual must choose, and historically human beings have chosen almost every possible objective to live for, one's own values will be determined by one's own personal objectives.

Whatever an individual chooses as their objective is relative and subjective only in the sense that one's goals must be individually chosen and one's values will be related to their objective. With regard to anyone's personal objectives, however, what will be a positive value and what will be a negative value is absolute, determined by the nature of reality, the nature of the physical world and one's own nature as a human being. One may choose anything as their personal objective or purpose, but cannot do just anything to achieve that objective or purpose.

I have some objections to the ethical views posted above.


First is the claim that a thing' only has value (worth) relative to how effective an instrument it is in furthering the persuance of some future-oriented human purpose, objective or goal So, for example, in certain parts of China, dogs have no value to the local inhabitants except as things/objects that exist as a potentially source of food. To this end they round up stays dogs. place them in cases, feed them (and breed them) until they have acquired the ideal body weight. They are then slaughtered and butchered' to harvest cuts of flesh which can be cooked and eaten. Another example would be the "sport" of fox-hunting in England that was a traditional past-time for the landed gentry, or other traditional English "sports" like grouse and pheasant shooting where animals are hunted for the amusement of human beings and often endure terrible suffering and physical pain before dying. The claim that something only has value (moral worth) if it can be utilised (instrumentally) by an individual human being to further the achievement of some future objective/s or goal/s that nature of which he or she has decided, denies the notion of intrinsic value. And I think that a good case can be made in support of the claim that some non-human things, do indeed, possess intrinsic value.


Certain animals can be used to explain the moral concept of intrinsic value. Consider, for instance, there are many animals who are not merely alive and conscious, but who possess sufficient cognitive capacity to be what the late philosopher of Ethics, Tom Regan, termed "experiencing subjects-of-a-life" "Subjects-of-a-life" are characterised by a set of features including: beliefs; desires; memory; feelings; self-consciousness; a emotional life; a sense of their own future; an ability to initiate action to pursue goals and an existence that is logically independent of its utility for others - of being useful to anyone else's interests. Because of this this inherent value, a "subjects-of-a-life" have rights to protect this value and not to be harmed.Other subjects have a duty to respect these rights. All mature, normal mammals fit the condition for being the "subject-of-a-life." Therefore we (human beings) have natural duties towards these animals and should treat them equally and not interfere with their normal life course. In sum, those animals who satisfy the "Subject-of-a-life" criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value - inherent value, and they are not to be treated as mere "receptacles." Being a "subject-of-a-life" is a criterion for inclusion as an individual in the moral community. The "subject-of-a-life", in short, is a SOMEBODY - not just life, but life that has a SUBJECT.


So, I do not agree with you that only human beings engage in future -oriented, goal - directed actions/behaviours, or that a (moral) value is something that only exists in the context of a socially isolated human INDIVIDUAL'S choices and actions, The daily conduct of my own dachshund dog gives lie to both of these assertions.



You say that: "...one's own values will be determined by one's own (choice of) personal objectives" and "one may choose anything as their personal or purpose" (telos). Therefore, you are suggesting that one is absolutely free to determine his/her own values in accordance with a pretty much infinite number of possible personal objectives/ goals/purposes. Right?


First of all, the idea that one's values are determined by their choice of future objective or goal is arse about. Very often the case is that one future-oriented, objectives and goals ( that which is in ones self-interest to achieve) are inculcated by external, environmental factors/agents. That is, values are mostly passed down from one generation to the next. Sometimes, however values are innate, for example, mainstream psychologists agree that human babies can identify right from wrong even at the age of 6 months.


More generally, we "absorb" ( in an "osmotic" fashion) values from: the family we have; from the kind of society we live in; the schools/colleges we attended or the religious principles we were taught, if any, while we were growing up. We might subsequently come to "discover" these values, and then decide whether we want to accept or reject them, and actively seek alternative values for ourselves. It is extremely difficult, however, to create meaningful values for oneself out of "thin air", unless, of course, you happen to be a real-life Nietzschian Superman.


You argue in your post that : "What will be a positive value and what will be a negative value is ...determined by the nature of reality, the nature of the physical world and one' own nature as a human being.


As to the nature of absolute/ultimate reality, I have no idea what it is like. And if you're in the same boat, I think we'll put it to one side for now. Next, as to human nature as it exists in the "physical world" (here on Earth) we basically have no detailed or even remotely comprehensive knowledge either. Why? Because human nature is simply too complex for us to have unravelled its mysteries. We do, however know some very general, very basic things things about it."


One fundamental truth about human nature was identified a long time ago in classical Athens by Aristotle. In Politics he wrote:


"Man is by nature zoon politikon (a social animal)...Anyone who either cannot lead the common life or is so self-sufficient as not to need to is either a beast or a god."


Recent research in neuroscience has validated Aristotle's claim. For a good, brief introduction to this body of literature, if you "google up" a free-access article in "The Atlantic" magazine that outlines the research work of Matthew Liebermann ( a US social psychologist and neuroscientist) entitled "Social: Why Our Brains are Wired to Connect." Very briefly, Liebermann argues from his research evidence that the brain is the centre of the social self, its PRIMARY purpose is social thinking; it is INHERENTLY social. For example, when we are not engaged in carrying out some active task such as, say: playing a video game, playing tennis, trying to solve a maths problem, attempting to fix a broken car engine, walking a tight-rope, writing an essay on ethics, etc - when we take a break from active tasks like these that require our focused attention/concentration and give ourselves a break/ have some "down time"/ "chill out"/ rest our brains for a while, what happens is that our brains immediately and automatically flick into what neuroscientists call the "default network". What is remarkable is that the "default network" is a neural configuration that is almost IDENTICAL to the one that our brains use for social thinking. That is, the "default network" directs us to think about other people's minds - their thoughts, feelings, moods, motivations, goals and so on.


Before I continue, could I point out that in what follows, I am going to use the descriptor, "flourishing", in place of "happy". Instead of saying, for example, "Most normal, adult human beings try to survive and live a happy life", I will say instead: "Most normal adult human being try to survive and flourish in their lives." ( For me, a human life that is vibrantly, flourishing is basically is infused with what I personally think Nietzsche meant by his notion of "The Will to Power").In short, "flourishing" is an authentic way of living that orient's one's life towards the highest hedonic well-being ("feeling good") and the highest eudaimonic well-being ("functioning well").


Presuming that most, normal, adults would like to be "flourishing" over the course of live a long and healthy (medically) life. Affirming pro-social values and engaging in pro-social behaviours would seems to be very wise advice. Some examples of pro-social values are: compassion/empathy; sympathy; charity; mercy; fairness; benevolence, caregiving, toleration; reciprocal altruism; kindness, cooperation etc. All values are hierarchically ordered along a vertical axis by their relative importance and it seems to me that pro-social (moral) values must be the most important, though even among the (a hypothetically) fully comprehensive group of pro-social (moral) values some will be more relatively more important (ranked "higher") in the overall hierarchy of (moral) values than others. To conclude, I will set down the most important five moral, pro-social values in the paragraph below.


Briefly, our evolved pro-social mental tools have provided us with social intelligence in order to live peacefully amongst one another since the dawn of early humankind. We have both an intuitive capacity to act right or wrong but also reflective (rational) capacities to negotiate moral norms, so that we can ensure the moral fibre and well-being of our social world. There are FIVE moral pillars of our pro-social mechanisms of intuitive morality, social exchange ( i.e; cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit), and respectful deference for authority:



(1) ALTRUISM

(2) FAIRNESS

(3) HONESTY

(4) COMPETENT SELF-CONTROL

(5) DEFERENCE and RESPECT FOR LEGITIMATE/BONE FIDE AUTHORITY




Regards

Dachshund

[Peter Holmes]

"Please can you produce an example and show how it describes a feature of reality correctly."

I can tell you what I think.

I believe myself to be a free will (of the libertarian agent causation variety). My experience of myself, in the world, convinces me of this.

Thing is: reality seems to be deterministic, seems to disallow free will (particularly the agent causation I adhere to).

So: cause & effect, in some way, is wrong or I'm wrong.

I don't think C & E is wrong, don't think I'm wrong, so -- seems to me -- there must be some element to me, some lil extra 'sumthin' wedged deep down into the meat of me that makes me a C & E defyin' free will.

And if there's a lil sumthin' extra wedged deep into the meat of me, it must have a supra-natural quality (cuz if it were wholly of nature, I wouldn't be defyin' C & E, would I?).

So: I surmised this spark, this soul, this non-deterministic algorithm, the lil sumthin' extra, comes from somewhere, mebbe from someone.

I settled on 'someone', a Prime Mover (makin' me, a formerly indifferent agnostic, a somewhat less indifferent deist).

Now: as a free will, there are things that seem natural and normal for me. For example: I believe I own 'me', believe I have a natural and normal right and desire to preserve myself, use myself, and defend myself, and an obligation to offer defense to folks who want it (hence my repeated inquiry 'person or meat?'). And since my being a free will is a gift of Crom (the face, name, and personality I hang on Prime Mover), my bein a free will, my bein' my first and best property, is intrinsic to me and not an issue to be determined by community or government.

So: me, as free will (and you as free will too), is an objective truth, a moral fact, and from that moral fact extend other moral facts.

Anyway: that's how I see it.

#

"We can think there are moral facts because, first, our moral opinions matter deeply to us; and second, our moral opinions are usually universal - not restricted to place and time - if we think slavery is wrong, then we think it always was and will be wrong."

Sure, but in an amoral universe, that's just opinion, not moral fact.

That is: A moral 'fact' is only a 'fact' if it exists independent of what you or I think. Slavery is wrong cuz individuals own themselves, not 'slavery is wrong cuz I think individuals own themselves'. The first is fact; the second, just an opinon.

I think I follow the reasoning that got you to believing you have a soul that came from a prime mover.

I think it's complete nonsense, but that's irrelevant. What matters is the mistake here: 'So: me, as free will (and you as free will too), is an objective truth, a moral fact, and from that moral fact extend other moral facts.' It may be that each of us is a libertarian-style free agent - that could be a fact - but that fact would have absolutely no moral implications. You can't segue from fact to moral fact without showing the connection.

Cutting out the folksy autobiography, can you cite a moral fact and show why it describes a feature of reality correctly, independent of judgement, belief or opinion?

[Peter Holmes]

No, it doesn't make it clearer.

Oh, sorry. I'll try again.

The good is that which is in harmony with a god's nature, and the not-good is that which isn't in harmony with a god's nature.

But this is circular. A god is good. What is goodness? Harmoniousness with a god's nature. It doesn't explain what goodness is. It's vacuous.

It's not actually circular. It's recursive. And there's all the difference in the world.

If I ask a question like, "Are you single, or are you a bachelor?" I have asked a nonsense question, because of recursion. I've presented the two (potential) synonyms as if they were a dichotomy, an "either-or," when they are a "both." Or if I say, "Is this figure curvilinear or circular?" I've made a similar error: the answer is simply "both."

The answer to the question "Is God's nature good, or is good God's nature?" can only be "Yes." Anything else is nonsense -- but not because of any fault in the answer. The fault is in the supposition of the question.

To put it as clearly as I can: "good" is a property that does not exist apart from the Creator of all things. And that just makes sense, if you think about it: if He's the Creator of all things, how can "good" be anything by a property defined by relation to His intention? Yet, your question supposes a kind of "good" that is NOT a synonym for "harmonious with the character of the Creator."

But if you believe, as I do, in the Creator and His goodness, you can only realize that they are coextensive concepts, like "single" and "bachelor."

Nonsense. If 'the good' or 'goodness' is a property (a predicate), then it is independent of the subject of which it is predicated. But if a god and goodness are identical (coextensive?), then goodness is not a property of the god. It is just another name for the god. So ditch the god - which was an invention anyway. Goodness we can understand and know about.

And you haven't answered the question. If The Creator commands us to do something wicked, should we do it? 'The Creator is goodness' isn't an answer.

[henry quirk]

"can you cite a moral fact and show why it describes a feature of reality correctly"

I think I did that already. To my satisfaction: I've cited a moral fact and tied it directly (and correctly) to a feature of reality. You disagree.

Since I got no time or taste for ridin' a merry go 'round today: we -- you and me -- might just have to agree to disagree.

[Peter Holmes]

"can you cite a moral fact and show why it describes a feature of reality correctly"

I think I did that already. To my satisfaction: I've cited a moral fact and tied it directly (and correctly) to a feature of reality. You disagree.

Since I got no time or taste for ridin' a merry go 'round today: we -- you and me -- might just have to agree to disagree.

Sorry, I missed the moral fact, so I'm none the wiser. Thanks anyway.

[Immanuel Can]

Nonsense. If 'the good' or 'goodness' is a property (a predicate), then it is independent of the subject of which it is predicated.

Roundness is not "independent of" circles. But in the case of the Creator, you've got an additional problem with that objection: namely, that the One who makes all things, the universe's First Cause, if you will, cannot possibly be defined by something beyond Him. Rather, He is the source of the meaning of the predications.

If there are any predications that can be made of him, they come only after-the-fact, by way of retrospective analogy from the creation -- as when one looks at a painting and calls the artist, whom one has not seen, "talented." One is only predicating from the creation back to the creator.

But if a god and goodness are identical (coextensive?), then goodness is not a property of the god.

Think again. "Singleness" is a predication of "bachelorhood." The terms are coextensive, because essentially they point to exactly the same fact.

Goodness we can understand and know about.

How?

And you haven't answered the question. If The Creator commands us to do something wicked, should we do it?

Your question contains an assumption of distinction between "the good" and "God's nature." That's an errant dichotomy, I'm suggesting. "A wicked thing commanded by God" would be like "a dry thing covered with water": it's a contradiction in terms, not a rational question, if Theistic suppositions are correct.

How can you ask a Theist to answer a question that requires him to be an Atheist?

Or do you mean only, "If God commanded something Peter Holmes chooses to designate as 'wicked,' should you do it?" Subjective morality would make that the question you're asking. In which case, the answer would have to be, "Who told Peter Holmes what good and evil are, and why should anybody -- let alone the Creator -- take his subjective impressions seriously?"

I don't think that within Moral Subjectivism there is any answer to that.

[Belinda]

Peter: Koran, Ten Commandments, Litany of Curses( Deuteronomy 27:15-26),Code of Hammurabi, Lex Talionis for examples. Civil law is usually founded upon religious moral codes.

No doubt. But what and where is 'the moral law', and who codified it? You've just listed various moral codes, some claiming divine sanctification. And some of them contain disgustingly immoral 'laws', in my opinion. So who says if a law is morally good?

Why ask me, Peter?You can find out the information as well as I can. You are just as capable as I of evaluating the various moral codes .That is your business surely? It's not my place to inform you about what is good and what is evil.