Pay attention. I said 'Agreed, any description - and therefore any truth-claim - is within a descriptive context, with a conventional use of signs. So what we mean when we say a factual assertion is true is what constitutes what we call truth - and therefore what we call facts.' What you call 'within a framework' is what I call 'within a descriptive context'. We're agreeing here - please don't misrepresent what I say.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 28, 2020 8:29 amYou are still very blind on the truth.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu May 28, 2020 7:20 am Your theory of frameworks doesn't do the work that you think it does.
Agreed, any description - and therefore any truth-claim - is within a descriptive context, with a conventional use of signs. So what we mean when we say a factual assertion is true is what constitutes what we call truth - and therefore what we call facts.
But 'what we mean when we say a factual assertion is true' is that its truth-value is independent from opinion, given the way we use the signs involved in that context. So what we call truth is very explicitly not a matter of intersubjectve consensus - of collective opinion.
I agree the truth-value of a fact is independent from an individual's opinion and beliefs.
But that objective fact [whilst independent in one phase] and even the referent-of-that-fact cannot ultimately be totally independent from the collective's involvement via emergence and confirmed by intersubjective consensus.
You are claiming for a 'fact' and 'truth' that are not qualified to any Framework, but you are ignorant you are grounding your 'fact' and 'truth' on some kind of Framework [i.e. Philosophical Realism and linguistics] which ultimately are not realistic but only produce illusions.
You got dig deeply to understand how you are caught in this deep hole and conundrum you are ignorant of.
Your mistake is in saying that, because facts are always within a descriptive context - a 'framework' - then any descriptive context can produce facts - so what you call a moral framework can produce facts. And that generalised conclusion is patently false.
For example, in astrology, human personality has twelve types according to birth date. So, given your claim, it's a fact that all Librans are indecisive, and so on. I assume you agree that's nonsense.
So, what's the difference between a descriptive context (a 'framework') that can produce facts, and one that can't? It can only be the evidence for the factual claims within that descriptive context. So, in a given context, with given criteria, a stick is 1m long - and you agree that 'the truth-value of a fact is independent from an individual's opinion and beliefs.' Because the stick is a feature of reality, the assertion 'the stick is 1m long' is true, regardless of opinion, given the context and criteria of the claim.
Now, back to what you call the 'moral framework'. What feature of reality can possibly confirm the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong', in the way that the stick confirms the assertion 'the stick is 1m long'? Is the moral wrongness of slavery a feature of reality? Is the indecisiveness of Librans a feature of reality?
As I said, your theory of frameworks doesn't establish the factual nature of moral assertions. Back to the drawing board.
This is ridiculous. I've never advocated moral relativism or skepticism. My argument is against moral objectivism.
The moral relativism [or moral skepticism] you are banking on could possibly exterminate the human species in the future in the hands of humans.