The rule has no truth-value. The rule is what establishes the criteria and mechanisms by which we determine truth-value.
Without axiomatic rules you cannot assert anything!
If we take "=" to mean "compare two things to one another" then the proposition "A=A" can be interpreted as "Is A the same as A"?
Then we can have two different rules/axioms.
* A=A ⇒ ⊤ (two things can be the same)
* A=A ⇒ ⊥ (two things can never be the same)
Which one is "correct"? It's a matter of choice!
The same goes with things you classify as 'errors'.
In order to assert error-value - you necessarily have a set of rules.
The consequence of the above is that both truth-value; error-value or any assertion for that matter is a function of choice. The choice of rules you adhere to.
Since rules are prescriptive by definition it leaves us in a very precarious paradox: How do we decide which prescriptions to adhere to? What if we choose different rules?
The rule has no truth-value. Choosing to adhere or ignore any particular rule produces different truth-value for the same grammatical proposition.
You are failing to recognise that when you have overlapping definitions you are already guilty of a contradiction.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Jan 13, 2019 8:48 pm Here's the conflation and confusion at work. You're mistaking the application of rules (we call this a rock and this a pebble) for the things and properties we talk about, using the rules. Things and properties don't name, categorise and describe themselves. That thing, with those properties, is not in itself a rock or a pebble - so, of course, we can call it either or both.
A thing can not be two different things at the same time and in the same sense.
If some rocks are pebbles then necessarily some things are "rocks" and "pebbles" at the same time and in the same sense.
This violates the law of non-contradiction. And you are yet to answer whether you have chosen to adhere to it or not...
Sorry. Your premise is entirely artificial.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Jan 13, 2019 8:48 pm If you mean that the social behaviour we describe as morally good and bad is not a linguistic matter - that's trivially true, and also not the moot point. The issue is whether a moral assertion is factual, so that morality is objective (a factual matter). No demonstration so far.
Animals do not have spoken or written language yet they exhibit morality.
To insist that morality is all about the truth-value of the linguistic assertion "murder is wrong" is a fundamental misconceptualisation of morality and objectivity.
Nobody can meet the subjective criteria which you have chosen as the mark of "objective morality".
It is a confirmation bias. A self-fulfilling prophecy that “morality is linguistic”.
Logic/language is constructive and constructed.
Objectivity is constructive and constructed.
Morality is constructive and constructed.
Society is constructive and constructed.
Objective morality is constructed and goes hand-in-hand with social contract theory.