What could make morality objective?

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

Moderators: AMod, iMod

Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Fri Apr 16, 2021 1:30 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Apr 16, 2021 1:04 pm The expression 'a true objective fact' is a complete mess. Could there be a false fact, or a subjective fact?

It's because what we call truth, facts and objectivity are what we say they are - that our saying an assertion is true doesn't mean it must be true - or even that it's factual at all.
On my view there are subjective facts.

"Subjective" refers to mental phenomena. There are facts about mental phenomena. So there are subjective facts.

An example is "Joe feels that Stravinsky is the best composer." That's a subjective fact, a fact about Joe's mental phenomena.
I agree with you on this to a degree.

I would put the terms subjective, fact, mental phenomena aside in this case as they are very confusing.
Let's focus on what is really real.

Basically "Joe feels that Stravinsky is the best composer" is a real feature and part and parcel of reality.
When "Joe feels that Stravinsky is the best composer" and expressed it, the feeling is represented by real neuronal activities which is generic to all humans when they feel a 'thing' is the 'best'.
'Feeling' in this case is attributable to its physical referent.

In another case, when Joe feels hungry, there are two sets of physical process, i.e.
1. the generic preprogrammed hunger driver that trigger hunger,
2. the process that trigger the feeling of hunger onto Joe's consciousness.

Both 1 and 2 are real physical things.

Similarly, when Joe feels any moral elements or is driven to moral acts, there are also two sets of physical processes, i.e.
1. the generic preprogrammed moral driver that drive moral actions
2. the process that execute moral actions or sensing goodness or evilness re morality.

Both 1 and 2 are real physical things related to morality proper.
Since these are verifiable and justifiable physical moral things which are universal in all humans, therefore morality-proper is objective, i.e. independent of anyone's opinions or beliefs.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Apr 16, 2021 4:12 pm It's a fact that water is H2O.
Objectively speaking, water is H2O.
It's true that water is H2O.

Those are assertions with a demonstrable truth-value. They claim something about reality that is or isn't the case. And because it demonstrably is the case, these factual assertions are true.

Now do the same demonstration with the assertion 'slavery is wrong'. Is the wrongness of slavery a thing that is or isn't the case? Could the assertion 'slavery is wrong' be false? If not, in what sense could it be true?
Your above is rhetorical and hiding something mystical in those plain unsubstantiated statements.

To get to the point,
Water is a real thing which is part and parcel of reality; it is represented by its chemical symbols, i.e. H20 as verified and justified empirically and philosophically as true and objective within the scientific-chemistry FSK.

So
The generic inhibition in all humans i.e. 'a human ought-not-to kill humans' is a real thing which is part and parcel of reality; it is verified and justified empirically and philosophically as true and objective within the scientific-chemistry FSK and imported into the moral FSK as a real thing of morality-proper.
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 4548
Joined: Wed Aug 03, 2016 7:18 pm
Location: NYC Man

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 5:05 am
Both 1 and 2 are real physical things related to morality proper.
Since these are verifiable and justifiable physical moral things which are universal in all humans, therefore morality-proper is objective, i.e. independent of anyone's opinions or beliefs.
Aside from disagreement about how to use the word "objective," no, that would NOT be independent of anyone's opinions or beliefs. The physical phenomena in question are identical to opinions and beliefs.

Aside from that, there are NO universal moral xs. This is trivially the case. Any moral x you suggest will have dissenters who feel differently. That can't be the case of any moral x is universal.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Terrapin Station wrote: Fri Apr 16, 2021 1:30 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Apr 16, 2021 1:04 pm The expression 'a true objective fact' is a complete mess. Could there be a false fact, or a subjective fact?

It's because what we call truth, facts and objectivity are what we say they are - that our saying an assertion is true doesn't mean it must be true - or even that it's factual at all.
On my view there are subjective facts.

"Subjective" refers to mental phenomena. There are facts about mental phenomena. So there are subjective facts.

An example is "Joe feels that Stravinsky is the best composer." That's a subjective fact, a fact about Joe's mental phenomena.
Okay, I understand your distinction between 'in a mind' (subjective) and 'outside a mind' (objective). And, as you know, I think that minds, like all abstract or non-physical things, are misleading metaphysical fictions - so that your account of the subjective/objective distinction is incorrect.

I think that what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts; and that what we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case. From this, it follows that what we call subjectivity is dependence on - or being a matter of - opinion, judgement or belief.

To apply this to your example: if Joe feels that Stravinsky is the best composer, that is a fact - a feature of reality that is the case - and so the factual assertion 'Joe feels that Stravinsky is the best composer' is true, regardless of anyone's opinion. The fact that someone has a (subjective) opinion isn't a subjective fact. The very expression 'subjective fact' is incoherent. There are just facts: features of reality that are or were the case.

However, the assertion 'Stravinsky is the best composer' expresses an opinion, as does the assertion 'abortion is morally wrong'. With these assertions, we've moved away from the factual, and therefore objectivity, and into the subjective. There is no feature of reality that is 'being the best composer' or 'being morally wrong' - which is why opinion, judgement or belief is all that can be appealed to to justify those assertions.

I appreciate that you and I won't agree about this - but at least here's my argument.
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 4548
Joined: Wed Aug 03, 2016 7:18 pm
Location: NYC Man

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 11:54 am Okay, I understand your distinction between 'in a mind' (subjective) and 'outside a mind' (objective). And, as you know, I think that minds, like all abstract or non-physical things, are misleading metaphysical fictions - so that your account of the subjective/objective distinction is incorrect.

I think that what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts;
So, you obviously think that there's "that which has an opinion"--that is, there are physical brain processes that amount to an individual having an opinion, for example. That's all (well, or it's simply the sort of thing) that I'm referring to by "mind." Those physical brain processes that amount to opinions, thoughts, concepts, desires, and so on. "Mind" is just a term for lumping all of that sort of stuff together.
To apply this to your example: if Joe feels that Stravinsky is the best composer, that is a fact - a feature of reality that is the case - and so the factual assertion 'Joe feels that Stravinsky is the best composer' is true, regardless of anyone's opinion.

Well, not regardless of Joe's opinion, obviously. But sure, regardless of anyone else's opinion. It's a fact because it is Joe's opinion.
(Also, I wouldn't say that anything is true regardless of anyone's opinion, but I don't want to get into a big tangent about truth theory. I'd say that it's a fact regardless of anyone's opinion (except for Joe's). Joe's opinion is necessary for it to be a fact, which isn't saying that we need Joe's approval that it's a fact for it to be a fact, of course.)
However, the assertion 'Stravinsky is the best composer' expresses an opinion, as does the assertion 'abortion is morally wrong'. With these assertions, we've moved away from the factual, and therefore objectivity, and into the subjective. There is no feature of reality that is 'being the best composer' or 'being morally wrong' - which is why opinion, judgement or belief is all that can be appealed to to justify those assertions.
Normally if someone says "Abortion is morally wrong" I'd say that they're giving their opinion, and I'd not expect that they believe it to be anything other than that unless they explicitly specify otherwise. It's not necessary for them to say "In my opinion" every time they state something like that. It should be understood that that's their opinion. The unusual idea would be if they're claiming that it's something other than their (or other persons') opinion(s). So I wouldn't say that those utterances move away from something factual. It's just that it's a fact of what their opinion happens to be. They're only moving away from something factual if they say that "Abortion is wrong independent of anyone's opinion."

It seems like maybe you're using "subjective" in a way that kind of "devalues" it, which I think we need to be careful of, because it's why there's resistance from some corners to saying that morality is subjective. I'm in no way devaluing subjective things. I'm just locating them in the correct location (as a subset of brain phenomena), and that they occur in the location they do also has some upshots re implications (for example, with respect to normativity).
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 10:43 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 5:05 am
Both 1 and 2 are real physical things related to morality proper.
Since these are verifiable and justifiable physical moral things which are universal in all humans, therefore morality-proper is objective, i.e. independent of anyone's opinions or beliefs.
Aside from disagreement about how to use the word "objective," no, that would NOT be independent of anyone's opinions or beliefs. The physical phenomena in question are identical to opinions and beliefs.
The physical phenomena in question cannot be confirmed as identical to opinions and beliefs.
Opinions and beliefs are only identical to physical phenomena when they are verified and justified within a FSK e.g. as a scientific knowledge which is then independent of opinions and beliefs.
Aside from that, there are NO universal moral xs. This is trivially the case. Any moral x you suggest will have dissenters who feel differently. That can't be the case of any moral x is universal.
What I have demonstrated is there are universal physical moral* things [drivers] in the human brain just as there are are universal physical sexual drivers [represented by specific sets of neurons and chemical] in the human brain.
*morality-proper as defined.
These universal physical moral* things [drivers] can be tested and confirmed scientifically and when subsumed within a moral FSK, they are real moral things.

If you disagree, give more substantial counter arguments rather than say no, no, not this, not that .. ad nauseam.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 12:15 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 11:54 am Okay, I understand your distinction between 'in a mind' (subjective) and 'outside a mind' (objective). And, as you know, I think that minds, like all abstract or non-physical things, are misleading metaphysical fictions - so that your account of the subjective/objective distinction is incorrect.

I think that what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts;
So, you obviously think that there's "that which has an opinion"--that is, there are physical brain processes that amount to an individual having an opinion, for example. That's all (well, or it's simply the sort of thing) that I'm referring to by "mind." Those physical brain processes that amount to opinions, thoughts, concepts, desires, and so on. "Mind" is just a term for lumping all of that sort of stuff together.
That is a good point which I agrees with.
When someone expressed an opinion or belief, there are corresponding real physical brain matters and processes that enable the opinion or belief.
Whether the opinion or belief is true or not to reality is a different issue.
However, the assertion 'Stravinsky is the best composer' expresses an opinion, as does the assertion 'abortion is morally wrong'. With these assertions, we've moved away from the factual, and therefore objectivity, and into the subjective. There is no feature of reality that is 'being the best composer' or 'being morally wrong' - which is why opinion, judgement or belief is all that can be appealed to to justify those assertions.
Normally if someone says "Abortion is morally wrong" I'd say that they're giving their opinion, and I'd not expect that they believe it to be anything other than that unless they explicitly specify otherwise. It's not necessary for them to say "In my opinion" every time they state something like that. It should be understood that that's their opinion. The unusual idea would be if they're claiming that it's something other than their (or other persons') opinion(s). So I wouldn't say that those utterances move away from something factual. It's just that it's a fact of what their opinion happens to be. They're only moving away from something factual if they say that "Abortion is wrong independent of anyone's opinion."
1. When someone expresses "Abortion is morally wrong" they are expressing a statement which could be an opinion or beliefs.
Just like my points above, there are physical brain matters and processes that correspond to the activity of making the expression "Abortion is morally wrong".

2. Take for example, the expression by someone 'killing is morally wrong'.
This expression like any expression is manifested from physical brain matters and processes that enable the expression 'killing is morally wrong'.

3. The reality is the above expression 'killing is morally wrong' is represented by activities of the brain functions that enable one to make expressions of opinions and beliefs, i.e. involving the inference function, the linguistic functions, memory, concepts, etc.

4. However the expression 'killing is morally wrong' has nothing to do with [independent to] the inherent moral drivers and functions [humans ought not to kill humans] which has its corresponding physical referents in terms of its specific neural correlates and chemical activities.

5. This is what I meant when I insisted 'moral' judgments, decisions, opinions, beliefs are independent of morality-proper.
Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615

6. So there are two independent physical functions in the human brain on the issue of drivers in expressing 'moral opinions' and the physical moral drivers.

7. The neural drives for expressing opinions, beliefs can manifest all sorts of opinion and beliefs which need not be merely 'moral' related but can be any type of opinions or belief.

8. The physical moral drivers [represented by physical neurons and chemicals] in the brain deal with moral matters only.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 6:10 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 12:15 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 11:54 am Okay, I understand your distinction between 'in a mind' (subjective) and 'outside a mind' (objective). And, as you know, I think that minds, like all abstract or non-physical things, are misleading metaphysical fictions - so that your account of the subjective/objective distinction is incorrect.

I think that what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts;
So, you obviously think that there's "that which has an opinion"--that is, there are physical brain processes that amount to an individual having an opinion, for example. That's all (well, or it's simply the sort of thing) that I'm referring to by "mind." Those physical brain processes that amount to opinions, thoughts, concepts, desires, and so on. "Mind" is just a term for lumping all of that sort of stuff together.
That is a good point which I agrees with.
When someone expressed an opinion or belief, there are corresponding real physical brain matters and processes that enable the opinion or belief.
Whether the opinion or belief is true or not to reality is a different issue.
However, the assertion 'Stravinsky is the best composer' expresses an opinion, as does the assertion 'abortion is morally wrong'. With these assertions, we've moved away from the factual, and therefore objectivity, and into the subjective. There is no feature of reality that is 'being the best composer' or 'being morally wrong' - which is why opinion, judgement or belief is all that can be appealed to to justify those assertions.
Normally if someone says "Abortion is morally wrong" I'd say that they're giving their opinion, and I'd not expect that they believe it to be anything other than that unless they explicitly specify otherwise. It's not necessary for them to say "In my opinion" every time they state something like that. It should be understood that that's their opinion. The unusual idea would be if they're claiming that it's something other than their (or other persons') opinion(s). So I wouldn't say that those utterances move away from something factual. It's just that it's a fact of what their opinion happens to be. They're only moving away from something factual if they say that "Abortion is wrong independent of anyone's opinion."
1. When someone expresses "Abortion is morally wrong" they are expressing a statement which could be an opinion or beliefs.
Just like my points above, there are physical brain matters and processes that correspond to the activity of making the expression "Abortion is morally wrong".

2. Take for example, the expression by someone 'killing is morally wrong'.
This expression like any expression is manifested from physical brain matters and processes that enable the expression 'killing is morally wrong'.

3. The reality is the above expression 'killing is morally wrong' is represented by activities of the brain functions that enable one to make expressions of opinions and beliefs, i.e. involving the inference function, the linguistic functions, memory, concepts, etc.

4. However the expression 'killing is morally wrong' has nothing to do with [independent to] the inherent moral drivers and functions [humans ought not to kill humans] which has its corresponding physical referents in terms of its specific neural correlates and chemical activities.

5. This is what I meant when I insisted 'moral' judgments, decisions, opinions, beliefs are independent of morality-proper.
Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615

6. So there are two independent physical functions in the human brain on the issue of drivers in expressing 'moral opinions' and the physical moral drivers.

7. The neural drives for expressing opinions, beliefs can manifest all sorts of opinion and beliefs which need not be merely 'moral' related but can be any type of opinions or belief.

8. The physical moral drivers [represented by physical neurons and chemicals] in the brain deal with moral matters only.
A physical brain-state that 'corresponds to/with' expressing a moral opinion isn't therefore a 'moral brain-state'. That expression transfers the epithet 'moral' from what it applies to - say, the behaviour caused by the brain-state - to the brain-state itself. Would the expression 'immoral brain-state' refer to the brain-state?

The correct analysis is this: our 'brain-states' cause certain actions; some of those actions can be judged to have moral implications - to be morally right or wrong; our moral judgements 'come from' or 'reflect' or 'manifest' our 'brain-states'.
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 4548
Joined: Wed Aug 03, 2016 7:18 pm
Location: NYC Man

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 8:21 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 6:10 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 12:15 pm

So, you obviously think that there's "that which has an opinion"--that is, there are physical brain processes that amount to an individual having an opinion, for example. That's all (well, or it's simply the sort of thing) that I'm referring to by "mind." Those physical brain processes that amount to opinions, thoughts, concepts, desires, and so on. "Mind" is just a term for lumping all of that sort of stuff together.
That is a good point which I agrees with.
When someone expressed an opinion or belief, there are corresponding real physical brain matters and processes that enable the opinion or belief.
Whether the opinion or belief is true or not to reality is a different issue.

Normally if someone says "Abortion is morally wrong" I'd say that they're giving their opinion, and I'd not expect that they believe it to be anything other than that unless they explicitly specify otherwise. It's not necessary for them to say "In my opinion" every time they state something like that. It should be understood that that's their opinion. The unusual idea would be if they're claiming that it's something other than their (or other persons') opinion(s). So I wouldn't say that those utterances move away from something factual. It's just that it's a fact of what their opinion happens to be. They're only moving away from something factual if they say that "Abortion is wrong independent of anyone's opinion."
1. When someone expresses "Abortion is morally wrong" they are expressing a statement which could be an opinion or beliefs.
Just like my points above, there are physical brain matters and processes that correspond to the activity of making the expression "Abortion is morally wrong".

2. Take for example, the expression by someone 'killing is morally wrong'.
This expression like any expression is manifested from physical brain matters and processes that enable the expression 'killing is morally wrong'.

3. The reality is the above expression 'killing is morally wrong' is represented by activities of the brain functions that enable one to make expressions of opinions and beliefs, i.e. involving the inference function, the linguistic functions, memory, concepts, etc.

4. However the expression 'killing is morally wrong' has nothing to do with [independent to] the inherent moral drivers and functions [humans ought not to kill humans] which has its corresponding physical referents in terms of its specific neural correlates and chemical activities.

5. This is what I meant when I insisted 'moral' judgments, decisions, opinions, beliefs are independent of morality-proper.
Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615

6. So there are two independent physical functions in the human brain on the issue of drivers in expressing 'moral opinions' and the physical moral drivers.

7. The neural drives for expressing opinions, beliefs can manifest all sorts of opinion and beliefs which need not be merely 'moral' related but can be any type of opinions or belief.

8. The physical moral drivers [represented by physical neurons and chemicals] in the brain deal with moral matters only.
A physical brain-state that 'corresponds to/with' expressing a moral opinion isn't therefore a 'moral brain-state'. That expression transfers the epithet 'moral' from what it applies to - say, the behaviour caused by the brain-state - to the brain-state itself. Would the expression 'immoral brain-state' refer to the brain-state?

The correct analysis is this: our 'brain-states' cause certain actions; some of those actions can be judged to have moral implications - to be morally right or wrong; our moral judgements 'come from' or 'reflect' or 'manifest' our 'brain-states'.
There are two different senses of "moral" there. Note that in philosophy, we don't usually use "moral," without other qualifiers, to denote "morally permissible" or "morally obligatory" or anything like that. "Moral" in philosophy rather typically refers to "having to do with judgments of/ about the permissibility/impermissibility (etc.) of behavioral interactions."

A moral utterance is thus an utterance of or about these judgments. It's not saying that the utterance itself is morally permissible whereas an utterance might be morally impermissible. "X is morally impermissible" is a moral utterance just like "X is morally permissible" or "X is morally neutral."

So a "moral brain state" is a brain state of or about judgments of behavioral interactions . It's not a morally permissible (versus morally impermissible) brain state.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 2:24 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 8:21 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 6:10 am
That is a good point which I agrees with.
When someone expressed an opinion or belief, there are corresponding real physical brain matters and processes that enable the opinion or belief.
Whether the opinion or belief is true or not to reality is a different issue.


1. When someone expresses "Abortion is morally wrong" they are expressing a statement which could be an opinion or beliefs.
Just like my points above, there are physical brain matters and processes that correspond to the activity of making the expression "Abortion is morally wrong".

2. Take for example, the expression by someone 'killing is morally wrong'.
This expression like any expression is manifested from physical brain matters and processes that enable the expression 'killing is morally wrong'.

3. The reality is the above expression 'killing is morally wrong' is represented by activities of the brain functions that enable one to make expressions of opinions and beliefs, i.e. involving the inference function, the linguistic functions, memory, concepts, etc.

4. However the expression 'killing is morally wrong' has nothing to do with [independent to] the inherent moral drivers and functions [humans ought not to kill humans] which has its corresponding physical referents in terms of its specific neural correlates and chemical activities.

5. This is what I meant when I insisted 'moral' judgments, decisions, opinions, beliefs are independent of morality-proper.
Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615

6. So there are two independent physical functions in the human brain on the issue of drivers in expressing 'moral opinions' and the physical moral drivers.

7. The neural drives for expressing opinions, beliefs can manifest all sorts of opinion and beliefs which need not be merely 'moral' related but can be any type of opinions or belief.

8. The physical moral drivers [represented by physical neurons and chemicals] in the brain deal with moral matters only.
A physical brain-state that 'corresponds to/with' expressing a moral opinion isn't therefore a 'moral brain-state'. That expression transfers the epithet 'moral' from what it applies to - say, the behaviour caused by the brain-state - to the brain-state itself. Would the expression 'immoral brain-state' refer to the brain-state?

The correct analysis is this: our 'brain-states' cause certain actions; some of those actions can be judged to have moral implications - to be morally right or wrong; our moral judgements 'come from' or 'reflect' or 'manifest' our 'brain-states'.
There are two different senses of "moral" there. Note that in philosophy, we don't usually use "moral," without other qualifiers, to denote "morally permissible" or "morally obligatory" or anything like that. "Moral" in philosophy rather typically refers to "having to do with judgments of/ about the permissibility/impermissibility (etc.) of behavioral interactions."

A moral utterance is thus an utterance of or about these judgments. It's not saying that the utterance itself is morally permissible whereas an utterance might be morally impermissible. "X is morally impermissible" is a moral utterance just like "X is morally permissible" or "X is morally neutral."

So a "moral brain state" is a brain state of or about judgments of behavioral interactions . It's not a morally permissible (versus morally impermissible) brain state.
We physicalists agree that mentalist talk - such as talk about judgements, beliefs and opinions - is just a way of talking about physical, neurological processes: things that go on in brains.

So making a moral judgement is a physical, neurological process. But it makes no sense to call that physical, neurological process 'moral'. That's the category error that VA keeps making. Physical processes just do or don't exist - as do physical actions. The inherent or intrinsic or natural rightness or wrongness, permissibility or impermissibility, obligatoriness or non-obligatoriness that VA asserts don't exist, in brains or anywhere else.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

VA's argument is that morality is objective because humans are programmed neurologically to behave in certain ways. For example, humans are (supposedly) programmed not to kill humans, so that in the assertion 'humans ought not to kill humans', the verb 'ought' does not refer to moral rightness or wrongness, but simply to conformity to programming. So the argument is this:

Humans are programmed not to kill humans; therefore humans ought not to kill humans - because that would be inconsistent with their programming.

And this 'instrumentai' interpretation of words such as 'right', 'wrong', 'ought to' and 'should' in moral assertions is not uncommon. It could be called the goal-consistency approach to morality. The idea is that the moral 'ought' is identical to the 'ought' in 'if we want to drive safely, we ought not to jump the lights'.

But, by this argument, if our goal is patriarchy, then we ought to subjugate women. And if our goal white supremacy, then we ought to oppress non-white people. if moral objectivity is nothing more than goal-consistency, then these are legitimate conclusions.

And 'goal-consistency' moral objectivists who reject these grotesque moral conclusions have to explain with what goal the assertion 'we ought to have this goal' is consistent. And with which goal is the claim 'we ought to act in line with our goals' consistent?

The truth is that 'consistency with neural programming' has the same moral significance as 'obedience to a king or a god' - viz, none whatsoever. The claim 'this action is right because we're programmed to do it' has no place in a rational moral discussion.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 8:21 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 6:10 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 12:15 pm

So, you obviously think that there's "that which has an opinion"--that is, there are physical brain processes that amount to an individual having an opinion, for example. That's all (well, or it's simply the sort of thing) that I'm referring to by "mind." Those physical brain processes that amount to opinions, thoughts, concepts, desires, and so on. "Mind" is just a term for lumping all of that sort of stuff together.
That is a good point which I agrees with.
When someone expressed an opinion or belief, there are corresponding real physical brain matters and processes that enable the opinion or belief.
Whether the opinion or belief is true or not to reality is a different issue.

Normally if someone says "Abortion is morally wrong" I'd say that they're giving their opinion, and I'd not expect that they believe it to be anything other than that unless they explicitly specify otherwise. It's not necessary for them to say "In my opinion" every time they state something like that. It should be understood that that's their opinion. The unusual idea would be if they're claiming that it's something other than their (or other persons') opinion(s). So I wouldn't say that those utterances move away from something factual. It's just that it's a fact of what their opinion happens to be. They're only moving away from something factual if they say that "Abortion is wrong independent of anyone's opinion."
1. When someone expresses "Abortion is morally wrong" they are expressing a statement which could be an opinion or beliefs.
Just like my points above, there are physical brain matters and processes that correspond to the activity of making the expression "Abortion is morally wrong".

2. Take for example, the expression by someone 'killing is morally wrong'.
This expression like any expression is manifested from physical brain matters and processes that enable the expression 'killing is morally wrong'.

3. The reality is the above expression 'killing is morally wrong' is represented by activities of the brain functions that enable one to make expressions of opinions and beliefs, i.e. involving the inference function, the linguistic functions, memory, concepts, etc.

4. However the expression 'killing is morally wrong' has nothing to do with [independent to] the inherent moral drivers and functions [humans ought not to kill humans] which has its corresponding physical referents in terms of its specific neural correlates and chemical activities.

5. This is what I meant when I insisted 'moral' judgments, decisions, opinions, beliefs are independent of morality-proper.
Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615

6. So there are two independent physical functions in the human brain on the issue of drivers in expressing 'moral opinions' and the physical moral drivers.

7. The neural drives for expressing opinions, beliefs can manifest all sorts of opinion and beliefs which need not be merely 'moral' related but can be any type of opinions or belief.

8. The physical moral drivers [represented by physical neurons and chemicals] in the brain deal with moral matters only.
A physical brain-state that 'corresponds to/with' expressing a moral opinion isn't therefore a 'moral brain-state'. That expression transfers the epithet 'moral' from what it applies to - say, the behaviour caused by the brain-state - to the brain-state itself. Would the expression 'immoral brain-state' refer to the brain-state?

The correct analysis is this: our 'brain-states' cause certain actions; some of those actions can be judged to have moral implications - to be morally right or wrong; our moral judgements 'come from' or 'reflect' or 'manifest' our 'brain-states'.
See response here,
viewtopic.php?p=508029#p508029
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 7:26 pm VA's argument is that morality is objective because humans are programmed neurologically to behave in certain ways. For example, humans are (supposedly) programmed not to kill humans, so that in the assertion 'humans ought not to kill humans', the verb 'ought' does not refer to moral rightness or wrongness, but simply to conformity to programming. So the argument is this:

Humans are programmed not to kill humans; therefore humans ought not to kill humans - because that would be inconsistent with their programming.

And this 'instrumentai' interpretation of words such as 'right', 'wrong', 'ought to' and 'should' in moral assertions is not uncommon. It could be called the goal-consistency approach to morality. The idea is that the moral 'ought' is identical to the 'ought' in 'if we want to drive safely, we ought not to jump the lights'.

But, by this argument, if our goal is patriarchy, then we ought to subjugate women. And if our goal white supremacy, then we ought to oppress non-white people. if moral objectivity is nothing more than goal-consistency, then these are legitimate conclusions.

And 'goal-consistency' moral objectivists who reject these grotesque moral conclusions have to explain with what goal the assertion 'we ought to have this goal' is consistent. And with which goal is the claim 'we ought to act in line with our goals' consistent?

The truth is that 'consistency with neural programming' has the same moral significance as 'obedience to a king or a god' - viz, none whatsoever. The claim 'this action is right because we're programmed to do it' has no place in a rational moral discussion.
You are missing a lot of my premises.

I have stated many times, humans are programmed with the 'ought-not_ness' to kill humans and that is a biological and psychological reality represented by physical referents.
It is this same biological 'ought-not_ness' to kill humans that is duplicated within a moral FSK as a moral reality and thus used as a moral standard.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon Apr 19, 2021 4:10 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 7:26 pm VA's argument is that morality is objective because humans are programmed neurologically to behave in certain ways. For example, humans are (supposedly) programmed not to kill humans, so that in the assertion 'humans ought not to kill humans', the verb 'ought' does not refer to moral rightness or wrongness, but simply to conformity to programming. So the argument is this:

Humans are programmed not to kill humans; therefore humans ought not to kill humans - because that would be inconsistent with their programming.

And this 'instrumentai' interpretation of words such as 'right', 'wrong', 'ought to' and 'should' in moral assertions is not uncommon. It could be called the goal-consistency approach to morality. The idea is that the moral 'ought' is identical to the 'ought' in 'if we want to drive safely, we ought not to jump the lights'.

But, by this argument, if our goal is patriarchy, then we ought to subjugate women. And if our goal white supremacy, then we ought to oppress non-white people. if moral objectivity is nothing more than goal-consistency, then these are legitimate conclusions.

And 'goal-consistency' moral objectivists who reject these grotesque moral conclusions have to explain with what goal the assertion 'we ought to have this goal' is consistent. And with which goal is the claim 'we ought to act in line with our goals' consistent?

The truth is that 'consistency with neural programming' has the same moral significance as 'obedience to a king or a god' - viz, none whatsoever. The claim 'this action is right because we're programmed to do it' has no place in a rational moral discussion.
You are missing a lot of my premises.

I have stated many times, humans are programmed with the 'ought-not_ness' to kill humans and that is a biological and psychological reality represented by physical referents.
It is this same biological 'ought-not_ness' to kill humans that is duplicated within a moral FSK as a moral reality and thus used as a moral standard.
No, the biological programming (if it exists) is morally 'neutral'. So the 'oughtness' you refer to is purely mechanical. You're saying that we ought to conform to our programming, whatever that makes us do.

But adopting a moral standard or principle or value is a matter of choice, and is therefore subjective. Nothing forces us to adopt a standard.

So your argument is contradictory: morality is about doing what we're programmed to do; and morality is about choosing a moral standard.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12247
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Mon Apr 19, 2021 7:04 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon Apr 19, 2021 4:10 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Apr 18, 2021 7:26 pm VA's argument is that morality is objective because humans are programmed neurologically to behave in certain ways. For example, humans are (supposedly) programmed not to kill humans, so that in the assertion 'humans ought not to kill humans', the verb 'ought' does not refer to moral rightness or wrongness, but simply to conformity to programming. So the argument is this:

Humans are programmed not to kill humans; therefore humans ought not to kill humans - because that would be inconsistent with their programming.

And this 'instrumentai' interpretation of words such as 'right', 'wrong', 'ought to' and 'should' in moral assertions is not uncommon. It could be called the goal-consistency approach to morality. The idea is that the moral 'ought' is identical to the 'ought' in 'if we want to drive safely, we ought not to jump the lights'.

But, by this argument, if our goal is patriarchy, then we ought to subjugate women. And if our goal white supremacy, then we ought to oppress non-white people. if moral objectivity is nothing more than goal-consistency, then these are legitimate conclusions.

And 'goal-consistency' moral objectivists who reject these grotesque moral conclusions have to explain with what goal the assertion 'we ought to have this goal' is consistent. And with which goal is the claim 'we ought to act in line with our goals' consistent?

The truth is that 'consistency with neural programming' has the same moral significance as 'obedience to a king or a god' - viz, none whatsoever. The claim 'this action is right because we're programmed to do it' has no place in a rational moral discussion.
You are missing a lot of my premises.

I have stated many times, humans are programmed with the 'ought-not_ness' to kill humans and that is a biological and psychological reality represented by physical referents.
It is this same biological 'ought-not_ness' to kill humans that is duplicated within a moral FSK as a moral reality and thus used as a moral standard.
No, the biological programming (if it exists) is morally 'neutral'. So the 'oughtness' you refer to is purely mechanical. You're saying that we ought to conform to our programming, whatever that makes us do.

But adopting a moral standard or principle or value is a matter of choice, and is therefore subjective. Nothing forces us to adopt a standard.

So your argument is contradictory: morality is about doing what we're programmed to do; and morality is about choosing a moral standard.
Do you choose to breathe?
Humans are "programmed" with the oughtness to breathe.
Actually 'ought' is less intense modal verb, it is actually a 'must' or 'imperative' to breathe.

Similarly [not in exact intensity] humans are also "programmed" with the 'ought-not_ness to kill humans'.
Do you choose not to kill humans? or is it something natural and spontaneous that is sustained by some real organic machinery in your brain?
Post Reply