What could make morality objective?

[Belinda]

I care because I believe it does matter who says what. The social context of Sculptors utterance matters because all utterances' meanings are dependent on their social contexts. By "social context" I refer to who said it to whom, and why, when and so forth. Each utterance is embedded not flitting around like some ghost.
The context within which somebody uses computer languages, or formal logic, or mathematics, is ultimately social. Society arbitrates the parameters for interpretation whatever the medium of communications. Even avant garde art has to have some connection with accepted meanings.

But that's only because you are minding the broader audience, and you are minding that somebody outside of the present interaction might judge your words outside of the context in which you've used them. Ignore all of those concerns for a second.

Between you and me - why does it matter whether we classify murder as "right" or "wrong"?

It matters because I respect you as an authentic and knowledgeable contributor to discussions and so I take your opinions seriously. I expect you take my opinions seriously ,if I did not I'd not bother to talk to you. Murder is hardly a topic for small talk.

On second thoughts I maybe misunderstood you. Were you saying like "objectivity and subjectivity are no more than items within an heuristic frame that might help the communicators to decide what is right and what is wrong, and to act accordingly?

[Skepdick]

It matters because I respect you as an authentic and knowledgeable contributor to discussions and so I take your opinions seriously. I expect you take my opinions seriously ,if I did not I'd not bother to talk to you. Murder is hardly a topic for small talk.

I am taking your opinions seriously, which is why I asked you a serious question leading closer to my point.

I find myself invoking this quote by William James too often.

It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insignificance the moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere—no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and some-when.

What is consequentially different if we label things one way or the other?

If there is no consequential difference, then any discussion about the rightness/wrongness of murder; or the subjectivity/objectivity of morality is indeed, nothing but small talk.

The import of such classifications must surely be more than just pinning labels on things.

[Skepdick]

On second thoughts I maybe misunderstood you. Were you saying like "objectivity and subjectivity are no more than items within an heuristic frame that might help the communicators to decide what is right and what is wrong, and to act accordingly?

Something along those lines, yes. Language is merely an instrument for getting minds on the same page.

It doesn't matter whether you SAY that "murder is wrong" and I SAY that "murder is right", and it doesn't matter if I persuade you to SAY the same things that I SAY (murder is right) if both of us continue acting in the same manner in which we have always acted.

And that is - we abhor and discourage murders. We support anti-murder laws and we authorise a government to seek out and incarcerate murderers.

[surreptitious57]

Why would anyone act to discourage something if they believed it was right ?
As there would be no actual reason for them not to do it if that was the case

[Skepdick]

Why would anyone act to discourage something if they believed it was right ?
As there would be no actual reason for them not to do it if that was the case

What's your reason for discouraging something you believe is wrong?

[Belinda]

On second thoughts I maybe misunderstood you. Were you saying like "objectivity and subjectivity are no more than items within an heuristic frame that might help the communicators to decide what is right and what is wrong, and to act accordingly?

Something along those lines, yes. Language is merely an instrument for getting minds on the same page.

It doesn't matter whether you SAY that "murder is wrong" and I SAY that "murder is right", and it doesn't matter if I persuade you to SAY the same things that I SAY (murder is right) if both of us continue acting in the same manner in which we have always acted.

And that is - we abhor and discourage murders. We support anti-murder laws and we authorise a government to seek out and incarcerate murderers.

I'd certainly agree with that. I recommend Hans-Georg Gadamer, hermenuetics philosopher who was partisan to the subjective base of ideas.

[Skepdick]

I'd certainly agree with that. I recommend Hans-Georg Gadamer, hermenuetics philosopher who was partisan to the subjective base of ideas.

Read the wikipedia summary and the first 2-3 pages of his book "Truth and Method"... bought it!

Hopefully I get around to reading it soon.

[surreptitious57]

Too many books too little time but one does the best one can

[Belinda]

I'd certainly agree with that. I recommend Hans-Georg Gadamer, hermenuetics philosopher who was partisan to the subjective base of ideas.

Read the wikipedia summary and the first 2-3 pages of his book "Truth and Method"... bought it!

Hopefully I get around to reading it soon.

Skepdick I am favourably impressed !Thank you.

[Peter Holmes]

In order to demonstrate that 'shooting someone in the face is morally wrong' is a moral fact, the following definition has been offered here.

'Definition of fact
1a: something that has actual existence
example: space exploration is now a fact
b: an actual occurrence
example: prove the fact of damage
2: a piece of information presented as having objective reality
example: These are the hard facts of the case.
3: the quality of being actual : ACTUALITY
example: a question of fact hinges on evidence

Now, if someone shoots someone in the face, that is or rather was an actual occurrence - something that has or rather had actual existence,

But is the moral wrongness of shooting someone in the face 'something that has actual existence' in the way that shooting someone in the face could? Does the moral rightness or wrongness of slavery, abortion or capital punishment exist in the way that slavery, abortion and capital punishment exist?

The supposed gotcha question - would you want to be shot in the face, enslaved, aborted or judicially executed? - is just rhetorical emotonalism - not a cogent argument for the actuality or factuality of moral judgements.

The supposed 'real world' argument - no one wants to be enslaved; therefore the moral wrongness of slavery is a fact - is specious. All the fact that no one wants to be enslaved means is that no one wants to be enslaved. And that doesn't entail the conclusion 'slavery is morally wrong' - though it probably does explain why people may make that moral judgement.

[Peter Holmes]

In order to demonstrate that 'shooting someone in the face is morally wrong' is a moral fact, the following definition has been offered here.

'Definition of fact
1a: something that has actual existence
example: space exploration is now a fact
b: an actual occurrence
example: prove the fact of damage
2: a piece of information presented as having objective reality
example: These are the hard facts of the case.
3: the quality of being actual : ACTUALITY
example: a question of fact hinges on evidence

Now, if someone shoots someone in the face, that is or rather was an actual occurrence - something that has or rather had actual existence,

But is the moral wrongness of shooting someone in the face 'something that has actual existence' in the way that shooting someone in the face could? Does the moral rightness or wrongness of slavery, abortion or capital punishment exist in the way that slavery, abortion and capital punishment exist?

The supposed gotcha question - would you want to be shot in the face, enslaved, aborted or judicially executed? - is just rhetorical emotonalism - not a cogent argument for the actuality or factuality of moral judgements.

The supposed 'real world' argument - no one wants to be enslaved; therefore the moral wrongness of slavery is a fact - is specious. All the fact that no one wants to be enslaved means is that no one wants to be enslaved. And that doesn't entail the conclusion 'slavery is morally wrong' - though it probably does explain why people may make that moral judgement

So the only fact here - the only thing 'that has actual existence' - is that people may believe slavery is morally wrong. And that doesn't mean 'slavery is morally wrong' is a fact. That's just a mistake - the obvious category error of moral objectivism.

[Veritas Aequitas]

In order to demonstrate that 'shooting someone in the face is morally wrong' is a moral fact, the following definition has been offered here.

'Definition of fact
1a: something that has actual existence
example: space exploration is now a fact
b: an actual occurrence
example: prove the fact of damage
2: a piece of information presented as having objective reality
example: These are the hard facts of the case.
3: the quality of being actual : ACTUALITY
example: a question of fact hinges on evidence

Now, if someone shoots someone in the face, that is or rather was an actual occurrence - something that has or rather had actual existence,

But is the moral wrongness of shooting someone in the face 'something that has actual existence' in the way that shooting someone in the face could? Does the moral rightness or wrongness of slavery, abortion or capital punishment exist in the way that slavery, abortion and capital punishment exist?

The supposed gotcha question - would you want to be shot in the face, enslaved, aborted or judicially executed? - is just rhetorical emotonalism - not a cogent argument for the actuality or factuality of moral judgements.

The supposed 'real world' argument - no one wants to be enslaved; therefore the moral wrongness of slavery is a fact - is specious. All the fact that no one wants to be enslaved means is that no one wants to be enslaved. And that doesn't entail the conclusion 'slavery is morally wrong' - though it probably does explain why people may make that moral judgement.

Despite my many explanations it is not likely you will get it, nevertheless here it is again.

Moral judgments themselves made by individuals are not moral facts.
Instead it is a moral fact that individuals are making moral judgments. This is not the main point.

What is pertinent as a moral fact is that inherent ought_ness and ought-not_ness within the human psyche, brain and mind that is represented by a "programmed" neural algorithm comprising related neural connectivities and those to the body.

It is that generic and inherent 'ought-not_ness' to kill another human' within the human brain/mind that is the moral fact.

This moral fact can be verified as evidently not active in one who is a psychopath where neuroscientists can explained via certain lesions and damage to the 'ougth-not_ness' circuitry in the brain.
This moral fact 'no human ought to kill another' is thus representing a state of affair which can be tested to be true or false, thus cognitivism.

The moral fact is real because it has actual existence and a referent and is a state-of-affairs, a matter of moral fact- meeting the definition of fact presented above.

The question of "would you want to be shot in the face, enslaved, killed or subject to other evil acts?" is a real test of the moral fact in action and real life. It is already common knowledge, that no 'normal' person would agree to the above which is in alignment with their inherent moral fact within. It is very possible to ask those question to every 'normal' person in the world and their answer will be no!
There will those who will answer 'Yes' but they can be easily certified by psychiatrists as abnormal within DSM-V and other psychiatric standards.

Shooting someone in the face is also represented by a gradation of the 'ought-not_ness' to commit such an evil acts which could lead to killing, thus it is wrong immorally.

Get it?
I don't think you will get it and will continue to spew your filth on this issue.

[Peter Holmes]

In order to demonstrate that 'shooting someone in the face is morally wrong' is a moral fact, the following definition has been offered here.

'Definition of fact
1a: something that has actual existence
example: space exploration is now a fact
b: an actual occurrence
example: prove the fact of damage
2: a piece of information presented as having objective reality
example: These are the hard facts of the case.
3: the quality of being actual : ACTUALITY
example: a question of fact hinges on evidence

Now, if someone shoots someone in the face, that is or rather was an actual occurrence - something that has or rather had actual existence,

But is the moral wrongness of shooting someone in the face 'something that has actual existence' in the way that shooting someone in the face could? Does the moral rightness or wrongness of slavery, abortion or capital punishment exist in the way that slavery, abortion and capital punishment exist?

The supposed gotcha question - would you want to be shot in the face, enslaved, aborted or judicially executed? - is just rhetorical emotonalism - not a cogent argument for the actuality or factuality of moral judgements.

The supposed 'real world' argument - no one wants to be enslaved; therefore the moral wrongness of slavery is a fact - is specious. All the fact that no one wants to be enslaved means is that no one wants to be enslaved. And that doesn't entail the conclusion 'slavery is morally wrong' - though it probably does explain why people may make that moral judgement.

Despite my many explanations it is not likely you will get it, nevertheless here it is again.

Moral judgments themselves made by individuals are not moral facts.
Instead it is a moral fact that individuals are making moral judgments. This is not the main point.{/quote]

No. This is a category error. which you need to recognise. The fact that people make moral judgements is NOT a 'moral fact'. It isn't even a moral assertion, so it can't be a 'moral fact'.

What is pertinent as a moral fact is that inherent ought_ness and ought-not_ness within the human psyche, brain and mind that is represented by a "programmed" neural algorithm comprising related neural connectivities and those to the body.

It is that generic and inherent 'ought-not_ness' to kill another human' within the human brain/mind that is the moral fact.

Again, no. The fact (if it is a fact) that we're programmed to act in a certain way - that behavioural 'oughts' and 'ought-nots' are buit into our brains - is NOT a 'moral fact', because it isn't even a moral assertion.

Perhaps you need reminding: a moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong, or one that says we ought or ought not to do something. So, pay attention: 'we are programmed to act thus' is NOT a moral assertion. You are making a simple but fundamental mistake.

This moral fact can be verified as evidently not active in one who is a psychopath where neuroscientists can explained via certain lesions and damage to the 'ougth-not_ness' circuitry in the brain.
This moral fact 'no human ought to kill another' is thus representing a state of affair which can be tested to be true or false, thus cognitivism.

The moral fact is real because it has actual existence and a referent and is a state-of-affairs, a matter of moral fact- meeting the definition of fact presented above.

Again, no. What 'has actual existence' (maybe) - and therefore is a fact - is the neural programming with oughts and ought-nots that psychopaths lack. That is the state-of-affairs that actually exists.

Please think about - and directly answer - this question:

If (like all other primates) we were programmed to kill our and our group's enemies, including other humans, would 'we ought to kill some other humans' be what you call a 'moral fact'?

Shooting someone in the face is also represented by a gradation of the 'ought-not_ness' to commit such an evil acts which could lead to killing, thus it is wrong immorally.

Get it?
I don't think you will get it and will continue to spew your filth on this issue.

So, showing why your argument is fallacious is 'spewing filth'?

You sound like someone who knows they've lost the argument.

[Veritas Aequitas]

In order to demonstrate that 'shooting someone in the face is morally wrong' is a moral fact, the following definition has been offered here.

'Definition of fact
1a: something that has actual existence
example: space exploration is now a fact
b: an actual occurrence
example: prove the fact of damage
2: a piece of information presented as having objective reality
example: These are the hard facts of the case.
3: the quality of being actual : ACTUALITY
example: a question of fact hinges on evidence

Now, if someone shoots someone in the face, that is or rather was an actual occurrence - something that has or rather had actual existence,

But is the moral wrongness of shooting someone in the face 'something that has actual existence' in the way that shooting someone in the face could? Does the moral rightness or wrongness of slavery, abortion or capital punishment exist in the way that slavery, abortion and capital punishment exist?

The supposed gotcha question - would you want to be shot in the face, enslaved, aborted or judicially executed? - is just rhetorical emotonalism - not a cogent argument for the actuality or factuality of moral judgements.

The supposed 'real world' argument - no one wants to be enslaved; therefore the moral wrongness of slavery is a fact - is specious. All the fact that no one wants to be enslaved means is that no one wants to be enslaved. And that doesn't entail the conclusion 'slavery is morally wrong' - though it probably does explain why people may make that moral judgement.

Despite my many explanations it is not likely you will get it, nevertheless here it is again.

Moral judgments themselves made by individuals are not moral facts.
Instead it is a moral fact that individuals are making moral judgments. This is not the main point.{/quote]

No. This is a category error. which you need to recognise. The fact that people make moral judgements is NOT a 'moral fact'. It isn't even a moral assertion, so it can't be a 'moral fact'.

As I had stated he above is not the main point about moral facts.
That one is making moral judgments and moral assertions, i.e. the acts is fact. It is a moral fact in a way it is related to morality specifically. Note again, that is not the main point and I am not focused on this.

What is pertinent as a moral fact is that inherent ought_ness and ought-not_ness within the human psyche, brain and mind that is represented by a "programmed" neural algorithm comprising related neural connectivities and those to the body.

It is that generic and inherent 'ought-not_ness' to kill another human' within the human brain/mind that is the moral fact.

Again, no. The fact (if it is a fact) that we're programmed to act in a certain way - that behavioural 'oughts' and 'ought-nots' are buit into our brains - is NOT a 'moral fact', because it isn't even a moral assertion.

Perhaps you need reminding: a moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong, or one that says we ought or ought not to do something. So, pay attention: 'we are programmed to act thus' is NOT a moral assertion. You are making a simple but fundamental mistake.

Point is you are ignorant of what is morality-proper.

As I had stated moral judgments and moral assertions by individuals and groups are not moral facts per se because they are individuals' and groups' opinions and beliefs.

That we are "programmed" with the impulse to act morally is moral fact.
The impulse to act morally is different from the impulse to think and making moral decisions.

• Note the analogy:
  All human are "programmed' with the hunger impulse [represented by a neural algorithm connected to the body] and it is activated accordingly to the appropriate circumstances. This is a fact that is inherent in ALL humans.
  This primary set-up is different from the secondary acts of assertions of being hungry, deciding what to eat or how to get the food to eat.

The above analogy is in parallel with the "programmed" of "ought-ness" and "ougth-not_ness as the potential to perform the necessary moral actions, moral thinking, moral assertions, moral decisions, etc.
The arising state of ought-not_ness to kill another human is the moral fact as represented by the neural algorithm, the potentials, the forces, etc. which is its referent and state-of-affairs.
I have been on to this paradigm of morality and I believe this is the confusion you got entangled with because your sense of morality is in another paradigm of moral assertions, etc.

This moral fact can be verified as evidently not active in one who is a psychopath where neuroscientists can explained via certain lesions and damage to the 'ougth-not_ness' circuitry in the brain.
This moral fact 'no human ought to kill another' is thus representing a state of affair which can be tested to be true or false, thus cognitivism.

The moral fact is real because it has actual existence and a referent and is a state-of-affairs, a matter of moral fact- meeting the definition of fact presented above.

Again, no. What 'has actual existence' (maybe) - and therefore is a fact - is the neural programming with oughts and ought-nots that psychopaths lack. That is the state-of-affairs that actually exists.

Please think about - and directly answer - this question:

If (like all other primates) we were programmed to kill our and our group's enemies, including other humans, would 'we ought to kill some other humans' be what you call a 'moral fact'?

Yes, human are programmed [1] to kill to facilitate survival but such a useful potential is double-edged, that is why humans are also programmed with [1] 'ought-not to kill another human' to counter the possible abuse of 1.

The categorical ought is 'no human ought to kill another'
where did you get your 'we ought to kill some other humans' from?

Where humans has to kill in self-defense, that is only a hypothetical ought, not an categorical ought.
Human are "programmed to kill" and because the 'moral impulse' is not well developed in the majority, some people will kill other people. Where people are imposed with an ought to kill another, that would be a fact of evil, not a moral fact.

But note, the overriding categorical ought 'no human ought to kill another' will strive and drive humans to eliminate all hypothetical causes that will drive humans to kill in the future as evident with the trend from 10,000 years ago.
It is evident there is a decrease rate [sign of progress] in human killing another arbitrarily, and with advancing knowledge humanity will be able to inhibit the causes that trigger humans to kill another human in the future.

Shooting someone in the face is also represented by a gradation of the 'ought-not_ness' to commit such an evil acts which could lead to killing, thus it is wrong immorally.

Get it?
I don't think you will get it and will continue to spew your filth on this issue.

So, showing why your argument is fallacious is 'spewing filth'?

You sound like someone who knows they've lost the argument.

For me it is not about winning or losing the argument as in an intellectual debate without regard for the truth.
My mission is to explore the truth, that is why I am doing SO much research which is eventually for my own knowledge database [wow!! I now have 500 files in 26 folders in relation to this topic alone] and not to win an argument specifically.

[Peter Holmes]

Despite my many explanations it is not likely you will get it, nevertheless here it is again.

Moral judgments themselves made by individuals are not moral facts.
Instead it is a moral fact that individuals are making moral judgments. This is not the main point.{/quote]

No. This is a category error. which you need to recognise. The fact that people make moral judgements is NOT a 'moral fact'. It isn't even a moral assertion, so it can't be a 'moral fact'.

As I had stated he above is not the main point about moral facts.
That one is making moral judgments and moral assertions, i.e. the acts is fact. It is a moral fact in a way it is related to morality specifically. Note again, that is not the main point and I am not focused on this.

What is pertinent as a moral fact is that inherent ought_ness and ought-not_ness within the human psyche, brain and mind that is represented by a "programmed" neural algorithm comprising related neural connectivities and those to the body.

It is that generic and inherent 'ought-not_ness' to kill another human' within the human brain/mind that is the moral fact.

Again, no. The fact (if it is a fact) that we're programmed to act in a certain way - that behavioural 'oughts' and 'ought-nots' are buit into our brains - is NOT a 'moral fact', because it isn't even a moral assertion.

Perhaps you need reminding: a moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong, or one that says we ought or ought not to do something. So, pay attention: 'we are programmed to act thus' is NOT a moral assertion. You are making a simple but fundamental mistake.

Point is you are ignorant of what is morality-proper.

As I had stated moral judgments and moral assertions by individuals and groups are not moral facts per se because they are individuals' and groups' opinions and beliefs.

That we are "programmed" with the impulse to act morally is moral fact.
The impulse to act morally is different from the impulse to think and making moral decisions.

• Note the analogy:
  All human are "programmed' with the hunger impulse [represented by a neural algorithm connected to the body] and it is activated accordingly to the appropriate circumstances. This is a fact that is inherent in ALL humans.
  This primary set-up is different from the secondary acts of assertions of being hungry, deciding what to eat or how to get the food to eat.

The above analogy is in parallel with the "programmed" of "ought-ness" and "ougth-not_ness as the potential to perform the necessary moral actions, moral thinking, moral assertions, moral decisions, etc.
The arising state of ought-not_ness to kill another human is the moral fact as represented by the neural algorithm, the potentials, the forces, etc. which is its referent and state-of-affairs.
I have been on to this paradigm of morality and I believe this is the confusion you got entangled with because your sense of morality is in another paradigm of moral assertions, etc.

This moral fact can be verified as evidently not active in one who is a psychopath where neuroscientists can explained via certain lesions and damage to the 'ougth-not_ness' circuitry in the brain.
This moral fact 'no human ought to kill another' is thus representing a state of affair which can be tested to be true or false, thus cognitivism.

The moral fact is real because it has actual existence and a referent and is a state-of-affairs, a matter of moral fact- meeting the definition of fact presented above.

Again, no. What 'has actual existence' (maybe) - and therefore is a fact - is the neural programming with oughts and ought-nots that psychopaths lack. That is the state-of-affairs that actually exists.

Please think about - and directly answer - this question:

If (like all other primates) we were programmed to kill our and our group's enemies, including other humans, would 'we ought to kill some other humans' be what you call a 'moral fact'?

Yes, human are programmed [1] to kill to facilitate survival but such a useful potential is double-edged, that is why humans are also programmed with [1] 'ought-not to kill another human' to counter the possible abuse of 1.

The categorical ought is 'no human ought to kill another'
where did you get your 'we ought to kill some other humans' from?

Where humans has to kill in self-defense, that is only a hypothetical ought, not an categorical ought.
Human are "programmed to kill" and because the 'moral impulse' is not well developed in the majority, some people will kill other people. Where people are imposed with an ought to kill another, that would be a fact of evil, not a moral fact.

But note, the overriding categorical ought 'no human ought to kill another' will strive and drive humans to eliminate all hypothetical causes that will drive humans to kill in the future as evident with the trend from 10,000 years ago.
It is evident there is a decrease rate [sign of progress] in human killing another arbitrarily, and with advancing knowledge humanity will be able to inhibit the causes that trigger humans to kill another human in the future.

Shooting someone in the face is also represented by a gradation of the 'ought-not_ness' to commit such an evil acts which could lead to killing, thus it is wrong immorally.

Get it?
I don't think you will get it and will continue to spew your filth on this issue.

So, showing why your argument is fallacious is 'spewing filth'?

You sound like someone who knows they've lost the argument.

For me it is not about winning or losing the argument as in an intellectual debate without regard for the truth.
My mission is to explore the truth, that is why I am doing SO much research which is eventually for my own knowledge database [wow!! I now have 500 files in 26 folders in relation to this topic alone] and not to win an argument specifically.

So now you claim there are overriding categorical oughts, and subordinate hypothetical oughts. Who decides which is which? And is it a fact that one overrides the other, or a matter of opinion? And this laughable evasion doesn't answer my question anyway.

If we were programmed categorically not to kill humans, but also hypothetically to kill some humans, do you think the assertion 'sometimes we ought to kill some humans' is a 'moral fact'? Cut the blather and focus just on that question.