What could make morality objective?

[Skepdick]

The suggestion that, because I deny the existence of moral facts, I have no right to judge and condemn that scumbag is nauseatingly offensive.

Sorry for your personal tragedy, but this is not about that.

Do you think thee exists such thing as rights? You know.. Right to judge and condemn. Right to life.

[Belinda]

For a long time, something's been festering that I need to vent.

Someone I love was raped. And if the scumbag that did it were caught and eradicated, I'd be happy.

The suggestion that, because I deny the existence of moral facts, I have no right to judge and condemn that scumbag is nauseatingly offensive.

So I say to anyone who has made, or is inclined to make, that argument: you can fuck off back under the rock whence you crawled.

I'm posting this twice, to make assurance double sure.

You have a 1.right to judge and 2 . you have a duty as a man to judge.

1. Because you live in a free society where the individual matters.

2. Because, unless they are criminals or otherwise disabled as judges, men live within the tenets of their cultures of belief.The normal belief in modern free societies is individuals should live as well as they can.

[Peter Holmes]

I suggest the standard phulosophical description of subjectivity as 'dependence on the mind' and objectivity as 'independence from the mind' comes from the metaphysical delusion that there are two substances: mind and matter (body) - and that therefore this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is misleading.

What we have is brains, which are physical things in which physical processes occur. Our venerable talk about minds containing thoughts, ideas, feelings, desires, wants, opinions, intentions - updated and given a technical gloss with talk of concepts, percepts, consciousness and so on - all the panoply of what can be called mentalism - is and has always been just that: ways of talking about ourselves and our experience.

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind', the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind. And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes. And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind, have a location and a boundary separating 'inside' from 'outside'? The conceptual mess deepens into a mire.

Fortunately, an ordinary (non-philosophical) description of objectivity usually avoids talk of minds: 'independence from opinion when considering the facts'. And subjectivity is 'dependence on opinion, belief or judgement'. Sometimes, 'subjective' is also assumed to mean 'personal' or 'individual' - but this is confusing, because an individual can reason objectively - so this distinction isn't about who and how many people are involved.

My conclusion is that the subjective/objective distinction is about what we call facts, and whether and how much we use and refer to them. And, in terms of linguistic expression, this boils down to the function of an assertion: if it refers to or asserts the existence of a fact, then it's a factual assertion. If not, it's a non-factual assertion. So it follows that what we're arguing about is whether moral (and, as it happens, aesthetic) assertions are factual - with factual truth-value - or not.

(I'm also posting this at my other OP: Is morality objective or subjective?)

[Veritas Aequitas]

I suggest the standard phulosophical description of subjectivity as 'dependence on the mind' and objectivity as 'independence from the mind' comes from the metaphysical delusion that there are two substances: mind and matter (body) - and that therefore this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is misleading.

What we have is brains, which are physical things in which physical processes occur. Our venerable talk about minds containing thoughts, ideas, feelings, desires, wants, opinions, intentions - updated and given a technical gloss with talk of concepts, percepts, consciousness and so on - all the panoply of what can be called mentalism - is and has always been just that: ways of talking about ourselves and our experience.

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind', the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind. And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes. And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind, have a location and a boundary separating 'inside' from 'outside'? The conceptual mess deepens into a mire.

Fortunately, an ordinary (non-philosophical) description of objectivity usually avoids talk of minds: 'independence from opinion when considering the facts'. And subjectivity is 'dependence on opinion, belief or judgement'. Sometimes, 'subjective' is also assumed to mean 'personal' or 'individual' - but this is confusing, because an individual can reason objectively - so this distinction isn't about who and how many people are involved.

My conclusion is that the subjective/objective distinction is about what we call facts, and whether and how much we use and refer to them. And, in terms of linguistic expression, this boils down to the function of an assertion: if it refers to or asserts the existence of a fact, then it's a factual assertion. If not, it's a non-factual assertion. So it follows that what we're arguing about is whether moral (and, as it happens, aesthetic) assertions are factual - with factual truth-value - or not.

(I'm also posting this at my other OP: Is morality objective or subjective?)

Your above views of what is objectivity and what is mind is archaic and inherited from the bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists [now defunct] and the classical analytic philosopher which had be debunked gradually by Wittgenstein then with Quine and Sellars hitting the last nails into its coffin.

Your insistence on your definitions of the above are merely ideological and psychological as a therapy for your own mental disturbances.

The current understanding of what is philosophical objectivity is this;
What is Philosophical Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31416
What is objective truths are conditioned upon a credible FSK/FSR and the principles thereby extracted has been put into practice and had benefited humanity tremendously.

What is mind
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind
the principles also has been put into practice had benefited humanity tremendously.

[Peter Holmes]

I suggest the standard phulosophical description of subjectivity as 'dependence on the mind' and objectivity as 'independence from the mind' comes from the metaphysical delusion that there are two substances: mind and matter (body) - and that therefore this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is misleading.

What we have is brains, which are physical things in which physical processes occur. Our venerable talk about minds containing thoughts, ideas, feelings, desires, wants, opinions, intentions - updated and given a technical gloss with talk of concepts, percepts, consciousness and so on - all the panoply of what can be called mentalism - is and has always been just that: ways of talking about ourselves and our experience.

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind', the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind. And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes. And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind, have a location and a boundary separating 'inside' from 'outside'? The conceptual mess deepens into a mire.

Fortunately, an ordinary (non-philosophical) description of objectivity usually avoids talk of minds: 'independence from opinion when considering the facts'. And subjectivity is 'dependence on opinion, belief or judgement'. Sometimes, 'subjective' is also assumed to mean 'personal' or 'individual' - but this is confusing, because an individual can reason objectively - so this distinction isn't about who and how many people are involved.

My conclusion is that the subjective/objective distinction is about what we call facts, and whether and how much we use and refer to them. And, in terms of linguistic expression, this boils down to the function of an assertion: if it refers to or asserts the existence of a fact, then it's a factual assertion. If not, it's a non-factual assertion. So it follows that what we're arguing about is whether moral (and, as it happens, aesthetic) assertions are factual - with factual truth-value - or not.

(I'm also posting this at my other OP: Is morality objective or subjective?)

Your above views of what is objectivity and what is mind is archaic and inherited from the bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists [now defunct] and the classical analytic philosopher which had be debunked gradually by Wittgenstein then with Quine and Sellars hitting the last nails into its coffin.

Your insistence on your definitions of the above are merely ideological and psychological as a therapy for your own mental disturbances.

The current understanding of what is philosophical objectivity is this;
What is Philosophical Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31416
What is objective truths are conditioned upon a credible FSK/FSR and the principles thereby extracted has been put into practice and had benefited humanity tremendously.

What is mind
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind
the principles also has been put into practice had benefited humanity tremendously.

What empirical evidence do you have for the existence of any so-called non-physical or abstract thing?

[Belinda]

I suggest the standard phulosophical description of subjectivity as 'dependence on the mind' and objectivity as 'independence from the mind' comes from the metaphysical delusion that there are two substances: mind and matter (body) - and that therefore this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is misleading.

What we have is brains, which are physical things in which physical processes occur. Our venerable talk about minds containing thoughts, ideas, feelings, desires, wants, opinions, intentions - updated and given a technical gloss with talk of concepts, percepts, consciousness and so on - all the panoply of what can be called mentalism - is and has always been just that: ways of talking about ourselves and our experience.

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind', the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind. And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes. And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind, have a location and a boundary separating 'inside' from 'outside'? The conceptual mess deepens into a mire.

Fortunately, an ordinary (non-philosophical) description of objectivity usually avoids talk of minds: 'independence from opinion when considering the facts'. And subjectivity is 'dependence on opinion, belief or judgement'. Sometimes, 'subjective' is also assumed to mean 'personal' or 'individual' - but this is confusing, because an individual can reason objectively - so this distinction isn't about who and how many people are involved.

My conclusion is that the subjective/objective distinction is about what we call facts, and whether and how much we use and refer to them. And, in terms of linguistic expression, this boils down to the function of an assertion: if it refers to or asserts the existence of a fact, then it's a factual assertion. If not, it's a non-factual assertion. So it follows that what we're arguing about is whether moral (and, as it happens, aesthetic) assertions are factual - with factual truth-value - or not.

(I'm also posting this at my other OP: Is morality objective or subjective?)

No. "What we have is" brain-minds. Brain-minds have two aspects. The anatomist sees the physical aspect of A's brain-mind: A sees the mental aspect of A's brain -mind.

Humans and maybe some other animals can symbolise ideas in order to file away the ideas in memory. The symbol is not and never was the thing or the event itself which is not permanent . However for practical purposes we do not normally pay attention to that Heraclitean fact and we pretend things and events persist in essence over time and place. Symbols are how we do so. The moral precept is a symbol not any thing itself.

[Peter Holmes]

I suggest the standard phulosophical description of subjectivity as 'dependence on the mind' and objectivity as 'independence from the mind' comes from the metaphysical delusion that there are two substances: mind and matter (body) - and that therefore this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is misleading.

What we have is brains, which are physical things in which physical processes occur. Our venerable talk about minds containing thoughts, ideas, feelings, desires, wants, opinions, intentions - updated and given a technical gloss with talk of concepts, percepts, consciousness and so on - all the panoply of what can be called mentalism - is and has always been just that: ways of talking about ourselves and our experience.

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind', the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind. And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes. And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind, have a location and a boundary separating 'inside' from 'outside'? The conceptual mess deepens into a mire.

Fortunately, an ordinary (non-philosophical) description of objectivity usually avoids talk of minds: 'independence from opinion when considering the facts'. And subjectivity is 'dependence on opinion, belief or judgement'. Sometimes, 'subjective' is also assumed to mean 'personal' or 'individual' - but this is confusing, because an individual can reason objectively - so this distinction isn't about who and how many people are involved.

My conclusion is that the subjective/objective distinction is about what we call facts, and whether and how much we use and refer to them. And, in terms of linguistic expression, this boils down to the function of an assertion: if it refers to or asserts the existence of a fact, then it's a factual assertion. If not, it's a non-factual assertion. So it follows that what we're arguing about is whether moral (and, as it happens, aesthetic) assertions are factual - with factual truth-value - or not.

(I'm also posting this at my other OP: Is morality objective or subjective?)

No. "What we have is" brain-minds. Brain-minds have two aspects. The anatomist sees the physical aspect of A's brain-mind: A sees the mental aspect of A's brain -mind.{/quote]

No. This begs the question. There's evidence for the existence of brains. What evidence is there for the existence of 'brain-minds'? That's just the same old deluded claim-with-no-evidence.

Humans and maybe some other animals can symbolise ideas in order to file away the ideas in memory. The symbol is not and never was the thing or the event itself which is not permanent . However for practical purposes we do not normally pay attention to that Heraclitean fact and we pretend things and events persist in essence over time and place. Symbols are how we do so. The moral precept is a symbol not any thing itself.

What and where is the abstract thing we call an idea? And what and where is the abstract thing we call memory? Answers come there none, which is why all anyone can do is repeat the claim.

[Skepdick]

What and where is the abstract thing we call an idea?

You don't have any ideas? it shows

And what and where is the abstract thing we call memory?

Do you remember your wife's name? How?

Answers come there none, which is why all anyone can do is repeat the claim.

We could also demonstrate the absurdity of the skepticism.

[Terrapin Station]

I suggest the standard phulosophical description of subjectivity as 'dependence on the mind' and objectivity as 'independence from the mind' comes from the metaphysical delusion that there are two substances: mind and matter (body) - and that therefore this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is misleading.

What we have is brains, which are physical things in which physical processes occur. Our venerable talk about minds containing thoughts, ideas, feelings, desires, wants, opinions, intentions - updated and given a technical gloss with talk of concepts, percepts, consciousness and so on - all the panoply of what can be called mentalism - is and has always been just that: ways of talking about ourselves and our experience.

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind', the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind. And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes. And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind, have a location and a boundary separating 'inside' from 'outside'? The conceptual mess deepens into a mire.

Fortunately, an ordinary (non-philosophical) description of objectivity usually avoids talk of minds: 'independence from opinion when considering the facts'. And subjectivity is 'dependence on opinion, belief or judgement'. Sometimes, 'subjective' is also assumed to mean 'personal' or 'individual' - but this is confusing, because an individual can reason objectively - so this distinction isn't about who and how many people are involved.

My conclusion is that the subjective/objective distinction is about what we call facts, and whether and how much we use and refer to them. And, in terms of linguistic expression, this boils down to the function of an assertion: if it refers to or asserts the existence of a fact, then it's a factual assertion. If not, it's a non-factual assertion. So it follows that what we're arguing about is whether moral (and, as it happens, aesthetic) assertions are factual - with factual truth-value - or not.

(I'm also posting this at my other OP: Is morality objective or subjective?)

No. "What we have is" brain-minds. Brain-minds have two aspects. The anatomist sees the physical aspect of A's brain-mind: A sees the mental aspect of A's brain -mind.{/quote]

No. This begs the question. There's evidence for the existence of brains. What evidence is there for the existence of 'brain-minds'? That's just the same old deluded claim-with-no-evidence.

Humans and maybe some other animals can symbolise ideas in order to file away the ideas in memory. The symbol is not and never was the thing or the event itself which is not permanent . However for practical purposes we do not normally pay attention to that Heraclitean fact and we pretend things and events persist in essence over time and place. Symbols are how we do so. The moral precept is a symbol not any thing itself.

What and where is the abstract thing we call an idea? And what and where is the abstract thing we call memory? Answers come there none, which is why all anyone can do is repeat the claim.

We have a ton of evidence re imaging brains with respect to specific mental content. I can link to some of it, but you're probably familiar with it. The usual objection is that this is "just a correlation," but "just a correlation" is all we have for any observable relative to any set of properties. So the objection that it's "just a correlation" on the mind/brain end is a double standard.

[Belinda]

I suggest the standard phulosophical description of subjectivity as 'dependence on the mind' and objectivity as 'independence from the mind' comes from the metaphysical delusion that there are two substances: mind and matter (body) - and that therefore this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is misleading.

What we have is brains, which are physical things in which physical processes occur. Our venerable talk about minds containing thoughts, ideas, feelings, desires, wants, opinions, intentions - updated and given a technical gloss with talk of concepts, percepts, consciousness and so on - all the panoply of what can be called mentalism - is and has always been just that: ways of talking about ourselves and our experience.

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind', the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind. And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes. And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind, have a location and a boundary separating 'inside' from 'outside'? The conceptual mess deepens into a mire.

Fortunately, an ordinary (non-philosophical) description of objectivity usually avoids talk of minds: 'independence from opinion when considering the facts'. And subjectivity is 'dependence on opinion, belief or judgement'. Sometimes, 'subjective' is also assumed to mean 'personal' or 'individual' - but this is confusing, because an individual can reason objectively - so this distinction isn't about who and how many people are involved.

My conclusion is that the subjective/objective distinction is about what we call facts, and whether and how much we use and refer to them. And, in terms of linguistic expression, this boils down to the function of an assertion: if it refers to or asserts the existence of a fact, then it's a factual assertion. If not, it's a non-factual assertion. So it follows that what we're arguing about is whether moral (and, as it happens, aesthetic) assertions are factual - with factual truth-value - or not.

(I'm also posting this at my other OP: Is morality objective or subjective?)

No. "What we have is" brain-minds. Brain-minds have two aspects. The anatomist sees the physical aspect of A's brain-mind: A sees the mental aspect of A's brain -mind.{/quote]

No. This begs the question. There's evidence for the existence of brains. What evidence is there for the existence of 'brain-minds'? That's just the same old deluded claim-with-no-evidence.

Humans and maybe some other animals can symbolise ideas in order to file away the ideas in memory. The symbol is not and never was the thing or the event itself which is not permanent . However for practical purposes we do not normally pay attention to that Heraclitean fact and we pretend things and events persist in essence over time and place. Symbols are how we do so. The moral precept is a symbol not any thing itself.

What and where is the abstract thing we call an idea? And what and where is the abstract thing we call memory? Answers come there none, which is why all anyone can do is repeat the claim.

An idea is a complex memory that is couched in symbolic form. The repositories of memories are brain-minds, and also artificial media such as newspapers, books, academia, theatre, rap, and song lyrics. Artificial media are cultural devices.

Evidence for the subjective aspect of brain-minds is not publicly available however subjects of experience can and often do report it in great detail, and find other subjects of experience who corroborate experiences. It is pleasant for experiencers when this happens .

[Peter Holmes]

No. "What we have is" brain-minds. Brain-minds have two aspects. The anatomist sees the physical aspect of A's brain-mind: A sees the mental aspect of A's brain -mind.{/quote]

No. This begs the question. There's evidence for the existence of brains. What evidence is there for the existence of 'brain-minds'? That's just the same old deluded claim-with-no-evidence.

Humans and maybe some other animals can symbolise ideas in order to file away the ideas in memory. The symbol is not and never was the thing or the event itself which is not permanent . However for practical purposes we do not normally pay attention to that Heraclitean fact and we pretend things and events persist in essence over time and place. Symbols are how we do so. The moral precept is a symbol not any thing itself.

What and where is the abstract thing we call an idea? And what and where is the abstract thing we call memory? Answers come there none, which is why all anyone can do is repeat the claim.

An idea is a complex memory that is couched in symbolic form. The repositories of memories are brain-minds, and also artificial media such as newspapers, books, academia, theatre, rap, and song lyrics. Artificial media are cultural devices.

Evidence for the subjective aspect of brain-minds is not publicly available however subjects of experience can and often do report it in great detail, and find other subjects of experience who corroborate experiences. It is pleasant for experiencers when this happens .

Sorry, but again this is the claim, not evidence for the claim that abstract things exist somehow, somewhere. That we have and talk about experiences, using shared language, is true. But this isn't evidence that what you call brain-minds exist.

[Belinda]

No. This begs the question. There's evidence for the existence of brains. What evidence is there for the existence of 'brain-minds'? That's just the same old deluded claim-with-no-evidence.
What and where is the abstract thing we call an idea? And what and where is the abstract thing we call memory? Answers come there none, which is why all anyone can do is repeat the claim.

An idea is a complex memory that is couched in symbolic form. The repositories of memories are brain-minds, and also artificial media such as newspapers, books, academia, theatre, rap, and song lyrics. Artificial media are cultural devices.

Evidence for the subjective aspect of brain-minds is not publicly available however subjects of experience can and often do report it in great detail, and find other subjects of experience who corroborate experiences. It is pleasant for experiencers when this happens .

Sorry, but again this is the claim, not evidence for the claim that abstract things exist somehow, somewhere. That we have and talk about experiences, using shared language, is true. But this isn't evidence that what you call brain-minds exist.

You know brains exist as objects.You know brains are 'active' or 'inactive'. Mind is the subjective experience of activated brain state.

[Skepdick]

Sorry, but again this is the claim, not evidence for the claim that abstract things exist somehow, somewhere. That we have and talk about experiences, using shared language, is true. But this isn't evidence that what you call brain-minds exist.

Ohhh, you reject abstract entities, do you?

What or where is this abstraction you call "experience"?

Do you even experience anything? You seem like a talking meatbag.

[Peter Holmes]

An idea is a complex memory that is couched in symbolic form. The repositories of memories are brain-minds, and also artificial media such as newspapers, books, academia, theatre, rap, and song lyrics. Artificial media are cultural devices.

Evidence for the subjective aspect of brain-minds is not publicly available however subjects of experience can and often do report it in great detail, and find other subjects of experience who corroborate experiences. It is pleasant for experiencers when this happens .

Sorry, but again this is the claim, not evidence for the claim that abstract things exist somehow, somewhere. That we have and talk about experiences, using shared language, is true. But this isn't evidence that what you call brain-minds exist.

You know brains exist as objects.You know brains are 'active' or 'inactive'. Mind is the subjective experience of activated brain state.

And? There's no reason to think 'the subjective experience of activated brain state' is anything abstract or non-physical.

[Belinda]

Sorry, but again this is the claim, not evidence for the claim that abstract things exist somehow, somewhere. That we have and talk about experiences, using shared language, is true. But this isn't evidence that what you call brain-minds exist.

You know brains exist as objects.You know brains are 'active' or 'inactive'. Mind is the subjective experience of activated brain state.

And? There's no reason to think 'the subjective experience of activated brain state' is anything abstract or non-physical.

Minds surely by definition are not physical ; mental implies not -physical, if you are talking within the common FSK of modern science , and the common FSB of substance ontology.
You and I experience activated brain states both as objective observers of others and also as subjects of our own experiences.