What could make morality objective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Such wisdom. So much profoundness. It's no use warning us, if you are going to keep deluding yourself!

The picture isn't a red circle. We just say that it's a red circle.
Murder isn't objectively wrong. We just say that it's objectively wrong.

Such mystery. So much stupid.

red.png

The above "circle" is really "red" but such proposition must be heavily qualified as true ONLY within the condition of a community of people and its conditions, humans collectively and the relevant history [FSK or FSR].

Claim: that thing - say, the colour red - is what it is only because there are people around. Obviously not. That thing is what it is, how ever it's named and described - which it can be in countless different ways. A truth-claim exists within a descriptive context. But a description doesn't create or change the thing being described. Do you disagree with any of these assertions?

Nope!

Within common sense [crude and fallible] whatever "that thing is" is "what it is" which is of the external world and can be described in whatever name and description in countless ways.

But beyond fallible common sense there are finer grades of reality;

Whatever "that thing is what it is" is co-created by the person[s] naming and describing it.
Humans are the Co-Creator of Reality They are In [2]
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32476
As such, the naming and description is after the person[s] has contributed to the thing that is co-created by the person[s].
The term 'co-created' is very subtle with nuances, not merely physically making that thing like making a physical table.

I believe it was already highlighted and emphasized to you, take a circle of red on a piece of paper.
There are many perspectives to it, each with its countless names and description.

1. When humans see what is identified as "red" there is no certainty they are seeing the same red due to their varying physical color detection system.
2. When that red is seen under different light conditions, the color varies.
So what is color is in the eyes of the beholder.

To get to what is objectively red, one may resort to,
3. Colors from a source are represented by same color wavelengths.
But what is wavelengths [based on definitions, using the relevant tool to measure, calibrations, etc.] are conditioned by the Physics FSK of human construct.
4. Pure Red in the RGB scale is 255:0:0. Again this is conditioned by some color calibration FSK of human construct.

Note:
5. Whatever the color, it is never pure red wavelenghts or RGB scale is 255:0:0 at every spot of the circle.
6. Whatever are waves [not physical things] are inventions within the Physics FSK.

As you can see from the above,
Whatever "that thing is what it is" [that can be named and described in many ways] is actually a-different-thing depending from the different perspectives of reality, i.e. framework and system of reality one is leveraging on.

So there is no ONE fixed real "that thing" which is "what it is" that is named and described in countless ways.

Whatever is "that thing" which is "what it is" that is named and described in countless ways, is dependent on the FSK one is leveraged on.

There is no free existing [standing] "that thing" which is "what it is" by itself independent of any FSK, i.e. no thing-in-itself.

You can apply the above to any thing in existence that is claimed as real.

Get it?

[Skepdick]

Claim: that thing - say, the colour red- is what it is only because there are people around. Obviously not.

This requires justification. For your claim to be true red must be ontological.

Go ahead and demonstrate that.

But a description doesn't create or change the thing being described. Do you disagree with any of these assertions?

The measurement/observation obviously changes "the thing"! It's the observer effect.

Physicists have found that even passive observation of quantum phenomena (by changing the test apparatus and passively "ruling out" all but one possibility) can actually change the measured result. Despite the "observer" in this experiment being an electronic detector—possibly due to the assumption that the word "observer" implies a person—its results have led to the popular belief that a conscious mind can directly affect reality.The need for the "observer" to be conscious is not supported by scientific research, and has been pointed out as a misconception rooted in a poor understanding of the quantum wave function ψ and the quantum measurement process, apparently being the generation of information at its most basic level that produces the effect.

"Redness" is created (emerges) from the interaction between our minds and our observations.

[Peter Holmes]

1 If all epistemological foundationalisms are incorrect, then so is constructivism. And so is empiricism, and therefore empiricist skepticism.

2 If the quantum observer effect is fundamental, then it applies to the observation of the quantum observer effect. (Doubt exists only against a background of certainty.)

3 The idea that one kind of description (for example, QM) and its truth-claims are fundamental is an example of foundationalism. Another example is: reality can be described mathematically; therefore reality is mathematical. (Mistaking the description for the described.)

4 Empiricist skepticism has always worked at all levels. Can we step in the same river twice? Do two people who observe and describe Russell's table observe and describe the same table? Identity - sameness and difference - are linguistic, social constructs. Is this not true in QM?

5 Fatuous but ancient 'philosophical' question: is red ontological? Perhaps this means 'does red (or redness) exist?' And perhaps this means: 'does the thing we humans perceive as - and we English speakers call - 'red' exist? Or is redness - and are we - just indeterminate quantum phenomena?

6 What, if anything, has this got to do with the existence of so-called moral facts?

[Terrapin Station]

1 If all epistemological foundationalisms are incorrect, then so is constructivism. And so is empiricism, and therefore empiricist skepticism.

2 If the quantum observer effect is fundamental, then it applies to the observation of the quantum observer effect. (Doubt exists only against a background of certainty.)

3 The idea that one kind of description (for example, QM) and its truth-claims are fundamental is an example of foundationalism. Another example is: reality can be described mathematically; therefore reality is mathematical. (Mistaking the description for the described.)

4 Empiricist skepticism has always worked at all levels. Can we step in the same river twice? Do two people who observe and describe Russell's table observe and describe the same table? Identity - sameness and difference - are linguistic, social constructs. Is this not true in QM?

5 Fatuous but ancient 'philosophical' question: is red ontological? Perhaps this means 'does red (or redness) exist?' And perhaps this means: 'does the thing we humans perceive as - and we English speakers call - 'red' exist? Or is redness - and are we - just indeterminate quantum phenomena?

6 What, if anything, has this got to do with the existence of so-called moral facts?

They're still going on about the red thing? How are they still going on about that?

[Peter Holmes]

1 If all epistemological foundationalisms are incorrect, then so is constructivism. And so is empiricism, and therefore empiricist skepticism.

2 If the quantum observer effect is fundamental, then it applies to the observation of the quantum observer effect. (Doubt exists only against a background of certainty.)

3 The idea that one kind of description (for example, QM) and its truth-claims are fundamental is an example of foundationalism. Another example is: reality can be described mathematically; therefore reality is mathematical. (Mistaking the description for the described.)

4 Empiricist skepticism has always worked at all levels. Can we step in the same river twice? Do two people who observe and describe Russell's table observe and describe the same table? Identity - sameness and difference - are linguistic, social constructs. Is this not true in QM?

5 Fatuous but ancient 'philosophical' question: is red ontological? Perhaps this means 'does red (or redness) exist?' And perhaps this means: 'does the thing we humans perceive as - and we English speakers call - 'red' exist? Or is redness - and are we - just indeterminate quantum phenomena?

6 What, if anything, has this got to do with the existence of so-called moral facts?

They're still going on about the red thing? How are they still going on about that?

I think it's that (sophomoric excitement about) indeterminacy - how can we show that what we call a red circle really is a red circle? - somehow means that there are moral facts. A red circle is a red circle because we call it a red circle: therefore abortion is morally wrong because we call it morally wrong. If one's a fact, so is the other. Yowser.

[FlashDangerpants]

They're still going on about the red thing? How are they still going on about that?

It's a function of them not agreeing with their own arguments, which in turn is a function of their tendencies to discard their strategic objectives for short term tactical strategies.

So to you and I it would seem incongruent to use an argument from Locke that assumes a picture theory of mind whilst also claiming to be the epitome of post-analytic iconoclastic excellence. But Ventricle Aquarium doesn't really care that no two arguments he presents work together so off he goes.

Likewise, he probably didn't notice that he just described language as it is used as [crude and fallible] and in need of verification via an FSK, which, you know, doesn't go that well his long history of accusing us all of being bastard logical positivists. He won't get it, this isn't contradictory in his terms, because all he knows of logical positivism is that he read a book which said LP is bad.

He also didn't notice that he just accidentally conceeded everything Pete has been writing for ages about truth values and descriptive contexts either.

Somehow that boy managed to fuck himself quite entirely just by discussing what "red" means. But he's done the same sort of thing innumerable times already and he'll do it again next week. And it will still be the case that he considers himself justified simply because he doesn't understand any of the ways in which he's failed.

[Skepdick]

1 If all epistemological foundationalisms are incorrect, then so is constructivism. And so is empiricism, and therefore empiricist skepticism.

1. Constructivism is not foundationalism. Constructivism is anti-foundationalism.

2. Given that you reject correspondence theories then what exactly do you mean by "correct"?

[Terrapin Station]

I think it's that (sophomoric excitement about) indeterminacy - how can we show that what we call a red circle really is a red circle? - somehow means that there are moral facts. A red circle is a red circle because we call it a red circle: therefore abortion is morally wrong because we call it morally wrong. If one's a fact, so is the other. Yowser.

Is the idea about calling it a "red circle" though? How would they not realize that's not the issue? It wouldn't matter what we call anything. Morality isn't objective because there aren't objective moral normatives, regardless of what anyone would call them. In other words, there's no extramental state of affairs that amounts to "x should be the case (re interpersonal behavior more significant than etiquette)"--whatever we'd call it. There are no objective properties in that vein whether we name them "morality," "right," "hiwnapopoo," or whatever.

[Skepdick]

He also didn't notice that he just accidentally conceeded everything Pete has been writing for ages about truth values and descriptive contexts either.

Dumb dichotomised thinker. You still think I "disagree" with Peter because he's "wrong" and I am "right"?

I disagree with peter because his theory is incomplete.
His theory suffers from special pleading.

He arbitrarily admits some descriptive contexts as having "truth value". And rejects other descriptive contexts as not having truth value.

Such as the descriptive context of "I am angry right now".

[FlashDangerpants]

He also didn't notice that he just accidentally conceeded everything Pete has been writing for ages about truth values and descriptive contexts either.

Dumb dichotomised thinker. You still think I "disagree" with Peter because he's "wrong" and I am "right"?

Not everything is about you, you narcissistic little wanker. I explicitly referred to Vegetable Ambulance by name when I was describing his post.

[Skepdick]

Not everything is about you, you narcissistic little wanker. I explicitly referred to Vegetable Ambulance by name when I was describing his post.

And yet you focus on me instead of the the substance of my point.

Way to fall for the entrapment. Every time. You uncharitable twat.

[Peter Holmes]

The factual assertion 'I am angry' is true or false. But the assertion 'I ought to be angry' is not true or false. It expresses an opinion, with which it could be rational to disagree.

[Peter Holmes]

Epistemological constructivism exists because of empiricist skepticism. We can never really know stuff, so we have to construct what we know, produce models that are all wrong, rely on consensual truth, and reach conclusions that are merely polished conjectures. Constructivism is a theory of knowledge, and is therefore metaphysical and foundationalist, like all other theories of knowledge.

Stupid but ancient 'philosophical' question: what is knowledge and where does it come from? Delusional answer: knowledge is ... justified true belief... derived from experience ... the fruit of reason ... our construction ... Next question: what is truth? Delusional answer: something that can only be defined in a meta-language. And on and on.

[Skepdick]

But the assertion 'I ought to be angry' is not true or false. It expresses an opinion, with which it could be rational to disagree.

Holy fucking shitballs!

So you "assert" that you ought to be angry, but you disagree with yourself?

What the fuck does that even mean?

[Skepdick]

Epistemological constructivism exists because of empiricist skepticism. We can never really know stuff, so we have to construct what we know, produce models that are all wrong, rely on consensual truth, and reach conclusions that are merely polished conjectures. Constructivism is a theory of knowledge, and is therefore metaphysical and foundationalist, like all other theories of knowledge.

Yeah, so that's what "I want to frame the narrative!" looks like.

Foundationalism is foundationailism.
The rejection of foundationalism is also foundationalism.

I guess I know how to do this too.

If you are stupid then you are stupid.
If you aren't stupid then you are still stupid.