Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jan 25, 2019 10:40 am
Pending a full response to the tendentious description of my argument - and particularly the surprising definition of objectivity as whatever's popular - I suggest there's a problem with the claim that facts are subject to choice.
1 If facts are subject to choice, then the claim that facts are subject to choice is itself subject to choice.
2 If the claim that facts are subject to choice is subject to choice, then facts may not be subject to choice.
3 So if facts are subject to choice, then facts may not be subject to choice.
4 A claim that entails a contradiction is false.
Or, substituting 'opinion' for 'subject to choice':
1 If facts are opinions, then the claim that facts are opinions is itself an opinion.
2 If the claim that facts are opinions is an opinion, then facts may not be opinions.
3 So if facts are opinions, then facts may not be opinions.
4 A claim that entails a contradiction is false.
In other words, to say the factual claims of decision theory are not subject to decision theory is special pleading.
You are conflating the word "choice" and re-using it in multiple contexts.
I choose to eat an apple.
You can choose to not eat an apple.
They are both choices. They are different choices.
Your choice does not contradict my choice.
When you are narrating your experiences of reality you CHOOSE the words to use. This is intended meaning.
When I am narrating my interpretation of your words I CHOOSE which meaning to interpret. This is interpreted meaning.
If the intended and interpreted meanings are to coincide the interlocutors MUST use language conventionally and in exactly the same way!
Shared context is required.
But this is precisely your claim. That language is conventional. So you are committing the 'Begging the question' fallacy.
If we are using language conventionally then facts exist.
If we aren't using language conventionally then facts do not exist.
We could even say that in general we may be using language conventionally. And that in general facts exist.
But in any particular context we can't ask and answer: Are we using language conventionally?
Is this particular statement a fact?
Decision problem.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jan 25, 2019 10:40 am
In other words, to say the factual claims of decision theory are not subject to decision theory is special pleading.
1. Decision theory makes no "factual" claims. It's a conceptual/theoretical model and framework for decision-making. The Platonism you despise so much. And yet - it works in practice.
2. How did you decide that it's special pleading?
Decision theory also recognises that some yes/no questions are undecidable. No objective procedure exists to make the choice. And yet - humans do it all the time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_machine