The subjective/objective question is a question of morality's ontological status--just where morality occurs, just how it obtains, just what it's a property of, etc.DPMartin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 26, 2021 4:14 pmfor some reason objective or subjective morals is the box no one can get out of.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Jul 14, 2018 10:29 am It seems to me this question - which has emerged from discussion of my post 'Is morality objective or subjective?' - is the crux in the disagreement between objectivists and subjectivists.
An objection to moral subjectivism is that, if moral values and judgements are matters of opinion, we can't know if they're correct. For example, we can't know if slavery is right or wrong, and can't therefore morally condemn those who think slavery is justifiable. That's just their opinion, and we can't say which opinion is correct or true.
But this assumes that there is indeed something to be known: an object of some kind that verifies the assertion slavery is wrong and falsifies the assertion slavery is right - or, perhaps, vice versa. But what is the object that makes moral judgements objective - matters of fact - and therefore true or false?
It can't be slavery itself, because that would also be the object of the assertion slavery is right - so we're back to square one. And it can't be the wrongness of slavery. To say the assertion slavery is wrong is justified (shown to be true) by the objective wrongness of slavery is circular, and so no justification at all.
So what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent of judgement, belief or opinion?
Does any moral objectivist here have an answer that doesn't beg the question?
(The claim that objective moral values and judgements come from a god's commands or a god's nature begs the question: what makes a god's commands or a god's nature objectively morally good?)
its simple morals are relative to those in the agreement that is the set of rules called morals. you are not bound or obligated to follow a set of rules or morals agreed to in a nation you are not from or in. but the nation you are in or from you are bound or obligated to honor that set of rules or morals.
morals are relative to those in the agreement or law or covenant or contract or constitution so on and so forth.
Whether you're obligated to do something legally or otherwise you'll face legal punishments, whether you're obligated to do something in terms of customs/customary behavior or you'll face things like censure and ostracization, is rather a social issue. That doesn't tell us anything about the ontological status of morality, it doesn't tell us whether moral claims can be true or false, it doesn't tell us whether the laws, customs, etc. are right or wrong even.