Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Feb 18, 2020 8:53 amNot so. It's an application of the logical rule of identity, which is a tautology.Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Feb 17, 2020 9:56 pmIt begs the question.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Feb 17, 2020 7:50 pm Your reasoning is faulty. A value-judgement is a value-judgement - or do you deny that fact?
Well, it might also correspond to identity, but it's identity circularly stated, obviously. The purpose of the law of identity is to stabilize the relation between a predicate and its definition for logical purposes. But you didn't define; you just restated exactly the same phrase, "value-judgment."
That's why it begs the question, Pete. The right question is, "What IS a value judgment?" As I wrote,
Nobody denies that a value judgment is a value judgment. That's circular. The real question is, "Is that ALL a value-judgment is?" That is, the question is not whether or not somebody is valuing something...the question is whether or not the thing they're valuing is actually valuable.[/quote]
It's not question-begging at all. I'm a Theist. I don't only believe there is objective value, but also that there is a Valuer whose assessments are absolutely valid.And there's your question-begging problem. You want there to be things that are 'actually valuable', but value can only be a matter of judgement, and therefore subjective. For a thing to be valuable, there must be a valuer.
But I'm not asking you to believe that, at this moment. And I'm not making a case for it. I'm merely pointing out that to speak of objective value, we must speak of whether or not the object in question is absolutely, intrinsically associated with value. I'm not foreclosing on that question: I'm presenting it to you as necessary...and you shouldn't have any problem agreeing, even though you presently hold that neither a Valuer nor an objective value is available.
In other words, to say something like "I value X" is to say very little. It's like saying, "I happen to like vanilla ice cream." Big deal.
On the other hand, to say "I value X, and X is intrinsically the sort of thing worthy of being valued" is to say a whole lot more. It's more like saying, "I value freedom, and you should too."
That's where my point stops for the minute. It's just that something intrinsically valuable would be, in theory, much more important than anything that merely, contingently, happens to be valued by somebody.
If you see that point, then there's not a lot of reason for disagreement with that. In fact, I wouldn't say there's any.
That's a presumptive objection. It's not certain, and given your OP, ought to be discussed.That a value-judgement is a good ot bad one is itself a value-judgement, and therefore subjective.
Your belief, I know, is that "value-judgment" cannot refer to anything beyond the person making it. But that simply makes it utterly trivial, and forecloses on the OP. The answer would simply be "nothing."
A better answer would be as follows...and it wouldn't even require you to alter your opinion. You could say, "IF there were an objective value intrinsic to an object prior to the incidental fact of some particular human deciding to value it, THEN morality would be objective. You could even go on to add, BUT IF there is no objective value intrinsic to any object (or action, or whatever), then there is NOTHING that can EVER make morality objective."
And that would be the right answer, without you arbitrarily foreclosing on the very question you posed in the OP.
So how about that?
I've never seen a convincing refutation of Euthyphro. Assuming objectivity is independence from opinion, please can you refute it in a nutshell? I'd be very grateful to see how you do it.
Yep.
Stage 1: Go back to the original, and look at how Socrates frames the problem. Here is the actual exerpt:
Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences-would there now?
Euth. You are quite right.
Soc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,-about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among them.
Euth. Very true.
Soc. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
Euth. True.
Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?
Euth. So I should suppose.
Soc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
In other words, the problem arises because of the Greek belief in multiple gods. What one god likes, the others may not; and what one god likes one minute, he may not like in the next.
Stage 2: As you can see, the problem is posited by Socrates as one of dichotomy. Either gods like things because they are good, or good things are made good by the gods liking them. But the second cannot really be true, if the gods disagree and if they change their minds...so it must be that there is a "good" which precedes all the gods.
So, says the modern skeptic, if objective value exists, it must make belief in gods irrelevant to the question of value. And is that not your present objection, Pete?
Stage 3: However the problem is in the dichotomy. They dichotomy is created by the premise that multiple gods exist, and that they disagree on value judgments; or at least that they can change their minds about whatever it is they happen to value.
The failure here is the failure to consider how monotheism is different from polytheism. In polytheism, no God grounds value. Value precedes the gods. But if there is but one Supreme Being, one God, then by definition, then there is no dichotomy between what is valuable, and what God values. God IS, Himself, the grounds and basis of value.
Stage 4: So Euthyprho's dilemma becomes a false dichotomy, a foolish question, in the order of, "Is this man a bachelor, or is he unmarried?" or "Is this a circle, or is it round?" God both loves things that are good, and the good things are that which is loved by God." There isn't even a conflict in those two claims, because the Supreme Being is by definition, the origin and Value-imparter of all objective value.
Caveat: Now, I know, and I want you to know I'm acknowledging, that you don't believe in God. So to you, this whole thing must seem like a hypothetical discussion. But monotheists do not say multiple gods can exist. And the Euthyprho Dilemma requires that they should. So the Euthyphro Dilemma is an excellent defeater for objective value for polytheists, but absolutely useless in terms of refuting monotheists, because they don't take the assumptions Socrates himself required in order to make the Euthyphro Dilemma appear.
I'm sorry, you're incorrect in your assumption of why I chose the word "intuition."1 Here's a Cambridge definition of intuition: '(knowledge from) an ability to understand or know something immediately based on your feelings rather than facts'. So here, intuition is a supposed route to knowledge, as I pointed out. And this is back-door moral cognitivism - begging the question again.You speak for yourself there, since you use "I." I spoke of the more general intuition we all have about it. I would suggest that the intuition or belief (no, I'm not saying "knowledge") that we all have that slavery is wrong would be based on something. And I would say the secular explanation...that it's just a weird, irrational byproduct of contingent forces...comes across as awfully thin by comparison.
An "intuition" is a (possibly-trivial) feeling of sensing something. As such, the word leaves open the question of whether or not the "intuition" in hand is of something real or something not real. By using that word, I was leaving open your view as well as mine, and NOT prejudicing our language for you or against you. I was being as fair as I could be, not "smuggling in" anything.
I think it's not too much to ask of your position, Pete, that you recognize that people have ideas in their heads about morality. Calling these "intuitions" is a good way of avoiding slanting the discussion. But if you want a different word -- sensations, supposals, assumptions, I don't know what you'd take in place of "intuitions," then that's fine. Let's not say "knowledge" or "conviction," because that perhaps slants the discussion in my favour; but let's equally not say "imaginings," "fancies" or "delusions," because the would slant the discussion unjustly the other way.
What word do you want? I'll take any neutral term you choose. What we both know is that people do have some kind of...whatever...that imparts to them the inclination to think that X is valuable and Y is not. We can leave entirely open whether or not they're right to have this...whatever...but we need some name for it in order to talk about it.
What's your pleasure, for that word?
On what points?2 Your account of secular morality is false and tendentious