What could make morality objective?

[Skepdick]

gimme a figure

What sort of ballpark do you have in mind?

[henry quirk]

gimme a figure

What sort of ballpark do you have in mind?

your soul

[Skepdick]

your soul

Deal.

(I love double-mortgaging my stuff!!!)

[henry quirk]

your soul

Deal.

(I love double-mortgaging my stuff!!!)

no, I need exclusive ownership and -- like my gold -- I need physical possession

[SpheresOfBalance]

Is it morally right to force medicate people like VA, when their obsessive, unhinged nature starts to cause others too much distress? And can we make an objective fact out of that?

My version of the Golden Rule, that I call the Fundamental Social Axiom:

"Treat others as you would have others treat you, to the extent that, all parties knowingly agree, at that time."

One would have to understand the differences between us to take your comment into serious consideration. I largely do and if I understand you correctly, you've been found wanting.

Morality, it can bite one in the ass when they least expect it.

Just a little tit for tat to see how it's worn.

[SpheresOfBalance]

Is it morally right to force medicate people like VA, when their obsessive, unhinged nature starts to cause others too much distress? And can we make an objective fact out of that?

no...if distressed: walk away

yep...VA belongs to himself (the fact), so it would be wrong to force-medicate him (the moral fact)
So do we all, Mr shotgun in hand, while you hold the one big button; tremble much as you perpetuate the fear?
easy-peazy

[henry quirk]

no shit

[SpheresOfBalance]

no shit

Then why insinuate that AV is some how diminished because of it? And if I took you wrong, then I apologize.

[henry quirk]

no shit

Then why insinuate that AV is some how diminished because of it? And if I took you wrong, then I apologize.

you did...no worries

[Atla]

Is it morally right to force medicate people like VA, when their obsessive, unhinged nature starts to cause others too much distress? And can we make an objective fact out of that?

My version of the Golden Rule, that I call the Fundamental Social Axiom:

"Treat others as you would have others treat you, to the extent that, all parties knowingly agree, at that time."

One would have to understand the differences between us to take your comment into serious consideration. I largely do and if I understand you correctly, you've been found wanting.

Morality, it can bite one in the ass when they least expect it.

Just a little tit for tat to see how it's worn.

All parties knowingly agree, what does that mean? When a murderer doesn't agree with going to jail, then he shouldn't have to?

[Veritas Aequitas]

To repeat: the logical positivists were wrong to claim 'that ethical statements, being incapable of empirical verification, were cognitively meaningless'.
But that non-factual assertions - moral or aesthetic - are indeed empirically unverifiable and unfalsifiable is a fact.

The logical positivists comprised of philosophers with different views on morality but they all have these common views of morality, i.e.

• Moral statement, judgments are;
  1. not moral facts
  2. not state-of-affairs
  3. not propositions
  4. not truth-apt, neither be true or false
  5. expressing desires, opinions and beliefs
  6. Prescriptive [is] not descriptive [oughts]
  7. Not mind independent

Note I omitted the "meaningless" element which were claimed by SOME of the LPs, e.g. Ayer and others.

Yours views on morality are of the above [1-7] which were agreed by all the logical positivists, thus were inherited from the LPs with their notable "fact = state-of-affairs".

Rather than endlessly rehearse and regurgitate your research, why not concentrate on the actual question, and produce an example of a moral fact, showing why it's a state-of-affairs, rather than merely the expression of a moral opinion?

I have done that a '1000' times as gleaned from my extensive research into the subject of Morality and Ethics.
I am still researching into the deeper depths of Morality and Ethics. Previously I'd spent a lot of time focusing mainly on Kantian Ethics but now I have acquired a wider and deeper perspective on the subject.

As with the above, you have inherited the bastardized version of 'what is fact' 'state-of-affairs' from the LPs and is being very dogmatic about it. Thus my '1000' times demonstration that moral facts exist is not likely to get into your thick dogmatic skull due to very aggressive confirmation bias.

Note my argument on
'What is Fact?"
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486

The above is the general definition of 'what is fact' and there is no way it can be disputed.
So with a moral FSK,

There are Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Btw, your path to what is morality - the nonCognitivists' view is severely hindered and is not tenable because of;

Frege-Geach Problem Destroyed NonCognitivism
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30150

Thus,

What is most plausible is the default;
Moral Realism is the Default Within Morality
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30483

I think you've been seduced by some impressive-sounding and seemingly technical theorising. Frege's analysis is a nice example of mistaking what we say for the way things are. And speech-act theory is mired in delusions about the nature and function of language, not least of which is the myth of propositions, which, like all so-called abstract things, are misleading metaphysical fictions.

Pending evidence for the existence of a moral reality - whatever that could be - moral realism doesn't even make it to the starting post. And, as with everything else, the existence of a moral reality has nothing at all to do with language.

As usual you ignore the substance of what I had presented above.

You have no defense of substance and solidness, thus the best you can do is make noise and wave away whatever you cannot defend.

Whatever I presented are based on solid justifications and arguments by the authors.
To be intellectually honest you have the onus to at least read and understand [not necessary agree] before making any judgment on their views.

Note what is most reliable is to start with observations, experiences and empirical evidences.
Moral realism as the default is based on everyday experiences and abductions and inductions that are empirically justified and deliberated philosophically.

On the other hand what you are relying upon are merely meanings of words, i.e. 'facts = states-of-affairs' which on their own are fatuous. This is very flimsy.
You state nothing nor refer to justifications of whatever are facts.

I proposed you tick off the following checklist;

• Moral statement, judgments are;
  1. not moral facts
  2. not state-of-affairs
  3. not propositions
  4. not truth-apt, neither be true or false
  5. expressing desires, opinions and beliefs
  6. Prescriptive [is] not descriptive [oughts]
  7. Not mind independent

I believed you are agreeable to all the above including 6 which your originally disagree but I had explained you cannot run away from it.

Since you are agreeable to the above, you are a nonCognitivist and such a view is not tenable and is destroyed by the Frege-Geach Problem.

As such the most plausible stance for morality and ethics is Moral Realism [i.e. contrast to points 1-7 above ], in my case, Moral Empirical Realism which is similar [not exactly] to Science.

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA is pretty determined about reforming the world, hopefully his works will get published soon. One of his ideas was to alter the brain chemistry of agressive cavemen like you, just a little benevolent fine tuning in the head, that's all. Plus other techniques that improve the personality and behaviour. I don't think it's optional by the way. Good to see that you're fine with this stuff.

As usual you are a very aggressive serial liar.
It is also immoral to allude such "agressive cavemen like you" to Henry and getting personal for no reason.

Your response is typical of the paranoid who upon the mentioned of "brain changes", would straightaway jump to the terror idea of "Frankenstein".

Even for anyone who had learned how to swim from not knowing how to swim, that would entail a change in brain connectivity for the better.
With the improvement of change in attitude and lesser chattel slavery at present, there would had to be a change in the brain connectivity in the present average humans from humans >10,000 years ago where there was a prevalence of chattel slavery.

So what is the issue with a change in brain neural connectivity especially if we can target the specific connectors for improvement rather than based on a hit and miss approach.

Nope!! it is NOT using chemicals but only with FOOLPROOF mental exercises to target the specific neurons for moral competence.
This is what I am proposing to improve moral competence and that is only in the future not for the present generation or even the next, but perhaps next 75-100 years when we have more knowledge of neural connectivity from the Human Genome Project.
https://www.genome.gov/human-genome-project

Oh stop whining moron, every method changes the brain chemistry, I didn't mention added chemicals.

Too bad your methods won't be used on henry, but maybe he can volunteer for early testing?

You're the moron and stupid ignorant idiot.
The brain is organic thus has chemicals.
But NOT every methodology adopted and practiced change the brain chemistry significantly but rather it alters the neural connections between different neurons contrastingly from previous state.

When one changes one's state from not knowing how to swim to be an average swimmer there are significant changes within the motor neuron connections and also to other parts of the brain.

The brain chemistry changes significantly when one take drugs to enhance performance.

[Peter Holmes]

The logical positivists comprised of philosophers with different views on morality but they all have these common views of morality, i.e.

• Moral statement, judgments are;
  1. not moral facts
  2. not state-of-affairs
  3. not propositions
  4. not truth-apt, neither be true or false
  5. expressing desires, opinions and beliefs
  6. Prescriptive [is] not descriptive [oughts]
  7. Not mind independent

Note I omitted the "meaningless" element which were claimed by SOME of the LPs, e.g. Ayer and others.

Yours views on morality are of the above [1-7] which were agreed by all the logical positivists, thus were inherited from the LPs with their notable "fact = state-of-affairs".


I have done that a '1000' times as gleaned from my extensive research into the subject of Morality and Ethics.
I am still researching into the deeper depths of Morality and Ethics. Previously I'd spent a lot of time focusing mainly on Kantian Ethics but now I have acquired a wider and deeper perspective on the subject.

As with the above, you have inherited the bastardized version of 'what is fact' 'state-of-affairs' from the LPs and is being very dogmatic about it. Thus my '1000' times demonstration that moral facts exist is not likely to get into your thick dogmatic skull due to very aggressive confirmation bias.

Note my argument on
'What is Fact?"
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486

The above is the general definition of 'what is fact' and there is no way it can be disputed.
So with a moral FSK,

There are Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Btw, your path to what is morality - the nonCognitivists' view is severely hindered and is not tenable because of;

Frege-Geach Problem Destroyed NonCognitivism
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30150

Thus,

What is most plausible is the default;
Moral Realism is the Default Within Morality
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30483

I think you've been seduced by some impressive-sounding and seemingly technical theorising. Frege's analysis is a nice example of mistaking what we say for the way things are. And speech-act theory is mired in delusions about the nature and function of language, not least of which is the myth of propositions, which, like all so-called abstract things, are misleading metaphysical fictions.

Pending evidence for the existence of a moral reality - whatever that could be - moral realism doesn't even make it to the starting post. And, as with everything else, the existence of a moral reality has nothing at all to do with language.

As usual you ignore the substance of what I had presented above.

You have no defense of substance and solidness, thus the best you can do is make noise and wave away whatever you cannot defend.

Whatever I presented are based on solid justifications and arguments by the authors.
To be intellectually honest you have the onus to at least read and understand [not necessary agree] before making any judgment on their views.

Note what is most reliable is to start with observations, experiences and empirical evidences.
Moral realism as the default is based on everyday experiences and abductions and inductions that are empirically justified and deliberated philosophically.

On the other hand what you are relying upon are merely meanings of words, i.e. 'facts = states-of-affairs' which on their own are fatuous. This is very flimsy.
You state nothing nor refer to justifications of whatever are facts.

I proposed you tick off the following checklist;

• Moral statement, judgments are;
  1. not moral facts
  2. not state-of-affairs
  3. not propositions
  4. not truth-apt, neither be true or false
  5. expressing desires, opinions and beliefs
  6. Prescriptive [is] not descriptive [oughts]
  7. Not mind independent

I believed you are agreeable to all the above including 6 which your originally disagree but I had explained you cannot run away from it.

Since you are agreeable to the above, you are a nonCognitivist and such a view is not tenable and is destroyed by the Frege-Geach Problem.

As such the most plausible stance for morality and ethics is Moral Realism [i.e. contrast to points 1-7 above ], in my case, Moral Empirical Realism which is similar [not exactly] to Science.

Don't patronise me. I've studied Frege's 'concept-writing' in great detail, so I have an informed view of its fundamental flaws - mistakes which at first fooled Wittgenstein into his picture theory of meaning, which in part fooled the logical positivists. It was Wittgenstein's later recognition of the mistakes that matured into his profound insights into the nature and functions of language.

And Searle's belief in representationalism, which informed his speech-act theory - along with the delusion of 'propositional content' - represents a deep misunderstanding of the later Wittgenstein's conclusions - in my opinion. Since propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions, the claim that all linguistic expressions have a propositional content is false.

And I have no idea why you think my use of the word 'fact' is any different from yours, of from any standard dictionary explanation: a thing or event that exists or existed, or that is true. But perhaps I misunderstood - isn't that what you think a fact is?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I think you've been seduced by some impressive-sounding and seemingly technical theorising. Frege's analysis is a nice example of mistaking what we say for the way things are. And speech-act theory is mired in delusions about the nature and function of language, not least of which is the myth of propositions, which, like all so-called abstract things, are misleading metaphysical fictions.

Pending evidence for the existence of a moral reality - whatever that could be - moral realism doesn't even make it to the starting post. And, as with everything else, the existence of a moral reality has nothing at all to do with language.

As usual you ignore the substance of what I had presented above.

You have no defense of substance and solidness, thus the best you can do is make noise and wave away whatever you cannot defend.

Whatever I presented are based on solid justifications and arguments by the authors.
To be intellectually honest you have the onus to at least read and understand [not necessary agree] before making any judgment on their views.

Note what is most reliable is to start with observations, experiences and empirical evidences.
Moral realism as the default is based on everyday experiences and abductions and inductions that are empirically justified and deliberated philosophically.

On the other hand what you are relying upon are merely meanings of words, i.e. 'facts = states-of-affairs' which on their own are fatuous. This is very flimsy.
You state nothing nor refer to justifications of whatever are facts.

I proposed you tick off the following checklist;

• Moral statement, judgments are;
  1. not moral facts
  2. not state-of-affairs
  3. not propositions
  4. not truth-apt, neither be true or false
  5. expressing desires, opinions and beliefs
  6. Prescriptive [is] not descriptive [oughts]
  7. Not mind independent

I believed you are agreeable to all the above including 6 which your originally disagree but I had explained you cannot run away from it.

Since you are agreeable to the above, you are a nonCognitivist and such a view is not tenable and is destroyed by the Frege-Geach Problem.

As such the most plausible stance for morality and ethics is Moral Realism [i.e. contrast to points 1-7 above ], in my case, Moral Empirical Realism which is similar [not exactly] to Science.

Don't patronise me. I've studied Frege's 'concept-writing' in great detail, so I have an informed view of its fundamental flaws - mistakes which at first fooled Wittgenstein into his picture theory of meaning, which in part fooled the logical positivists. It was Wittgenstein's later recognition of the mistakes that matured into his profound insights into the nature and functions of language.

And Searle's belief in representationalism, which informed his speech-act theory - along with the delusion of 'propositional content' - represents a deep misunderstanding of the later Wittgenstein's conclusions - in my opinion. Since propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions, the claim that all linguistic expressions have a propositional content is false.

And I have no idea why you think my use of the word 'fact' is any different from yours, of from any standard dictionary explanation: a thing or event that exists or existed, or that is true. But perhaps I misunderstood - isn't that what you think a fact is?

I have already presented my view on "what is fact" with reference to moral facts, note, repeat from above;

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Re 'Frege',
The Frege-Geach Problem is not from Frege.
It was Geach who made reference to Frege.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Geach

As I had stated you have to research into the Frege-Geach Problem to understand the substance of the challenge.
Don't just jump to conclusion merely because you see the word 'Frege' and similarly Searle and Speech Acts.

[Peter Holmes]

I think you've been seduced by some impressive-sounding and seemingly technical theorising. Frege's analysis is a nice example of mistaking what we say for the way things are. And speech-act theory is mired in delusions about the nature and function of language, not least of which is the myth of propositions, which, like all so-called abstract things, are misleading metaphysical fictions.

Pending evidence for the existence of a moral reality - whatever that could be - moral realism doesn't even make it to the starting post. And, as with everything else, the existence of a moral reality has nothing at all to do with language.

As usual you ignore the substance of what I had presented above.

You have no defense of substance and solidness, thus the best you can do is make noise and wave away whatever you cannot defend.

Whatever I presented are based on solid justifications and arguments by the authors.
To be intellectually honest you have the onus to at least read and understand [not necessary agree] before making any judgment on their views.

Note what is most reliable is to start with observations, experiences and empirical evidences.
Moral realism as the default is based on everyday experiences and abductions and inductions that are empirically justified and deliberated philosophically.

On the other hand what you are relying upon are merely meanings of words, i.e. 'facts = states-of-affairs' which on their own are fatuous. This is very flimsy.
You state nothing nor refer to justifications of whatever are facts.

I proposed you tick off the following checklist;

• Moral statement, judgments are;
  1. not moral facts
  2. not state-of-affairs
  3. not propositions
  4. not truth-apt, neither be true or false
  5. expressing desires, opinions and beliefs
  6. Prescriptive [is] not descriptive [oughts]
  7. Not mind independent

I believed you are agreeable to all the above including 6 which your originally disagree but I had explained you cannot run away from it.

Since you are agreeable to the above, you are a nonCognitivist and such a view is not tenable and is destroyed by the Frege-Geach Problem.

As such the most plausible stance for morality and ethics is Moral Realism [i.e. contrast to points 1-7 above ], in my case, Moral Empirical Realism which is similar [not exactly] to Science.

Don't patronise me. I've studied Frege's 'concept-writing' in great detail, so I have an informed view of its fundamental flaws - mistakes which at first fooled Wittgenstein into his picture theory of meaning, which in part fooled the logical positivists. It was Wittgenstein's later recognition of the mistakes that matured into his profound insights into the nature and functions of language.

And Searle's belief in representationalism, which informed his speech-act theory - along with the delusion of 'propositional content' - represents a deep misunderstanding of the later Wittgenstein's conclusions - in my opinion. Since propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions, the claim that all linguistic expressions have a propositional content is false.

And I have no idea why you think my use of the word 'fact' is any different from yours, of from any standard dictionary explanation: a thing or event that exists or existed, or that is true. And the moral rightness or wrongness of, say, capital punishment simply can't be a thing that exists or be true. There can be no such thing as a moral fact.