What could make morality objective?

[Skepdick]

Have you considered that morality might be an invention not a discovery?

Have you considered that the distinction doesn't matter?

Airplanes are invented, not discovered. What could make airplanes objective?

Oh. Wait!

[Skepdick]

Suppose two people are arguing about a painting. One says it's beautiful, and the other says it's ugly. Would it be reasonable for the admirer to claim the painting is objectively beautiful, or the detractor that it's objectively ugly? What facts could either point to in order to settle the argument? And if there aren't any, does that mean that what each person says is meaningless?

Suppose that two people are arguing over Earth. One says it's round, and the other says it's not round. Would it be reasonable for the round-earther to claim Earth is objectively round, or the non-rounder to claim that it's objectively not round?

The expression 'objectively beautiful/ugly' is as incoherent as the expression 'subjectively beautiful/ugly'. And exactly the same incoherence appears in the expressions 'objectively morally right/wrong' and 'subjectively morally right/wrong'.

We can usually explain why we think a thing is beautiful or ugly, or why we think an action is morally right or wrong. But to believe those are properties that exist 'factually' - independent from opinion - is a delusion.

The expression 'Earth is objectively round' is as incoherent as the expression 'Earth is objectively not round'.

We can usually explain why we think a thing is round; or not round. But to believe those are properties that exist 'factually' - independent from opinion - is a delusion.

How have you solved the symbol-grounding problem?
How do you determine whether any particular description is "grounded" e.g objective?

[CIN]

I don't think slavery IS always wrong — not if the slaves are happy. In fact if they're happy, I think slavery is right — for them. Can you find an example that might better serve your purpose?

You don't seem to understand 'What is Morality and Ethics".

Morality and Ethics involved Universal Principles applicable to ALL humans.

As an analogy from Biology, it is a Universal Principle in Biology and human nature, that ALL humans ought to breathe without exception.

Why ought they? Only to stay alive. So this isn't a categorical ought, it's a hypothetical ought ('if you want to stay alive, you ought to breathe'). But moral oughts are categorical, not hypothetical, so this biological ought is not relevant to the question whether there are moral oughts.

Morality and Ethics involved Universal Principles applicable to ALL humans.

Agreed.

As such, since Morality involves Universals and Slavery is one of the Moral Elements,
so, 'No humans ought to enslave another' is the Universal Principle applicable to ALL Humans,
otherwise, the universal principle would be "Humans ought to enslave another" which is abhorrent!

No. You haven't demonstrated that slavery is a moral element, you have merely ASSUMED this. And in fact slavery is NOT a moral element. That is, it is not fundamental to morality. Only pleasure and pain are fundamental. Therefore only pleasure and pain can be involved in universal principles.
This becomes obvious if we ask, 'why is slavery bad?' This question is reasonable, and the answer is 'because people are generally happier if they're free.' Whereas 'why is pain bad?' is just stupid. No-one needs to have it explained why pain is bad. Everyone knows that pain is bad. Even animals know it's bad, that's why your dog runs away from you if you keep beating him.
'Slavery is a moral evil' isn't a universal principle, it's just a rule of thumb. It's a good rule of thumb, because when humans enslave other humans, this generally makes these other humans unhappy; but it's still only a rule of thumb, because pain (or unhappiness, which is a kind of pain) can be the only reason anything is an evil, and if slavery doesn't cause people pain or make them unhappy, it isn't an evil.

To be objective and as a fact, the above universal principle must be empirically verifiable and justifiable with reinforcement by philosophical arguments.

You haven't verified your principle empirically. Nor have you established it by argument, as I pointed out, you merely ASSERTED WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION that slavery was a moral element.

[Age]

Peter, I'd like to take you right back to the start of this thread and make a comment on your very first post.

It seems to me this question - which has emerged from discussion of my post 'Is morality objective or subjective?' - is the crux in the disagreement between objectivists and subjectivists.

An objection to moral subjectivism is that, if moral values and judgements are matters of opinion, we can't know if they're correct. For example, we can't know if slavery is right or wrong, and can't therefore morally condemn those who think slavery is justifiable. That's just their opinion, and we can't say which opinion is correct or true.

But this assumes that there is indeed something to be known: an object of some kind that verifies the assertion slavery is wrong and falsifies the assertion slavery is right - or, perhaps, vice versa. But what is the object that makes moral judgements objective - matters of fact - and therefore true or false?

It can't be slavery itself, because that would also be the object of the assertion slavery is right - so we're back to square one. And it can't be the wrongness of slavery. To say the assertion slavery is wrong is justified (shown to be true) by the objective wrongness of slavery is circular, and so no justification at all.

So what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent from judgement, belief or opinion?

Does any moral objectivist here have an answer that doesn't beg the question?

I don't think slavery IS always wrong — not if the slaves are happy.

So, if a child, for example, is happy when they are being ABUSED, then this ABUSE is NOT wrong, correct?

In fact if they're happy, I think slavery is right — for them.

Again, so if a child is happy, then ABUSE is 'right' - for them, correct?

Can you find an example that might better serve your purpose?

[Age]

Suppose two people are arguing about a painting. One says it's beautiful, and the other says it's ugly. Would it be reasonable for the admirer to claim the painting is objectively beautiful, or the detractor that it's objectively ugly? What facts could either point to in order to settle the argument? And if there aren't any, does that mean that what each person says is meaningless?

Suppose that two people are arguing over Earth. One says it's round, and the other says it's not round. Would it be reasonable for the round-earther to claim Earth is objectively round, or the non-rounder to claim that it's objectively not round?

The expression 'objectively beautiful/ugly' is as incoherent as the expression 'subjectively beautiful/ugly'. And exactly the same incoherence appears in the expressions 'objectively morally right/wrong' and 'subjectively morally right/wrong'.

We can usually explain why we think a thing is beautiful or ugly, or why we think an action is morally right or wrong. But to believe those are properties that exist 'factually' - independent from opinion - is a delusion.

The expression 'Earth is objectively round' is as incoherent as the expression 'Earth is objectively not round'.

We can usually explain why we think a thing is round; or not round. But to believe those are properties that exist 'factually' - independent from opinion - is a delusion.

How have you solved the symbol-grounding problem?
How do you determine whether any particular description is "grounded" e.g objective?

If you would like to put the so-called, 'symbol grounding problem', into one simple question, (thus make 'it' a PROPER 'problem'. That is; a question posed for a solution), then, I think, I can VERY EASILY 'solve' that 'problem', for 'you'.

And, I think it WILL BE FOUND to answer 'your' following question here, AS WELL.

[Skepdick]

But moral oughts are categorical, not hypothetical.

That's not a descriptive statement. That's a prescriptive statement.

Moral oughts are whatever moral oughts are.

What you are really saying is that "moral oughts OUGHT TO BE categorical..."

[Skepdick]

Only pleasure and pain are fundamental.

This becomes obvious if we ask, 'why is slavery bad?'

So... uuuh. Why are pleasure and pain fundamental to morality?

When you keep asking "Why?" questions you are perpetually asking "Why?". You keep going deeper and deeper... until you land up in the abyss.

[CIN]

Thanks, but the example used is irrelevant. I'm not arguing here for the moral wrongness of slavery - though i think it is always wrong.

My point is that whether slavery (or anything else) is morally right or wrong - and always or only sometimes - is a matter of belief, judgement or opinion, which is subjective. There's no moral fact of the matter - which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.

So you say 'I think slavery is always wrong', and then you say that this is a matter of 'belief, judgement or opinion', implying that this is your belief.
Usually when people say that they believe slavery is wrong, they mean that they believe it is OBJECTIVELY wrong.
Since you don't believe in objective morality, that can't be what you mean when you say 'I think slavery is wrong'. So what DO you mean?

Suppose two people are arguing about a painting. One says it's beautiful, and the other says it's ugly. Would it be reasonable for the admirer to claim the painting is objectively beautiful, or the detractor that it's objectively ugly? What facts could either point to in order to settle the argument? And if there aren't any, does that mean that what each person says is meaningless?

I agree that a painting cannot be objectively beautiful or objectively ugly. I think this is irrelevant to the moral issue.

The expression 'objectively beautiful/ugly' is as incoherent as the expression 'subjectively beautiful/ugly'.

I don't understand you. Why are these expressions incoherent?

And exactly the same incoherence appears in the expressions 'objectively morally right/wrong' and 'subjectively morally right/wrong'.

As I said, I think the aesthetic and moral issues differ. You can't settle the moral issue by assuming that an analogy with the aesthetic issue holds, you can only do it either by showing that the analogy holds, or by discarding the aesthetic issue and simply proving that moral subjectivism is correct.

We can usually explain why we think a thing is beautiful or ugly, or why we think an action is morally right or wrong. But to believe those are properties that exist 'factually' - independent from opinion - is a delusion.

It is true that some supposed explanations would not show objectivism to be true, but this does not prove that there are NO explanations that would prove this. You have to take each supposed explanation on its merits.

Here's what I see as the problem with your statements quoted above:
You said, regarding slavery, 'I think it is always wrong.' You also said ' whether slavery (or anything else) is morally right or wrong - and always or only sometimes - is a matter of belief, judgement or opinion.' Now if you say 'I think it is always wrong', and you also say that whether it is right or wrong is a matter of belief, then this strongly implies that you believe that the statement 'slavery is wrong' is true. But the only way 'slavery is wrong' can be true is if slavery is wrong, which would be a moral fact. So you have strongly implied that you accept that there are moral facts. And yet you have often claimed in these forums that there aren't any moral facts. Your position therefore appears to be inconsistent.

I was trying to give you the opportunity to explain your statement 'I think [slavery] is always wrong' in some way which would avoid this inconsistency. You have sidestepped my question, and introduced an analogy which I think is not relevant, or which, at least, you have not shown is relevant.

Frankly, I think you are guilty of holding an objectivist view about slavery — that it is wrong — while falsely claiming to be a subjectivist.

Over to you.

[Peter Holmes]

So you say 'I think slavery is always wrong', and then you say that this is a matter of 'belief, judgement or opinion', implying that this is your belief.
Usually when people say that they believe slavery is wrong, they mean that they believe it is OBJECTIVELY wrong.
Since you don't believe in objective morality, that can't be what you mean when you say 'I think slavery is wrong'. So what DO you mean?

Suppose two people are arguing about a painting. One says it's beautiful, and the other says it's ugly. Would it be reasonable for the admirer to claim the painting is objectively beautiful, or the detractor that it's objectively ugly? What facts could either point to in order to settle the argument? And if there aren't any, does that mean that what each person says is meaningless?

I agree that a painting cannot be objectively beautiful or objectively ugly. I think this is irrelevant to the moral issue.

The expression 'objectively beautiful/ugly' is as incoherent as the expression 'subjectively beautiful/ugly'.

I don't understand you. Why are these expressions incoherent?

And exactly the same incoherence appears in the expressions 'objectively morally right/wrong' and 'subjectively morally right/wrong'.

As I said, I think the aesthetic and moral issues differ. You can't settle the moral issue by assuming that an analogy with the aesthetic issue holds, you can only do it either by showing that the analogy holds, or by discarding the aesthetic issue and simply proving that moral subjectivism is correct.

We can usually explain why we think a thing is beautiful or ugly, or why we think an action is morally right or wrong. But to believe those are properties that exist 'factually' - independent from opinion - is a delusion.

It is true that some supposed explanations would not show objectivism to be true, but this does not prove that there are NO explanations that would prove this. You have to take each supposed explanation on its merits.

Here's what I see as the problem with your statements quoted above:
You said, regarding slavery, 'I think it is always wrong.' You also said ' whether slavery (or anything else) is morally right or wrong - and always or only sometimes - is a matter of belief, judgement or opinion.' Now if you say 'I think it is always wrong', and you also say that whether it is right or wrong is a matter of belief, then this strongly implies that you believe that the statement 'slavery is wrong' is true. But the only way 'slavery is wrong' can be true is if slavery is wrong, which would be a moral fact. So you have strongly implied that you accept that there are moral facts. And yet you have often claimed in these forums that there aren't any moral facts. Your position therefore appears to be inconsistent.

I was trying to give you the opportunity to explain your statement 'I think [slavery] is always wrong' in some way which would avoid this inconsistency. You have sidestepped my question, and introduced an analogy which I think is not relevant, or which, at least, you have not shown is relevant.

Frankly, I think you are guilty of holding an objectivist view about slavery — that it is wrong — while falsely claiming to be a subjectivist.

Over to you.

1 Here are two assertions between which there's no logical contradiction:
There are no moral facts. Slavery is morally wrong.
I assume you understand why there's no contradiction.

2 If there are no moral facts, then a moral assertion doesn't make a factual claim with a truth-value.
I assume you understand the function of a hypothetical premise.

3 In the expression 'X is subjectively morally wrong', the modifier 'subjectively' is grammatically misattached, because it doesn't refer to the moral wrongness of X. It refers to the status or function of the assertion that X is morally wrong.
I assume you're familiar with grammatical misattachments, such as abstract noun and true belief.

4 The analogy between aesthetic and moral assertions is precise. Both express value-judgements with no factual truth-value. Since beauty and ugliness are not independent properties, neither are moral rightness and wrongness.

[Skepdick]

1 Here are two assertions between which there's no logical contradiction:
There are no moral facts. Slavery is morally wrong.
I assume you understand why there's no contradiction.

What the hell do you mean by "is" then?!?

We use the word "is" to establish a factual relationship (a correspondence if you will) between things.

To establish a relationship between Earth and roundness we say "Earth IS round."
To establish a relationship between Paris and the capital of France we say "Paris IS the capital of France"
To establish a relationship between today and Monday we say "Today IS monday"
To establish a relationship between Joe Biden and the president of the united states we say "Joe Biden IS the president of the United States"

What does your "IS " mean in the sentence "Slavery is morally wrong." if not to establish a relationship between wrongness and slavery?!?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I don't think slavery IS always wrong — not if the slaves are happy. In fact if they're happy, I think slavery is right — for them. Can you find an example that might better serve your purpose?

You don't seem to understand 'What is Morality and Ethics".

Morality and Ethics involved Universal Principles applicable to ALL humans.

As an analogy from Biology, it is a Universal Principle in Biology and human nature, that ALL humans ought to breathe without exception.

Why ought they? Only to stay alive. So this isn't a categorical ought, it's a hypothetical ought ('if you want to stay alive, you ought to breathe'). But moral oughts are categorical, not hypothetical, so this biological ought is not relevant to the question whether there are moral oughts.

Say, you are the average person, I challenge you to hold your breath for more than a minute if not two or more, surely you will and can experience that 'oughtness' to breathe as you will try to grasp for air or even kill to ensure you can breathe.
It is not a question of 'if you want to stay alive' -this is crude thinking.
The 'oughtness' to breathe is a 'program' that is innate and involuntary within the human organism and other breathing organisms.

My point is, whilst not as obvious as the oughtness program to breathe, in a similar way, all humans are embedded with an inherent program for the propensity towards morality-proper. This moral potential inherent in all humans is unfolding within humanity in a range of degrees of activation.

At this point I am saying there an inherent potential for morality within all humans that is similar to the inherent oughtness to breathe in all humans.
I have not provided the justifications of my thesis as yet, but if you researched deeply into the subject, you will get a clue that such an inherent program do exists within all humans.

Morality and Ethics involved Universal Principles applicable to ALL humans.

Agreed.

The "oughtness to breathe" is universal in all humans, and for morality to be universal, morality will be similar to the universal principle of the inherent "oughtness to breathe".

As such, since Morality involves Universals and Slavery is one of the Moral Elements,
so, 'No humans ought to enslave another' is the Universal Principle applicable to ALL Humans,
otherwise, the universal principle would be "Humans ought to enslave another" which is abhorrent!

No. You haven't demonstrated that slavery is a moral element, you have merely ASSUMED this. And in fact slavery is NOT a moral element. That is, it is not fundamental to morality. Only pleasure and pain are fundamental. Therefore only pleasure and pain can be involved in universal principles.
This becomes obvious if we ask, 'why is slavery bad?' This question is reasonable, and the answer is 'because people are generally happier if they're free.' Whereas 'why is pain bad?' is just stupid. No-one needs to have it explained why pain is bad. Everyone knows that pain is bad. Even animals know it's bad, that's why your dog runs away from you if you keep beating him.
'Slavery is a moral evil' isn't a universal principle, it's just a rule of thumb. It's a good rule of thumb, because when humans enslave other humans, this generally makes these other humans unhappy; but it's still only a rule of thumb, because pain (or unhappiness, which is a kind of pain) can be the only reason anything is an evil, and if slavery doesn't cause people pain or make them unhappy, it isn't an evil.

What is primary and critical to Slavery is about 'freedom' as a basic human right and not to be 'owned' as a property and 'traded' by another human.
There is also an inherent 'oughtness' programmed into all humans to be 'free' i.e. not owned as a property by another human.
The physical plus mental sufferings and pains are significant to slavery but is it secondary.

In general no normal humans would want to be enslaved by another in view of the inherent propensity for freedom and the avoidance of the associated physical and mental sufferings.
Those who feel good as being a slave to another are perverts.
Out of 8 billion humans on Earth, how many do you think would feel good and happy to be enslaved and owned by another to the extent they can be sold as a property to another?
1000? that is only 0.0000125% or even 1,000,000 [which is unlikely] that is only 0.0125% and these small groups are really perverts in contrast to normal humans.

Slavery is recognized by all normal people as evil. This is why the UN has a Slavery Convention to ban all forms of slavery, notably Chattel Slavery.

Your view that 'slavery' is not a moral issue, i.e. promoting good and avoiding evil is too narrow minded.

To be objective and as a fact, the above universal principle must be empirically verifiable and justifiable with reinforcement by philosophical arguments.

You haven't verified your principle empirically. Nor have you established it by argument, as I pointed out, you merely ASSERTED WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION that slavery was a moral element.

The term 'morality' used at present is very loose and in many cases corrupted within various groups.
I define 'morality' [proper] as 'promoting good and avoiding evil' for the well being of the individual and humanity.
What is 'good' in this case means not-evil.
What is 'evil' is the net-negative impact on the well-being of the individual and humanity.
What is negative to the well-being is that which to the extreme form threatens the preservation of the human species and in lesser forms, the related physical & mental sufferings and freedom of the individual.
In this sense, slavery [especially chattel slavery] is a moral element which must be eliminated morally [in contrast to politically].

[popeye1945]

Morality though innate is a social function and requires what one might call a trigger, and that trigger is the identification of the self with the self in others, rather like an extended concept of the self. Where there is no identification with others there arises no compassion and compassion is elemental to morality. This can be seen in other animals and in cross-species examples, it is not something unique to the human family. Schopenhauer thought it a metaphysical realization, that you and the other are one, which makes conceivable the breaking of the first principle of life, that of self-survival—putting one's life on the line to save self. Often after the fact of such a deed, one will hear the hero of the scene express the fact that they didn't even think about it, it just grabs them.

[Peter Holmes]

The is of predication at work

Marmite is delicious.
I/we think Marmite is delicious.
? It's a fact that Marmite is delicious.
? The assertion Marmite is delicious is true.
? The assertion Marmite is disgusting is false.
? The deliciousness of Marmite is objective - a matter of fact - not subjective - a matter of opinion.

In this context, there are no gustatory facts, just as there are no aesthetic and moral facts. It can't be a fact that Marmite is delicious/disgusting, a turd is ugly/beautiful, or capital punishment is morally right/wrong.

The is of predication introduces a subject complement. And that's all.

[Skepdick]

The is of predication at work

Marmite is delicious.
I/we think Marmite is delicious.
? It's a fact that Marmite is delicious.

If it isn't delicious then why are you/we saying it's delicious?

? The assertion Marmite is delicious is true.
? The assertion Marmite is disgusting is false.

The assertion this color is blue is true.
The assertion this color is blue is false.

What's your point?

? The deliciousness of Marmite is objective - a matter of fact - not subjective - a matter of opinion.

The redness of this color is objective - a matter of fact - not subjective - a matter of opinion.
The blueness of this color is objective - a matter of fact - not subjective - a matter of opinion.

You don't seem to understand the difference between coherence and correspondence.

Both "red" and "blue" cohere with this color, but which one corresponds to this color?

The way we establish correspondence is by using the verb "IS"!

This color IS blue.
This color IS red.

In this context, there are no gustatory facts, just as there are no aesthetic and moral facts.

What premise has led you to this conclusion? You said you need arguments so lets hear them.

It can't be a fact that Marmite is delicious/disgusting, a turd is ugly/beautiful, or capital punishment is morally right/wrong.

Why not?

The is of predication introduces a subject complement. And that's all.

Bullshit. "IS" is a conjunction. It establishes a relationship (a correspondence?) betwen entities.

Marmite is.
Deliciousness is.
Marmite IS delicious.

Earth is.
Roundness is.
Earth IS round.

Paris is.
France is.
Capitals are.
Paris IS the capital of France.

Joe Biden is.
United States is.
Presidents are.
Joe Biden IS the presidenf ot the United States.

Slavery is.
Wrongness is.
Slavery IS wrong.

Peter Holmes is.
Stupidity is.
Peter Holmes IS stupid.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The is of predication at work

Marmite is delicious.
I/we think Marmite is delicious.
? It's a fact that Marmite is delicious.
? The assertion Marmite is delicious is true.
? The assertion Marmite is disgusting is false.
? The deliciousness of Marmite is objective - a matter of fact - not subjective - a matter of opinion.

In this context, there are no gustatory facts, just as there are no aesthetic and moral facts. It can't be a fact that Marmite is delicious/disgusting, a turd is ugly/beautiful, or capital punishment is morally right/wrong.

The is of predication introduces a subject complement. And that's all.

That marmite is delicious is objective is a good analogy for moral elements as objective moral facts.
In this particular case, the deliciousness of Marmite is objective - a matter of fact!

• Marmite is high in umami flavor, as it's fermented with yeast, while oyster sauce is umami-rich, as it's made with boiled oysters or oyster extract, which are high in glutamate.
  [Link]

• Umami or savoriness, is one of the five basic tastes.[1] It has been described as savory and is characteristic of broths and cooked meats.
  People taste umami through taste receptors that typically respond to glutamates and nucleotides, which are widely present in meat broths and fermented products. Since umami has its own receptors rather than arising out of a combination of the traditionally recognized taste receptors, scientists now consider umami to be a distinct taste.
  In 1985, the term umami was recognized as the scientific term to describe the taste of glutamates and nucleotides at the first Umami International Symposium in Hawaii.[17] Umami represents the taste of the amino acid L-glutamate and 5'-ribonucleotides such as guanosine monophosphate (GMP) and inosine monophosphate (IMP).[14] It can be described as a pleasant "brothy" or "meaty" taste with a long-lasting, mouthwatering and coating sensation over the tongue.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umami

The umami taste receptors are present in all human beings just like the other taste receptors.
That umami taste receptors detect taste that are savory, i.e. delicious.
Since Marmite is high in umami flavor, marmite will be delicious to all normal humans without damage taste receptors.
This is a fact that can be verified and justified with experiences of all humans which taste marmite.
So it is an objective fact, a matter of fact, a state of affairs that marmite is delicious.

Point there is no question of right or wrong with the deliciousness of marmite, it is just a matter of fact [verifiable] that it is delicious and an innate propensity.

Similarly just as there are objective taste receptors for umami and other tastes as a matter of fact, whilst not so obvious, there are inherent moral algorithms represent by neuronal system in the brain, e.g. "the ought-not-ness of killing another human."