What could make morality objective?

[Sculptor]

As I had stated earlier;

• The empirical and moral fact is;
  "ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."
  
  The objective moral absolute in this case is;
  "No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"

The above are the moral features of an empirical moral realist.

Name me one if you disagree.

You can identify as many facts as you like but the one overriding assumption that you are making, that is NOT a fact: you seem to think that humans ought to live. Sorry but that is simply an opinion.
Until you embrace this failing in your thinking you shall never understand your interlocutors.

[vegetariantaxidermy]

As I had stated earlier;

• The empirical and moral fact is;
  "ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."
  
  The objective moral absolute in this case is;
  "No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"

The above are the moral features of an empirical moral realist.

Name me one if you disagree.

You can identify as many facts as you like but the one overriding assumption that you are making, that is NOT a fact: you seem to think that humans ought to live. Sorry but that is simply an opinion.
Until you embrace this failing in your thinking you shall never understand your interlocutors.

[Veritas Aequitas]

As I had stated earlier;
The empirical and moral fact is;
"ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."

The objective moral absolute in this case is;
"No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"
The above are the moral features of an empirical moral realist.

Wrong, as ever.

Fact: humans must breathe or they die.
Opinion: humans ought to breathe.
Question: why ought humans to breathe?
Answer: so that they live.
Question: why ought humans to live?
Answer: because if they don't, they die.
Question: why ought humans not to die?
Answer: because they ought to live.

And on and on and on, in an utterly fatuous spiral down into nothingness.

You missed the 500 pounds gorilla in the room.
I gave you a clue re the difference between Practical Reason and Theoretical Reason, and such critical element did not click with you, thus you went on with your ontological philosophical realism nonsense.

Fact: humans must breathe or they die.
Opinion: humans ought to breathe.

It is your desperation that you introduce 'opinion'.

From the perspective of Practical Reasoning, not Theoretical Reasoning,
'Human ought to breathe' is a moral fact, which leads to another level of moral fact;
'No human ought to stop another human from breathing'

Question: why ought humans not to die?
Answer: because they ought to live.

Again you invent your own nonsensical limited answer.
The question should be;
Question: why ought humans not to die prematuredly?
Answer: because there are loads of empirical evidences, all humans are "programmed" not to die prematuredly but programmed naturally for mortality.
Thus the final moral fact is justified by empirical evidences with philosophical reasoning, thus supporting my stance, i.e. empirical-moral-realism.

I asked you to produce one real moral thing - a moral feature of reality - because you believe such things exist - and all you could produce was a linguistic assertion: all humans ought to breathe else they die.

You missed out the moral fact from a Framework of Practical Reasoning, i.e.
'No human ought to stop another human from breathing'

Now, I asked you to try really hard this time - which meant to think about it as hard as you can with your tiny, conceited brain. And this was the result. Looking back, and reflecting on the fruit of your intellectual endeavours - does what you produced strike you as a tiny wee bit off the mark? Could it possibly be that a linguistic assertion doesn't qualify as the supposed MORAL THING that moral realists claim exists? Could something have gone ever so slightly wrong with this way of thinking? Could it be that moral realists have no f*****g clue how to demonstrate the truth of their idiotic claim?

Well, who knows? Why let abject failure get in the way of a pious belief - one as absurdly irrational as belief in gods?

You are the ignorant one with only a kindergarten view on morality and ethics.
Suggest you research further on what is Practical Reason before displaying more of your kindergarten tantrum.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I read your link, Veritas.
But if nature is orderly and we can reason and acquire empirical knowledge about nature it is possible the knowledge we have acquired might sometimes fortunately hit the mark even while we cannot know whether or not.
After all, fantasies are vastly improbable predictions while much modern scientific knowledge yields probable predictions and explanations ; there are degrees of probability and there is an element of chance mixed in with all choices.

I agree there are degrees of probability of hitting the mark.
As with Science - modern or classical, scientific truths are merely polished conjectures [hypothesis] and can never reflect absolute reality which is non-existent any way.
What is critical is we reach justified and reliable knowledge that will facilitate to optimize the well being of the individual and therefrom humanity.

But there are certain empirical knowledge that even with common sense are very certain [99.99%] e.g. mortality, the imperative to breathe, drink and eat.
Don't think you can dispute the above.
Obviously we have to refine the above with more sophisticated empirical justifications [science, etc.] and philosophical reasoning to establish greater certainty, i.e. 99.9999999..99 certainty.

Similarly, some of our ethics could be true to the order of nature while we cannot be certain this is so. Fortune could play its part in ethical claims just like it can in empirical claims.

There is no need for fortune, chance or luck.
Point is it is imperative we ground whatever are the moral and ethical principles based on the empirical evidences that are very justified to be certain [99.99999..999%].
Then we use this moral principles as ground to make other moral reasoning and evaluations.
Even with 99.999999999..9% certainty, there is no enforcement within morality but these are only to be used as GUIDES only.

Alas there is no way we can know nature is orderly or chaotic ! We have to presume it is orderly so we can predict as well as we can what happens next.The mark to hit is a matter of faith and there may be no mark to hit.
The claim that fortune or chance is an element of each choice is to claim nobody knows everything nor has perfect judgement. Uncertainty is a virtue of good science and ethical living.

I agree we can aim to be as certain as we possibly can and we should aim to be as certain as we possibly can as to the consequences of any choice. Some of these consequences are affective, and that is where morality matters.

You are still playing around with uncertainty when I have shown you there are certain knowledge that are almost as close to absolute certainty, i.e.

• But there are certain empirical knowledge that even with common sense are very certain [99.99%] e.g. mortality, the imperative to breathe, drink and eat.
  Don't think you can dispute the above.
  Obviously we have to refine the above with more sophisticated empirical justifications [science, etc.] and philosophical reasoning to establish greater certainty, i.e. 99.9999999..99 certainty.

[Peter Holmes]

You missed out the moral fact from a Framework of Practical Reasoning, i.e.
'No human ought to stop another human from breathing'

Oh, another linguistic assertion which isn't a MORAL THING. You call yourself a moral realist, which means you think moral things exist. Nothing to see here. Just another moral opinion.

Oh, and sticking the word 'practical' in does nothing to improve your argument.

You have nothing, even assuming your demonstrably ridiculous consensus theory of truth. Nada. Tipota. They wouldn't even let you into kindergarten.

[Veritas Aequitas]

As I had stated earlier;

• The empirical and moral fact is;
  "ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."
  
  The objective moral absolute in this case is;
  "No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"

The above are the moral features of an empirical moral realist.

Name me one if you disagree.

You can identify as many facts as you like but the one overriding assumption that you are making, that is NOT a fact: you seem to think that humans ought to live. Sorry but that is simply an opinion.
Until you embrace this failing in your thinking you shall never understand your interlocutors.

I have supported my views with arguments.

I understand the interlocutors views.
While the interlocutors are stuck with ontological philosophical realism and offer to sound arguments to counter my views.

Note my mention of Practical Reasoning as opposed to Theoretical Reasoning.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You missed out the moral fact from a Framework of Practical Reasoning, i.e.
'No human ought to stop another human from breathing'

Oh, another linguistic assertion which isn't a MORAL THING. You call yourself a moral realist, which means you think moral things exist. Nothing to see here. Just another moral opinion.

Oh, and sticking the word 'practical' in does nothing to improve your argument.

You have nothing, even assuming your demonstrably ridiculous consensus theory of truth. Nada. Tipota. They wouldn't even let you into kindergarten.

Do you really understand what is Practical Reasoning?
Describe what you understand what is Practical Reasoning re Morality and Ethics.
Don't just limit yourself to Wiki, but do a survey of it within the full range of the Philosophy of Morality and Ethics.

Note Kant's The Critique of Practical Reason

The Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft) is the second of Immanuel Kant's three critiques, published in 1788. It follows on from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and deals with his moral philosophy.
-wiki

You are deceptive.
I am specifically an empirical moral realist not 'ontological moral realist.'

[Peter Holmes]

You missed out the moral fact from a Framework of Practical Reasoning, i.e.
'No human ought to stop another human from breathing'

Oh, another linguistic assertion which isn't a MORAL THING. You call yourself a moral realist, which means you think moral things exist. Nothing to see here. Just another moral opinion.

Oh, and sticking the word 'practical' in does nothing to improve your argument.

You have nothing, even assuming your demonstrably ridiculous consensus theory of truth. Nada. Tipota. They wouldn't even let you into kindergarten.

Do you really understand what is Practical Reasoning?
Describe what you understand what is Practical Reasoning re Morality and Ethics.
Don't just limit yourself to Wiki, but do a survey of it within the full range of the Philosophy of Morality and Ethics.

Note Kant's The Critique of Practical Reason

The Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft) is the second of Immanuel Kant's three critiques, published in 1788. It follows on from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and deals with his moral philosophy.
-wiki

You are deceptive.
I am specifically an empirical moral realist not 'ontological moral realist.'

Yes, I know all about Kant's distinction, and I can't be bothered to show you why it's specious.

Now, as an empirical moral realist, you claim there are real moral things - otherwise, what does 'moral realist' mean?

So stop deflecting and produce an example of a real moral thing - a thing discernable in experience, based on sense data. I don't care if it's not what you call ontologically real - meaningless as the distinction between empirically real and ontologically real actually is. Just do it.

[Sculptor]

As I had stated earlier;

• The empirical and moral fact is;
  "ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."
  
  The objective moral absolute in this case is;
  "No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"

The above are the moral features of an empirical moral realist.

Name me one if you disagree.

You can identify as many facts as you like but the one overriding assumption that you are making, that is NOT a fact: you seem to think that humans ought to live. Sorry but that is simply an opinion.
Until you embrace this failing in your thinking you shall never understand your interlocutors.

I have supported my views with arguments.

I understand the interlocutors views.
While the interlocutors are stuck with ontological philosophical realism and offer to sound arguments to counter my views.

Note my mention of Practical Reasoning as opposed to Theoretical Reasoning.

You still don't get it do you?
Why are you carrying your personal assumptions into a discussion about objectivity?

[Immanuel Can]

I believe you are conflating the various perspectives of 'objectivity'.

I am indeed speaking of ontological objectivity, which is not only tenable but absolutely necessary to any conception of subjectivity that does not implicate mere delusion.

The Correspondence Theory of Truth is really not an ontological theory. It's an epistemological theory, a theory about what humans can or cannot know, not about what does or does not exist. And I'm not subscribing to that view.

Do you deny scientific truths are objective, albeit they are merely polished conjectures.

You would have to nuance this question. As you are presently stating it, it's ambiguous, so I'm not sure which way to answer it honestly for you.

What-the-truth-is-about is an emergence that is co-dependent with humans collectively as part and parcel of that emergence.

It's not, actually. Emergentism has such serious rational problems right now that it cannot claim plausibility. See Jaegwon Kim on that, if you wonder what I mean.

So by what process is a belief "justified," as you see it?

"Justified" means justified in according to the imperative processes and principles of the specific Framework of Knowledge.
As such scientific objectivity must satisfy the requirements of the Scientific Methods, verifiability, testability, repeatability, falsifiability, peer review.[/quote]
You mean what's called "the epistemological virtues." You just listed some of them.

That's an epistemological framework. And it depends on a realist ontology, a belief in an objective reality outside of the subjective.

It does not tell us that objective reality doesn't exist -- rather, it assumes objective reality DOES exist, and merely proposes the probabilistic means of people seeking to perceive most accurately that objective reality.

[Peter Holmes]

So you side with Nietzsche against George Eliot.

Sure.

Nietzsche's right, in this case. Histrionic though he may have sometimes been.

No, he's wrong - and he did nothing to demonstrate the truth of his claim. He merely assumed its truth.

Well, let's not be ad hominem. If Nietzsche were the Devil himself, we would still be faced with the question of whether or not, as Shakespeare put it, the Devil can "speak true." Let us concede that Nietzsche was "histrionic" -- but what about his assertion? Is this one of the instances in which he's got it wrong, or is he actually right? You're going to have to show reasons for dismissing a point of view for which all the good reasons seem to be on his side. If subjective morality is a real thing, on what basis does it stand?

Let's be precise. Nietzsche's claim is this: if there's no god, then there are no moral facts. This says nothing about moral subjectivism.

No, actually, that's not the limit of the implication, as Nietzsche well understood. It was the point on which he took issue with Eliot et al. Nietzsche well understood that if God is dead, then we are putting ourselves "beyond good and evil," i.e., into a realm in which the terms "good" and "evil" don't even have a referent.

Nope. The claim 'if there's no god, then there are no moral facts' is as unjustified as the claim 'if there's a god, then there are moral facts'. In fact, they're flipsides of the same fallacy. There's no logical entailment in either case.

In such a realm, there is no substance to moral subjectivism. As Nietzsche rightly saw, it's only a "lack of discernment" that could allow people like Eliot to think otherwise.

Your problem all along has been your identification of morality - the function of moral assertions - with moral facts, even though neither you nor any moral realist or objectivist I've come across has been able to identufy a moral fact and explain why it's a fact. And if there are no moral facts, the existence or otherwise of a god is irrelevant with regard to the existence of moral facts. The duck is dead in the water.

So if you think Nietzsche's wrong, you can disprove him very easily: just say what the real justification for subjective moralizing is.

Nietzsche and you are wrong because there is no such thing as a moral fact - it's a contradiction in terms - a non-existent thing. So moral facts aren't things that could exist even if there were a god.

His focus, if you see, is on AEN -- the "Argument from Evolutionary Naturalism." But you could argue there is some other way of grounding a subjective morality apart from evolutionism, if you want; but if you don't want to, then you've got to grant that, as Plantinga, Dawkins and Rosenberg have argued from opposite sides (the first, a Theist, the others, Naturalists) that Darwin is the only game in town. (394)

Explaining the biological and social evolutionary source and development of human morality is dead easy - you can do it yourself - anyone can. Your determination to deny the basis for a secular humanist account of moral values and judgements comes purely from your unjustified belief that there are moral facts - a belief that you simply can't justify - which is why you've failed to produce even one example. That we can and do disagree about moral judgements such as 'eating animals is morally wrong' - that there's no fact of the matter - demonstrates the actual nature of morality, as distinct from the fantasy preached by theists and other objectivists.

And if that's right, you've got to defend some version of an argument that shows an AEN can rationally legitimize morality. So that's the next step.

But the premise - that morality is an epistemological matter, so that moral assertions need a grounding in the way that factual assertions do - is the matter in dispute.

It shouldn't be. Either a moral statement has a justification, or it does not. There's no "sort of" option possible there. And while I agree that it will not be precisely the kind of justification one would seek for a physical fact, it is very clear that nobody has any reason to take any moral judgment at all with any seriousness if it lacks justification.

Yes - and that justification involves argument, persuasion, and collective agreement of the kind that brought about the legal ending of the slavery endorsed by the invented Abrahamic god. That's what morality is and how it works and develops.

What does 'legitimise morality' mean? Why does it need legitimising?

Morality needs legitimizing because it asks groups of people to agree on a value judgment. More than that, it calls them to agree on that value judgment on peril of having been "immoral" or "amoral" or "having done the wrong thing."

Got it - not hard, is it? It does require agreement in values and judgement - not outsourcing them to some moral authority or by inventing supposed moral facts, about which there can be no argument. But it's been a wretchedly slow and uneven process, a struggle against the wickedness of religions and other harmful ideologies.

If it does not achieve this, then what you're calling "morality" is not compelling to anyone but the person who happens to believe it at the present moment: in other words, it amounts to nothing more persuasive than "Peter doesn't like X." And why should anyone be concerned whether or not Peter "likes" or "doesn't like" things, especially since, lacking any justification even to himself, Peter might change his mind in the next ten seconds?

Back to the same old fallacy. If Peter changed his mind, would that mean that what was morally right is now morally wrong? Of course not. Why on earth should it? If the wicked OT god that you worship thought collective punishment of the innocent, genocide, the oppression of women and homosexuals were morally right, did that mean those atrocities were morally right? Of course not. What sort of swivel-eyed fundamentalist could think that?

Actually, we could. If two quantities are mutually necessary, you can argue from either one to the other, and it's valid and logical to do so. To deny that logic, you'd have to show that there was another circumstance under which one or the other could exist. Then you could call it "question-begging." But not if both are mutually necessary.

No. To assume a conclusion in a premise is circular. And establishing each conclusion - 'there is a god' and 'there are moral facts' - is a separate opertaion.

Not at all.

You can deduce the existence of the tides from the existence of the moon, or the existence of the moon from the existence of the ocean tides. Both ways, the deduction works, if a moon is necessary to the generating of tides...which, of course, it is.

But a deduction is sound only if the premises are true, or taken to be true. And the truth of a premise has to be independent from the conclusion supposedly justified by the premise. This is logic 101.

If the existence of morality and the existence of God are mutually necessary, as both I and Nietzsche would agree (oddly enough), then the proof of one is the proof of both. So to show that people can't argue that way, you'd have to show that morality can be justified apart from reference to God. If it cannot, then you have to drop all this talk of "subjective morality" of which you've been speaking, because "subjective" then denies the meaning of "morality." To be "subjective" is to say that you have only your perception, and no information about praise or blame, proscriptions or prescriptions pertaining to anyone else, and no information even about their evaluation of your own actions or intentions -- and hence no "moral" information, by definition.

I understand that you agree with Nietzsche

Well, only when what he says is actually right. And he certainly had this right.

No, he was wrong.

If there are no moral facts anyway - if moral facts are impossible - then a god is irrelevant here

Well, you need to show that there are no moral facts, then. But if there are no moral facts, neither is there such thing as morality. So then, subjective morality is closeted Nihilism.

No, no and no. Yours is (and Nietzsche's was) the burden of proving that there are moral facts. He didn't bother, and you've failed so far.

And I'm not saying you can't be a Nihilist: I'm just pointing out that you've rationally got no choice, once you say that morality isn't objective. Subjectivism isn't a stopping point, because it's not rationally explicable or justifiable in any way.

False and stupid. But anyway, if there are no moral facts - and there's no evidence that they exist - the claims of metaethical moral relativism and moral nihilism - nothing is objectively morally right or wrong - are trivially true by definition and default. But pay attention: moral nihilism doesn't mean what you insist it means in your determination, against all reason, to maintain moral objectivism.

And that's what I'm waiting to see, now...you've pitched for subjective morality (oddly enough, for its existence being objective, though its substance is supposed to remain subjective -- at some point, you'll have to show how that can work). But how can morality be "subjective" and be morality at all?

Burden of proof.

...became yours, the very second you said, "morality is subjective." If you went for Nihilism, then the burden of proof would remain on me.

Rubbish. If morality isn't objective, then the default position is moral subjectivism - that moral assertions express value judgements. Don't try to shift the burden of proof.

Do you want to opt for AEN, and hence, to refute Linville's argument in some way, or do you want to make some argument for subjective morality that does not take as any premise, or presuppose, that AEN is true?

I'm not making an argument for moral subjectivism.

Then are you a Nihilist? It's the only option you've got left.

You don't seem to understand the relationship between moral nihilism and moral subjectivism, with regard to the absence of moral objectivity. There are moral nihilists who rationally and consistently live by freely-chosen moral values. Now, how can that possibly be?

[Skepdick]

There are moral nihilists who rationally and consistently live by freely-chosen moral values. Now, how can that possibly be?

You are lying.

There may be people who rationally and consistently live by their freely-chosen values, but as a moral subjectivist you can't possibly assert whether those values are moral or immoral.

If morality isn't objective, then the default position is moral subjectivism - that moral assertions express value judgements.

Negative. If morality isn't objective then the default position is that morality does not exist: nihilism. Neither values nor value-judgments exist.

[Immanuel Can]

Nietzsche's right, in this case. Histrionic though he may have sometimes been.

No, he's wrong - and he did nothing to demonstrate the truth of his claim. He merely assumed its truth.

I would say the same about his claim "God is dead." He never did one thing to show that it was true; he just assumed it.

However, you can easily show that Nietzsche was wrong. Just show that there is a kind of subjective morality that can be justified somehow. Then, logically, you don't have to become a Nihilist, either. So you could win your whole case at one stroke, if you could show that somehow subjective morality can be articulated in a rational way.

The claim 'if there's no god, then there are no moral facts' is as unjustified...

Then show it is. Show the form of morality that exists, but is neither objective nor Nihilistic. And you've won.

...there is no such thing as a moral fact - it's a contradiction in terms ...

If that's true, then there's no such thing as "subjective morality" either, because there is no "factual" or real things to which the term "morality" refers at all.

Again, that puts you back at Nihilism, if you leave your claim there.

Explaining the biological and social evolutionary source and development of human morality is dead easy - you can do it yourself - anyone can.

Go ahead, then. If it's as "dead easy" as you say, you can finish of this conversation with a resounding win right now...

I'm sure you can see that. And, you say, it's "dead easy." But you won't even try. Why is that?

...that justification involves argument, persuasion, and collective agreement...

That's it? You think that subjective morality is "justified" if it "persuades" a "collective" to "agree" by "argument"? If that were true, then propaganda would be "justified," if people are persuaded to believe it. And if that were true, then slavery would be as morally right as anything could be, so long as the people practicing it were persuaded that what they were doing was fine.

That won't do. There are far too many cases where "collectives" of people were persuaded to agree to things we now all believe are immoral. Your view would make that "justified" belief.

What does 'legitimise morality' mean? Why does it need legitimising?

Morality needs legitimizing because it asks groups of people to agree on a value judgment. More than that, it calls them to agree on that value judgment on peril of having been "immoral" or "amoral" or "having done the wrong thing."

Got it - not hard, is it? It does require agreement in values and judgement...

No, No...I did not say that morality is justified by how many people believe it. I said that justification was necessary because not all people believe the same thing.

In fact, not all versions of Peter believe the same thing, since Peter can change his mind about moral values. That's why we need justification...but it doesn't provide the justification. For that, we would need to show that the moral precepts entailed were justified, not just that people happened, for now, to agree.

If Peter changed his mind, would that mean that what was morally right is now morally wrong? Of course not. ?

THAT's the point! Peter can be wrong about HIS OWN moral judgments, because every time he changes his mind, he shows he was wrong. Slavery, for example, cannot be right when Peter thinks it is, and wrong when he doesn't...and there would be nothing more useless to figuring out whether or not slavery was really wrong then saying, "Well, right now, Peter thinks it's wrong." He might change his mind.

But a deduction is sound only if the premises are true, or taken to be true.

But the premises in my example are all true. Ocean tides are caused by the moon, and a planet without a moon doesn't have ocean tides. So the conclusion is valid and true. So you can deduce either tides or moon from each other. That is, indeed, logic 101.

I understand that you agree with Nietzsche

Well, only when what he says is actually right. And he certainly had this right.

No, he was wrong.

Then show he was wrong. You can't expect people simply to take your word for it. So provide the justification for subjective morality. Pick any precept you like.

And I'm not saying you can't be a Nihilist: I'm just pointing out that you've rationally got no choice, once you say that morality isn't objective. Subjectivism isn't a stopping point, because it's not rationally explicable or justifiable in any way.

False and stupid.

Then prove it is. Show what the justification for subjective morality is.

Burden of proof...

...became yours, the very second you said, "morality is subjective." If you went for Nihilism, then the burden of proof would remain on me.

If morality isn't objective, then the default position is moral subjectivism

No, it isn't. The default is Nihilism.

You yourself insist that any positive claim must be justified. The assertion that there is a thing that really exists, called "subjective morality" is every bit as much in need of demonstration as any claim that "objective morality" is a real thing.

The default then is Nihilism. Since there are no objective moral facts, there are no justifiable moral facts either, in that case. And then, what "subjective" means is merely "Peter likes..."

And the worst part of subjective moralizing is that, being entirely unjustified (show otherwise, if you think that's not true), it amounts to a raw power move -- an attempt by one subjectivity to dominate other subjectivities...of one person to impose his peculiar values on other people...but without the benefit of any justification or rationalization at all.

And we're back again to this: moral subjectivism is nothing more than propaganda. Nobody else ought to believe it, because nothing makes it true.

You don't seem to understand the relationship between moral nihilism and moral subjectivism, with regard to the absence of moral objectivity. There are moral nihilists who rationally and consistently live by freely-chosen moral values. Now, how can that possibly be?

Oh, that's easy. It's because people are inconsistent creatures. They often do things that do not rationalize with their own beliefs.

A Nihilist who behaves morally is just choosing to do what suits him at the moment...but he recognizes no deeper obligation to hold fidelity to that, and he doesn't even have reason to think that if he does the dead opposite he's being a "bad" or a "better" person.

So a Nihilist can be an abolitionist or a slave owner, and there is basis for choosing one or the other in his beliefs about right and wrong...which he takes to be fictions anyway. If he chooses to be an abolitionist, this doesn't make him a "good" person, and if he chooses to own a thousand slaves and whip them every day, that doesn't (on Nihilism's account) make him a "bad" one.

A Nihilist can choose to be a (conventionally) good-behaving person, or a (conventionally) bad-behaving one. But in his worldview, there's no difference. Either is just a choice he's happening to make. From Nihilism, there's no more to be said about it.

[Peter Holmes]

Nietzsche's right, in this case. Histrionic though he may have sometimes been.

No, he's wrong - and he did nothing to demonstrate the truth of his claim. He merely assumed its truth.

I would say the same about his claim "God is dead." He never did one thing to show that it was true; he just assumed it.

However, you can easily show that Nietzsche was wrong. Just show that there is a kind of subjective morality that can be justified somehow. Then, logically, you don't have to become a Nihilist, either. So you could win your whole case at one stroke, if you could show that somehow subjective morality can be articulated in a rational way.

The claim 'if there's no god, then there are no moral facts' is as unjustified...

Then show it is. Show the form of morality that exists, but is neither objective nor Nihilistic. And you've won.

...there is no such thing as a moral fact - it's a contradiction in terms ...

If that's true, then there's no such thing as "subjective morality" either, because there is no "factual" or real things to which the term "morality" refers at all.

Again, that puts you back at Nihilism, if you leave your claim there.

Explaining the biological and social evolutionary source and development of human morality is dead easy - you can do it yourself - anyone can.

Go ahead, then. If it's as "dead easy" as you say, you can finish of this conversation with a resounding win right now...

I'm sure you can see that. And, you say, it's "dead easy." But you won't even try. Why is that?

...that justification involves argument, persuasion, and collective agreement...

That's it? You think that subjective morality is "justified" if it "persuades" a "collective" to "agree" by "argument"? If that were true, then propaganda would be "justified," if people are persuaded to believe it. And if that were true, then slavery would be as morally right as anything could be, so long as the people practicing it were persuaded that what they were doing was fine.

That won't do. There are far too many cases where "collectives" of people were persuaded to agree to things we now all believe are immoral. Your view would make that "justified" belief.

Morality needs legitimizing because it asks groups of people to agree on a value judgment. More than that, it calls them to agree on that value judgment on peril of having been "immoral" or "amoral" or "having done the wrong thing."

Got it - not hard, is it? It does require agreement in values and judgement...

No, No...I did not say that morality is justified by how many people believe it. I said that justification was necessary because not all people believe the same thing.

In fact, not all versions of Peter believe the same thing, since Peter can change his mind about moral values. That's why we need justification...but it doesn't provide the justification. For that, we would need to show that the moral precepts entailed were justified, not just that people happened, for now, to agree.

If Peter changed his mind, would that mean that what was morally right is now morally wrong? Of course not. ?

THAT's the point! Peter can be wrong about HIS OWN moral judgments, because every time he changes his mind, he shows he was wrong. Slavery, for example, cannot be right when Peter thinks it is, and wrong when he doesn't...and there would be nothing more useless to figuring out whether or not slavery was really wrong then saying, "Well, right now, Peter thinks it's wrong." He might change his mind.

But a deduction is sound only if the premises are true, or taken to be true.

But the premises in my example are all true. Ocean tides are caused by the moon, and a planet without a moon doesn't have ocean tides. So the conclusion is valid and true. So you can deduce either tides or moon from each other. That is, indeed, logic 101.

Well, only when what he says is actually right. And he certainly had this right.

No, he was wrong.

Then show he was wrong. You can't expect people simply to take your word for it. So provide the justification for subjective morality. Pick any precept you like.

And I'm not saying you can't be a Nihilist: I'm just pointing out that you've rationally got no choice, once you say that morality isn't objective. Subjectivism isn't a stopping point, because it's not rationally explicable or justifiable in any way.

False and stupid.

Then prove it is. Show what the justification for subjective morality is.

...became yours, the very second you said, "morality is subjective." If you went for Nihilism, then the burden of proof would remain on me.

If morality isn't objective, then the default position is moral subjectivism

No, it isn't. The default is Nihilism.

You yourself insist that any positive claim must be justified. The assertion that there is a thing that really exists, called "subjective morality" is every bit as much in need of demonstration as any claim that "objective morality" is a real thing.

The default then is Nihilism. Since there are no objective moral facts, there are no justifiable moral facts either, in that case. And then, what "subjective" means is merely "Peter likes..."

And the worst part of subjective moralizing is that, being entirely unjustified (show otherwise, if you think that's not true), it amounts to a raw power move -- an attempt by one subjectivity to dominate other subjectivities...of one person to impose his peculiar values on other people...but without the benefit of any justification or rationalization at all.

And we're back again to this: moral subjectivism is nothing more than propaganda. Nobody else ought to believe it, because nothing makes it true.

You don't seem to understand the relationship between moral nihilism and moral subjectivism, with regard to the absence of moral objectivity. There are moral nihilists who rationally and consistently live by freely-chosen moral values. Now, how can that possibly be?

Oh, that's easy. It's because people are inconsistent creatures. They often do things that do not rationalize with their own beliefs.

A Nihilist who behaves morally is just choosing to do what suits him at the moment...but he recognizes no deeper obligation to hold fidelity to that, and he doesn't even have reason to think that if he does the dead opposite he's being a "bad" or a "better" person.

So a Nihilist can be an abolitionist or a slave owner, and there is basis for choosing one or the other in his beliefs about right and wrong...which he takes to be fictions anyway. If he chooses to be an abolitionist, this doesn't make him a "good" person, and if he chooses to own a thousand slaves and whip them every day, that doesn't (on Nihilism's account) make him a "bad" one.

A Nihilist can choose to be a (conventionally) good-behaving person, or a (conventionally) bad-behaving one. But in his worldview, there's no difference. Either is just a choice he's happening to make. From Nihilism, there's no more to be said about it.

There's obviously no point in going over this, saying the same things.

Produce an example of a moral fact, and show why it's a fact. I know you can't, but you insist you can. So do so, and then I'll show why it isn't a fact, but only the expression of an opinion. I suppose it passes the time.

[Skepdick]

Produce an example of a moral fact, and show why it's a fact. I know you can't, but you insist you can. So do so, and then I'll show why it isn't a fact, but only the expression of an opinion. I suppose it passes the time.

That which has caused a global decrease (as opposed to an increase or homeostasis) in war/violence is a moral fact.
That which has caused global economic and social prosperity (as opposed to poverty or homeostasis) is a moral fact.
That which has caused the increase of knowledge and education (as opposed to ignorance or homeostasis) is a moral fact.
That which has caused increased human well-being (as opposed to suffering or homeostasis) is a moral fact.

It may be ineffable, but it exist. It's testable/falsifiable and everything.

https://ourworldindata.org/