What could make morality objective?

[Immanuel Did]

If faced with a Munchausen Trillema I find that the only way out will be a circular or regressive argument.

That is a value-judgment. There is no way out of the Trillema.

The common labels for people who pull themselves out of the swamp are "coherentists" for those who abandon justification, and "dogmatists" for those who resort to circular arguments as grounding for justification.

True, however there is the axiomatic (something I think Descartes was aiming for).

[Logik]

True, however there is the axiomatic (something I think Descartes was aiming for).

Foundationalism.

It's grounded in assumption.

"Cogito ergo sum" falls flat on its face the moment you ask an ontological question: "What is thought?"
Are you really thinking? For if you aren't then you don't exist? There's far too much at stake to be mistaken about this

I remain a Pyrrhonist.

[Peter Holmes]

Logik and Immanuel Did

Our linguistic practices constitute everything we say about everything. And that includes everything we say about knowledge, justification and foundations - which aren't abstract, metaphysical entities.

Are the ways we use language 'assumptions' or matters of value-judgement? Are chess moves 'assumptions' or 'value-judgements'?

[Logik]

Our linguistic practices constitute everything we say about everything. And that includes everything we say about knowledge, justification and foundations - which aren't abstract, metaphysical entities.

This is a red herring. Do we hold our linguistic practices to any standard whatsoever? Such as the law of non-contradiction; or is language anarchic?

If you agree that our linguistic practices are held to some standard then that standard is used to determine "appropriate" from "inappropriate" linguistic use. The collection of rules forms the grammar and semantics of our linguistic practices.

For we USE such standards (rules!) to determine "right" form "wrong" USE of language.

Yet when I asked you if you are a linguistic prescriptivist - you rejected it.
You also rejected "truth as a social norm".

So, it's really difficult to find foundation or coherence in your position.

Are the ways we use language 'assumptions' or matters of value-judgement? Are chess moves 'assumptions' or 'value-judgements'?

Chess moves are "valid" and "invalid" to move a bishop like a knight is illegal! Not to mention that there so many variants of chess...

Who decided on the rules of chess? Who decided on the rules of language?

[Peter Holmes]

Our linguistic practices constitute everything we say about everything. And that includes everything we say about knowledge, justification and foundations - which aren't abstract, metaphysical entities.

This is a red herring. Do we hold our linguistic practices to any standard whatsoever? Such as the law of non-contradiction; or is language a free-for-all?

If you agree that our linguistic practices are held to some standard then that standard is used to determine "appropriate" from "inappropriate" linguistic use. A contradictory statement is wrong.

Objective morality!

You're confusing two completely different uses of the words 'right' and 'wrong': correct/incorrect and morally good/morally bad.

And the linguistic 'standard' we hold to is conformity to the rules we follow. What other sort of standard could there be?

That you think the foundational nature of our linguistic practices is a red herring demonstrates the potency and pervasiveness of language.

[Logik]

And the linguistic 'standard' we hold to is conformity to the rules we follow. What other sort of standard could there be?

Rules maketh language! Grammar and semantics.

Which set of rules do we follow? Russian has different rules to English! French has different rules to Russian and English. Chinese maybe?

There is no universal set of linguistic rules! To claim there is puts you in the prescriptivist camp again - which you openly rejected.
You also rejected "social convention" as a possible foundation.

You are being non-commital on the "rules we follow" exactly in the same way you were non-committal to the number of planets in the solar system.

That you think the foundational nature of our linguistic practices is a red herring demonstrates the potency and pervasiveness of language.

I don't think it's a "red herring" - I say it's a red herring. To assume that I think what I say demonstrates your confirmation bias.
For I could have also said "distraction", "inconsequential", "non-sequitur" or any number of linguistic formulations which would have communicated my meaning.

[Peter Holmes]

And the linguistic 'standard' we hold to is conformity to the rules we follow. What other sort of standard could there be?

Rules maketh language! Grammar and semantics.

Which set of rules do we follow? Russian has different rules to English! French has different rules to Russian and English. Chinese maybe?

There is no universal set of linguistic rules! To claim there is puts you in the prescriptivist camp again - which you openly rejected.
You also rejected "social convention" as a possible foundation.

That you think the foundational nature of our linguistic practices is a red herring demonstrates the potency and pervasiveness of language.

Confirmation bias.

I never claimed there'a universal set of linguistic rules. Why do you make that projection? (But there are similarities between the rules of natural languages, because we're all humans on the same planet.)

And I think I've always said the rules of a game are conventional - and I apologise if I've ever said otherwise.

What do you mean by 'confirmation bias' here?

[Logik]

I never claimed there'a universal set of linguistic rules. Why do you make that projection? (But there are similarities between the rules of natural languages, because we're all humans on the same planet.)

You acknowledge the similarities but do not acknowledge the differences. What am I to make of this one-sided perspective? A bias?

And I think I've always said the rules of a game are conventional - and I apologise if I've ever said otherwise.

Then you necessarily take the rules for granted? Or the fact that different rules makes a different game.

If vague truisms what we are after then: There are some similarities between chess and backgammon also.

[Logik]

What do you mean by 'confirmation bias' here?

What I mean is that you are using "we are humans on the same planet" as justification for your linguistic foundation for "truth".
Where I can similarly use "we are humans on the same planet" as justification for a phenomenological foundation for "truth".

Regardless of language - we share experiences of the phenomena around us. Our collective experience is objective by convention.

And so truth-in-shared experience is just as (in?)coherent a foundation as "truth-in-linguistic-practices".

[Peter Holmes]

What do you mean by 'confirmation bias' here?

What I mean is that you are using "we are humans on the same planet" as justification for your linguistic position.
Where I can similarly use "we are humans on the same planet" as justification for a phenomenological position.

Regardless of language - we share experiences of the phenomena around us. Our collective experience is objective by convention.

And so truth-in-shared experience is just as (in?)coherent a foundation as "truth-in-linguistic-practices".

1 There's nothing incoherent about our linguistic practices - by definition. They wouldn't work if they were incoherent.

2 Phenomenology is just another foundationalist delusion that pretends to by-pass language with its claims about experience.

[Logik]

1 There's nothing incoherent about our linguistic practices - by definition. They wouldn't work if they were incoherent.

By what criteria for "work" vs "don't work"?

Since we are failing to agree (e.g settle on a convention) I am convinced that what we are doing right now is not working! It violates Aumann's theorem.

2 Phenomenology is just another foundationalist delusion that pretends to by-pass language with its claims about experience.

Oh. I think it succeeds just fine with its claims. Majority of humans understand that putting your hand in the fire is a bad idea!

And I think you would get tacit consensus on this issue between people who don't share a language.

[Peter Holmes]

1 There's nothing incoherent about our linguistic practices - by definition. They wouldn't work if they were incoherent.

By what criteria for "work" vs "don't work"?

Since we are failing to agree (e.g settle on a convention) I am convinced that what we are doing right now is not working! It violates Aumann's theorem.

2 Phenomenology is just another foundationalist delusion that pretends to by-pass language with its claims about experience.

Oh. I think it succeeds just fine with its claims. Everybody understands that putting your hand in the fire is a bad idea!

And I think you would get tacit consensus on this issue between people who don't share a language.

Everything we've said to each other demonstrates agreement in conventions - in our linguistic practices.

And you seem to agree that creatures sharing an evolved physiology and sharing an environment are likely to experience things in a similar way. Which is what I said: we're all humans on the same planet. Where do you think our linguistic practices came from, and why they are as they are?

[Immanuel Did]

When it comes to the language game as advanced by Wittgenstein he posits that this structure follows rules such as that as of a board game.

When it comes to the chess identity rule the applicability of the rule requires not only that there are principles which tie chess piece identity to initial position, but also that there are principles for what makes a piece retain its chess piece identity throughout the game. What are the relevant criteria of identity here?

Suppose we use a very heavy golden figurine as white queen, and a hat as white king. After a while, we realize that using the heavy figurine in this way is very inconvenient, since it makes it cumbersome to perform the queen’s characteristically long, sweeping moves. In such a case, we are free to make a simple exchange: the golden figurine is moved to the square where the hat is placed, and then the hat is moved to the figurine’s former location. This does not mean that the white queen and the white king change places. Rather, what happens is that the golden figurine takes over the hat’s former identity as the white king, and that the hat takes over the figurine’s former identity as the white queen. Despite the fact that the figurine and the hat change places, the white queen and the white king remain where they are. The physical moves involved in the exchange are not moves in the game and thus cannot be identified as a "value-judgement".

[Logik]

Everything we've said to each other demonstrates agreement in conventions - in our linguistic practices.

It does?

I have spent the entirety of our exchange attempting to understand your "conventional" use of the words "facts", "assertion", "objectivity" etc. Whether I have failed to understand it; or you have failed to explain it is immaterial. What is obvious (to me) is that we are not in agreement over the claimed "conventional use" of these terms.

And so while you are using our conversation (in general) to support your claim of "agreement in convention", you are dismissing the particulars of our conversation which is all about disagreement over convention!

This is the 2nd time you've cherry-picked the evidence to feed your confirmation bias.

And you seem to agree that creatures sharing an evolved physiology and sharing an environment are likely to experience things in a similar way. Which is what I said: we're all humans on the same planet. Where do you think our linguistic practices came from, and why they are as they are?

I have no idea what you are saying or asking. What way is that - which "our linguistic practices are"? You have claimed that they are similar, while consistently discarding the ways in which they are different.

Linguistic practices evolve. So do conventions. To assume they are "any particular way" is to ignore this constant change.

To ignore differences and favour similarities would be demonstration of "facts" being value judgments.

[Peter Holmes]

Everything we've said to each other demonstrates agreement in conventions - in our linguistic practices.

It does?

I have spent the entirety of our exchange attempting to understand your "conventional" use of the words "facts", "assertion", "objectivity" etc. Whether I have failed to understand it; or you have failed to explain it is immaterial. What is obvious (to me) is that we are not in agreement over the claimed "conventional use" of these terms.

And so while you are using our conversation (in general) to support your claim of "agreement in convention", you are dismissing the particulars of our conversation which is all about disagreement over convention!

This is the 2nd time you've cherry-picked the evidence to feed your confirmation bias.

And you seem to agree that creatures sharing an evolved physiology and sharing an environment are likely to experience things in a similar way. Which is what I said: we're all humans on the same planet. Where do you think our linguistic practices came from, and why they are as they are?

I have no idea what you are saying or asking. What way is that - which "our linguistic practices are"? You have claimed that they are similar, while consistently discarding the ways in which they are different.

Linguistic practices evolve. So do conventions. To assume they are "any particular way" is to ignore this constant change.

To ignore differences and favour similarities would be demonstration of "facts" being value judgments.

You're exaggerating our disagreement. It's boiled down to my use of 'factual assertion' to mean 'an assertion that makes a falsifiable claim about a feature of reality', when you think it's synonymous with 'fact'. I'm sorry we've been bogged down in this misunderstanding, but to say this is evidence for the arbitrary fluidity of linguistic practice is ridiculous.

Of course linguistic practices and conventions evolve - and they remain practices and conventions. And of course there can be disagreements and shifts in the use of words and other signs - and the new uses settle down and become conventional. No disagreement there.