Is morality objective or subjective?

[Immanuel Can]

1 Show that there is an objective moral standard by which the assertion 'slavery is right' can be shown to be factually false.

I did that. It's above. It cannot be done by a moral subjectivist, but it can if morality is objective.

2 Show that there is an infallible source of factual truth.

Done again. If God exits, He is decidedly that standard...in relation to both factual and moral truth.

3 Show that factual assertions are true simply because that authority says that they are.

Done above. In the case of a 100% authority, (which God, by definition, would be) they are not true merely because an Authority says they are; they are true and the ultimate Authority says they are.

Are you reading what I wrote? I know you're feeling a bit prickly; but if you can get over that, you'll see I'm actually responding to your comments.

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Can

Perhaps we've finally found the root of your misunderstanding.

I ask you to show THAT there is an objective moral standard by which the assertion 'slavery is right' can be shown to be factually false.

And you reply that IF THERE IS A GOD, it would be or be the source of the objective moral standard by which the assertion 'slavery is right' can be shown to be factually false.

So you don't understand the difference between a factual claim and its justification on the one hand, and on the other hand a hypothetical consisting of an antecedent requiring justification and its consequent, whose deduction also requires justification.

You need to go back to the drawing board.

[Immanuel Can]

So you don't understand the difference between a factual claim and its justification on the one hand, and on the other hand a hypothetical consisting of an antecedent requiring justification and its consequent, whose deduction also requires justification.

Ah, I see.

You misunderstand my purpose. You should by now know that I know you do not believe in objective standards or, unless I miss my guess, in God. I'm not attempting to make you believe in either. Thus, the hypothetical wording is offered in respect to your right to choose your worldview. It's not intended to be evasive, but rather to allow for your worldview to be examined alongside mine, as two options a rational, morally-interested human being might consider.

On the other hand, though I defer here to your choice of worldview (because of your unalienable right to follow your conscience), there always remain certain logical implications that inevitably flow from the choice of a particular worldview. As I have said several times, ontology precedes ethics. If your ontology is one thing, you need not anticipate you will get anything but a particular set of logical consequences out of it. And my purpose has been simply to show what logical consequences flow from the ontological position you have chosen.

These are the consequences: you will never find morality in the way you're looking for it. In logical consistency, you can't even really discuss it, because there is no such thing in a moral subjectivist's world. I'm not saying a moral subjectivist has to be a "bad" person; I'm saying that a moral subjectivist, even if he is a "good" person (whatever he might suppose that to be) can't know what it means to be "good" or "bad." There are no such items available in the worldview he holds. Moral terms refer to nothing.

This, you seem to know almost instinctively, for you recognize that it entails that there are no moral facts, values are no more than individual or social epiphenomena, and no source of moral obligation exits or can exist. All of this is quite true, in the world you have chosen to believe in.

Now, in testing whether or not your worldview is chosen wisely, I have asked whether you are willing to live with the consequences of your ontology and worldview: namely, that slavery, rape or child molestation are not "wrong," because objectively, nothing is "wrong" in that world. So let's see if you are.

Are you?

[uwot]

As I have said several times, ontology precedes ethics.

Indeed you have, Mr Can. So, prove your ontology.

[QuantumT]

To ontologise or not to ontologise, that is the question bees ask themselves.

- Wilhelm Shakinstevens

[Alex_Greenhalgh]

Hello,

Couldn't we say that there is such a thing as objective moral rightness, though it exists imaginatively and is dictated subjectively? i.e. killing is wrong because I believe that it is wrong, and therefore this exists as an objective truth inside my subjectively experienced but objectively real moral universe? Why should the amoral physical world of cells, skin and tissue have claim to objectivity over the multitudinous worlds of subjective experience, in which evidently right and wrong do exist for conscious people (and possibly animals too)?

I suppose the conclusion from this would be that the objectively morally right thing to do is to maximise the belief in rightness i.e. the more people keep believing in the rightness of things the more rightness there is in the universe. Morality is a bit like Tinkerbell, in that respect...

Fairly new to philosophy so if anyone has any suggestions of writers that have discussed morality in these terms, I'd be grateful to hear about them.

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Can

So, to clarify, you can't show how a moral assertion expresses a falsifiable factual claim with a truth-value - but you don't mind that you can't. You think it could be true but unfalsifiable (but then how is it verifiable?), or it could be probabilistic (but then, how is the probability that slavery is wrong calculated?).

And, to clarify, you can't show how the source of a supposedly factual assertion has any bearing on its truth-value: this is true because I say it is. But, again, you don't care that you can't.

In sum, you have no justification for your belief that morality is or even could be objective.

I'm wondering if, perhaps for this reason, you seek consolation in the ridiculous thought that, if there are no moral facts, our moral judgements have no possible justification. So that we can have no reason to believe that slavery, rape, genocide, the oppression of women and homosexuals - along with other atrocities performed, commanded or endorsed in one or more of the Abrahamic scriptures - are morally wrong. Perhaps your moral nightmare is a projection, rather like hell itself.

[Immanuel Can]

So, to clarify, you can't show how a moral assertion expresses a falsifiable factual claim with a truth-value - but you don't mind that you can't.

It's not just me; it's you too, and everyone else who cannot falsify such claims. "Falsification," as per Popper, is nothing to do with value judgments, whether they are true ones or not. Polanyi, in particular, is very illuminating in this regard.

You think it could be true but unfalsifiable (but then how is it verifiable?),

It's not, per se "verifiable," if we use that word in its technical, philosophically accurate sense. Do you mean, "How do we decide if it's true or not?" because that's perhaps the more obvious question. The idea of "verifiability," as it is philosophically established, has to be abandoned not just for value judgments but for all empirical (i.e. experience-based and scientific) questions as well.

or it could be probabilistic (but then, how is the probability that slavery is wrong calculated?).

Like normal empirical questions, it is something one has to know probabilistically. But things that are highly probable are unquestionably more reliable to believe than things which are low in probability. However, the probability itself is a measure of what we know, not a measure of the absolute truthfulness of anything. Low probability things can turn out to be true.

The problem here is that you're conflating two different questions. One is, "Is morality objective," (factual) and the other is "Do we have certain knowledge of morality?" (a thing we can have only probabilistically) Clearly, they are quite different questions. The first is essentially your OP question. The second can only be decided afterward.

And, to clarify, you can't show how the source of a supposedly factual assertion has any bearing on its truth-value: this is true because I say it is. But, again, you don't care that you can't.

Incorrect. But I've tried to say the point twice already. I'll try one last time. When a source and a fact are guaranteed to be 100% synchronized, you can look at either the source or the fact for the truth. But this only applies to sources that are 100% reliable -- and really, there can be only one of those, in relation to morality.

In sum, you have no justification for your belief that morality is or even could be objective.

Incorrect. The justification would be the existence of a Supreme Giver of morality. In such a case, morality would be objective.

I'm wondering if, perhaps for this reason, you seek consolation in the ridiculous thought that, if there are no moral facts, our moral judgements have no possible justification.

Interesting. You now call "ridiculous" a statement you yourself made earlier. It's you who claimed there are no moral facts -- not I. And it's your worldview that assures you of that, not mine.

So that we can have no reason to believe that slavery, rape, genocide, the oppression of women and homosexuals...are morally wrong.

Ah. Is this, in a roundabout way, your answer to my last question? Are you prepared to follow moral subjectivism to this logical conclusion it compels?

I'll ask it again, just in case.

[uwot]

When a source and a fact are guaranteed to be 100% synchronized, you can look at either the source or the fact for the truth. But this only applies to sources that are 100% reliable -- and really, there can be only one of those, in relation to morality.

In sum, you have no justification for your belief that morality is or even could be objective.

Incorrect. The justification would be the existence of a Supreme Giver of morality. In such a case, morality would be objective.

Fair enough; there could be a "Supreme Giver of morality". As you say though:

As I have said several times, ontology precedes ethics.

So if you want to demonstrate that morality is objective, you have to show that your arguments for the existence of this "Supreme Giver" are "100% reliable". Even if you could achieve that, you then have also to show that your interpretation of what the "Supreme Giver" wishes us to do is "100% reliable", or you simply have a vacuous injunction to do what the "Supreme Giver" wants, without knowing what that is. Less than 100% reliability in either respect means that in practical terms you are necessarily a moral relativist.

Are you prepared to follow moral subjectivism to this logical conclusion it compels?

Mr Can, even by your shoddy standards, to insist that moral nihilism follows from moral relativism is piss poor logic.

[Peter Holmes]

Gentle Reader

To make their case, moral objectivists have simply to show how a moral assertion, such as 'slavery is wrong', is factual - how it makes a factual claim which is true or false. Just one demonstration would clinch the argument.

The case against moral objectivism is simple: moral assertions express value judgements, which are not factual, and so are neither true nor false.

And the case against theistic moral objectivism is also simple: if an assertion is factual, its source has no bearing on its truth or falsehood. So if the assertion 'slavery is wrong' is a fact (as objectivists claim), its truth is independent of any claimant, even if the claimant is a god. (The reliability of the claimant is obviously irrelevant.)

Moral subjectivism doesn't entail moral nihilism. But even if it did, that would do nothing to undermine the case for moral subjectivism, or support the case for moral objectivism. To claim that it would is to make a fallacious appeal to consequences.

Some time ago, uwot wisely warned me of the futility of trying to nail jelly to the wall. I should have listened.

[uwot]

Gentle Reader

To make their case, moral objectivists have simply to show how a moral assertion, such as 'slavery is wrong', is factual - how it makes a factual claim which is true or false. Just one demonstration would clinch the argument.

Well indeed. The irony is that the Mr Cans of this world will appeal to some version of the ontological argument to demonstrate the existence of a "Supreme Giver of morality". What makes this creature the "Supreme Giver of morality"? Well, it only commands things which are supremely good. Wassat? The "Supreme Giver of morality" is bound by the rules of supreme good? Sorry mate, your ontological argument fails because at best it is circular, but more to the point, if the "Supreme Giver of morality" is only supreme because it obeys the rules of supreme morality, it isn't itself supreme.

Some time ago, uwot wisely warned me of the futility of trying to nail jelly to the wall. I should have listened.

Erm, well yeah. It's more a case of do as I say, rather than do as I do.

[Peter Holmes]

Hi, uwot.

It seems to me that you and I disagree as to why moral objectivism is a mistake. You say this to Mr Can:

uwot wrote:

So if you want to demonstrate that morality is objective, you have to show that your arguments for the existence of this "Supreme Giver" are "100% reliable". Even if you could achieve that, you then have also to show that your interpretation of what the "Supreme Giver" wishes us to do is "100% reliable", or you simply have a vacuous injunction to do what the "Supreme Giver" wants, without knowing what that is. Less than 100% reliability in either respect means that in practical terms you are necessarily a moral relativist.

I think the defeater for moral objectivism is much more radical than you suggest. Even if there were a Supreme Leader, whose existence and moral opinions were undeniable, that wouldn't mean morality is objective: 'slavery is wrong simply because the Supreme Leader says slavery is wrong'. There's nothing objective (factual) about this conclusion whatsoever. Would the assertion 'the earth orbits the sun' be true just because the Supreme Leader (or anyone else) 100% reliably says it's true? This is to misunderstand the nature of objectivity, and what a fact is.

In other words, I think you concede the crucial error: if there is a god, morality is objective. This is simply false. IMHO. Unless I'm missing something. Happy to be disabused. Etc.

[uwot]

...I think you concede the crucial error: if there is a god, morality is objective. This is simply false. IMHO. Unless I'm missing something. Happy to be disabused. Etc.

Well, that was addressed to Mr Can as a challenge to support his own argument. It's a bit of mischief, because he has 100% reliably failed to do so and will 100% reliably continue to fail to do so. I entirely agree with your point, and inspired by your post of Fri Aug 03, 2018 12:05 am said as much in my post of Fri Aug 03, 2018 7:56 am, albeit in a roundabout, faintly silly way.

[Peter Holmes]

uwot

Ha - I stand corrected. Apologies.

[Peter Holmes]

To clarify and summarise my OP...

An argument against moral objectivism

1 To be objective is to rely on facts, rather than judgements, beliefs or opinions, which are subjective.

2 A factual assertion is a linguistic expression which (classically) may be true or false, because it makes a claim about a feature of reality that may or may not be the case.

3 The truth or falsehood of a factual assertion is independent of judgement, belief or opinion. (We call a true factual assertion a fact.)

4 A fact describes a feature of reality correctly, given the way we use the words or other signs involved. So there must be a feature of reality for it to describe.

5 There seems to be no evidence that moral rightness and wrongness are features of reality that may or may not be the case. The absence of evidence may not mean they do not exist, but it does mean that to believe they do exist is irrational.

6 In practice, we use words such as moral, immoral, right, wrong, good and bad to express judgements, beliefs or opinions about some features of reality.

7 If moral rightness and wrongness are not features of reality, moral assertions are not and cannot be factual.

8 If moral assertions are not factual, there can be no moral facts, and morality is not and cannot be objective.

Notes

This argument assumes we are part of a reality we can know about and describe correctly. And it assumes a standard use of the words truth, fact and objectivity.

But any use of language (of signs such as words) is conventional, contextual and purposive. And we can describe things in many different ways. So what we call truth and facts, and therefore objectivity, is always within a context, or from a perspective.

(To mistake abstract nouns, such as truth and objectivity, for things of some kind that we may not understand, or that may not exist, is an ancient metaphysical delusion.)

Our linguistic practices constitute everything we say about everything, including what we say about our linguistic practices. The things we talk about cannot tell us what our words mean. So there is no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices. And in practice, we distinguish functionally between factual and non-factual assertions.

The task for moral objectivists and moral realists is to provide an example of what they think is a moral fact, and show why, in context, it describes a feature of reality correctly, independent of judgement, belief or opinion. And theirs is the burden of proof. But the following notes assume that morality is not objective.

A To look for a moral feature of reality, such as the rightness or wrongness of capital punishment, is to misunderstand the function of a moral assertion. To mistake a moral assertion for a factual one is to make a category error.

B How ever strongly or widely held, a moral judgement remains a judgement. For example, even if everyone believes capital punishment is morally wrong, it cannot be a fact that it is morally wrong.

C Whatever facts we deploy to justify a moral judgement, it remains a judgement. And others can deploy the same facts differently, or different facts, to justify different moral judgements. That is our inescapable moral predicament.

E That moral judgements are subjective explains why we can argue about them, and why they can change over time. If there were moral facts, their truth would be unarguable and unchanging.

F That there are no moral facts does not mean we cannot make moral judgements. On the contrary, it means that we can. To be moral, we have no choice but to make moral judgements.

G Moral values and judgements often matter deeply to us, and we tend to think of them as universal: not restricted to a time and place. (To think otherwise would be morally inconsistent.) And this may explain why we can think morality is objective – that there are moral facts. It is an understandable misunderstanding.

H Some behaviour, such as the abuse of children, arouses moral outrage and disgust in many or most of us. But to cite what may be even universally regarded as a moral atrocity as an example of a moral fact is to make a fallacious appeal to emotion.

I Talk of the distinction between moral ontology and moral epistemology assumes what has yet to be shown: that there are moral things which can therefore be known.

J Talk of moral intuition and moral conscience also assumes what has yet to be shown. There seems to be no objective way to adjudicate between conflicting moral intuitions or deliverances of moral conscience, which points to their subjectivity.

K There is a useful analogy between moral and aesthetic assertions. Like moral rightness and wrongness, ugliness and beauty are not independent properties or features of reality. To say a thing is ugly or beautiful is to express a judgement, belief or opinion, not to make a factual claim. It cannot be a fact that a thing is ugly or beautiful.

Peter Holmes
May 2019