Thanks again, Belinda. There's a lot here, most of which I agree with. So I'll try to focus on where I disagree.
Belinda wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2019 12:33 pm
Peter Holmes wrote:
As I said, what ever facts we use to justify a moral opinion, others can use the same facts differently, or different facts, to justify different moral opinions.
True.
If you agree with my point here, I suggest you're accepting the crucial distinction between factual and non-factual assertions, such as moral and aesthetic ones. And that's my whole argument.
To insist that it's a fact that 'murder is morally wrong' is merely to mistake a moral opinion for a fact. It's an understandable misunderstanding, but it can and does have catastrophic consequences. Talk to homosexuals about the consequences of people thinking 'homosexuality is wrong' is a fact - for example, believers fantasising that their god shares their moral opinions. It ends up with people being thrown off high buildings.
You refer to Daesh (ISIS ) . The so-called Islamic State does not recognise relativity; it's notorious as the epitome of fundamentalism. Believers who "fantasise that their god shares their moral opinions" are religious fundamentalists a stance similar and in many ways identical to idolatry.That killing another man is wrong relates to moral codes of right behaviour. These codes relate to cultures of belief. Some cultures of belief are wrong as they are cultures that cannot accept relativity but insist upon absolutism. This last claim is itself relative to who I am. There is no escape from
subjectivity or, to be more precise, intersubjectivity.
You distinguish between what you call (moral) 'relativism' and 'absolutism'. But I think the distinction we're discussing is between (moral) subjectivism and objectivism. And there's an important difference. My argument is against moral objectivism - that there are moral facts - and for moral subjectivism - that there are only moral judgements, opinions and beliefs.
Moral subjectivism does not entail meta-ethical moral relativism. Moral relativism is the claim that, because there are no moral facts, moral rightness and wrongness can only be relative to a people or culture - and to me that just means moral inconsistency. For example, if we think slavery is wrong, that means we think it's universally wrong - not just wrong in some places and at some times. Relativism can lead to moral abstentionism: well, slavery is right in their culture, so leave them to it - intervention is unjustifiable.
I still can't quite understand what [you] mean by moral objectivism. You claim that "murder" is categorically wrong but again you don't as you also claim murder is wrong is not a fact. Are you saying murder is wrong is intersubjective as opposed to factual? If so we agree although I'd rather not use the word 'murder' as it's pejorative connotation.
I'm not referring to Kant's categorical imperative - my lack of clarity. The categories I'm referring to are linguistic: factual and non-factual (such as moral). Mistaking moral for factual assertions is the category error. Moral assertions are non-factual, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective. And as I use 'subjective' to mean 'a matter of judgement, belief or opinion', whether that's individual or collective is incidental. My only reservation about the expression 'intersubjective' is that it may equivocate on the meaning of 'subjective'. But if it just means communal or co-operative or social, that's fine.
To agree rationally on moral values we need to collect information about what moral values contribute to life and love and which do the opposite. This information includes facts about human nature, economics, aesthetics, traditions, politics, and the pasts of separate peoples. Because killing is wrong is founded upon facts I say that killing is wrong is also a fact. But killing is wrong is founded upon shifting facts not eternal truths so killing is wrong is relatively not eternally true.
And there's the rub. 'Because killing is wrong is founded upon facts I say that killing is wrong is also a fact.' As my tribal example shows, different facts can justify different judgements. It's what I call our inescapable moral predicament. The moral assertion 'killing is wrong' isn't and can't be a fact. It's a judgement - what ever facts we use to justify it. Which takes us back to the top, where I think you agreed with me.