Is morality objective or subjective?

[Peter Holmes]

There is nothing meaningful out there in the physical world. All meaning is subjective and when the subjective mind bestows it upon the physical world it is then objective in the form of some biological extension called morality, systems, values or what have you. The physical world as apparent reality your daily reality is a biological readout thus there is only one place to look for answers and that is the experience and understanding of biological subjects. Facts are meanings and again there is only one source.

I think we've done this before - but here are some observations on your model.

1 The mind/matter or mind/body split - and therefore so-called problem - is a legacy of Cartesian dualism, which recycled the ancient religious delusion that there are two substances: physical and non-physical. Calling what goes on inside/outside the mind 'subjective' and 'objective' merely repeats and reinforces the mistake.

2 Mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things and events - is and has always been metaphorical - which is why we can 'be in two minds', 'change our minds', 'share our thoughts', and so on. Our everyday talk is saturated with these metaphors, and in their place they are unproblematic. The trouble comes when we take them literally, and invent a realm of abstract, non-physical things, such as concepts, propositions and - pertinent here - meanings that, somehow, exist in the big daddy invention: the mind.

3 Hence your model: the 'subjective mind' (?) bestows meaning on a meaningless objective reality - which is attractive and persuasive, partly because it chimes with our dualist heritage.

4 Leave the fictional mind to one side, and we're left with what we always only ever had: brains. And suddenly it makes no sense to say that brains - physical objects - somehow contain or possess abstract things such as meanings that they somehow bestow on the reality outside them. Out of place, the metaphors crack and crumble.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=568393 time=1650176049 user_id=15099]
[quote=popeye1945 post_id=568356 time=1650127895 user_id=21999]

There is nothing meaningful out there in the physical world. All meaning is subjective and when the subjective mind bestows it upon the physical world it is then objective in the form of some biological extension called morality, systems, values or what have you. The physical world as apparent reality your daily reality is a biological readout thus there is only one place to look for answers and that is the experience and understanding of biological subjects. Facts are meanings and again there is only one source.
[/quote]
I think we've done this before - but here are some observations on your model.

1 The mind/matter or mind/body split - and therefore so-called problem - is a legacy of Cartesian dualism, which recycled the ancient religious delusion that there are two substances: physical and non-physical. Calling what goes on inside/outside the mind 'subjective' and 'objective' merely repeats and reinforces the mistake.

2 Mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things and events - is and has always been metaphorical - which is why we can 'be in two minds', 'change our minds', 'share our thoughts', and so on. Our everyday talk is saturated with these metaphors, and in their place they are unproblematic. The trouble comes when we take them literally, and invent a realm of abstract, non-physical things, such as concepts, propositions and - pertinent here - meanings that, somehow, exist in the big daddy invention: the mind.

3 Hence your model: the 'subjective mind' (?) bestows meaning on a meaningless objective reality - which is attractive and persuasive, partly because it chimes with our dualist heritage.

4 Leave the fictional mind to one side, and we're left with what we always only ever had: brains. And suddenly it makes no sense to say that brains - physical objects - somehow contain or possess abstract things such as meanings that they somehow bestow on the reality outside them. Out of place, the metaphors crack and crumble.
[/quote]

Mind is a metaphor for the patterns in the brain. Spiritual is meaningful as "of the human spirit", which makes sense as "of the patterns in the mind". Favorite color, salience, priority, desire, meaning, experience; all are spiritual, and real.

[RCSaunders]

Mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things and events - is and has always been metaphorical - which is why we can 'be in two minds', 'change our minds', 'share our thoughts', and so on. Our everyday talk is saturated with these metaphors, and in their place they are unproblematic. The trouble comes when we take them literally, and invent a realm of abstract, non-physical things, such as concepts, propositions and - pertinent here - meanings that, somehow, exist in the big daddy invention: the mind.

Metaphors for what. I agree that every concept for anything other than actual physical entities is mataphorical, but how is the concept (not the word) apple a metaphor. What is the actual thing it only metaphorically represents? The concept, "apple," in the phrase, "apple of his eye," is a metaphor. How is the concept, "apple," in, "apple pie," a metaphor?

[Peter Holmes]

Mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things and events - is and has always been metaphorical - which is why we can 'be in two minds', 'change our minds', 'share our thoughts', and so on. Our everyday talk is saturated with these metaphors, and in their place they are unproblematic. The trouble comes when we take them literally, and invent a realm of abstract, non-physical things, such as concepts, propositions and - pertinent here - meanings that, somehow, exist in the big daddy invention: the mind.

Metaphors for what. I agree that every concept for anything other than actual physical entities is mataphorical, but how is the concept (not the word) apple a metaphor. What is the actual thing it only metaphorically represents? The concept, "apple," in the phrase, "apple of his eye," is a metaphor. How is the concept, "apple," in, "apple pie," a metaphor?

My point is that what we call concepts are fictions. So the question 'how is the concept "apple" in 'apple pie' a metaphor?' is incoherent. There's no such thing as the concept apple, just as there's no such thing as the concept truth or knowledge. We invented concepts, just as we invented propositions and other so-called abstract things, to flesh out the fiction of the mind as a separate place.

There are things we call apples. There's the word apple that we use to talk about what we call apples. And then - what else is there? What and where is the so-called concept of an apple? In the mind? And what and where is the mind?

[popeye1945]

I think we've done this before - but here are some observations on your model.

1 The mind/matter or mind/body split - and therefore so-called problem - is a legacy of Cartesian dualism, which recycled the ancient religious delusion that there are two substances: physical and non-physical. Calling what goes on inside/outside the mind 'subjective' and 'objective' merely repeats and reinforces the mistake.

2 Mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things and events - is and has always been metaphorical - which is why we can 'be in two minds', 'change our minds', 'share our thoughts', and so on. Our everyday talk is saturated with these metaphors, and in their place they are unproblematic. The trouble comes when we take them literally, and invent a realm of abstract, non-physical things, such as concepts, propositions and - pertinent here - meanings that, somehow, exist in the big daddy invention: the mind.

3 Hence your model: the 'subjective mind' (?) bestows meaning on a meaningless objective reality - which is attractive and persuasive, partly because it chimes with our dualist heritage.

4 Leave the fictional mind to one side, and we're left with what we always only ever had: brains. And suddenly it makes no sense to say that brains - physical objects - somehow contain or possess abstract things such as meanings that they somehow bestow on the reality outside them. Out of place, the metaphors crack and crumble.
[/quote]

HI Peter,

You are mistaken in referring to my statements as inferring dualism. I believe dualism is a philosophy of the past and incorrect but historically it has caused much confusion. Modern physics underlines this in the belief that all things are connected. Schopenhauer's statement that subject and object stand or fall together is the case in point. Where philosophy talks of subject and object as separate it is just a matter of convenience to our understanding. There can be no division between subject and object for if one is taken away the other ceases to be. Spinoza's statement in like-kind states that the body is the object of the mind and no other, for it is through the body we come to know the world as it alters the state of our biology. Subject and object are merely two aspects of one thing. Understanding and accepting this one can understand that apparent reality or one's everyday reality is a biological readout and that all meaning is the property of the subject and never the property of the world as an object. It is the knowing subject that thus bestows its effective meaning upon the outside world.

[RCSaunders]

Mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things and events - is and has always been metaphorical - which is why we can 'be in two minds', 'change our minds', 'share our thoughts', and so on. Our everyday talk is saturated with these metaphors, and in their place they are unproblematic. The trouble comes when we take them literally, and invent a realm of abstract, non-physical things, such as concepts, propositions and - pertinent here - meanings that, somehow, exist in the big daddy invention: the mind.

Metaphors for what. I agree that every concept for anything other than actual physical entities is mataphorical, but how is the concept (not the word) apple a metaphor. What is the actual thing it only metaphorically represents? The concept, "apple," in the phrase, "apple of his eye," is a metaphor. How is the concept, "apple," in, "apple pie," a metaphor?

My point is that what we call concepts are fictions. So the question 'how is the concept "apple" in 'apple pie' a metaphor?' is incoherent. There's no such thing as the concept apple, just as there's no such thing as the concept truth or knowledge. We invented concepts, just as we invented propositions and other so-called abstract things, to flesh out the fiction of the mind as a separate place.

There are things we call apples. There's the word apple that we use to talk about what we call apples. And then - what else is there? What and where is the so-called concept of an apple? In the mind? And what and where is the mind?

Yes, well of course. When we use the word, "apple," to talk about apples we use it to differentiate what we are talking about from all other things we might talk about. We use it to indicate whatever we are saying is about--it's about an, "apple," not a rock, an apricot, or tomato.

What a word is used to indicate is what others mean by a words, "conception." The word concept only means, "that which is indicated or identified." It's not a, "thing," or, "entity." What others mean by concept is, "the indication or identification," of what is being talked about. A word is only a physical means of tagging or symbolizing that indication or identification.

Without that indication or identification, i.e. without the concept, a word is just an empty symbol for nothing at all.

I know you have an aversion to the word concept, and you certainly don't have to use it, but your characterization of it as some kind of mystical something is your own view. I think there are many others who do view concepts in that mystical sense, but you need to know, it's not what concepts really are, and not what everyone means by them.

[Advocate]

[quote=RCSaunders post_id=568590 time=1650286362 user_id=16196]
[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=568476 time=1650261851 user_id=15099]
[quote=RCSaunders post_id=568455 time=1650223405 user_id=16196]

Metaphors [i]for what[/i]. I agree that every concept for anything other than actual physical entities is mataphorical, but how is the concept (not the word) apple a metaphor. What is the actual thing it only metaphorically represents? The concept, "apple," in the phrase, "apple of his eye," is a metaphor. How is the concept, "apple," in, "apple pie," a metaphor?
[/quote]
My point is that what we call concepts are fictions. So the question 'how is the concept "apple" in 'apple pie' a metaphor?' is incoherent. There's no such thing as the concept [i]apple[/i], just as there's no such thing as the concept [i]truth[/i] or [i]knowledge[/i]. We invented concepts, just as we invented propositions and other so-called abstract things, to flesh out the fiction of the mind as a separate place.

There are things we call apples. There's the word [i]apple[/i] that we use to talk about what we call apples. And then - what else is there? What and where is the so-called concept of an apple? In the mind? And what and where is the mind?
[/quote]
Yes, well of course. When we use the word, "apple," to talk about apples we use it to differentiate what we are talking about from all other things we might talk about. We use it to indicate whatever we are saying is about--it's about an, "apple," not a rock, an apricot, or tomato.

What a word is used to indicate is what others mean by a words, "conception." The word concept only means, "that which is indicated or identified." It's not a, "thing," or, "entity." What others mean by concept is, "the indication or identification," of what is being talked about. A word is only a physical means of tagging or symbolizing that indication or identification.

Without that indication or identification, i.e. without the concept, a word is just an empty symbol for nothing at all.

I know you have an aversion to the word concept, and you certainly don't have to use it, but your characterization of it as some kind of mystical something is your own view. I think there are many others who do view concepts in that mystical sense, but you need to know, it's not what concepts really are, and not what everyone means by them.
[/quote]

An apple to an apple vendor is a much higher resolution Thing in their mind than it is to you or i, regardless of whether the concepts share an external correlate in a particular area of space/time (an apple-stuff instance).

[RCSaunders]

My point is that what we call concepts are fictions. So the question 'how is the concept "apple" in 'apple pie' a metaphor?' is incoherent. There's no such thing as the concept apple, just as there's no such thing as the concept truth or knowledge. We invented concepts, just as we invented propositions and other so-called abstract things, to flesh out the fiction of the mind as a separate place.

There are things we call apples. There's the word apple that we use to talk about what we call apples. And then - what else is there? What and where is the so-called concept of an apple? In the mind? And what and where is the mind?

Yes, well of course. When we use the word, "apple," to talk about apples we use it to differentiate what we are talking about from all other things we might talk about. We use it to indicate whatever we are saying is about--it's about an, "apple," not a rock, an apricot, or tomato.

What a word is used to indicate is what others mean by a words, "conception." The word concept only means, "that which is indicated or identified." It's not a, "thing," or, "entity." What others mean by concept is, "the indication or identification," of what is being talked about. A word is only a physical means of tagging or symbolizing that indication or identification.

Without that indication or identification, i.e. without the concept, a word is just an empty symbol for nothing at all.

I know you have an aversion to the word concept, and you certainly don't have to use it, but your characterization of it as some kind of mystical something is your own view. I think there are many others who do view concepts in that mystical sense, but you need to know, it's not what concepts really are, and not what everyone means by them.

An apple to an apple vendor is a much higher resolution Thing in their mind than it is to you or i, regardless of whether the concepts share an external correlate in a particular area of space/time (an apple-stuff instance).

Platonic realism nonsense. You are confusing what the concept apple means (an actual apple) and what is known about apples. Apple has exactly the same meaning for a botanist specializing in apples and a boy who knows little more about them than what they look and taste like. The botanist knows a lot more about apples, but that knowledge is about the very same entity the boy's limited knowledge is about. The word apple represent the very same concept, i.e. means the very same thing, for both.

And just to be clear their is no apple thing in anyone's mind. That is the very kind of mistake Peter is referring to.

[Peter Holmes]

Metaphors for what. I agree that every concept for anything other than actual physical entities is mataphorical, but how is the concept (not the word) apple a metaphor. What is the actual thing it only metaphorically represents? The concept, "apple," in the phrase, "apple of his eye," is a metaphor. How is the concept, "apple," in, "apple pie," a metaphor?

My point is that what we call concepts are fictions. So the question 'how is the concept "apple" in 'apple pie' a metaphor?' is incoherent. There's no such thing as the concept apple, just as there's no such thing as the concept truth or knowledge. We invented concepts, just as we invented propositions and other so-called abstract things, to flesh out the fiction of the mind as a separate place.

There are things we call apples. There's the word apple that we use to talk about what we call apples. And then - what else is there? What and where is the so-called concept of an apple? In the mind? And what and where is the mind?

Yes, well of course. When we use the word, "apple," to talk about apples we use it to differentiate what we are talking about from all other things we might talk about. We use it to indicate whatever we are saying is about--it's about an, "apple," not a rock, an apricot, or tomato.

What a word is used to indicate is what others mean by a words, "conception." The word concept only means, "that which is indicated or identified." It's not a, "thing," or, "entity." What others mean by concept is, "the indication or identification," of what is being talked about. A word is only a physical means of tagging or symbolizing that indication or identification.

Without that indication or identification, i.e. without the concept, a word is just an empty symbol for nothing at all.

I know you have an aversion to the word concept, and you certainly don't have to use it, but your characterization of it as some kind of mystical something is your own view. I think there are many others who do view concepts in that mystical sense, but you need to know, it's not what concepts really are, and not what everyone means by them.

Thanks, but I think your use of the word 'concept' is far from standard. Here are some dictionary descriptions:

1 The meaning of CONCEPT is something conceived in the mind : thought, notion.

2 concept · a general notion or idea; conception. · an idea of something formed by mentally combining all its characteristics or particulars; a construct.

3 A concept is a thought or idea.

That which is identified or denoted by the word 'apple' is an apple - a physical thing - not the concept of an apple, whatever that is. Concepts are fictional things that actually explain nothing whatsoever. And standard descriptions demonstrate their uselessness and/or mysticism. I think there are few cases more obviously crying out for the application of Occam's razor.

If you think any question - philosophical or otherwise - is illuminated by talk about concepts, rather than the use of words, I'd be interested to know about it.

[RCSaunders]

If you think any question - philosophical or otherwise - is illuminated by talk about concepts, rather than the use of words, I'd be interested to know about it.

The reason I think so, is because, "words," are only symbols, marks on paper or other material, sounds one makes, gestures or signs, or electronic states on magnetic material or some solid state material. On there own they have no use or function. A Symbol might be an interesting little picture or design, but it does not mean anything.

When a word is used in a language, it is used to indicate or identify something, some entity, for example, like a planet, a person, or an apple. What a word is used to indicate or identify is usually referred to as what the word means. When we use a word in language, it is not the words, the symbols themselves, that one discusses, but what the words mean. "Joe loves apples," does not mean, "the word, 'Joe,' has an affection for the word, 'apples.'" It is not, "symbols," one uses them to think about, it's what the symbols (words) mean one uses them to think about. It is what words mean that is meant by their, "conception," because without it, words have no meaning and are just empty marks, sounds, gestures, or signs.

So, for me, there must be a distinction between a mere word, as a symbol, and a word's meaning, as a concept--the identification of something. The word, "house," for example, has no meaning on it's own, and only has a meaning because it is used as a symbol for the identification of a specific kind of existent, which is the concept. It is not the symbol that has the meaning, it is the concept the symbol represents.

Though it is generally assumed word are defined, it is not actually words that are defined but the concepts words are only the symbols for. From my old essay, "Epistemology, Concepts:"

Words are not concepts. Words are only symbols that represent concepts. The words, 'home,' 'domocile,' 'residence,' 'abode,' 'casa,' (Spanish), 'maison,' (French), 'spiti,' (Greek), and 'bahn,' (Thai) all have the same definition because those different words all stand for the same concept. It is not the symbols or words for concepts that have meaning, but the concepts the symbols represent.

The same word (symbol) may also be used to represent more than one concept. The word, 'light,' represents many different concepts for different existents, which may be related but are not the same existents, requiring different definitions, such as: "electromagnetic radiation that makes vision possible," "a source of light: such as a lamp," "enlightenment," "not dark," "to ignite a fire," "to illuminate something," "not heavy," "slight," "quick," "soft," "dismount," and "alight or land." Each is a different concept for a different existent represented by the same symbol, "light."

For me, failing to make a distinction between words as symbols, and concepts (the meanings words are used as symbols for) leads to endless confusion (like logical positivism, or Kant's absurd assumption that words mean their definitions).

I'm only answering your question of why I regard concepts as important to understand epistemology. I'm not trying to convince you my view is right.

Thanks for showing your interest.

[Peter Holmes]

If you think any question - philosophical or otherwise - is illuminated by talk about concepts, rather than the use of words, I'd be interested to know about it.

The reason I think so, is because, "words," are only symbols, marks on paper or other material, sounds one makes, gestures or signs, or electronic states on magnetic material or some solid state material. On there own they have no use or function. A Symbol might be an interesting little picture or design, but it does not mean anything.

When a word is used in a language, it is used to indicate or identify something, some entity, for example, like a planet, a person, or an apple. What a word is used to indicate or identify is usually referred to as what the word means. When we use a word in language, it is not the words, the symbols themselves, that one discusses, but what the words mean. "Joe loves apples," does not mean, "the word, 'Joe,' has an affection for the word, 'apples.'" It is not, "symbols," one uses them to think about, it's what the symbols (words) mean one uses them to think about. It is what words mean that is meant by their, "conception," because without it, words have no meaning and are just empty marks, sounds, gestures, or signs.

So, for me, there must be a distinction between a mere word, as a symbol, and a word's meaning, as a concept--the identification of something. The word, "house," for example, has no meaning on it's own, and only has a meaning because it is used as a symbol for the identification of a specific kind of existent, which is the concept. It is not the symbol that has the meaning, it is the concept the symbol represents.

Though it is generally assumed word are defined, it is not actually words that are defined but the concepts words are only the symbols for. From my old essay, "Epistemology, Concepts:"

Words are not concepts. Words are only symbols that represent concepts. The words, 'home,' 'domocile,' 'residence,' 'abode,' 'casa,' (Spanish), 'maison,' (French), 'spiti,' (Greek), and 'bahn,' (Thai) all have the same definition because those different words all stand for the same concept. It is not the symbols or words for concepts that have meaning, but the concepts the symbols represent.

The same word (symbol) may also be used to represent more than one concept. The word, 'light,' represents many different concepts for different existents, which may be related but are not the same existents, requiring different definitions, such as: "electromagnetic radiation that makes vision possible," "a source of light: such as a lamp," "enlightenment," "not dark," "to ignite a fire," "to illuminate something," "not heavy," "slight," "quick," "soft," "dismount," and "alight or land." Each is a different concept for a different existent represented by the same symbol, "light."

For me, failing to make a distinction between words as symbols, and concepts (the meanings words are used as symbols for) leads to endless confusion (like logical positivism, or Kant's absurd assumption that words mean their definitions).

I'm only answering your question of why I regard concepts as important to understand epistemology. I'm not trying to convince you my view is right.

Thanks for showing your interest.

And thanks for setting out your position. As explained, the word 'concept' usually refers to a supposed mental thing - so your use of the word is non-standard. And that's fine, because you explain how you use it.

Perhaps our disagreement is as follows. I agree with Wittgenstein that the meaning of a sign is its use - in the way(s) we use it. Whereas you think the meaning of a sign is the concept it denotes. My counter is that we don't use signs to denote concepts, because concepts don't exist. For example, we use the word 'house' to talk about what we call a house, which is a real, physical thing. That the word 'maison' is also used to talk about a house doesn't mean there's another thing - a concept - which both words denote.

But if what you call a concept is nothing more than 'the way we use a word', then I guess we're on the same page.

[popeye1945]

Maison means house the concept.

[Peter Holmes]

What and where is the concept of a house?
Describe the concept of a house. Is that different from describing a house?

Mantra-mumbling. Of course there are concepts. We talk about them all the time.

[RCSaunders]

If you think any question - philosophical or otherwise - is illuminated by talk about concepts, rather than the use of words, I'd be interested to know about it.

The reason I think so, is because, "words," are only symbols, marks on paper or other material, sounds one makes, gestures or signs, or electronic states on magnetic material or some solid state material. On there own they have no use or function. A Symbol might be an interesting little picture or design, but it does not mean anything.

When a word is used in a language, it is used to indicate or identify something, some entity, for example, like a planet, a person, or an apple. What a word is used to indicate or identify is usually referred to as what the word means. When we use a word in language, it is not the words, the symbols themselves, that one discusses, but what the words mean. "Joe loves apples," does not mean, "the word, 'Joe,' has an affection for the word, 'apples.'" It is not, "symbols," one uses them to think about, it's what the symbols (words) mean one uses them to think about. It is what words mean that is meant by their, "conception," because without it, words have no meaning and are just empty marks, sounds, gestures, or signs.

So, for me, there must be a distinction between a mere word, as a symbol, and a word's meaning, as a concept--the identification of something. The word, "house," for example, has no meaning on it's own, and only has a meaning because it is used as a symbol for the identification of a specific kind of existent, which is the concept. It is not the symbol that has the meaning, it is the concept the symbol represents.

Though it is generally assumed word are defined, it is not actually words that are defined but the concepts words are only the symbols for. From my old essay, "Epistemology, Concepts:"

Words are not concepts. Words are only symbols that represent concepts. The words, 'home,' 'domocile,' 'residence,' 'abode,' 'casa,' (Spanish), 'maison,' (French), 'spiti,' (Greek), and 'bahn,' (Thai) all have the same definition because those different words all stand for the same concept. It is not the symbols or words for concepts that have meaning, but the concepts the symbols represent.

The same word (symbol) may also be used to represent more than one concept. The word, 'light,' represents many different concepts for different existents, which may be related but are not the same existents, requiring different definitions, such as: "electromagnetic radiation that makes vision possible," "a source of light: such as a lamp," "enlightenment," "not dark," "to ignite a fire," "to illuminate something," "not heavy," "slight," "quick," "soft," "dismount," and "alight or land." Each is a different concept for a different existent represented by the same symbol, "light."

For me, failing to make a distinction between words as symbols, and concepts (the meanings words are used as symbols for) leads to endless confusion (like logical positivism, or Kant's absurd assumption that words mean their definitions).

I'm only answering your question of why I regard concepts as important to understand epistemology. I'm not trying to convince you my view is right.

Thanks for showing your interest.

And thanks for setting out your position. As explained, the word 'concept' usually refers to a supposed mental thing - so your use of the word is non-standard. And that's fine, because you explain how you use it.

Perhaps our disagreement is as follows. I agree with Wittgenstein that the meaning of a sign is its use - in the way(s) we use it. Whereas you think the meaning of a sign is the concept it denotes. My counter is that we don't use signs to denote concepts, because concepts don't exist. For example, we use the word 'house' to talk about what we call a house, which is a real, physical thing. That the word 'maison' is also used to talk about a house doesn't mean there's another thing - a concept - which both words denote.

But if what you call a concept is nothing more than 'the way we use a word', then I guess we're on the same page.

We're definitely not on the same page, but if you buy Wittgenstein, we are never going to be. That's OK, of course, everyone has to come to their own understanding of things.

For me, you've described what I mean by the word concept when you said, "the word, 'maison' is also used to talk about a house...which both words denote. What I mean by a concept is a words, "donation."

[RCSaunders]

What and where is the concept of a house?
Describe the concept of a house. Is that different from describing a house?

Mantra-mumbling. Of course there are concepts. We talk about them all the time.

But, if, "the meaning of a sign is its use - in the way(s) we use it," ala Wittgenstein, and that is how Popeye is using it, how can he be wrong?