Is morality objective or subjective?

[popeye1945]

There is no known objectivity, there is but a subjectively known world, which is a product of the alterations the energies around us that affect our biological senses, knowing is the effects of energies as experience.

[Peter Holmes]

There is no known objectivity, there is but a subjectively known world, which is a product of the alterations the energies around us that affect our biological senses, knowing is the effects of energies as experience.

Same special pleading. If there is no known objectivity [?], then there is no subject with biological senses to experience the world.

[popeye1945]

There is no known objectivity, there is but a subjectively known world, which is a product of the alterations the energies around us that affect our biological senses, knowing is the effects of energies as experience.

Same special pleading. If there is no known objectivity [?], then there is no subject with biological senses to experience the world.

Same old same old misunderstandings. It really depends upon your definition of objective reality; your objective reality is the world of objects, mine is the world of energy. The effect energies have on biology gives you a subjective knowledge of a world of objects. Subject and object indeed stand or fall together, but object is first energy processed through biology. Just as there is no sound or color in the real world without biology, so there would be no object. You are concerned about your own body in the outside world--yes? Well, it is in the outside world and it is an object, but it is first energy, made manifest through biology. Try to question the obvious!

[Iwannaplato]

There is no known objectivity, there is but a subjectively known world, which is a product of the alterations the energies around us that affect our biological senses, knowing is the effects of energies as experience.

Same special pleading. If there is no known objectivity [?], then there is no subject with biological senses to experience the world.

Could you elaborate. I see problems with what popeye is asserting, but I am not sure what you mean here.

[Peter Holmes]

There is no known objectivity, there is but a subjectively known world, which is a product of the alterations the energies around us that affect our biological senses, knowing is the effects of energies as experience.

Same special pleading. If there is no known objectivity [?], then there is no subject with biological senses to experience the world.

Could you elaborate. I see problems with what popeye is asserting, but I am not sure what you mean here.

Sure. If there is only a subjectively known world, which is only the effect of 'energies as experience', then that must be true of the 'subject' with 'biological senses' that experiences those energies. How can the subject be 'known'? What is it that experiences those energies?

I've been pointing the problem out for a long time. I maintain that popeye assumes something which is denied in all other cases. Special pleading. If there is a subject that experiences, then that is a fact - a 'knowable' feature of reality, and not merely a 'subjectively known' thing.

At least, that's how I see it. I'd be interested to know your take.

[Iwannaplato]

Same special pleading. If there is no known objectivity [?], then there is no subject with biological senses to experience the world.

Could you elaborate. I see problems with what popeye is asserting, but I am not sure what you mean here.

Sure. If there is only a subjectively known world, which is only the effect of 'energies as experience', then that must be true of the 'subject' with 'biological senses' that experiences those energies. How can the subject be 'known'? What is it that experiences those energies?

I've been pointing the problem out for a long time. I maintain that popeye assumes something which is denied in all other cases. Special pleading. If there is a subject that experiences, then that is a fact - a 'knowable' feature of reality, and not merely a 'subjectively known' thing.

At least, that's how I see it. I'd be interested to know your take.

So, the special pleading is implicit.

Let me tell you what is going on.......[then after a bit] we can't know what's going on.

So the special pleading has to do with laying out how things are. Or?

If so, I have reacted similarly, generally with a fruit of the poison tree critique. You know that really matter is energy (everywhere). That this energy impinges on our biological senses (which presumably are also energy), giving us experiences. But it seems inevitable that these conclusions are all drawn from science (if incorrectly): sensory physiology, physics - and so the fruit is 'there is no known objectivity' and the tree is a bunch of objective claims about the nature or reality.

And also a kind of 'how do you know that's true for me?' reaction. I also think it runs into problems when applied universally. If popye's sense of things is energies impinging on his made of energy 'body', how could he possibly know what happening for other entities. It's a bit like brain in the vat, but much broader. He doesn't need to be in some special science fiction scenario. He's claiming a subjective bubble around/as himself, but then wants to apply this to entities whose voices and words he thinks he hears in his bubble. For all he knows they are quite capable of objectivity.

[Peter Holmes]

Could you elaborate. I see problems with what popeye is asserting, but I am not sure what you mean here.

Sure. If there is only a subjectively known world, which is only the effect of 'energies as experience', then that must be true of the 'subject' with 'biological senses' that experiences those energies. How can the subject be 'known'? What is it that experiences those energies?

I've been pointing the problem out for a long time. I maintain that popeye assumes something which is denied in all other cases. Special pleading. If there is a subject that experiences, then that is a fact - a 'knowable' feature of reality, and not merely a 'subjectively known' thing.

At least, that's how I see it. I'd be interested to know your take.

So, the special pleading is implicit.

Let me tell you what is going on.......[then after a bit] we can't know what's going on.

So the special pleading has to do with laying out how things are. Or?

If so, I have reacted similarly, generally with a fruit of the poison tree critique. You know that really matter is energy (everywhere). That this energy impinges on our biological senses (which presumably are also energy), giving us experiences. But it seems inevitable that these conclusions are all drawn from science (if incorrectly): sensory physiology, physics - and so the fruit is 'there is no known objectivity' and the tree is a bunch of objective claims about the nature or reality.

And also a kind of 'how do you know that's true for me?' reaction. I also think it runs into problems when applied universally. If popye's sense of things is energies impinging on his made of energy 'body', how could he possibly know what happening for other entities. It's a bit like brain in the vat, but much broader. He doesn't need to be in some special science fiction scenario. He's claiming a subjective bubble around/as himself, but then wants to apply this to entities whose voices and words he thinks he hears in his bubble. For all he knows they are quite capable of objectivity.

All agreed - and that explains it nicely.

Before now, I suggested that popeye was proposing a kind of Cartesian foundationalism which, like all others - including an empiricist appeal to 'experience' - can't account for itself.

[Skepdick]

Sure. If there is only a subjectively known world, which is only the effect of 'energies as experience', then that must be true of the 'subject' with 'biological senses' that experiences those energies. How can the subject be 'known'? What is it that experiences those energies?

I've been pointing the problem out for a long time. I maintain that popeye assumes something which is denied in all other cases. Special pleading. If there is a subject that experiences, then that is a fact - a 'knowable' feature of reality, and not merely a 'subjectively known' thing.

At least, that's how I see it. I'd be interested to know your take.

So, the special pleading is implicit.

Let me tell you what is going on.......[then after a bit] we can't know what's going on.

So the special pleading has to do with laying out how things are. Or?

If so, I have reacted similarly, generally with a fruit of the poison tree critique. You know that really matter is energy (everywhere). That this energy impinges on our biological senses (which presumably are also energy), giving us experiences. But it seems inevitable that these conclusions are all drawn from science (if incorrectly): sensory physiology, physics - and so the fruit is 'there is no known objectivity' and the tree is a bunch of objective claims about the nature or reality.

And also a kind of 'how do you know that's true for me?' reaction. I also think it runs into problems when applied universally. If popye's sense of things is energies impinging on his made of energy 'body', how could he possibly know what happening for other entities. It's a bit like brain in the vat, but much broader. He doesn't need to be in some special science fiction scenario. He's claiming a subjective bubble around/as himself, but then wants to apply this to entities whose voices and words he thinks he hears in his bubble. For all he knows they are quite capable of objectivity.

All agreed - and that explains it nicely.

Before now, I suggested that popeye was proposing a kind of Cartesian foundationalism which, like all others - including an empiricist appeal to 'experience' - can't account for itself.

Who is holding it to account and why?

[popeye1945]

Same special pleading. If there is no known objectivity [?], then there is no subject with biological senses to experience the world.

Could you elaborate. I see problems with what popeye is asserting, but I am not sure what you mean here.

Sure. If there is only a subjectively known world, which is only the effect of 'energies as experience', then that must be true of the 'subject' with 'biological senses' that experiences those energies. How can the subject be 'known'? What is it that experiences those energies?

I've been pointing the problem out for a long time. I maintain that Popeye assumes something which is denied in all other cases. Special pleading. If there is a subject that experiences, then that is a fact - a 'knowable' feature of reality, and not merely a 'subjectively known' thing. At least, that's how I see it. I'd be interested to know your take.

Why would your consciousness not recognize your own body out there as a body out there? What do you think the process is of coming to know the world of objects, is it not the alterations said objects make to biology that provides you with your apparent reality? "Not merely a subjectively known thing." Quoting you. Subjectivity is the only way of knowing. The subjectively known object, your own body, is experienced like any other body/object but like all the other body/objects it is an energy form and is known as an object. Your senses are not your consciousness they are the means of discerning the effects of the energies around you. If you insist upon me solving the problem of consciousness, we both know that is not going to happen. Precisely where is the pleading, you do recognize that color and sound do not exist without being processed by a biological subject -- yes? All things have vibrational frequencies and everything thought of as an object has a vibrational frequency this is well established. A late breakthrough with cancer is due to matching its frequency to destroy it without harming the surrounding healthy cells, this is due to the healthy cells having a differing frequency. I know you believe you have something, please try to pinpoint it, or in other words point out where my reasoning goes astray.

[Belinda]

There is no known objectivity, there is but a subjectively known world, which is a product of the alterations the energies around us that affect our biological senses, knowing is the effects of energies as experience.

Same special pleading. If there is no known objectivity [?], then there is no subject with biological senses to experience the world.

You said it, Peter!
There is no enduring subject to experience an enduring world: neither is there any enduring world. There is only experience which experiences . True, experience is limited and does not imply omniscience, but that is not a reason to reify any subject of experience .

[popeye1945]

Same special pleading. If there is no known objectivity [?], then there is no subject with biological senses to experience the world.

Could you elaborate. I see problems with what Popeye is asserting, but I am not sure what you mean here.
[/quote]



Sure. If there is only a subjectively known world, which is only the effect of 'energies as experience', then that must be true of the 'subject' with 'biological senses' that experiences those energies. How can the subject be 'known'? What is it that experiences those energies?
I've been pointing the problem out for a long time. I maintain that Popeye assumes something which is denied in all other cases. Special pleading. If there is a subject that experiences, then that is a fact - a 'knowable' feature of reality, and not merely a 'subjectively known' thing.
At least, that's how I see it. I'd be interested to know your take.
[/quote]

All knowing is subjective. The subject is known in the world by consciousness as an object like any other. The subject is known as an object, what is not known is the nature of consciousness. We both know we aren't going to solve that here. What experiences those energies is consciousness processing the information of the senses. There is both subject and object and their relationship is apparent reality, it is called apparent because it is the experiences biology has of the object, but the object is an energy form itself. So, the subject is not really experiencing what is truly out there, the subject is experiencing the effects of what is out there as apparent reality. Science tells us today that all is energy, so one can derive some problematic thoughts from that. You might reasonably suspect that in this consideration apparent reality is biological reactions to what if not processed through one's biology would remain unmanifested energies. Do you agree that without biological processing there would be no sound or color in the real world?

[Atla]

It's irrelevant, guy. The point is that when you observe a physical object such as snow, your senses get affected in certain way, as a consequence of which, your brain ends up building a 2D image full of white dots. That's the point.

Hmm do you think that the image is literally made of dots, so it's discrete, or were you speaking figuratively?

I tend to think of the image as rather continuous, similar to say how an EM field is rather continuous. Although the image may receive dot-like inputs. Like throwing a stone into a pond, a patch of white-ness is reinforced, kept in place, at that position, as the ripples spread. The process just happens so fast, so often, using so many inputs and on such a small scale, that we experience it as a constant continuous white.

But of course I think it's impossible to tell in 2023 what's really going on, just wondering.

[Magnus Anderson]

Yes, I do mean it's literally made out of dots. But it's not necessary for that to be true in order to prove my point that colors are objective. The word "color" does not refer to things inside minds, e.g. qualia. When it's dark, a red ball doesn't appear red, it appears black. Yet, we don't say the ball is black when it's dark. We think it's red even when the color-qualia it causes in us is a shade of black -- and rightly so. That's because the world "color" denotes the texture of the object; it represents the aspect of the object that determines what kind of light is reflected off of it.

[Skepdick]

Yes, I do mean it's literally made out of dots. But it's not necessary for that to be true in order to prove my point that colors are objective. The word "color" does not refer to things inside minds, e.g. qualia. When it's dark, a red ball doesn't appear red, it appears black. Yet, we don't say the ball is black when it's dark. We think it's red even when the color-qualia it causes in us is a shade of black -- and rightly so. That's because the world "color" denotes the texture of the object; it represents the aspect of the object that determines what kind of light is reflected off of it.

That’s a conceptual error. Color is about connotation not denotation.

In fact that which humans recognize as “red” differs depending on light conditions.

[Atla]

Yes, I do mean it's literally made out of dots. But it's not necessary for that to be true in order to prove my point that colors are objective. The word "color" does not refer to things inside minds, e.g. qualia. When it's dark, a red ball doesn't appear red, it appears black. Yet, we don't say the ball is black when it's dark. We think it's red even when the color-qualia it causes in us is a shade of black -- and rightly so. That's because the world "color" denotes the texture of the object; it represents the aspect of the object that determines what kind of light is reflected off of it.

I didn't follow the discussion about colors, but I don't understand this either-or approach. Color primarily means color-quale, and then we assign these color-qualia to external objects. So color has two uses.
If I would see a red ball in the dark for the first time, I would think it's black or I would think that I can't tell its color because it's dark.