Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 05, 2023 9:06 pm
Okay - but I assume you agree that might (having 'forces') doesn't make right. That's the sine qua non of moral realism and objectivism - the claim that there are moral facts.
Wouldn't that be a specific kind of moral realism? I mean you could have a moral realism that says it is morally wrong to use power to make someone do/experience something they don't want. For example. And, to be clear I am neither advocating that moral realism nor positing a moral realism, just arguing that might makes right is not entailed by moral realism. I think a case could be made that moral antirealism eliminates one way to avoid might makes right. You try to convince people that right is based on moral apriori A, B and C. If you can convince people those are objective morals then you don't need to use force. And here I am not saying that there is some net gain against might makes right morals if there is moral realism, just that I am not sure there are net losses. I think might is right is a perfectly possible choice for handling things for moral antirealists. Psychopaths tend to be moral anti-realists and certainly will use might is right-like tactics if they can. (and, of course, I am not saying moral antirealists are psychopaths)
And, then, of course, the moral antirealist can't really argue that moral realism is bad because it leads to might makes right. I've been arguing that it doesn't need to lead to that, but now I'm pointing out that a moral anti-realist can't make moral claims like that. They could say, Hey come on everybody, we don't want that, right?
(and how does a moral anti-realist argue that a metaethical position like moral realism makes things worse without being a moral realist?)
Oh, now you're saying the same thing.
As I've argued elsewhere, the label 'moral anti-realist', like the label 'moral non-cognitivist', is - or at least can be - insidiously pejorative: defining something by what it lacks, as though it's the default position that it could have it. Your question assumes moral realism, or at least its possibility, which begs the question.
Right. I get that. I guess what I am saying is: given your or any other moral antirealists preferences, what is so bad about moral realism, per se? One can of course argue against moral realism on epistemological or ontological grounds. But I wonder what practical concerns there are, if any. So, it doesn't have to be a moral stance, but it could be a value stance.
Oh, I don't want any more moral realism because that leads to X AND if we don't have moral realism we will have less X. And I want less X and I am hoping to convince others to also have less X.
So, I am opening up for discussion: does eliminating moral realism, should one or we manage that, actually lead to a world we prefer. Or, will people just fight it out in pretty much the same ways, with all the same problems, but without claiming moral realist stances. Will it make the world a better place given your personal preferences for example. Can you be sure you'd be happier or more pleased with society if everyone became a moral anti-realist?
I am not sure it would be better for me. It might just be that people stop talking in a certain way and have ontological stances more in line with mine as far as morals, but nations, groups, individuals, organizations will continue with a similar mix of unpleasant and pleasant behaviors as I feell about them.
ote]Consider the case of Henry Quirk when he is on his own, versus Henry Quirk when he teams up with Immanuel Can.
But do you agree that when an argument is invalid or unsound, it isn't 'stubbornness' - ['having or showing dogged determination not to change one's attitude or position on something, especially in spite of good arguments or reasons to do so'] - to point it out?
My point is more like this: if IC and HQ decided they agreed with you, suddenly.
Hm, good argument.
Morals aren't real. I suspect that each would still think:
But I don't like abortion and trannies and will continue to fight against them. And lefties will have their own behaviors they want to stop, make illegal. The battles, the hatred, the division will continue.
I don't think that moral realism is hiding our deep down common preferences. That if we all stopped being moral realists we'd find 1) we have common preferences and 2) our passion to make the world the way we want it would be more gentle.
I think an argument against what I am saying could be that moral antirealism makes those believing it less committed. But I am not sure that works out in practice. It's not the behavior in the discussion, it's the behavior that direcly causes societal change or maintenance of policy, and of the individual's behavior in interpersonal situations, how that creates norms also.
I don't know if this is me quoted here or you writing here. But that is precisely what I mean.
I see this completely differently. Conservatism is, roughly speaking, wanting to keep things as they are. So, if things are unjust and unequal - which they are - conservatives want to maintain injustice and inequality, which is immoral - and which is why the rich and powerful are usually politically and socially conservative.
Well, as I might have said, I wish conservatives wanted to keep things the same in some of the ways they tend not to. Convervatives are a complicated group, but many of them are quite happy to have industry radically transform the world, social mores, relationships, nature...even what a corporation is.
But sure, conservatives can do what you say. Either position, at this level of abstraction is problematic.
If your heuristic is keep things as they are, well you're going to be on the wrong end of a bunch of issues.
If your heuristic is change things, same problem.
But both are moral realisms. Stasis, good. Change, good.
That the only alternative to moral objectivism is 'swinging' at the mercy of moral fashions is just another objectivist slur - like the anti-realist and non-cognitivist labels.
I don't think I've asserted this. My point, I think, has been: take away moral realism. I think this strips off a kind of facade. If we are contrasting conservatives and liberal and batching mostly everyone in two categories and we continue this post-realism, I think there will be two large groups, each trying to do what they were trying to do before, but now pushing for it without couching it in objectivist terms. They still have contradictory values, wants, preferences, hates. I'm not trying to say convervatism is good, or they are both bad (I actually object to the idea that there are two teams, but that's another issue), or they are equally good or bad. I am saying that I am not sure that we get along better if suddenly we were all no longer moral realists.