Is morality objective or subjective?

[Immanuel Can]

Thanks. (By the way, I want to apologise for my previous impatience and intemperance. No excuses.)

Wow. I confess I'm impressed. Apologizing is something people just don't do a whole lot around here. It shows you're a person of substance, and I mean that sincerely.

These are difficult topics, which, if we take them seriously, are high stakes. It's easy for us to forget that we can be totally disagreeing, and yet be totally civil. Most people (not excluding myself, of course) struggle with that, and when we do that we all sometimes misspeak. But not too many own it and deal with it. It shows moral backbone, whatever else one can say.

So no offence taken. You have my respect for it.

Here are two definitions I've just found online:

objective (adjective): (of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.

subjective (adjective): based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions...

But before I go further, do you have any thoughts about what I've said so far here?

Not at the moment. I think this catches some key elements of the distinction, and probably enough or our purposes. We could quibble about how much "influence" from the subjective is possible before a thing ceases to be "objective," or how "objective" a thing must be before we say it's no longer "subjective," as empiricists might do. But the base point is probably this: that for something to be "objective" is has to exist independently of human observation, because human observation is notoriously deceivable. To be purely "subjective," a thing must not exist outside of the mind of a human experiencer or group of experiencers.

It gets a little tricky when we talk about morality, because there is two senses in which one can call morality "objective."

A. One could say, "It's an objective fact that people (subjectively) believe in and practice a thing called 'morality.'" That is an objective sociological observation, and exists independently of our agreement with it.

B. One could also say, "Morality X is objectively true," as in, it's the objectively right moral precept, and people are morally obligated to follow it. That's quite different, of course.

And that's why I referred to the test case of slavery. Slavery is an institution that fits all the characteristics of definition A, and which people have believed fits also definition B. It's ancient (and still practiced today -- in fact, there are more slaves alive today than at any time in history), and has been believed moral by large numbers of people, and is associated with a well-developed culture and way of life. And people have even died to defend it, so important has it been to them.

But your and my intuition are against it. Probably strongly (I trust). If we saw it being practiced, we'd be horrified and try to prevent its continuance, no? But what resources would we have from subjective morality?

Us: 'Stop enslaving people."

Slaver: "Why?"

Us: Because subjectively, we don't like it. Our society condemns it. It's a violation of personhood and human rights."

Slaver: Well subjectively, I do like it. It's the practice of my culture, and there's more of us than of you. These slaves are not fully human -- at least, not to the point of having any rights -- and I don't regard them as persons. Besides, where does the law come from that says one person cannot enslave another? I have the power, I have the desire, and I have the opportunity. So who are you?

Us: Um......

Um what? What do we say next? And more importantly, what makes us "right" when we say it?

Thanks for your response. I look forward to our discussion.

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Can.

It looks like we may have crossed comments.

Thanks for your forgiveness. I appreciate it.

I agree that the assertion people have moral codes is a fact - a true factual assertion. And we know it's true - we can verify it - because there's a feature of reality to which it refers - which it asserts or describes. And that's what makes factual assertions objective and falsifiable.

But, as I understand it, you claim that morality is objective - that the moral assertion slavery is wrong is a fact - a true factual assertion. So my question is: what is the feature of reality that verifies the moral assertion slavery is wrong? If you think the wrongness of slavery is a feature of reality, I presume you think that is the thing that verifies the moral assertion. What is that thing? (I think this is the crux.)

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel Can

While you're contemplating your answer, perhaps you'll forgive me for pressing on - while my mind is on the issue.

If we define 'objective' as 'pertaining to an observed or unobserved object', the question is: what does it mean to say 'morality is objective'? In what way does morality pertain to an observed or unobserved object? And what is that object?

That's a great question. Do I have a duty to care about the pandas in China, or about the melting of the polar caps -- which, if it happens, will be unlikely to make any great impact on my own life? I don't observe either. And how about the war-injured kid in the Congo? I don't even know his name, and have never seen him. Can they have a moral claim on me, in spite of that?

Or is that quite what you're asking? Are you asking if the subject "morality" can itself be observed? Or are you asking if there's an authority behind morality, to stand as guarantor, that can be observed?

I'll let you explain which question interests you, or frame it another way, okay?

To be specific, in what way does the moral assertion slavery is wrong pertain to an object? Or, more simply, in what way is it about an object? And what is that object? The critical question is: is slavery right or wrong? If slavery is objectively right or wrong, there must be something that verifies or falsifies the assertions slavery is right and slavery is wrong.

Indeed so.

The object can't be slavery itself - that feature of reality about which we can make falsifiable factual assertions. Because if the object of the assertion slavery is wrong were slavery, then the object of the assertion slavery is right would also be slavery. So two morally contradictory assertions would have the same object. And one and the same object - slavery - can't verify contradictory moral assertions. Slavery can't be objectively both right and wrong - morally good and bad.

Well, the law of non-contradiction would also give us that, so I agree. But we might ask if "good" and "bad" are nouns or adjectives. I think it's the latter, isn't it? "Slavery" is the noun, and the word we want to attach to it adjectivally is "bad."

Adjectives are not always straightforwardly observable. I am very "tall," but not compared to a basketball player, perhaps. My "tallness" is both observable and real; but it requires a qualitative attribution that comes from a different process than mere see-and-know. It's no less real, and no less observable for all that; but it's a little less statistical and less clear how we understand I'm "tall."

So it seems that the object of the moral assertion slavery is wrong is the wrongness (the immorality) of slavery. It must be the wrongness of slavery that objectively justifies the moral assertion slavery is wrong. But what and where is the wrongness of slavery? After all, if morality is objective, the wrongness of slavery seems to be the object - the evidence - that verifies the truth of the moral assertion slavery is wrong.

Maybe "evidence" is the wrong word. That partakes more of the see-and-know idea, which would put us in the wrong paradigm. Morality is adjectival, correct? So we won't just see and know that slavery is bad. We'll need something more than eyes to be able to tell it.

No problem. We've got other senses. Our ears hear things, our nose smells things, and so on. But do we have a moral sense? Perhaps. People from Aristotle on have talked about a nebulous sense called "conscience" (literally, "knowing-along-with"), a kind of intuition that tells us when we've run afoul of something morally. And it's this little faculty that seems our most instant problem in the case of slavery -- we feel it's wrong in our conscience, perhaps, but we're having a hard time explaining why.

But our ears work because they pick up sound. And our eyes work because they admit light. But what does our conscience run on?

Some people say, "Mere social convention." That's certainly true for some things, and it explains why cultures are different. But there are a few things for which it doesn't work. Trans-socially, incest is a taboo. Betraying your clan or friends is also of very wide provenance. And there are places where wives are beaten for cultural reasons; but we think maybe the people who are doing it still know, on some level, it's wrong. Maybe they don't. But we think they might. And this shows that what people DO might not always be a good indicator of what they know about morality.

What if there are universals? What if all consciences that are not diseased have some intuition about them? Would that justify morality?

Well, no. Because there might be universal false beliefs as well as true ones. At one time, every living person on the planet believed the earth was flat. That didn't make it flat. Besides, as Hume pointed out, we can't get any "oughts" from any number of "is"s.

It seems reasonable to conclude that if the wrongness of slavery is the object that verifies the moral assertion slavery is wrong, the wrongness of slavery must be one of those putative unobserved objects.

But to say, "the wrongness makes it wrong" is surely circular.

But what and where is the wrongness of slavery? If it's an unobserved object, how do we know it exists? And we must know it exists, because otherwise we can't know that the moral assertion slavery is wrong is a fact - a true factual assertion. And how do we know that the unobserved object, the rightness of slavery, doesn't exist?

Right. We will have to cast beyond the object "slavery" itself. Slavery can't be said to be inherently wrong in that sense; it can't make itself wrong by it's own wrongness. But we do think it's objectively wrong. And we don't want to surrender that intuition without a fight.

So where to go? Let me suggest that the right question is, "What makes slavery wrong?" That is, what feature of the institution we call slavery is wrong, and why is it wrong? We already know it's not inherent, but must be something larger than and external to the issue of slavery considered all alone.

A good answer might be, "Dehumanization." Slavery deprives people of their individuality, their identity as an agent, their freedom and dignity. But from where do we get the confidence that dehumanization is wrong? Like when we looked at slavery, we've only moved the issue back one step: we've now made it dehumanization, but are no closer to being able to say why it's wrong.

And there's another problem. If the justification for claiming that slavery is objectively wrong is the wrongness of slavery (whatever that is), the dog is chasing its tail. (Perhaps it needs to re-think the premise.)

Right. And the same with dehumanization. We don't actually know from dehumanization that dehumanization is, in any meaningful or binding sense, wrong.

Now we don't just have the freedom of slaves at stake. Dehumanization impinges on every man, woman and child on the planet, potentially at least. What gives us our dignity as humans? What rationally compels our rights?

But if you think my deduction from the premise morality is objective is incorrect, please correct me and develop your version of the objectivity of moral assertions. How do you account for the objectivity of morality? What does it mean?

Now we're all the way back to ontology. What feature of our existence grounds our strong moral intuition that slavery, or dehumanization, or whatever, is wrong?

Let me tell the story one way.

We are all here by accident. We are the early product of a cosmic explosion, and the late product of material and biological forces that are utterly impersonally and indifferent to our existence, even if they created it. Our present existence is contingent. Our future is eternal cosmic oblivion when the universe reaches heat death. And in the meanwhile, some quirk of biological evolution has made us feel, contrary to the facts, that we have meaning and a strange thing called morals. This too is contingent. It might not have happened; and even if it presently serves some evolutionary function difficult to specify, evolution itself is indifferent to the question of whether or not we had to exist.

Now, within that ontology, we are left with this task: explain why slavery is wrong.

That's where that story leaves us.

So let's try another.

We are not here by accident. We are here by design. We are not merely the playthings of impersonal cosmic forces, but are placed here deliberately, to fulfill a particular destiny that may well extend beyond the present age. In the meanwhile, there are definite things that need to happen, and we have a role in it all. Among our roles is to do a thing called, "the right thing." Among the right things we are to do, avoiding dehumanizing others in any way is one of the chief ones. And we will be both laudable if we fulfill it, and accountable if we do not, regardless of our subjective feelings about that. Thus, slavery is objectively wrong, because it does not fit with the purpose for which we were created, the activities for which we were designed, and even more importantly, with the moral identity of the Creator who put us here.

Comments?

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel Can.

It looks like we may have crossed comments.

Ha! And we seem to again! Maybe I should stop typing at the same time you are.

[Peter Holmes]

I've just gone through your long discussion. (I respect the speed with which you produce!)

Slavery can't be said to be inherently wrong in that sense; it can't make itself wrong by it's own wrongness. But we do think it's objectively wrong. And we don't want to surrender that intuition without a fight.

Just so. (Most of us now) think slavery is wrong. And, in my opinion, we're right to do so. Slavery is an abomination, and as a species, we should be ashamed of ourselves for allowing it to continue. But because we believe so strongly that it's wrong, we mistake our judgement for a moral fact.

Your discussion of what might objectively ground our moral judgements is interesting - and it partly reprises the history of moral objectivism. But in the end it seems to come down to doing the right thing to please or show gratitude to, or fulfil the purpose given us by, a god.

Again, before I go on, is that your argument: morality is objective because ... it comes from a god?

[Immanuel Can]

I've just gone through your long discussion. (I respect the speed with which you produce!)

Slavery can't be said to be inherently wrong in that sense; it can't make itself wrong by it's own wrongness. But we do think it's objectively wrong. And we don't want to surrender that intuition without a fight.

Just so. (Most of us now) think slavery is wrong. And, in my opinion, we're right to do so.

Thanks, Peter.

By "most of us," you must surely mean in the developed West. That's factually untrue if we stretch it out to a historical or world scale. Slavery of all kinds is currently alive and well, sad to say. Child and sex slavery are big ones right now. And looking back, in the case of the US South, that conviction was not automatic or obvious to them; it was forced upon the South by a war. So for a lot of people, your moral convictions are not obvious.

Your discussion of what might objectively ground our moral judgements is interesting - and it partly reprises the history of moral objectivism. But in the end it seems to come down to doing the right thing to please or show gratitude to, or fulfil the purpose given us by, a god.

Again, before I go on, is that your argument: morality is objective because ... it comes from a god?

I'm merely saying that one anthropogenic narrative, if believed, has a chance of establishing the bona fides or legitimacy of objective moral conviction, such as "slavery is evil." Unfortunately, the other has absolutely no chance at all of establishing any moral precept, no matter how trivial or great.

In a sense, I wish it did. I have no wish to live perilously among those who (unbeknownst to them, perhaps) lack a legitimative ontological basis for their contingent moral choices. That could turn sour very fast, for any one of us. But the truth is that moral subjectivism has nothing that could address that problem if things did go badly.

[Peter Holmes]

Hi again, Immanuel Can.

I'm merely saying that one anthropogenic narrative, if believed, has a chance of establishing the bona fides or legitimacy of objective moral conviction, such as "slavery is evil." Unfortunately, the other has absolutely no chance at all of establishing any moral precept, no matter how trivial or great.

In a sense, I wish it did. I have no wish to live perilously among those who (unbeknownst to them, perhaps) lack a legitimative ontological basis for their contingent moral choices. That could turn sour very fast, for any one of us. But the truth is that moral subjectivism has nothing that could address that problem if things did go badly.

I'm sure you don't want to be evasive or obfuscatory. But I wonder why you dress up your theism with talk about an 'anthropogenic narrative that, if believed, has a chance of establishing the bona fides or legitimacy of objective moral conviction, such as "slavery is evil." ' Why not just say you believe morality is objective because it comes from a creator god? If that isn't what you mean, I apologise. (We can address that claim as dispassionately and rationally as any other - but maybe not here, because it's off-topic.)

But what matters here is your insertion of the condition 'if believed'. The whole point of objectivity - the primacy of facts - true factual assertions - is that they render belief, judgement and opinion - individual or collective - irrelevant. Objectivity frees us from our own and other people's opinions. Our believing that morality is objective because it comes from a creator god has absolutely no bearing on whether that claim is true. With factual assertions, belief is a red herring. That's their point. So I'm wondering which hedge you're planting with 'if believed'.

You say we need 'a legitimative ontological basis for {our} contingent moral choices.' Inside the circumlocution, this is making the same point and is open to the same criticism. An ontological claim is that something exists - and things exist independently of our believing or knowing they do. So again you're saying we need an objective morality, because without it we're morally at sea - we can't even judge if slavery is right or wrong. But slavery definitely is wrong, so morality must be objective. Now all we need to know is where moral objectivity comes from. (Well it can't be us - all our moral judgements are contingent. So it must come from a god.)

I hope you can see the deep flaws in that reasoning. It's a sequence of mutually supporting but unjustified claims. The argument is unsound.

I don't think you answered what I think is the big question. So - sorry to press you - but please can you do so now? Here it is again.

You claim that morality is objective - that the moral assertion slavery is wrong is a fact - a true factual assertion. So my question is: what is the feature of reality that verifies the moral assertion slavery is wrong? If you think the wrongness of slavery is a feature of reality, I presume you think that is the thing that verifies the moral assertion. What is that thing? (I think this is the crux.)

[Belinda]

Immanuel Can wrote:

I'm merely saying that one anthropogenic narrative, if believed, has a chance of establishing the bona fides or legitimacy of objective moral conviction, such as "slavery is evil." Unfortunately, the other has absolutely no chance at all of establishing any moral precept, no matter how trivial or great.

In a sense, I wish it did. I have no wish to live perilously among those who (unbeknownst to them, perhaps) lack a legitimative ontological basis for their contingent moral choices. That could turn sour very fast, for any one of us. But the truth is that moral subjectivism has nothing that could address that problem if things did go badly.

Yes, but there is an alternative moral objectivism, an alternative to theism. That alternative is Humanism. The Humanist claim is that human nature is fundamentally good harmonising, as fundamental human nature does, with the total environment within which it was nurtured and within which is still exists today. True, extremes of human moral cultures seem to belie the notion of basic human nature but culture itself is a fact of nature and culture itself has shaped human nature. People are responsible for seeking out such inherent qualities in human nature that tend towards life.
Theists too seek to defend the principle of life. However the imposition of the Authority inhibits free exploration.

Please recall that the Authority in the Garden of Eden, if that Authority so desired,could have stopped Adam eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and Adam could have remained contentedly in the Garden and not had to set out to contend with a relative world.

[Peter Holmes]

Hi, Belinda.

I just wanted to endorse what you say. The moral values and judgements that flow from secular humanism provide a sound basis for our morality. And they're superior to any theistic morality because they don't depend on unjustified claims about the supernatural.

But I think it's a mistake to call secular humanist morality 'objective'. It's no more objective than theistic morality - because morality isn't objective. Indeed, the great strength of secular humanism is that it allows for moral debate and improvement, such as our new attitude towards gay rights. It's precisely the calcification of supposedly objective theistic morality that can lead some religious people to oppose such improvements.

If we say a secular morality is objective, the easy theistic riposte is: well, it obviously isn't, because human moral judgements vary - some people thought and think that slavery is justifiable - and you secularists have no way to decide or justify your judgement. And that's been Immanuel Can's line all along. It's because moral value judgements are subjective that we can (and have to) make and repair our own moral foundations.

[Belinda]

Peter, I stated what my basic moral criterion is i.e. does it support life? which leads to the possibility of objective moral choices. Immanual Can may have stated his which I gather is is it according to the ontological authority of God as the most efficacious ontological choice?
which leads to absolute objective morality.


Would you state your criterion for your assertion that there's no objective morality ? Maybe you already did so and I cant remember what you said.

[Peter Holmes]

Belinda, I've been explaining why moral judgements can't be objective all the way through this discussion.

It's a simple matter of definition. The word 'objective' means 'independent of judgement, belief or opinion'. A factual assertion such as 'the earth orbits the sun' is objective because it claims something about a feature of reality, and its truth or falsehood (its 'truth value') is not a matter of opinion. So a factual assertion is falsifiable, because the feature of reality it asserts or describes may not be the case. In this case, the earth does indeed orbit the sun, so the assertion is true.

But this is not the case with a moral assertion such as 'slavery is wrong', which expresses a value judgement about a feature of reality. Unlike a factual assertion, a moral assertion has no truth value. There's nothing in reality that can verify or falsify the claim that slavery is wrong. To think there is is to misunderstand the purpose of the assertion 'slavery is wrong'. What could verify it - the wrongness of slavery? A value judgement is quite different from a factual assertion. And this is why we can and do argue about moral judgements, such as 'eating animals is wrong' and 'capital punishment is justifiable'. If morality were objective - if there were moral facts - we simply couldn't argue about them, because a fact is independently true regardless of our opinions.

You say that a basis for moral values and judgements is favouring life - and you have carefully thought out reasons for believing this. But the claim that it's morally good to favour life is a judgement - a matter of opinion. Just as is the claim that it's wrong to eat animals. What is there in reality that can objectively settle this moral dispute? I'm saying there is nothing, so these moral assertions aren't objective.

To put it as simply as I can: Objectivity means independence from judgement. A moral assertion such as 'slavery is wrong' expresses a judgement. Such a judgement can't be objective, by definition. So morality can't be objective. Our only hope for collective moral improvement is to understand this, and so realise that we can (and have to) make and repair our own moral foundations.

[Belinda]

Peter, I know you have been explaining all through this discussion. However nobody can live as an aware person and not make moral choices. We cannot escape the responsibility of choosing unless we are a young child, or mentally defective, or mentally enslaved.

When you asked me what my basic criterion was I answered that it's about whether or not the action in question will favour life over death. I fully recognise that this is subjective. So is Immanuel Can's basic criterion subjective. All basic criteria are subjective. Basic empirical criteria are subjective too. We never fully escape our subjectivity in our choices.
I do actually hesitate to ask you this, because it is an intimate question which reveals the real you far more than where you live, what your profession is, and so on. Doing philosophy is like that for those who are genuine participators.

If you were to say that slavery is wrong , as you do, and then someone said "Why?" and you replied, your interrogator could continue to quiz you until you arrived at what is for you your ultimate moral principle. That would be your subjective moral principle aka your basic moral criterion.

If, as we seem to be agreeing, ultimate moral principles vary from person to person, then we either have to compromise or go to war. Unless in the natural course of events (or Immanuel might say by miraculous intervention) the bone of contention goes away.

Take climate change for instance. It's clear to me based upon my principle that what sustains life is good, we all must work to stop degradation of the environment which leads towards death of most of the biosphere.

Would you say that subjectivity is inevitable not only as regards basic moral principles but also regarding the reasoning that ensues for basic principles? If so I agree. Objectivity is possible (arguably )within mathematics and formal logic but nowhere else. However, practically slaking there are facts, empirical facts that both common sense and science say result from specific causes.In addition many scientific predictions come true.If a person is firmly committed to the moral principle that what maintains life is good then with knowledge and reasoning that person will make efforts to stop degradation of the natural environment, or alternatively explore for possible habitats on other planets. The empirical data do feed into the moral subjectivity. Perhaps the answer is that the subjective/ objective question is a matter of the degree of objectivity.

Regarding slavery, William Blake made the phrase "mind-forged manacles" to describe how societal forces enslave some of the members of society, or indeed most of society.

[Peter Holmes]

Hi, Belinda.

I think you've explained our actual moral position very well. We have to make moral judgements, based on our moral values. And it's rational to have sound reasons - based on facts - to justify our judgements. And individual and social survival and progress depend on collective agreement on at least some of those values and judgements. It really is as simple as that.

If pressed, my moral foundation is the belief that every individual deserves an equal chance to thrive, be happy and fulfil potential - which is why I believe that economic equality must be our social goal. With unequal outcomes, equal opportunity is impossible. And I believe we must expand the scope of our moral concerns to include at least some other species, and our environment. I'd guess we pretty much agree on a secular moral framework.

[Belinda]

Yes Peter, I have arrived at your way of thinking that morality is subjective, however with two reservations. One is that empirical facts are also subjective. This sounds like Humpty Dumpty in Alice in Wonderland;

“When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.' 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master — that's all.”

Humpty Dumpty is right in general although social reality does exert a big restraining influence and prevents meanings becoming quite out of hand. Wittgenstein's is a social theory of knowledge.

My other reservation is that although empirical evidence is itself subjectively selected it's the best we can do regarding objective meanings. Science is amazingly efficient in its predictive power. Agreed, basic moral criteria are subjective ; and rationales to support and manifest those criteria are also subjective but ever since the scientific enlightenment these rationales have been enlightened by reason and knowledge. We don't drown or burn witches now.

[Peter Holmes]

Thanks, Belinda.

So I think your reservations are:

1 Empirical facts are subjective.

2 Empirical evidence is subjectively selected, but it's the best we can do regarding objective meanings.

1 I'm a bit lost here. A fact is a true factual assertion - true given the way we use those words of other signs. Once agreement on the use of signs is reached - and of course, that's subjective - the way we use them is objective - like moves in chess. And if by 'empirical' you just mean 'concerning a feature of reality', then I don't understand why a fact - a true assertion about a feature of reality - is subjective - a matter of judgement. Are empirical facts different from facts? And are there any other kinds of facts? If facts are subjective, the fact-value distinction evaporates, and morality may as well be objective after all. I think I must be missing your meaning.

2 I don't understand your connection between evidence - features of reality - and meanings, which exist only in language. Sorry - I'm probably being obtuse.

Interestingly, I describe myself as a (later) Wittgensteinian. Are you a fan?