Is morality objective or subjective?

[Univalence]

Let me cut to the chase:

To be objective is to rely on facts, rather than judgements

A fact describes a feature of reality correctly

1. Would you say that the notion of 'correctness' is a judgment?
2. https://www.google.co.za/search?q=define+correct

adjective: correct

1.
free from error; in accordance with fact or truth.

If we replace the above definition of 'correct' into your own claim then your argument becomes.
A fact describes a feature of reality in accordance with fact or truth

That sounds circular to me. So it must be the other one then.
A fact describes a feature of reality free from error

https://www.google.co.za/search?q=define+error

noun: error

a mistake. the state or condition of being wrong in conduct or judgement.

So, given the way we use words, it is not unfair to say that your definition of a 'fact' is equivalent to this:
A fact describes a feature of reality free from being wrong in conduct or judgement

If a description is wrong then it's not a fact?

Would you care to define 'wrong'?

[Peter Holmes]

Let me cut to the chase:

To be objective is to rely on facts, rather than judgements

A fact describes a feature of reality correctly

1. Would you say that the notion of 'correctness' is a judgment?
2. https://www.google.co.za/search?q=define+correct

adjective: correct

1.
free from error; in accordance with fact or truth.

If we replace the above definition of 'correct' into your own claim then your argument becomes.
A fact describes a feature of reality in accordance with fact or truth

That sounds circular to me. So it must be the other one then.
A fact describes a feature of reality free from error

https://www.google.co.za/search?q=define+error

noun: error

a mistake. the state or condition of being wrong in conduct or judgement.

So, given the way we use words, it is not unfair to say that your definition of a 'fact' is equivalent to this:
A fact describes a feature of reality free from being wrong in conduct or judgement

If a description is wrong then it's not a fact?

Would you care to define 'wrong'?

Again, I disagree with your analysis.

You ignore the first definition of 'error', which is 'a mistake', choosing to go for the second 'being wrong in conduct or judgement'.

And you seem to have forgotten my explanation that what we call 'truth' and 'fact' is always within a context, conventional and purposive. So if the sky here today is blue, then the assertion 'the sky here today is blue' is a fact (a true factual assertion); and the assertion 'the sky here today is grey' is false, an error or a mistake or wrong - given the way we use those words in this context.

As I also say, there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our (conventional and contextual) linguistic practices - no way to check how accurately or precisely we're describing things. Truth, accuracy, precision, and so on, are not independent (metaphysical) things against which we can measure our practices. And the same applies to mistakes, errors and 'wrongness'.

I await your demonstration of the existence of the supposed real moral things, such as the wrongness of murder, that justify the claim that morality is objective.

[Univalence]

You ignore the first definition of 'error', which is 'a mistake', choosing to go for the second 'being wrong in conduct or judgement'.

Yes. because it gets to the point quicker. You are welcome to define "mistake" for us also.

And you seem to have forgotten my explanation that what we call 'truth' and 'fact' is always within a context, conventional and purposive.

Ah good. You are helping me make my argument for me again. You are necessarily claiming that the "factuality" and "truth-value" of any particular thing you call "truth" and "facts" depends on (less importantly) convention but (more importantly) purpose.

Would you say that there is such a thing as objective purpose? e.g a reference frame/context from which we can assert the "factuality" of things?

So if the sky here today is blue, then the assertion 'the sky here today is blue' is a fact (a true factual assertion); and the assertion 'the sky here today is grey' is false, an error or a mistake or wrong - given the way we use those words in this context.

You have gone and ignored your own definition (again).

I can't assert whether the description/assertion "the sky is blue" is 'right' or 'wrong' until you tell me what purpose the definition is meant to serve.

If I am a pilot, and I asked you "what does the sky look like for our flight today?" and you said "it's blue". That is surely the wrong answer?

As I also say, there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our (conventional and contextual) linguistic practices - no way to check how accurately or precisely we're describing things. Truth, accuracy, precision, and so on, are not independent (metaphysical) things against which we can measure our practices. And the same applies to mistakes, errors and 'wrongness'.

This is wrong. Purpose is a way of checking. If an airplane is supposed to fly, but it crashes instead. That's clearly an error.

And given the track record of continuous improvement in air travel safety the practice of building safe airplanes sure seems like a measurable science to me.

Surely having 1 airplane tragedy a year is better than having 10 airplane tragedies a year?
Or are you arguing that 1 = 10 ?

I await your demonstration of the existence of the supposed real moral things, such as the wrongness of murder, that justify the claim that morality is objective.

Failed attempt at shifting the epistemic burden.

I await for your conventual, contextual and purposeful way of checking whether any particular statement is "wrong", "erroneous", "mistaken" or any other English adjective you choose to ascribe to the language I choose to use.

[Peter Holmes]

You ignore the first definition of 'error', which is 'a mistake', choosing to go for the second 'being wrong in conduct or judgement'.

Yes. because it gets to the point quicker. You are welcome to define "mistake" for us also.

And you seem to have forgotten my explanation that what we call 'truth' and 'fact' is always within a context, conventional and purposive.

Ah good. You are helping me make my argument for me again. You are necessarily claiming that the "factuality" and "truth-value" of any particular thing you call "truth" and "facts" depends on (less importantly) convention but (more importantly) purpose.

Would you say that there is such a thing as objective purpose? e.g a reference frame/context from which we can assert the "factuality" of things?

So if the sky here today is blue, then the assertion 'the sky here today is blue' is a fact (a true factual assertion); and the assertion 'the sky here today is grey' is false, an error or a mistake or wrong - given the way we use those words in this context.

You have gone and ignored your own definition (again).

I can't assert whether the description/assertion "the sky is blue" is 'right' or 'wrong' until you tell me what purpose the definition is meant to serve.

If I am a pilot, and I asked you "what does the sky look like for our flight today?" and you said "it's blue". That is surely the wrong answer?

As I also say, there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our (conventional and contextual) linguistic practices - no way to check how accurately or precisely we're describing things. Truth, accuracy, precision, and so on, are not independent (metaphysical) things against which we can measure our practices. And the same applies to mistakes, errors and 'wrongness'.

I await your demonstration of the existence of the supposed real moral things, such as the wrongness of murder, that justify the claim that morality is objective.

Failed attempt at shifting the epistemic burden.

I await for your conventual, contextual and purposeful way of checking whether any particular statement is "wrong", "erroneous", "mistaken" or any other English adjective you choose to ascribe to the language I choose to use.

I can't be bothered with this discussion any more. I think I've addressed your questions, and if you don't accept my answers, so be it.

The burden of proof is yours. You claim to 'know' that murder is morally wrong - that the moral assertion 'murder is wrong' is a fact. I maintain that that's an opinion, rather than a fact - one that I share, of course. I can't say more, until you offer a defence or explanation of your claim.

[Univalence]

The burden of proof is yours.

No. It isn't.

I made my argument as to why morality is an epistemic problem. You have failed to refute it, even though it's convenient for you to pretend that I am wrong.

Because if I am right, you have no argument.

I argued that "I know murder is wrong" and "I know the sky is blue" carry equal epistemic weight.

If you believe that the latter carries more epistemic weight than the former, then the burden of proof is on you.

[Belinda]

"Is morality objective or subjective?" doesn't make sense. You may as well ask "Is public transport objective or subjective?"

You can express a value judgement about someone's moral code, and about public transport , or about anything else. And you can describe some moral code without evaluating it, same as anything else.

Morality is interesting, and I am sure you mean something, Peter. I guess that what you really mean is

"Is there absolute right and absolute wrong? Or are right and wrong relative to times, places, and persons? "

[Peter Holmes]

"Is morality objective or subjective?" doesn't make sense. You may as well ask "Is public transport objective or subjective?"

You can express a value judgement about someone's moral code, and about public transport , or about anything else. And you can describe some moral code without evaluating it, same as anything else.

Morality is interesting, and I am sure you mean something, Peter. I guess that what you really mean is

"Is there absolute right and absolute wrong? Or are right and wrong relative to times, places, and persons? "

I disagree with your grammatical analysis. In the OP I'm using the word 'morality' as it is usually used in this context, as a shorthand: 'are moral assertions matters of fact (objective) or matters of opinion (subjective)?' The expressions 'objective morality' and 'moral objectivism' are in common use.

But thanks, I agree it could be read as you suggest.

[Belinda]

Moral Objectivism { Philosophy Index }
www.philosophy-index.com/ethics/meta-et ... tivism.php
Moral objectivism is the position that moral truths exist independantly from opinion. There are several versions of moral objectivism, of varying levels of strentgth. They area, from weakest to strongest: Moral universalism. Moral realism.

Morality Is Objective | Psychology Today UK
https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog ... -objective
23 Dec 2017 - Many people think that morality varies from culture to culture, person to person. But morality is as objective as mathematics or physics.

[Univalence]

'are moral assertions matters of fact (objective) or matters of opinion (subjective)?'

You keep refusing to answer the same question re: epistemic assertions.

I question your intellectual integrity and honesty at this point.

[Peter Holmes]

Moral Objectivism { Philosophy Index }
www.philosophy-index.com/ethics/meta-et ... tivism.php
Moral objectivism is the position that moral truths exist independantly from opinion. There are several versions of moral objectivism, of varying levels of strentgth. They area, from weakest to strongest: Moral universalism. Moral realism.

Morality Is Objective | Psychology Today UK
https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog ... -objective
23 Dec 2017 - Many people think that morality varies from culture to culture, person to person. But morality is as objective as mathematics or physics.

Thanks, Belinda. Does that mean you agree my OP question makes sense now? Not sure.

[Peter Holmes]

'are moral assertions matters of fact (objective) or matters of opinion (subjective)?'

You keep refusing to answer the same question re: epistemic assertions.

I question your intellectual integrity and honesty at this point.

Feel free. I question your grasp of the issues. Stalemate.

[Univalence]

Feel free. I question your grasp of the issues. Stalemate.

Then help us break this stalemate and answer my question.

In your view. Which one of these two statements carries higher epistemic weight:

A. Sky is blue
B. Murder is wrong

I have made my position extremely clear. In my mind - they are of equal epistemic weight.
You haven't.

In the spirit of empirical transparency, I am making an a priori prediction that you aren't going to give us an answer.

[Belinda]

Peter, I'd agree that moral universalism is true in the weakest sense that , all else being the same , all humans agree on certain universal principles. But this is a very weak version of moral objectivism because all else is never the same. For instance mothers will try to protect their babies is universally true only if the mothers in question are protected by the sort of social structures that will enable them to do so. Sad but true, this is not always the case.

The other two forms of moral universalism are moral realism and moral absolutism. I disagree with both of those that morals exist objectively.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter, I'd agree that moral universalism is true in the weakest sense that , all else being the same , all humans agree on certain universal principles. But this is a very weak version of moral objectivism because all else is never the same. For instance mothers will try to protect their babies is universally true only if the mothers in question are protected by the sort of social structures that will enable them to do so. Sad but true, this is not always the case.

The other two forms of moral universalism are moral realism and moral absolutism. I disagree with both of those that morals exist objectively.

Belinda, look at these two assertions:

1 Mothers will (or do) try to protect their babies.
2 Mothers should try to protect their babies.

My argument is that 1 is a factual assertion - it makes a claim about a feature of reality - in this case, I'd call it a fact. Its truth is independent of anyone's judgement, belief or opinion.

But 2 has a completely different function as an assertion. It doesn't make a factual claim about what is the case, but rather expresses a moral judgement about what should be the case. And we can re-phrase it: it is right (morally good) for mothers to protect their babies.

That's the difference between factual and moral assertions, and why I think moral assertions (and therefore morality) isn't and can't be objective (factual).

[Belinda]

Peter,

1 Mothers will (or do) try to protect their babies.
2 Mothers should try to protect their babies.

These utterances are divorced from real life. In real life every utterance has a social context.

For instance:

1. "Mothers will try to protect their babies" said the dairy farmer to the dog walker who had no concerns about crossing the cow pasture.
" Mothers will try to protect their babies" ordered the medical officer in charge of measles vaccinations.
" Mothers will try to protect their babies" is a law of nature and if it's natural it must be right.
" Mothers will try to protect their babies" , that is until they give them away under the terms of the surrogacy agreement.