Is morality objective or subjective?

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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Iwannaplato
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Iwannaplato »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Dec 09, 2022 10:50 pm It's a question of the presumed status of any particular moral statement, and it has a practical implications that do matter every time that status has practical implications.
I found this post a bit hard to understand. I'll respond as if I think I know what you mean and we can sort it out.
If by status you mean objective or subjective, I still don't think this matters. Those that think their view is objective will fight for their view to be the one that holds: legally, socially. Those that think it is subjective will fight for what they want. Those that think there are objective morals but disagree will also fight for what they want (what they would call 'right')
There is no more real life debate between realists and antirealists in this matter than ther is for any other, that meta shit is not relevant in real life.
And then here you seem to be agreeing with me.
But under one assumption I can decide thagt the contents of your head are categorically mistaken and that I don't need to take your views into account. Under the other, I cannot simply overrule you, there is a requirement on my part to persuade.
But you can't simply overrule. People don't knuckle under to someone else: Antirealist will still struggle for what they want. Different kinds of moral objectivists will do the same. One may think there is no requirement. Hey, I am objectively correct so I don't have to persuade you. And that doesn't work any better than it does for moral objectivists who disagree.

I get that people may think they don't need to persuade. But even fairly thickheaded objectivist deontologists will learn pretty fast that this conviction is not supported in practice. And even hard ass deontologists will get, even, extremely consequentialist in their arguments. IOW not only do they tend to (try to persuade), they even do it in terms that are often humanist and not deontological.
The tragedy of this forum, and I assume every other, is that nobody ever gets beyond this basic crap. No better conversation can be had here than this awful thread.
I think it's likely I agree with this.
Belinda
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Belinda »

Flash Dangerpants wrote:
The tragedy of this forum, and I assume every other, is that nobody ever gets beyond this basic crap. No better conversation can be had here than this awful thread.
How about : either everything is subjective (idealsm/immaterialism) or everything is objective (physicalism/materialism).
Skepdick
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Skepdick »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Dec 09, 2022 10:50 pm The tragedy of this forum, and I assume every other, is that nobody ever gets beyond this basic crap. No better conversation can be had here than this awful thread.
Look at you externalising your dissatisfaction with the quality of the conversation. This is splitting 101.

Given that you keep running out of depth on the not-so-basic stuff your bitching is largely unjustified.

Your tragedy (the one you are trying to pin on the forum) is that none of the conversations you want to have serve any broader purpose other than your own intellectual masturbation.
Peter Holmes
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Suppose philosophical arguments are really about the ways we do or could use certain abstract nouns and their cognates: being, knowledge, truth, falsehood, objectivity, subjectivity, identity, goodness, badness, rightness, wrongness, justice, beauty - and so on.

Suppose arguments about the supposed things those abstract nouns supposedly name are and have always been deluded - because abstract nouns aren't the names of things that, therefore, may or may not exist - and that, if they do exist, can be described. Suppose philosophy has been one, big, category-erroneous mistake.

If those claims are true, then pessimism about the chance of finding conclusive answers to ancient and perennial philosophical questions is rational. The questions are mistakes - or misfirings - which is why the supposed problems they illuminate are illusions. And I think that's worth knowing.
Skepdick
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Skepdick »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Dec 17, 2022 12:42 pm Suppose philosophical arguments are really about the ways we do or could use certain abstract nouns and their cognates: being, knowledge, truth, falsehood, objectivity, subjectivity, identity, goodness, badness, rightness, wrongness, justice, beauty - and so on.

Suppose arguments about the supposed things those abstract nouns supposedly name are and have always been deluded - because abstract nouns aren't the names of things that, therefore, may or may not exist - and that, if they do exist, can be described. Suppose philosophy has been one, big, category-erroneous mistake.

If those claims are true, then pessimism about the chance of finding conclusive answers to ancient and perennial philosophical questions is rational. The questions are mistakes - or misfirings - which is why the supposed problems they illuminate are illusions. And I think that's worth knowing.
Philosophical arguments are about which inferences we are; and aren't allowed to make.

Philosophical arguments are about "correct" and "incorrect" (e.g right vs wrong) reasoning.

In so far as it's a normative exercise - it's a moral debate.
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FlashDangerpants
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Iwannaplato wrote: Sat Dec 10, 2022 12:44 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Dec 09, 2022 10:50 pm It's a question of the presumed status of any particular moral statement, and it has a practical implications that do matter every time that status has practical implications.
I found this post a bit hard to understand. I'll respond as if I think I know what you mean and we can sort it out.
If by status you mean objective or subjective, I still don't think this matters. Those that think their view is objective will fight for their view to be the one that holds: legally, socially. Those that think it is subjective will fight for what they want. Those that think there are objective morals but disagree will also fight for what they want (what they would call 'right')
There is no more real life debate between realists and antirealists in this matter than ther is for any other, that meta shit is not relevant in real life.
And then here you seem to be agreeing with me.
But under one assumption I can decide thagt the contents of your head are categorically mistaken and that I don't need to take your views into account. Under the other, I cannot simply overrule you, there is a requirement on my part to persuade.
But you can't simply overrule. People don't knuckle under to someone else: Antirealist will still struggle for what they want. Different kinds of moral objectivists will do the same. One may think there is no requirement. Hey, I am objectively correct so I don't have to persuade you. And that doesn't work any better than it does for moral objectivists who disagree.
If I was a scientist and I had measured some detail of a caesium atom, I would know enough to overrule some random wanker on the internet who made up his own alternative facts about that atom. If I were the curator of some museum's collection of fine Etruscan silverware and some know-nothing shitstain on the philosophy now forum said that actually the Etruscans were entirely unfamiliar with that metal and made all their jewellery out of tin, I would have valid grounds to tell that idiot that the contents of his head were inferior to the contents of mine at least in this specific regard.

If I had a valid way to logically deduce moral facts, I would be in the same basic position as those guys, the position to overrule some inferior knowlessman. That's what it means when I say that this is a debate about the logical status of moral assertions.

Note that I am saying "logical status". I am not saying that to be an antirealist means to assert that there is no meaningful content to such statements. There is nothing at all that prevents and antirealist and a realist from understanding and meaning the exact same shit as each other when they speak of moral things.
Iwannaplato wrote: Sat Dec 10, 2022 12:44 am I get that people may think they don't need to persuade. But even fairly thickheaded objectivist deontologists will learn pretty fast that this conviction is not supported in practice. And even hard ass deontologists will get, even, extremely consequentialist in their arguments. IOW not only do they tend to (try to persuade), they even do it in terms that are often humanist and not deontological.
Consider the case of Henry Quirk when he is on his own, versus Henry Quirk when he teams up with Immanuel Can.

In the former case, when Henry runs out of steam he resorts to the implication that there is a dialog of the deaf problem, whereby the antirealist and the realist cannot truly understand each other, it's all suddenly moot. But watch him go on any topic where he is in lock step with his patron IC. In every case, they are agreed that you are in direct and obvious error, that you know it as well as they do, and that you are being obtuse in pretending not to know they are right. Go look in their threads about trannies and abortion if you don't believe me.

Iwannaplato wrote: Sat Dec 10, 2022 12:44 am
The tragedy of this forum, and I assume every other, is that nobody ever gets beyond this basic crap. No better conversation can be had here than this awful thread.
I think it's likely I agree with this.
It isn't even necessary to resolve the question of moral subjectivity to move onto some sort of metaethics. But the realists on this forum absolutely will never cover the question that follows - which is the correct method by which to uncover true moral facts? So what even would be the point in them triumphing in this thread? I mean, there's no two of them that agree as far as I can see, but at least two of them think they personally are the greatest philosopher ever and each of them, if he could make his argument work, would be among the top 10 greatest philosophers of all time, instantly taking Hume out of contention.

Meanwhile, there's never been any pressing need for the antirealist camp to try and sort through the equally thorny issue of how it would come to pass (if indeed it does) that all of our moral language appears to presuppose that there is some sort of objective truth to be describing? I see CIN raising that issue with Pete in another thread, but Pete is kinda right, the realists would need to present a much more sophisticated argument than any of them is capable of before those of us on the anti side would have any real need to consider the basis of the error, fiction, or false congition in question.
Iwannaplato
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Iwannaplato »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Mon Dec 26, 2022 6:43 am If I was a scientist and I had measured some detail of a caesium atom, I would know enough to overrule some random wanker on the internet who made up his own alternative facts about that atom. If I were the curator of some museum's collection of fine Etruscan silverware and some know-nothing shitstain on the philosophy now forum said that actually the Etruscans were entirely unfamiliar with that metal and made all their jewellery out of tin, I would have valid grounds to tell that idiot that the contents of his head were inferior to the contents of mine at least in this specific regard.
If I had a valid way to logically deduce moral facts, I would be in the same basic position as those guys, the position to overrule some inferior knowlessman. That's what it means when I say that this is a debate about the logical status of moral assertions.
I agree. However, I am not sure that those arguments make the world. I think the world is made not through philosophical discussions of positions with people with other positions, but by discussions with likeminded people and then also via media by those with the most power. I am not sure how much the metaposition is causal or that once we get down to the level of forces, the moral realists have some advantage.

(and how does a moral anti-realist argue that a metaethical position like moral realism makes things worse without being a moral realist?)

Though I feel like I have lost the thread of our context, so if I seem to be avoiding something or missing the point, it's probably the latter.
Consider the case of Henry Quirk when he is on his own, versus Henry Quirk when he teams up with Immanuel Can.

In the former case, when Henry runs out of steam he resorts to the implication that there is a dialog of the deaf problem, whereby the antirealist and the realist cannot truly understand each other, it's all suddenly moot. But watch him go on any topic where he is in lock step with his patron IC. In every case, they are agreed that you are in direct and obvious error, that you know it as well as they do, and that you are being obtuse in pretending not to know they are right. Go look in their threads about trannies and abortion if you don't believe me.
I can believe it. But then, is that effective? I understand how it empowers in their heads a certain stubborness. But everyone seems pretty stubborn to me. Just the how of that stubborness varies and perhaps the quality of reasoning. Will the anti-realist who prefers a society where women can get abortions and trans people are treated fairly give in when Henry waxes apriori-deontological, or maybe it's deontologically apriori claiming?

I think an argument against what I am saying could be that moral antirealism makes those believing it less committed. But I am not sure that works out in practice. It's not the behavior in the discussion, it's the behavior that direcly causes societal change or maintenance of policy, and of the individual's behavior in interpersonal situations, how that creates norms also.
I don't feel certain of this. But that's what I see, anyway.

It isn't even necessary to resolve the question of moral subjectivity to move onto some sort of metaethics. But the realists on this forum absolutely will never cover the question that follows - which is the correct method by which to uncover true moral facts? So what even would be the point in them triumphing in this thread? I mean, there's no two of them that agree as far as I can see, but at least two of them think they personally are the greatest philosopher ever and each of them, if he could make his argument work, would be among the top 10 greatest philosophers of all time, instantly taking Hume out of contention.
I think most people are leery of finding out how they arrived at their positions. This may be truer of moral realists, but I find it a rare virtue regardless.
Meanwhile, there's never been any pressing need for the antirealist camp to try and sort through the equally thorny issue of how it would come to pass (if indeed it does) that all of our moral language appears to presuppose that there is some sort of objective truth to be describing? I see CIN raising that issue with Pete in another thread, but Pete is kinda right, the realists would need to present a much more sophisticated argument than any of them is capable of before those of us on the anti side would have any real need to consider the basis of the error, fiction, or false congition in question.
I think the anti-realist can explain our moral language as the natural consequence of creatures wanting to thrive. I think there has to be a built in species axiom that 'our species is good' - or it is a good if we thrive. So that moves any moral conclusion, if it manages to show it is universally helpful for thriving to objectively good. I've asked VA a number of times how, even if we can demonstrate that X (a virtue, an attitude like empathy, a moral position) helps humans thrive, this entails that it is GOOD, since humans may well be a blight on the universe - I think a decent case can be made for that conclusion within moral realism and some make it these days) So right off the bat, given our drives universal means objective if we we presume good for us is Good.
This might be clearer if we suddenly ran into an alien species, especially if it was sentient insect or fungus. Where universals might not look objecive due to differences.

The second thing would be that as thinking creatures we will use all tools to protect that which (seems to) help us. Conservatives function as brakes (though God I wish they were more skeptical about certain facets of technology and corporate changes to society, than than only constitutional issues and social interpersonal morals). So, the past is objective and changes are subjective. This may seem terrible to non-conservatives on some issues, but I think there is something healthy at root. You don't want society swinging around with any fad all the time. Yes, we can jump to slavery where swinging rapidly with the 'fad' of abolition seems pretty damn justified. But if it becomes a rule that we swing, I think the overall instability will lead to things I don't like all over the place. (and which, I think, the corporations exploit constantly with everything they want to sell and implement being treated as if it was as obvious at abolition).

So, in order to defend the status quo all tools will be used, and treating something as objective is a tool.

I feel like I've been both very sloppy and probably off the makr of the context, but perhaps something interesting happened or will despite this.
Peter Holmes
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Hi, Iwannaplato. Just some thoughts on what you say here - which I've been mulling over for some time.
Iwannaplato wrote: Mon Dec 26, 2022 7:40 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Mon Dec 26, 2022 6:43 am If I was a scientist and I had measured some detail of a caesium atom, I would know enough to overrule some random wanker on the internet who made up his own alternative facts about that atom. If I were the curator of some museum's collection of fine Etruscan silverware and some know-nothing shitstain on the philosophy now forum said that actually the Etruscans were entirely unfamiliar with that metal and made all their jewellery out of tin, I would have valid grounds to tell that idiot that the contents of his head were inferior to the contents of mine at least in this specific regard.
If I had a valid way to logically deduce moral facts, I would be in the same basic position as those guys, the position to overrule some inferior knowlessman. That's what it means when I say that this is a debate about the logical status of moral assertions.
I agree. However, I am not sure that those arguments make the world. I think the world is made not through philosophical discussions of positions with people with other positions, but by discussions with likeminded people and then also via media by those with the most power. I am not sure how much the metaposition is causal or that once we get down to the level of forces, the moral realists have some advantage.
Okay - but I assume you agree that might (having 'forces') doesn't make right. That's the sine qua non of moral realism and objectivism - the claim that there are moral facts.

(and how does a moral anti-realist argue that a metaethical position like moral realism makes things worse without being a moral realist?)
As I've argued elsewhere, the label 'moral anti-realist', like the label 'moral non-cognitivist', is - or at least can be - insidiously pejorative: defining something by what it lacks, as though it's the default position that it could have it. Your question assumes moral realism, or at least its possibility, which begs the question.

Though I feel like I have lost the thread of our context, so if I seem to be avoiding something or missing the point, it's probably the latter.
Consider the case of Henry Quirk when he is on his own, versus Henry Quirk when he teams up with Immanuel Can.

In the former case, when Henry runs out of steam he resorts to the implication that there is a dialog of the deaf problem, whereby the antirealist and the realist cannot truly understand each other, it's all suddenly moot. But watch him go on any topic where he is in lock step with his patron IC. In every case, they are agreed that you are in direct and obvious error, that you know it as well as they do, and that you are being obtuse in pretending not to know they are right. Go look in their threads about trannies and abortion if you don't believe me.
I can believe it. But then, is that effective? I understand how it empowers in their heads a certain stubborness. But everyone seems pretty stubborn to me. Just the how of that stubborness varies and perhaps the quality of reasoning. Will the anti-realist who prefers a society where women can get abortions and trans people are treated fairly give in when Henry waxes apriori-deontological, or maybe it's deontologically apriori claiming?
But do you agree that when an argument is invalid or unsound, it isn't 'stubbornness' - ['having or showing dogged determination not to change one's attitude or position on something, especially in spite of good arguments or reasons to do so'] - to point it out?

I think an argument against what I am saying could be that moral antirealism makes those believing it less committed. But I am not sure that works out in practice. It's not the behavior in the discussion, it's the behavior that direcly causes societal change or maintenance of policy, and of the individual's behavior in interpersonal situations, how that creates norms also.
I don't feel certain of this. But that's what I see, anyway.

It isn't even necessary to resolve the question of moral subjectivity to move onto some sort of metaethics. But the realists on this forum absolutely will never cover the question that follows - which is the correct method by which to uncover true moral facts? So what even would be the point in them triumphing in this thread? I mean, there's no two of them that agree as far as I can see, but at least two of them think they personally are the greatest philosopher ever and each of them, if he could make his argument work, would be among the top 10 greatest philosophers of all time, instantly taking Hume out of contention.
I think most people are leery of finding out how they arrived at their positions. This may be truer of moral realists, but I find it a rare virtue regardless.
Meanwhile, there's never been any pressing need for the antirealist camp to try and sort through the equally thorny issue of how it would come to pass (if indeed it does) that all of our moral language appears to presuppose that there is some sort of objective truth to be describing? I see CIN raising that issue with Pete in another thread, but Pete is kinda right, the realists would need to present a much more sophisticated argument than any of them is capable of before those of us on the anti side would have any real need to consider the basis of the error, fiction, or false congition in question.
I think the anti-realist can explain our moral language as the natural consequence of creatures wanting to thrive. I think there has to be a built in species axiom that 'our species is good' - or it is a good if we thrive. So that moves any moral conclusion, if it manages to show it is universally helpful for thriving to objectively good. I've asked VA a number of times how, even if we can demonstrate that X (a virtue, an attitude like empathy, a moral position) helps humans thrive, this entails that it is GOOD, since humans may well be a blight on the universe - I think a decent case can be made for that conclusion within moral realism and some make it these days) So right off the bat, given our drives universal means objective if we we presume good for us is Good.
This might be clearer if we suddenly ran into an alien species, especially if it was sentient insect or fungus. Where universals might not look objecive due to differences.

The second thing would be that as thinking creatures we will use all tools to protect that which (seems to) help us. Conservatives function as brakes (though God I wish they were more skeptical about certain facets of technology and corporate changes to society, than than only constitutional issues and social interpersonal morals). So, the past is objective and changes are subjective. This may seem terrible to non-conservatives on some issues, but I think there is something healthy at root. You don't want society swinging around with any fad all the time. Yes, we can jump to slavery where swinging rapidly with the 'fad' of abolition seems pretty damn justified. But if it becomes a rule that we swing, I think the overall instability will lead to things I don't like all over the place. (and which, I think, the corporations exploit constantly with everything they want to sell and implement being treated as if it was as obvious at abolition).
I see this completely differently. Conservatism is, roughly speaking, wanting to keep things as they are. So, if things are unjust and unequal - which they are - conservatives want to maintain injustice and inequality, which is immoral - and which is why the rich and powerful are usually politically and socially conservative.

That the only alternative to moral objectivism is 'swinging' at the mercy of moral fashions is just another objectivist slur - like the anti-realist and non-cognitivist labels.

So, in order to defend the status quo all tools will be used, and treating something as objective is a tool.

I feel like I've been both very sloppy and probably off the makr of the context, but perhaps something interesting happened or will despite this.
Skepdick
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Skepdick »

Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Jan 05, 2023 9:06 pm conservatives want to maintain injustice and inequality, which is immoral
Soooo according to you is it true that maintaining injustice and inequality is immoral; or is it false that maintaining injustice and inequality is immoral?
Iwannaplato
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Iwannaplato »

Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Jan 05, 2023 9:06 pm Okay - but I assume you agree that might (having 'forces') doesn't make right. That's the sine qua non of moral realism and objectivism - the claim that there are moral facts.
Wouldn't that be a specific kind of moral realism? I mean you could have a moral realism that says it is morally wrong to use power to make someone do/experience something they don't want. For example. And, to be clear I am neither advocating that moral realism nor positing a moral realism, just arguing that might makes right is not entailed by moral realism. I think a case could be made that moral antirealism eliminates one way to avoid might makes right. You try to convince people that right is based on moral apriori A, B and C. If you can convince people those are objective morals then you don't need to use force. And here I am not saying that there is some net gain against might makes right morals if there is moral realism, just that I am not sure there are net losses. I think might is right is a perfectly possible choice for handling things for moral antirealists. Psychopaths tend to be moral anti-realists and certainly will use might is right-like tactics if they can. (and, of course, I am not saying moral antirealists are psychopaths)

And, then, of course, the moral antirealist can't really argue that moral realism is bad because it leads to might makes right. I've been arguing that it doesn't need to lead to that, but now I'm pointing out that a moral anti-realist can't make moral claims like that. They could say, Hey come on everybody, we don't want that, right?
(and how does a moral anti-realist argue that a metaethical position like moral realism makes things worse without being a moral realist?)
Oh, now you're saying the same thing.
As I've argued elsewhere, the label 'moral anti-realist', like the label 'moral non-cognitivist', is - or at least can be - insidiously pejorative: defining something by what it lacks, as though it's the default position that it could have it. Your question assumes moral realism, or at least its possibility, which begs the question.
Right. I get that. I guess what I am saying is: given your or any other moral antirealists preferences, what is so bad about moral realism, per se? One can of course argue against moral realism on epistemological or ontological grounds. But I wonder what practical concerns there are, if any. So, it doesn't have to be a moral stance, but it could be a value stance. Oh, I don't want any more moral realism because that leads to X AND if we don't have moral realism we will have less X. And I want less X and I am hoping to convince others to also have less X.

So, I am opening up for discussion: does eliminating moral realism, should one or we manage that, actually lead to a world we prefer. Or, will people just fight it out in pretty much the same ways, with all the same problems, but without claiming moral realist stances. Will it make the world a better place given your personal preferences for example. Can you be sure you'd be happier or more pleased with society if everyone became a moral anti-realist?

I am not sure it would be better for me. It might just be that people stop talking in a certain way and have ontological stances more in line with mine as far as morals, but nations, groups, individuals, organizations will continue with a similar mix of unpleasant and pleasant behaviors as I feell about them.

ote]Consider the case of Henry Quirk when he is on his own, versus Henry Quirk when he teams up with Immanuel Can.
But do you agree that when an argument is invalid or unsound, it isn't 'stubbornness' - ['having or showing dogged determination not to change one's attitude or position on something, especially in spite of good arguments or reasons to do so'] - to point it out?
My point is more like this: if IC and HQ decided they agreed with you, suddenly. Hm, good argument. Morals aren't real. I suspect that each would still think: But I don't like abortion and trannies and will continue to fight against them. And lefties will have their own behaviors they want to stop, make illegal. The battles, the hatred, the division will continue.

I don't think that moral realism is hiding our deep down common preferences. That if we all stopped being moral realists we'd find 1) we have common preferences and 2) our passion to make the world the way we want it would be more gentle.
I think an argument against what I am saying could be that moral antirealism makes those believing it less committed. But I am not sure that works out in practice. It's not the behavior in the discussion, it's the behavior that direcly causes societal change or maintenance of policy, and of the individual's behavior in interpersonal situations, how that creates norms also.
I don't know if this is me quoted here or you writing here. But that is precisely what I mean.
I see this completely differently. Conservatism is, roughly speaking, wanting to keep things as they are. So, if things are unjust and unequal - which they are - conservatives want to maintain injustice and inequality, which is immoral - and which is why the rich and powerful are usually politically and socially conservative.
Well, as I might have said, I wish conservatives wanted to keep things the same in some of the ways they tend not to. Convervatives are a complicated group, but many of them are quite happy to have industry radically transform the world, social mores, relationships, nature...even what a corporation is.

But sure, conservatives can do what you say. Either position, at this level of abstraction is problematic.
If your heuristic is keep things as they are, well you're going to be on the wrong end of a bunch of issues.
If your heuristic is change things, same problem.
But both are moral realisms. Stasis, good. Change, good.
That the only alternative to moral objectivism is 'swinging' at the mercy of moral fashions is just another objectivist slur - like the anti-realist and non-cognitivist labels.
I don't think I've asserted this. My point, I think, has been: take away moral realism. I think this strips off a kind of facade. If we are contrasting conservatives and liberal and batching mostly everyone in two categories and we continue this post-realism, I think there will be two large groups, each trying to do what they were trying to do before, but now pushing for it without couching it in objectivist terms. They still have contradictory values, wants, preferences, hates. I'm not trying to say convervatism is good, or they are both bad (I actually object to the idea that there are two teams, but that's another issue), or they are equally good or bad. I am saying that I am not sure that we get along better if suddenly we were all no longer moral realists.
Peter Holmes
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Iwannaplato wrote: Thu Jan 05, 2023 9:47 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Jan 05, 2023 9:06 pm Okay - but I assume you agree that might (having 'forces') doesn't make right. That's the sine qua non of moral realism and objectivism - the claim that there are moral facts.
Wouldn't that be a specific kind of moral realism?
First - sorry for having taken so long to respond. Here are some thoughts about your argument.
I mean you could have a moral realism that says it is morally wrong to use power to make someone do/experience something they don't want.
I meant that it's a sine qua non of moral realism that right does not make right - because there are moral facts. My bad.
For example. And, to be clear I am neither advocating that moral realism nor positing a moral realism, just arguing that might makes right is not entailed by moral realism. I think a case could be made that moral antirealism eliminates one way to avoid might makes right. You try to convince people that right is based on moral apriori A, B and C. If you can convince people those are objective morals then you don't need to use force. And here I am not saying that there is some net gain against might makes right morals if there is moral realism, just that I am not sure there are net losses. I think might is right is a perfectly possible choice for handling things for moral antirealists. Psychopaths tend to be moral anti-realists and certainly will use might is right-like tactics if they can. (and, of course, I am not saying moral antirealists are psychopaths)

And, then, of course, the moral antirealist can't really argue that moral realism is bad because it leads to might makes right. I've been arguing that it doesn't need to lead to that, but now I'm pointing out that a moral anti-realist can't make moral claims like that. They could say, Hey come on everybody, we don't want that, right?
(and how does a moral anti-realist argue that a metaethical position like moral realism makes things worse without being a moral realist?)
Oh, now you're saying the same thing.
As I've argued elsewhere, the label 'moral anti-realist', like the label 'moral non-cognitivist', is - or at least can be - insidiously pejorative: defining something by what it lacks, as though it's the default position that it could have it. Your question assumes moral realism, or at least its possibility, which begs the question.
Right. I get that. I guess what I am saying is: given your or any other moral antirealists preferences, what is so bad about moral realism, per se?

From what you say, I take this to be the crux of your argument. And I think moral realism is analogous to what could be called theistic realism: what's so bad about the belief that my team's god, alone of all those invented by our ancestors, actually exists, is as we describe it, and wants what we say it wants, which is good? Would the world be a better place if no one believed in gods?

Yes, it would - not because theistic realism necessarily leads to bad things - but because it definitely can and often does so.
One can of course argue against moral realism on epistemological or ontological grounds. But I wonder what practical concerns there are, if any. So, it doesn't have to be a moral stance, but it could be a value stance. Oh, I don't want any more moral realism because that leads to X AND if we don't have moral realism we will have less X. And I want less X and I am hoping to convince others to also have less X.

So, I am opening up for discussion: does eliminating moral realism, should one or we manage that, actually lead to a world we prefer. Or, will people just fight it out in pretty much the same ways, with all the same problems, but without claiming moral realist stances. Will it make the world a better place given your personal preferences for example. Can you be sure you'd be happier or more pleased with society if everyone became a moral anti-realist?

I am not sure it would be better for me. It might just be that people stop talking in a certain way and have ontological stances more in line with mine as far as morals, but nations, groups, individuals, organizations will continue with a similar mix of unpleasant and pleasant behaviors as I feell about them.

ote]Consider the case of Henry Quirk when he is on his own, versus Henry Quirk when he teams up with Immanuel Can.
But do you agree that when an argument is invalid or unsound, it isn't 'stubbornness' - ['having or showing dogged determination not to change one's attitude or position on something, especially in spite of good arguments or reasons to do so'] - to point it out?
My point is more like this: if IC and HQ decided they agreed with you, suddenly. Hm, good argument. Morals aren't real. I suspect that each would still think: But I don't like abortion and trannies and will continue to fight against them. And lefties will have their own behaviors they want to stop, make illegal. The battles, the hatred, the division will continue.

I don't think that moral realism is hiding our deep down common preferences. That if we all stopped being moral realists we'd find 1) we have common preferences and 2) our passion to make the world the way we want it would be more gentle.
I think an argument against what I am saying could be that moral antirealism makes those believing it less committed. But I am not sure that works out in practice. It's not the behavior in the discussion, it's the behavior that direcly causes societal change or maintenance of policy, and of the individual's behavior in interpersonal situations, how that creates norms also.
I don't know if this is me quoted here or you writing here. But that is precisely what I mean.
I see this completely differently. Conservatism is, roughly speaking, wanting to keep things as they are. So, if things are unjust and unequal - which they are - conservatives want to maintain injustice and inequality, which is immoral - and which is why the rich and powerful are usually politically and socially conservative.
Well, as I might have said, I wish conservatives wanted to keep things the same in some of the ways they tend not to. Convervatives are a complicated group, but many of them are quite happy to have industry radically transform the world, social mores, relationships, nature...even what a corporation is.

But sure, conservatives can do what you say. Either position, at this level of abstraction is problematic.
If your heuristic is keep things as they are, well you're going to be on the wrong end of a bunch of issues.
If your heuristic is change things, same problem.
But both are moral realisms. Stasis, good. Change, good.
The point is that to say something is morally right (good) or wrong (bad) is not - and can't be - to state a fact. So 'stasis good/bad' and 'change good/bad' are not, as you say, 'moral realisms'. I think that injustice and inequality are morally wrong - so that wanting to maintain them is morally wrong, and wanting to end them is morally right.
That the only alternative to moral objectivism is 'swinging' at the mercy of moral fashions is just another objectivist slur - like the anti-realist and non-cognitivist labels.
I don't think I've asserted this. My point, I think, has been: take away moral realism. I think this strips off a kind of facade. If we are contrasting conservatives and liberal and batching mostly everyone in two categories and we continue this post-realism, I think there will be two large groups, each trying to do what they were trying to do before, but now pushing for it without couching it in objectivist terms. They still have contradictory values, wants, preferences, hates. I'm not trying to say convervatism is good, or they are both bad (I actually object to the idea that there are two teams, but that's another issue), or they are equally good or bad. I am saying that I am not sure that we get along better if suddenly we were all no longer moral realists.
As above - people who think there are moral facts (moral realists/objectivists) always think they know what those facts are, and feel able to justify acting in accordance with those supposed facts. And human history is littered with the morally disastrous consequences of that egotistical delusion.

That the delusion can and sometimes does lead to morally good things doesn't, as it were, cancel out the wickedness. What matters is being rational and good, which we can be without moral and theistic realism. And the fewer reasons we have for being irrational and wicked, the better. In my opinion.
Peter Holmes
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Peter Holmes wrote: Tue Feb 07, 2023 1:10 pm
Iwannaplato wrote: Thu Jan 05, 2023 9:47 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Jan 05, 2023 9:06 pm Okay - but I assume you agree that might (having 'forces') doesn't make right. That's the sine qua non of moral realism and objectivism - the claim that there are moral facts.
Wouldn't that be a specific kind of moral realism?
First - sorry for having taken so long to respond. Here are some thoughts about your argument.
I mean you could have a moral realism that says it is morally wrong to use power to make someone do/experience something they don't want.
I meant that it's a sine qua non of moral realism that right does not make right - because there are moral facts. My bad.
For example. And, to be clear I am neither advocating that moral realism nor positing a moral realism, just arguing that might makes right is not entailed by moral realism. I think a case could be made that moral antirealism eliminates one way to avoid might makes right. You try to convince people that right is based on moral apriori A, B and C. If you can convince people those are objective morals then you don't need to use force. And here I am not saying that there is some net gain against might makes right morals if there is moral realism, just that I am not sure there are net losses. I think might is right is a perfectly possible choice for handling things for moral antirealists. Psychopaths tend to be moral anti-realists and certainly will use might is right-like tactics if they can. (and, of course, I am not saying moral antirealists are psychopaths)

And, then, of course, the moral antirealist can't really argue that moral realism is bad because it leads to might makes right. I've been arguing that it doesn't need to lead to that, but now I'm pointing out that a moral anti-realist can't make moral claims like that. They could say, Hey come on everybody, we don't want that, right?
(and how does a moral anti-realist argue that a metaethical position like moral realism makes things worse without being a moral realist?)
Oh, now you're saying the same thing.
As I've argued elsewhere, the label 'moral anti-realist', like the label 'moral non-cognitivist', is - or at least can be - insidiously pejorative: defining something by what it lacks, as though it's the default position that it could have it. Your question assumes moral realism, or at least its possibility, which begs the question.
Right. I get that. I guess what I am saying is: given your or any other moral antirealists preferences, what is so bad about moral realism, per se?

From what you say, I take this to be the crux of your argument. And I think moral realism is analogous to what could be called theistic realism: what's so bad about the belief that my team's god, alone of all those invented by our ancestors, actually exists, is as we describe it, and wants what we say it wants, which is good? Would the world be a better place if no one believed in gods?

Yes, it would - not because theistic realism necessarily leads to bad things - but because it definitely can and often does so.
One can of course argue against moral realism on epistemological or ontological grounds. But I wonder what practical concerns there are, if any. So, it doesn't have to be a moral stance, but it could be a value stance. Oh, I don't want any more moral realism because that leads to X AND if we don't have moral realism we will have less X. And I want less X and I am hoping to convince others to also have less X.

So, I am opening up for discussion: does eliminating moral realism, should one or we manage that, actually lead to a world we prefer. Or, will people just fight it out in pretty much the same ways, with all the same problems, but without claiming moral realist stances. Will it make the world a better place given your personal preferences for example. Can you be sure you'd be happier or more pleased with society if everyone became a moral anti-realist?

I am not sure it would be better for me. It might just be that people stop talking in a certain way and have ontological stances more in line with mine as far as morals, but nations, groups, individuals, organizations will continue with a similar mix of unpleasant and pleasant behaviors as I feell about them.

ote]Consider the case of Henry Quirk when he is on his own, versus Henry Quirk when he teams up with Immanuel Can.
But do you agree that when an argument is invalid or unsound, it isn't 'stubbornness' - ['having or showing dogged determination not to change one's attitude or position on something, especially in spite of good arguments or reasons to do so'] - to point it out?
My point is more like this: if IC and HQ decided they agreed with you, suddenly. Hm, good argument. Morals aren't real. I suspect that each would still think: But I don't like abortion and trannies and will continue to fight against them. And lefties will have their own behaviors they want to stop, make illegal. The battles, the hatred, the division will continue.

I don't think that moral realism is hiding our deep down common preferences. That if we all stopped being moral realists we'd find 1) we have common preferences and 2) our passion to make the world the way we want it would be more gentle.
I think an argument against what I am saying could be that moral antirealism makes those believing it less committed. But I am not sure that works out in practice. It's not the behavior in the discussion, it's the behavior that direcly causes societal change or maintenance of policy, and of the individual's behavior in interpersonal situations, how that creates norms also.
I don't know if this is me quoted here or you writing here. But that is precisely what I mean.
I see this completely differently. Conservatism is, roughly speaking, wanting to keep things as they are. So, if things are unjust and unequal - which they are - conservatives want to maintain injustice and inequality, which is immoral - and which is why the rich and powerful are usually politically and socially conservative.
Well, as I might have said, I wish conservatives wanted to keep things the same in some of the ways they tend not to. Convervatives are a complicated group, but many of them are quite happy to have industry radically transform the world, social mores, relationships, nature...even what a corporation is.

But sure, conservatives can do what you say. Either position, at this level of abstraction is problematic.
If your heuristic is keep things as they are, well you're going to be on the wrong end of a bunch of issues.
If your heuristic is change things, same problem.
But both are moral realisms. Stasis, good. Change, good.
The point is that to say something is morally right (good) or wrong (bad) is not - and can't be - to state a fact. So 'stasis good/bad' and 'change good/bad' are not, as you say, 'moral realisms'. I think that injustice and inequality are morally wrong - so that wanting to maintain them is morally wrong, and wanting to end them is morally right.
That the only alternative to moral objectivism is 'swinging' at the mercy of moral fashions is just another objectivist slur - like the anti-realist and non-cognitivist labels.
I don't think I've asserted this. My point, I think, has been: take away moral realism. I think this strips off a kind of facade. If we are contrasting conservatives and liberal and batching mostly everyone in two categories and we continue this post-realism, I think there will be two large groups, each trying to do what they were trying to do before, but now pushing for it without couching it in objectivist terms. They still have contradictory values, wants, preferences, hates. I'm not trying to say convervatism is good, or they are both bad (I actually object to the idea that there are two teams, but that's another issue), or they are equally good or bad. I am saying that I am not sure that we get along better if suddenly we were all no longer moral realists.
As above - people who think there are moral facts (moral realists/objectivists) always think they know what those facts are, and feel able to justify acting in accordance with those supposed facts. And human history is littered with the morally disastrous consequences of that egotistical delusion.

That the delusion can and sometimes does lead to morally good things doesn't, as it were, cancel out the wickedness. What matters is being rational and good, which we can be without moral and theistic realism. And the fewer reasons we have for being irrational and wicked, the better. In my opinion.
I've been reflecting on IWP's argument here - questioning the point of challenging moral objectivism: would we be better off without belief in moral facts? Or would we be worse off?

I think these are salutary questions, worth asking - though they're pragmatic rather than deontological, because an argument from perceived undesirable consequences is fallacious.

VA is a moralist, with a strong sense of the need to oppose evil and promote goodness. That what constitutes evil and goodness is a matter of opinion, which is subjective - which single and simple fact demolishes moral objectivism at a stroke - is anathema to VA. Hence his sprawlingly absurd attempts to construct a moral objectivity that won't stand up for a moment.

Some theistic moral objectivists here argue that, if [my team's] god doesn't exist, then there are no moral facts, morality is dead, and anything goes. As a fellow atheist, I agree with VA that belief in gods is irrational. But we part company at the claim that there are moral facts - only not divinely ordained or inspired ones.

There can be no such thing as a moral fact, whether or not there are gods. And I maintain that we're morally better off without both gods and moral objectivity. It's called growing up.
Skepdick
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Skepdick »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat May 06, 2023 2:43 pm I've been reflecting on IWP's argument here - questioning the point of challenging moral objectivism: would we be better off without belief in moral facts? Or would we be worse off?
What do such questions even mean to a moral subjectivist?

Better; or worse relative to what moral standard?

I say we are better off if we killed all moral subjectivists.
You say we are worse off if we killed all moral subjectivists.

If morality is subjective then both perspectives are equally valid.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat May 06, 2023 2:43 pm There can be no such thing as a moral fact, whether or not there are gods. And I maintain that we're morally better off without both gods and moral objectivity. It's called growing up.
So grow up then. If there are no moral facts then there are no such things as right and wrong; better or worse.

You are just confused about the existence of morality when you use those words.

Lets murder you on Monday?
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Agent Smith
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Agent Smith »

The mother of all questions is what makes ya, him, anyone for that matter, think morality is subjective?

I know the water's murky, you have only one eye, and you lost feeling in both your hands ... but catch that slippery fish ya must!!
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat May 06, 2023 2:43 pm VA is a moralist, with a strong sense of the need to oppose evil and promote goodness. That what constitutes evil and goodness is a matter of opinion, which is subjective - which single and simple fact demolishes moral objectivism at a stroke - is anathema to VA. Hence his sprawlingly absurd attempts to construct a moral objectivity that won't stand up for a moment.

Some theistic moral objectivists here argue that, if [my team's] god doesn't exist, then there are no moral facts, morality is dead, and anything goes. As a fellow atheist, I agree with VA that belief in gods is irrational. But we part company at the claim that there are moral facts - only not divinely ordained or inspired ones.

There can be no such thing as a moral fact, whether or not there are gods. And I maintain that we're morally better off without both gods and moral objectivity. It's called growing up.
As I had countered, you are relying on a delusional 'what is fact' to claim there are no moral facts.

There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992[/list]

You have not countered my above threads against your claims.

You are also relying on a delusional sense of 'what is objectivity'
Two Senses of 'Objective'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39326
And I maintain that we're morally better off without both gods and moral objectivity. It's called growing up.
Again, you are blabbering.

Note;
Scientific Objectivity
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39286

I argued my 'what is moral objectivity' from a human-based moral FSK is equivalent to scientific objectivity based on a human-based science-FSK.
Are we better off without scientific objectivity?

Your posts here are very infantile and very philosophically immature which are merely blabbering without references at all to support your points.
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