Is morality objective or subjective?

[Skepdick]

That (we say) we use our brains to think about things doesn't mean those things exist in our brains. What a ridiculous idea!

What or where is thinking if the thing we call "thinking" doesn't exist in our brains?

Fucking. Philosophical. Time-wasting. Retard.

[Terrapin Station]

There are too many different things to address in your post, so I'm just going to start with this first part, because it's kind of related to a lot of the other stuff to address

We can observe and describe the electrochemical processes going on in the brain of someone seeing, talking or thinking about a dog. But there's nothing canine going on in that person's brain. The claim that the idea or concept (same thing?) of a dog 'exists as a brain state' in that brain is an absurdity forced on us by the need for a physicalist foundation to replace the dualist-mentalist (Cartesian) foundation we've had to abandon.

No one is saying anything at all like "There is 'something canine going on in that person's brain," lol.

Ideas and concepts are IDEAS and CONCEPTS, they're not dogs. If you want to say that an idea or a concept can't exist as a brain state, then you've got a problem re immediately before that admitting that we can observe and describe what's going on in brains from a third-person point of view when the person has an idea, when they perceive something, etc.

With something like a number, we can't deny that there are numbers a la me writing "7" or thinking 7 or whatever. The question is then what the ontological nature of those phenomena are. If the ontological nature of those phenomena are limited to ink marks or pixel activations or whatever (re writing "7") as well as people thinking "7," thinking about the relations that amount to "7," etc. then that's what numbers are. It's all that they are. To deny that there are such things is to deny that we can write "7," that we can think "7," that we can think about the relations, etc. Which is kind of a ridiculous thing to deny. So the question is simply what is the ontological nature of those phenomena.

Phenomena that obviously obtain (like writing or thinking about a number, or thinking about a meaning) exist somehow, and in doing ontology, that's what you want to address. Just how they exist, just how they obtain, just what they are. If you're a physicalist, you can't just say "I don't know how they exist, but I'm a physicalist anyway," and if you simply deny that they exist--so that you're denying that we can write or think "7," then you're taking an absurd stance simply because you don't want to tackle the ontological issues.

[Peter Holmes]

There are too many different things to address in your post, so I'm just going to start with this first part, because it's kind of related to a lot of the other stuff to address

We can observe and describe the electrochemical processes going on in the brain of someone seeing, talking or thinking about a dog. But there's nothing canine going on in that person's brain. The claim that the idea or concept (same thing?) of a dog 'exists as a brain state' in that brain is an absurdity forced on us by the need for a physicalist foundation to replace the dualist-mentalist (Cartesian) foundation we've had to abandon.

No one is saying anything at all like "There is 'something canine going on in that person's brain," lol.

Ideas and concepts are IDEAS and CONCEPTS, they're not dogs. If you want to say that an idea or a concept can't exist as a brain state, then you've got a problem re immediately before that admitting that we can observe and describe what's going on in brains from a third-person point of view when the person has an idea, when they perceive something, etc.

With something like a number, we can't deny that there are numbers a la me writing "7" or thinking 7 or whatever. The question is then what the ontological nature of those phenomena are. If the ontological nature of those phenomena are limited to ink marks or pixel activations or whatever (re writing "7") as well as people thinking "7," thinking about the relations that amount to "7," etc. then that's what numbers are. It's all that they are. To deny that there are such things is to deny that we can write "7," that we can think "7," that we can think about the relations, etc. Which is kind of a ridiculous thing to deny. So the question is simply what is the ontological nature of those phenomena.

Phenomena that obviously obtain (like writing or thinking about a number, or thinking about a meaning) exist somehow, and in doing ontology, that's what you want to address. Just how they exist, just how they obtain, just what they are. If you're a physicalist, you can't just say "I don't know how they exist, but I'm a physicalist anyway," and if you simply deny that they exist--so that you're denying that we can write or think "7," then you're taking an absurd stance simply because you don't want to tackle the ontological issues.

Thanks. You say the idea of a dog physically exists in a brain. If so, it must be describable in physical terms. So please describe the idea of a dog in a brain. Just saying it exists in a brain as a brain state doesn't do the job. It says nothing useful.

Then, perhaps you can do the same thing for the idea of an idea, which presumably you also think exists physically as a brain state. And how about the idea of truth or identity or beauty, and so on. All these supposed abstract things that you think exist physically as brain states.

I am very directly tackling the ontological issue, by pointing out the way we mistake what we say about things for the way things are - which includes the way they are in our brains.

[popeye1945]

If all meaning belongs to a conscious subject, then how could anything thought not be subjective. Some will say well our apparent reality is not what it seems, it is but a model, a representation, which is true. Your senses tell you what is what , with a different biology the world would look quite different, or a biology in a different state again, a different apparent reality. That which you experience is determined by your biology, so what you think of as your objective reality, does not exist, at least not as you perceive it. Your objective world is really ultimate reality processed by your biology to give you an APPARENT reality. Apparent reality appears as it does because you are as you are, a healthy biology would present a different reality than an unhealthy biology. So, what you call your objective reality is a product of your biology and necessarily subjective. Ultimate reality you have no idea of.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Thanks. You say the idea of a dog physically exists in a brain. If so, it must be describable in physical terms. So please describe the idea of a dog in a brain. Just saying it exists in a brain as a brain state doesn't do the job. It says nothing useful.

Then, perhaps you can do the same thing for the idea of an idea, which presumably you also think exists physically as a brain state. And how about the idea of truth or identity or beauty, and so on. All these supposed abstract things that you think exist physically as brain states.

I am very directly tackling the ontological issue, by pointing out the way we mistake what we say about things for the way things are - which includes the way they are in our brains.

The 'idea' of a 'dog' does exists physically in a brain and that is represented by the respective neural activities in the person brain.
This pattern of brain activities in general [not specific & with exceptions] is universal for all humans when based on after having seen a real dog or an accepted image of what a dog is.
Note, a linguistic concept of a dog without the experience is not of the same neural circuit pattern.

However, there is also no absolutely independent physically real dog existing out there as claimed by the Philosophical Realists.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
i.e. as Rorty claimed there is no independent dog out there that mirror [to be corresponded with] our idea-of-a-dog-out-there.

What is supposed a real dog existing independently out there is merely an emergent reality from which the cluster of human molecules [with self-awareness] "dances in entanglement" with the clusters of molecules from the stardust via evolution where all of these elements are also emergences.

The problem is Philosophical Realism -PR- [arose psychologically out of an existential crisis] is that PR triggered an very erroneous assumption there is something pre-existing awaiting humans to discover and mirror it.

[Peter Holmes]

Thanks. You say the idea of a dog physically exists in a brain. If so, it must be describable in physical terms. So please describe the idea of a dog in a brain. Just saying it exists in a brain as a brain state doesn't do the job. It says nothing useful.

Then, perhaps you can do the same thing for the idea of an idea, which presumably you also think exists physically as a brain state. And how about the idea of truth or identity or beauty, and so on. All these supposed abstract things that you think exist physically as brain states.

I am very directly tackling the ontological issue, by pointing out the way we mistake what we say about things for the way things are - which includes the way they are in our brains.

The 'idea' of a 'dog' does exists physically in a brain and that is represented by the respective neural activities in the person brain.
This pattern of brain activities in general [not specific & with exceptions] is universal for all humans when based on after having seen a real dog or an accepted image of what a dog is.
Note, a linguistic concept of a dog without the experience is not of the same neural circuit pattern.

However, there is also no absolutely independent physically real dog existing out there as claimed by the Philosophical Realists.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
i.e. as Rorty there is no independent dog out there that mirror [to be corresponded with] our ideas of a dog out there.

What is supposed a real dog existing independently out there is merely an emergent reality from which the cluster of human molecules [with self-awareness] dances with the clusters of molecules from the stardusts via evolution where all of these elements are also emergences.

The problem is Philosophical Realism -PR- [arose psychologically out of an existential crisis] is that PR triggered an very erroneous assumption there is something pre-existing awaiting human to mirror it.

I'll leave aside your bonkers anti-realism: there are no real dogs anyway.

Please describe what you claim is the idea of a dog in a brain. Saying it's 'represented by the respective neural activities' explains nothing. That's just mumbling the mantra - like saying it's a brain state. 'Of course ideas exist in brains. Just look at those synapses firing.'

When neuro-scientists scan brains, do you think they say: 'Oh, look, there's an idea - and that crackle was an intention - oh, and I think I just spotted a meaning'?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Thanks. You say the idea of a dog physically exists in a brain. If so, it must be describable in physical terms. So please describe the idea of a dog in a brain. Just saying it exists in a brain as a brain state doesn't do the job. It says nothing useful.

Then, perhaps you can do the same thing for the idea of an idea, which presumably you also think exists physically as a brain state. And how about the idea of truth or identity or beauty, and so on. All these supposed abstract things that you think exist physically as brain states.

I am very directly tackling the ontological issue, by pointing out the way we mistake what we say about things for the way things are - which includes the way they are in our brains.

The 'idea' of a 'dog' does exists physically in a brain and that is represented by the respective neural activities in the person brain.
This pattern of brain activities in general [not specific & with exceptions] is universal for all humans when based on after having seen a real dog or an accepted image of what a dog is.
Note, a linguistic concept of a dog without the experience is not of the same neural circuit pattern.

However, there is also no absolutely independent physically real dog existing out there as claimed by the Philosophical Realists.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
i.e. as Rorty there is no independent dog out there that mirror [to be corresponded with] our ideas of a dog out there.

What is supposed a real dog existing independently out there is merely an emergent reality from which the cluster of human molecules [with self-awareness] dances with the clusters of molecules from the stardusts via evolution where all of these elements are also emergences.

The problem is Philosophical Realism -PR- [arose psychologically out of an existential crisis] is that PR triggered an very erroneous assumption there is something pre-existing awaiting human to mirror it.

I'll leave aside your bonkers anti-realism: there are no real dogs anyway.

You are being delusional in insisting there is a real dog that is absolutely independent of the human conditions as per Philosophical Realism.

Please describe what you claim is the idea of a dog in a brain. Saying it's 'represented by the respective neural activities' explains nothing. That's just mumbling the mantra - like saying it's a brain state. 'Of course ideas exist in brains. Just look at those synapses firing.'

When neuro-scientists scan brains, do you think they say: 'Oh, look, there's an idea - and that crackle was an intention - oh, and I think I just spotted a meaning'?

Your counter re the last statement exposed your very lack of and is insulting your own intelligence!


Note this image of the number 6.



If this number is computerized, the number 6 will be fixed on the respective pixels.
The other numbers will be represented by other fixed patterns of pixel.

The brain works somewhat similarly to a computer.
Thus the image of certain things will be represented by the activities of certain fixed patterns of neurons firings from different parts of the brain.
It is the same with ideas and concepts in the brain, they are represented by certain general patterns of neurons is the specific different parts of the brain.
Therefore the image or idea of a dog will be represented by activities of the specific parts of the brain that is universal in all humans.

However note the image and ideas of things are not represented by the same specific neurons but rather in the various specific parts of the brain.

Theoretically, when neuroscientists have the technology to scan the brain more precisely when a person have an idea of a dog, they will find the same pattern of neural activities in the same parts in all humans.

At present, using fMRI neuroscientists are able to trace the certain parts of the brain in relation to their mental activities. However with fMRI they can only identify crudely which parts of the brain but not in greater details.
If the brain is analogically the Earth, they can only track the activities to the respective Continents and countries, but not down to which States, district, towns, streets and individual house.

Whilst someday [progress of the human connectome project] neuroscientists will be able to track the representation of an idea, image or concepts to the more specific parts of the brain.
However because the brain is so complex, i.e. of average 100 billion of neurons each with up to 10,000 synapse, they will not be able to reproduce the same image if they were to trigger those parts due to the complexity.

But the principle is, an idea or image of a dog in the brain is represented by a specific brain states that is represented by a set of neural activities in certain specific parts of the brain which is the same for all humans who have a idea of a dog [as defined].
Do you deny this?

[Skepdick]

When neuro-scientists scan brains, do you think they say: 'Oh, look, there's an idea - and that crackle was an intention - oh, and I think I just spotted a meaning'?

Holy crap! You can't possibly be that stupid, can you?!?!? You are not even familiar with the notion of memory encoding ?

Do you see any music when you scan these atoms and molecules?



Do you see any photos when you scan these atoms and molecules?



And yet - there's meaningful music, photos and human ideas on both those physical things.
It is precisely the human intent to preserve our memories and folklore that is imprinted on those very items!

[Peter Holmes]

If we see a dog, does an image of the dog exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that a photo of the dog exists?

If we listen to music, does the music exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that the actual sounds exist?

Does a piece of music exist physically in a cd, in the way that it exists physically when we play the cd?

These are metaphors or analogies - ways of talking that can both be useful and lead us astray.

[Skepdick]

If we see a dog, does an image of the dog exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that a photo of the dog exists?

If we listen to music, does the music exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that the actual sounds exist?

Does a piece of music exist physically in a cd, in the way that it exists physically when we play the cd?

They aren't metaphors. They are memories.

A photo of a dog is a memory of a dog.
A recording of music is a memory of music.

It's in the fucking name. CD-ROM. Compact Disk - Read-Only Memory.

These are metaphors or analogies - ways of talking that can both be useful and lead us astray.

Like you have been led astray to argue against the existence of memories?

Memory is the faculty of the brain by which data or information is encoded, stored, and retrieved when needed. It is the retention of information over time for the purpose of influencing future action. If past events could not be remembered, it would be impossible for language, relationships, or personal identity to develop.

[Peter Holmes]

Mentalist talk - talk about minds containing mental things and events - is and always was metaphorical. Otherwise, how could we be in two minds, share our thoughts or run out of ideas, and so on?

And such talk does not become literal when we (I think rightly) abandon substance dualism and instead just talk about brains. Hence my questions:

If we see a dog, does an image of the dog exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that a photo of the dog exists?

If we listen to music, does the music exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that the actual sounds exist?

Does a piece of music exist physically in a cd, in the way that it exists physically when we play the cd?

Does anyone have a civilised and coherent answer - if to exist means to exist physically? Mystical woo about dogs and music existing as memories in photos and cds doesn't cut the mustard.

[Belinda]

Mentalist talk - talk about minds containing mental things and events - is and always was metaphorical. Otherwise, how could we be in two minds, share our thoughts or run out of ideas, and so on?

And such talk does not become literal when we (I think rightly) abandon substance dualism and instead just talk about brains. Hence my questions:

If we see a dog, does an image of the dog exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that a photo of the dog exists?

If we listen to music, does the music exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that the actual sounds exist?

Does a piece of music exist physically in a cd, in the way that it exists physically when we play the cd?

Does anyone have a civilised and coherent answer - if to exist means to exist physically? Mystical woo about dogs and music existing as memories in photos and cds doesn't cut the mustard.

Peter, were it not for your 'mind' you would experience nothing. Photos and CDs experience nothing. Your computer experiences nothing. Photos, CDs, door nails, and computers can't change from what they always were until they get destroyed. But you, I , and the tree in my garden can change because we have futures until we die.

[Peter Holmes]

Mentalist talk - talk about minds containing mental things and events - is and always was metaphorical. Otherwise, how could we be in two minds, share our thoughts or run out of ideas, and so on?

And such talk does not become literal when we (I think rightly) abandon substance dualism and instead just talk about brains. Hence my questions:

If we see a dog, does an image of the dog exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that a photo of the dog exists?

If we listen to music, does the music exist physically in our brains? Does it exist in the way that the actual sounds exist?

Does a piece of music exist physically in a cd, in the way that it exists physically when we play the cd?

Does anyone have a civilised and coherent answer - if to exist means to exist physically? Mystical woo about dogs and music existing as memories in photos and cds doesn't cut the mustard.

Peter, were it not for your 'mind' you would experience nothing. Photos and CDs experience nothing. Your computer experiences nothing. Photos, CDs, door nails, and computers can't change from what they always were until they get destroyed. But you, I , and the tree in my garden can change because we have futures until we die.

Belinda, I agree that talk about experiences has a natural place with reference to living things, and especially conscious living things. But does a hamster or an amoeba have a mind? At what stage of neural development does 'mind' emerge? Does a tree have a mind? And is it a person that experiences things, or is it a brain?

To repeat: like fictions, metaphors both have their uses and can lead us astray. For example, the claim that a picture of a dog, or a music cd, is a memory - suggests that memories can exist outside brains. Shurely shum mishtake? Surely, memories are mental things - but minds exist somehow in brains - and so on.

Mentalist talk is fine in its natural, metaphorical context. We learn and know what it means to say 'I have an idea'. But then we invent the mind as the place where ideas 'exist' - because, of course, an abstract noun must be the name of something that exists in a location. And on and on. The fiction of substance-dualism comes, as it were, from a mistaken view of language. Which is where the myth of abstract things - the stuff of philosophy - comes from.

[henry quirk]

Question (no snark, utterly serious)...

I imagine a unicorn: what is the material explanation for that imagining? What is the material explanation for the imaginer?

Seriously, how does, what is in essence, a bag of dirty water, jazzed up with electricity, imagine?

Explain it, in detail, to me.

[Peter Holmes]

Question (no snark, utterly serious)...

I imagine a unicorn: what is the material explanation for that imagining? What is the material explanation for the imaginer?

Seriously, how does, what is in essence, a bag of dirty water, jazzed up with electricity, imagine?

Explain it, in detail, to me.

Well, thinking and imagining and guessing and reasoning - and so on - must be things that happen, right? And material stuff can't possibly do those things, right? So it must be something immaterial - non-physical - spiritual that does those things, right?

So there must be two different substances, right?: physical and non-physical; natural and non-natural or - well, blow me down - supernatural.

And the evidence for the existence of non-natural or abstract things? It's obvious - we talk about them all the time.