Is morality objective or subjective?

[henry quirk]

"Only a tiny fraction of a thing's information-identity makes its way to your perception via your senses."

So what?

Looping back: All the information is outside me, Independent of me. Much of it is lost to me, but the sliver I apprehend is enough for me to successfully navigate through the world.

[henry quirk]

"What things, Henry? Isn't that precisely the question Physics is trying to answer?"

Whatever things are at their most foundational level, I reckon they exist independent of me, have qualities, information, intrinsic to them.

[Ginkgo]

interesting conservation. Sounds a lot like perceptual realism v subjective idealism.

[henry quirk]

interesting conservation. Sounds a lot like perceptual realism v subjective idealism.

I'm a direct realist, yeah. What Skep considers himself, I can't say.

[Peter Holmes]

interesting conservation. Sounds a lot like perceptual realism v subjective idealism.

I'm a direct realist, yeah. What Skep considers himself, I can't say.

I agree - an interesting conversation. And I'm wondering if Ginkgo is right - that Skep's objection to my distinction - between assertions about reality (with what we call truth-value) and assertions that express value-judgements (with no truth-value) - comes from some kind of idealism.

I'm with Henry on the ontology, which is why I'm arguing that there are three separate and different things: features of reality; what we believe and know about them; and what we say about them, which (classically) may be true or false - given the conventional and contextual way we use the signs involved.

Obviously, if we don't start with 'features of reality' - which includes ourselves, our brains, our perceptions and our language - then any talk of truth and falsehood, of facts and opinions, is mistaken, as Skep seems to be arguing. If everything is 'in' our brains, then everything must be subjective.

[Skepdick]

interesting conservation. Sounds a lot like perceptual realism v subjective idealism.

"Perceptual realism" is epistemology.

Everything that is known or knowable is perceptual and therefore subjective.

[Skepdick]

comes from some kind of idealism.

It comes from epistemology and its fundamental limits

Obviously, if we don't start with 'features of reality' - which includes ourselves, our brains, our perceptions and our language - then any talk of truth and falsehood, of facts and opinions, is mistaken, as Skep seems to be arguing. If everything is 'in' our brains, then everything must be subjective.

You don't have a choice on the matter - everything we know or that is knowable depends on perception.

Even from an ideal epistemic view-point (which is not what I am arguing) perception is reality. It can't be anything more than that because you can't perceive it!

You can SAY that "The sky is blue". You can SAY that this claim is "objective" and I will keep point out that you (the subject) are bestowing objectivity to your subjective claims. You are rubber-stamping/certifying the language that we are using as "correct" and "incorrect".

Distinctions are instrumental. And so these are the questions which plague your conceptual framework:
* What is the purpose of the objective/subjective distinction?
* What is the purpose of the fact/opinion distinction?
* What is the purpose of the true/false distinction?

[Skepdick]

I process the information in the light apprehended by my eyes.

Information is a Mathematical equation. It's a quantity, not a quality

It's a concept - a useful concept, but it's not real in the sense that you are using the word.

It's just a language, a conceptual framework for understanding/navigating the world.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_information

It's a belief-system/Religion/Philosophy like any other. But it works and that's good enough for me.

[Peter Holmes]

comes from some kind of idealism.

It comes from epistemology and its fundamental limits

Epistemology is theory (explanation) of knowledge. So I expect you mean your objection to the idea of objectivity comes from the actual nature of knowledge. But that's a metaphysical delusion. Knowledge isn't a thing of some kind with a nature that can be described. And talk of its 'fundamental limits' is incoherent.

Obviously, if we don't start with 'features of reality' - which includes ourselves, our brains, our perceptions and our language - then any talk of truth and falsehood, of facts and opinions, is mistaken, as Skep seems to be arguing. If everything is 'in' our brains, then everything must be subjective.

You don't have a choice on the matter.

But if everything is subjective (whatever that means), then each of us does have a choice in the matter. If what we call reality and facts are merely a matter of opinion, then, in my opinion, reality is real, there are facts, and we can make true factual assertions. And you can shove your useless subjectivist opinion where the sun don't shine. (Your position is completely incoherent.)

Everything we know or that is knowable depends on perception.

Now, this really is a bald idealist claim, for which you have the burden of proof. 'Everything that is knowable depends on perception'. Is that a fact - a true factual assertion? And is it perception that makes it knowable? What sort of perception would that be?

Even if I was arguing an idealist viewpoint (which I am not) - from an ideal epistemic view-point perception is reality and perception is entirely subjective.

I don't understand your grammar here - how the consequent is supposed to follow from the condition. And, having rejected the objective/subjective distinction as made-up, you then rely on the idea of subjectivity. This is a mess.

You can SAY that something is objective, and I can point out that you (the subject) are bestowing objectivity.

Distinctions are instrumental. You still haven't answered the question: What is the purpose of the objective/subjective distinction?

Of course. All our linguistic practices are instrumental - for a purpose. Who has ever denied that? We use the words 'knowledge', 'truth', 'fact' and 'objectivity' for a purpose - and they're not names of abstract things that may or may not exist, with natures - let alone fundamental natures - that can be described.

We use those words to talk about real things - features of reality - whose existence and properties are not a matter of opinion - though we can describe them in different ways for different purposes. And that's the function of the objective/subjective distinction.

My OP argument is that moral rightness and wrongness are not features of reality in the way that rocks and stones and trees are features of reality. And I think the burden of proof is with moral realists and objectivists who claim that they are.

[Skepdick]

So I expect you mean your objection to the idea of objectivity comes from the actual nature of knowledge. But that's a metaphysical delusion.

Language/Logic/Mathematics is metaphysics. Because we USE language as representational instrument for our perception.

If metaphysics is a "delusion" then stop speaking.

Knowledge isn't a thing of some kind with a nature that can be described. And talk of its 'fundamental limits' is incoherent.

OBVIOUSLY my position is incoherent to you because you are interpreting it from your view-point, not mine.

Your frame of reference is different to mine!

It's coherent to me. Which comes as no surprise to me, since I am in fact arguing for coherentism.

But if everything is subjective (whatever that means), then each of us does have a choice in the matter.

Exactly! You are currently exercising your choice.

You are interpreting my meaning from your view-point. And to you my meaning is incoherent.

If what we call reality and facts are merely a matter of opinion, then, in my opinion, reality is real

And in my opinion reality isn't real. How do we decide whose opinion is right or wrong?

there are facts, and we can make true factual assertions. And you can shove your useless subjectivist opinion where the sun don't shine.

^^^^ practice what you preach and shove the above opinion where the sun don't shine.

(Your position is completely incoherent.)

EXACTLY! The fact that MY epistemic position is incoherent to YOU defeats the very notion of objectivism.

Now, this really is a bald idealist claim, for which you have the burden of proof.

It's not an idealist claim. I am merely using the CONCEPT of an "ideal epistemology" as a point of reference. IF an idealist epistemology is perceptual, then a non-idealist epistemology (such as mine) is ALSO perceptual.

You misunderstand me. AGAIN. Q.E.D

I notice a trend here, you sure like burdening others with proof, while you skilfully dodge proving anything.
Just so there's no further misunderstanding going forward - much like yourself, I don't burden myself with proof either.

If I don't burden myself with proof and you don't burden yourself with proof, I guess we are going to have to figure out another way to move forward?

that is knowable depends on perception'. Is that a fact - a true factual assertion? And is it perception that makes it knowable? What sort of perception would that be?

Your question is incoherent to me. Naturally - because I don't understand your subjective, conceptual model where you use words like "facts" and "factual assertions"

I don't understand your grammar here - how the consequent is supposed to follow from the condition. And, having rejected the objective/subjective distinction as made-up, you then rely on the idea of subjectivity. This is a mess.

To you. It's perfectly coherent. Once you understand it.

What is preventing you from understanding me?

You can SAY that something is objective, and I can point out that you (the subject) are bestowing objectivity.

Distinctions are instrumental. You still haven't answered the question: What is the purpose of the objective/subjective distinction?
[/quote]

Of course. All our linguistic practices are instrumental - for a purpose. Who has ever denied that? We use the words 'knowledge', 'truth', 'fact' and 'objectivity' for a purpose - and they're not names of abstract things that may or may not exist, with natures - let alone fundamental natures - that can be described.

What is the purpose for which you use your distinctions?

We use those words to talk about real things - features of reality - whose existence and properties are not a matter of opinion - though we can describe them in different ways for different purposes. And that's the function of the objective/subjective distinction.

Affirming the consequent.

My OP argument is that moral rightness and wrongness are not features of reality in the way that rocks and stones and trees are features of reality. And I think the burden of proof is with moral realists and objectivists who claim that they are.

Your argument is incoherent to me.

I guess we are both coherentists, eh?

[Peter Holmes]

What we say has to be coherent, but coherence theories of truth are as ridiculous as correspondence theories. So, no, I'm not a coherentist. Truth isn't a 'thing' that can be explained, so theories of truth are always already down the rabbit hole where metaphysicians furkle.

It seems we're wasting our time arguing with each other. So if you stop, I'll stop.

[Skepdick]

What we say has to be coherent

It is coherent. TO ME.

It may be incoherent. TO YOU.

, but coherence theories of truth are as ridiculous as correspondence theories. So, no, I'm not a coherentist.

Then why do you EXPECT my perspective to be coherent in your frame of reference?

Truth isn't a 'thing' that can be explained, so theories of truth are always already down the rabbit hole where metaphysicians furkle.

I don't care about explaining truth. I only care about expressing it.

You express your truth - I express my truth.

The problem of reconciling our truths remains.

It seems we're wasting our time arguing with each other. So if you stop, I'll stop.

I am not arguing. I am trying to communicate.

Humans communicate. Idiots argue.

[henry quirk]

interesting conservation. Sounds a lot like perceptual realism v subjective idealism.

"Perceptual realism" is epistemology.

Everything that is known or knowable is perceptual and therefore subjective.

We can, do, have subjective takes on what's objectively there, what objectively exists.

But...

Normally, naturally, our takes align pretty closely with what's objectively there, what objectively exists, cuz what's objectively there, what objectively exists, while it contains mysteries, is not mysterious. Ever time you walk through a crowded room, weaving through a shifting group of people, you demonstrate that your senses, and your assessment of what your senses gather, is fairly accurate (so your take is fairly accurate).

Sure, there are folks with defective senses, or defective processors, and yeah, sometimes the slice of the world we apprehend is overtly mysterious, but these are the exceptions, not the rule.

The rule: the World is largely as we perceive it with our naked, un-enhanced senses. The models we create in our heads are fairly accurate. The World, and all the things in it exist, and do so independent of an observer.

[henry quirk]

"Information is a Mathematical equation."

That's one valid way to look at it. Another: I am in the world, I apprehend the world, I assess the world, I (begin to) understand the world. It may all foundationally be computation but I'm not a computer, *Sebastian, I'm physical.









*Rutger Hauer, Blade Runner

[Skepdick]

No. We can, do, have subjective takes on what's there, what exists.

Precisely! And that's ALL we have.

A subjective take.