Is morality objective or subjective?

[Immanuel Can]

Who are the "many"? Are they "wrong" to "force their values" on others? What "process"?

Who tries to force their values on others? You give an example of it later, many is almost everyone. It doesn't matter whether they are right or wrong, I'm not trying to make a moral judgement and I never said anything about it. The process is of "giving authority to values" that is quoted.

Oh. So you're trying to make the pejorative word "forced" apply to normal processes like reasoning, proving and justifying? You just mean, "If you tell me you have reasons I have to believe X, that means you're forcing me to believe X?"

Is that it? Help me out here, because that doesn't sound like "force" at all. That just sounds like a person is "making sense."

The problem is this, though: if subjectivity is what morality is, there is nothing BUT preference behind it

Your example really forces the use of this word where it isn't appropriate, things such as "southern slave owners preferred to own slaves" which pretty much ignores the entire issue. There are complicated ideas at play, surrounding the dominant value structures, cultural values, scientific understandings and so on that led to why American slave owners believed what they were doing was justified or not immoral. They didn't decide whether it was moral or immoral based on whether they wanted it to be moral or immoral or whether they wanted slaves or not and that's just an absurd way of looking at morality in general.

Easy. Drop the word "preferred." They certainly DID "prefer" it, but let's not make that the basis of their claim to be acting morally. When we do make that change, it won't change anything about the question. You've still got the problem of having to say whether or not their enslaving of people of colour was wrong, or bad, or immoral -- choose the best word, or another -- and from a morally subjectivist point of view, that's just impossible to say.

My question to you is this: which side was right, and how do you know? Both had strong hierarchies of value, they had power, they believed in beauty, and they were both absolutely convinced they were morally right to hold their positions

It is my position that objective morality is an impossible concept.

I know. But if you were right about that, you'd have to also believe that rape, pre-meditated murder, slavery and pedophilia aren't really wrong. You'd be rationally bound to believe they're only "wrong" if the people who perpetrate them think they're wrong, but perfectly right if, subjectively, they feel that those things are fine.

But I doubt that's what you really think. In fact, I don't think you can find a consistent moral subjectivist on planet earth. But if I ever meet one, I'll be happy to share that with you.

I was hoping Peter would at least try. Alas, he didn't.

Who was right? That will depend on who you ask...

The southern slave-owners said and wrote much to that effect. They believed it was right. So from a subjectivist perspective, they were right, and slavery was right.

But that's not a view I'd take. And I suspect you wouldn't either, despite the evasiveness of your answer.

Nothing will ever change that, not even if God came down from the heavens to tell us what is truly right and wrong.

That might be true. I've met not a few people for whom I've found reason to believe it's true. But if that's how hard they're committed to the view already, such that even an actual divine revelation of its falsity would not move them to reconsider, then I'd say that's a real problem...and it really doesn't speak well of any view thusly formed. It means they're simply "incorrigible": meaning, "uncorrectable by the facts."

Are you really insinuating that evidence can be provided that assures us that certain moral positions are objectively correct? Where is this evidence?

I have not said that. I also have not denied that. I've spoken exclusively about the implications of moral subjectivism. The OP set the terms exactly that way.

Moral subjectivism, it would seem, is a belief held without evidence -- for so far, nobody has provided even one iota. And you have said that it is one held so firmly that divine contradiction could not change it.

This isn't looking good for moral subjectivism. It's looking like you're saying it's completely dogmatic, incorrigible and irrational.

You mean "morals." We're not just talking about any kind of "distinctions." Moreover, it matters not a fig whether or not I -- or you --"acknowledge" them. It won't make them exist if they don't, nor stop them existing if they do.

I am using distinctions instead of morals, not to argue that this applies to all distinctions but to say that it applies to more distinctions than simply morality.

Let's not. To broaden the scope of this discussion beyond the OP is merely to depart the track. Let us stick to discussing morals, and when we have solved that, we can consider later how far the implications can go into other "distinctions." But if we broaden too far now, we'll have nothing specific to address.

The authority of subjective distinctions can only be accepted voluntarily, it doesn't exist unless you acknowledge it.

If you mean "morality," then your claim here means that there is simply no such thing as morality. In principle, every single person on the planet could believe a different thing, and they wouldn't be more right or more wrong for believing it. So then, we might as well just say that people just have "beliefs." But then none of them can merit the label "moral." For "moral" implies "rightness." Moreover, as morality always is about how we treat others, not just what we choose to do for ourselves, and as in an individualist subjectivist world we owe nobody else anything, there's no role for moral assessments at all.

That which is objective exerts itself or exists or is true irrespective of our opinions and that which is subjective does not

,
Absolutely right. I agree with this. Subjective morality does not "exert itself or exist," and "is not true." And all of that is "irrespective of our opinions."

Not only do I acknowledge that "crucial difference"; I believe it's definitionally true.

[Belinda]

You should be kind to the cow because then she will give more milk.

You should be kind to the cow because God (or the law)said you should.

You should be kind to the cow because you will feel bad if you are unkind to her.

You should be kind to the cow because she has feelings similar to your own feelings.

__________________________________

The above illustrates stages in maturation of conscience, or socialisation of the individual. Not all societies include the last item as regards cows however all societies as are societies enjoin empathy and sympathy towards one's own dependent children, and often towards one's entire nuclear family too. Some communes , and Israeli kibbutzim, substituted the communal group for the biological family.

Religions and other despotic regimes become toxic when they teach that the second item is the final item of moral maturity.

[Peter Holmes]

I've only just caught up with this conversation, and I'm not sure I've followed all of it - so apologies if I've missed something critical.

That moral assertions express value judgements, and are therefore subjective, is true by definition of the word 'subjective', which means 'dependent on judgement, belief or opinion'. A value judgement can't be verified or falsified by a feature of reality, because features of reality are not values. If you believe otherwise, please show an example of a feature of reality that is, in itself, a value.

Factual assertions express falsifiable claims about features of reality, which is what makes them objective: independent of judgement, belief or opinion. And this is a dictionary definition of 'objective'. A judgement using 'right', 'wrong', 'good' or 'bad' - or 'beautiful or 'ugly' can't be independent of judgement, opinion or belief, so it can't be objective, by definition. My premises in the OP are true, and my reasoning is sound.

And I tried to explain why people - including some contributors here - find the conclusion that morality is subjective so deeply distressing. Perhaps I need to spell out their mistake more clearly.

The fear is that, if morality is subjective - a matter of opinion - there are no rules, anything goes, might is right, and social anarchy and catastrophe ensue as, in a way, a logical consequence. Anyone can justify any action by saying, 'I believe this is morally good'.

But this fear is irrational for several reasons. It's precisely because moral judgements are not objective - matters of unarguable fact - that a moral judgement about an action is not a factual matter. So saying or believing an action is good or bad doesn't make it factually good or bad, just as saying a painting is beautiful or ugly doesn't make it factually beautiful or ugly.

If we were disagreeing about matters of fact, we could produce evidence - features of reality - that would settle the matter once and for all. But we simply can't - and it's a delusion to look for such confirmation of our value judgements actually in reality. If you disagree, please produce a moral - or aesthetic - assertion that is factually true and not a matter of judgement, belief or opinion. If you're a moral objectivist, this should be easy.

I'm not sure how else to explain this, but I'm happy to keep trying.

[Kayla]

math is subjective

does not mean that there are no right or wrong answers in math

it might be like that with ethics

[Peter Holmes]

Hi, Immanuel Can.

I've taken the following from one of your contributions.

'[If you think morality is subjective] you'd have to also believe that rape, pre-meditated murder, slavery and pedophilia aren't really wrong. You'd be rationally bound to believe they're only "wrong" if the people who perpetrate them think they're wrong, but perfectly right if, subjectively, they feel that those things are fine.'

This demonstrates the heart of your mistake. Your conclusion, if morality is subjective, is: 'If a rapist thinks rape is right, then rape is right.' But that doesn't follow from the claim that moral assertions express value judgements. You've invented a monstrous straw man.

From the fact that a rapist thinks rape is right, it doesn't follow that rape is right, or that the rest of us have to think that rape is right. Just as, from the fact that some people think capital punishment is right, it doesn't follow that it is, or that the rest of us have to think it is.

As I've asked elsewhere, if you think morality is objective, please can you produce a factual (and therefore falsifiable) moral assertion that is not a judgement. And as I've also mentioned elsewhere with regard to my own enlightenment, when the penny drops, you'll see that this is impossible - and that that's because morality is about judgements - and therefore subjective.

[Immanuel Can]

I've only just caught up with this conversation, and I'm not sure I've followed all of it - so apologies if I've missed something critical.

That moral assertions express value judgements, and are therefore subjective, is true by definition of the word 'subjective', which means 'dependent on judgement, belief or opinion'.

This is so. But what is under dispute is not the justification of the noun (morality), but rather of the adjective (subjective). What we need from you, Peter, is your reason for being so certain that that particular adjective is the right one for the noun.

A value judgement can't be verified or falsified by a feature of reality, because features of reality are not values.

This would be true if you could show a) that by "reality" you mean something very specific, like "materiality," say. Then all you're saying is that the material world cannot justify any value judgments...with which I would agree, but then would also wipe out any chance of subjective value judgments ever being regarded as justified, of course.

Morality itself would have no meaning, then, since "Giving ice cream to orphans is good," would really mean no more than "Giving ice cream to orphans is being done," or even, "Giving ice cream to orphans is bad." They'd all mean nothing, really, other than a dispassionate, value-void statement of fact. There would, in fact, be only facts: and declarations of "values" would just be very odd human phenomena, with no actual rightness or wrongness about them at all.

A judgement using 'right', 'wrong', 'good' or 'bad' - or 'beautiful or 'ugly' can't be independent of judgement, opinion or belief,

"Right" and "wrong" are moral terms. "Beautiful" and "ugly" are aesthetic, and have no inherent moral content in them, so we must not get them mixed up, I think.

The question is this: whose "judgment" of these (moral) matters is definitive? If the "judgments" in question are being made by mere humans, there's no reason to privilege one human -- or even one group of humans -- over another, by selecting their "judgments" as ultimately right. But what if it weren't a matter of mere human judgment? What if there were such a thing as an ultimate Guarantor of morality?

You say that there is not, perhaps: but again, you've given us no reason to think you have reason to believe that, Peter; so it's not yet established that...

My premises in the OP are true, and my reasoning is sound.

We're still awaiting that conclusive showing, if you have it. But you can't ask us to simply grant you the assumption of a godless universe, and proceed on as if you have nothing to prove, can you? Especially if we don't happen ourselves to take that assumption on blind faith...

The fear is that, if morality is subjective - a matter of opinion - there are no rules, anything goes, might is right, and social anarchy and catastrophe ensue as, in a way, a logical consequence. Anyone can justify any action by saying, 'I believe this is morally good'.

Nietzsche thought that was the right implication, for sure. And it gave him a bit of a stomach ache at times. His "Madman's Tale," for example, does not rejoice in that line of thought, but rather says, where are we going now, and, what are we going to do, now that the center has been pulled out? He saw moral anarchy as a real threat.

However, he was a bit hasty there. In truth, people are more like the villagers in "The Madman's Tale": they live as though there is objective morality, even while they have denied any justification for believing in such. So our cities do not instantly descend into anarchy, but rather slowly decay toward it instead. In other word, people are often just not rationally consistent -- they claim to think one thing, but live like they think another. (An excellent description of every self-proclaimed "moral subjectivist" I've ever met, by the way.) So they can say, "morals are relative," but still go on declaiming against slavery, rape, murder and so on -- all the while, having no real basis for doing so.

And "The Madman's Tale" seems to recognize this. Remember that the madman says had "come too early." People had "killed" the idea of God, but were not yet living rationally consistently with the consequences of that. What Nietzsche would have been surprised to see is how slowly the feeling of us having an objective morality can decay. Over a century later, we're still running downhill, but not all the way to complete nihilism yet.

[Immanuel Can]

Hi, Immanuel Can.

From the fact that a rapist thinks rape is right, it doesn't follow that rape is right,

Why not? The fact that you think it wrong doesn't make it wrong. It's subjective, remember? The subject in this situation (the rapist) enjoys violence against women.

You say, "Don't do that."

He says, "Why not? I love it."

And you say...?

As I've asked elsewhere, if you think morality is objective, please can you produce a factual (and therefore falsifiable) moral assertion that is not a judgement.

Yes: and fair enough. Had I your answer now, I'd happily give you mine. But I didn't post the OP that declared unilaterally that morality had to be regarded as subjective, so you're up to bat, old sport. Take a good swing, if you can.

[Peter Holmes]

The question is this: whose "judgment" of these (moral) matters is definitive? If the "judgments" in question are being made by mere humans, there's no reason to privilege one human -- or even one group of humans -- over another, by selecting their "judgments" as ultimately right. But what if it weren't a matter of mere human judgment? What if there were such a thing as an ultimate Guarantor of morality?

Ah - this is a new development. Are you arguing from objective morality to the existence of a god? If so - that may explain your block. How can any moral judgement be definitive? Do you believe the claim 'this is good (or bad) because I say it is' can ever be justifiable?

I repeat my request. Can you produce a factual (therefore falsifiable) moral assertion that is not a judgement?

[Peter Holmes]

From the fact that a rapist thinks rape is right, it doesn't follow that rape is right,

Why not? The fact that you think it wrong doesn't make it wrong. It's subjective, remember? The subject in this situation (the rapist) enjoys violence against women.[/quote]

Sorry - haven't got the hang of this quoting business here.

You're absolutely right - that I think rape is wrong doesn't make it (objectively/factually) wrong - because there is nothing objectively/factually right or wrong, good or bad about things and events - features of reality. You seem to be cracking it at last.

And maybe your use of the word 'subject' to mean 'individual' has been part of your confusion. 'Subjective' just means 'dependent on judgement, etc'.

[Immanuel Can]

The question is this: whose "judgment" of these (moral) matters is definitive? If the "judgments" in question are being made by mere humans, there's no reason to privilege one human -- or even one group of humans -- over another, by selecting their "judgments" as ultimately right. But what if it weren't a matter of mere human judgment? What if there were such a thing as an ultimate Guarantor of morality?

Ah - this is a new development. Are you arguing from objective morality to the existence of a god? If so - that may explain your block.

Funny: I feel strangely "not blocked."

How can any moral judgement be definitive? Do you believe the claim 'this is good (or bad) because I say it is' can ever be justifiable?

I'd like to answer, but I want to be cautious here, because I don't know for certain what you want to understand by your use of the word "justifiable."

If you mean "rationally justifiable," as in "justified to the rational satisfaction of a rational objector," then the answer would be no. The fact that you say "This is good or bad" can have no obligatory connotation beyond the tip of your own nose, if morality is subjective.

That's why power always has to come into play there: if the subjectivist wants his particular precept of morality to stick -- say, to influence the public agenda, to train his children, to make sure other people give him what he considers his rights, and so on -- he has only force or deception to help him get it done. Reason has abandoned him. There ARE no reasons demanding anything particular from subjective morality.

Now, if he's content with life as a lone solipsist, then that would be no problem for him...so long as he is also able to live as a hermit, so as to prevent others' different moralities from doing things to him he doesn't want done. But the minute he comes into contract (or contact, even) with another human being, a morality that only reaches the end of his own nose will no longer help him secure his well-being, his property or his other rights. He's going to have to use power or trickery again...if morality is subjective, and everybody knows and acts like it is.

Fortunately, people are blessedly inconsistent about that. Nobody is a real moral subjectivist -- at least, not in action, no matter how many profess it.

[Immanuel Can]

You're absolutely right - that I think rape is wrong doesn't make it (objectively/factually) wrong - because there is nothing objectively/factually right or wrong, good or bad about things and events - features of reality.

You seem to be cracking it at last.

Perhaps it was cracked a long time ago. "Rape is not wrong," you say? Well, I can't fault that statement for inconsistency. And if morality is purely subjective, it's surely true.

However, that's a massive, massive "if" that has never been shown.

And maybe your use of the word 'subject' to mean 'individual' has been part of your confusion.

No. I was using it to mean both "individual" and "collective," but in both cases, merely human. The problems are the same in both cases, really -- no actual justification, and yet the need to encourage / compel / influence / negotiate with others to achieve a common terms of living together.

We look to morality to solve that for us. But how will it, when it's merely subjective?

[Peter Holmes]

The question is this: whose "judgment" of these (moral) matters is definitive? If the "judgments" in question are being made by mere humans, there's no reason to privilege one human -- or even one group of humans -- over another, by selecting their "judgments" as ultimately right. But what if it weren't a matter of mere human judgment? What if there were such a thing as an ultimate Guarantor of morality?

Ah - this is a new development. Are you arguing from objective morality to the existence of a god? If so - that may explain your block.

Funny: I feel strangely "not blocked."

How can any moral judgement be definitive? Do you believe the claim 'this is good (or bad) because I say it is' can ever be justifiable?

I'd like to answer, but I want to be cautious here, because I don't know for certain what you want to understand by your use of the word "justifiable."

If you mean "rationally justifiable," as in "justified to the rational satisfaction of a rational objector," then the answer would be no. The fact that you say "This is good or bad" can have no obligatory connotation beyond the tip of your own nose, if morality is subjective.

That's why power always has to come into play there: if the subjectivist wants his particular precept of morality to stick -- say, to influence the public agenda, to train his children, to make sure other people give him what he considers his rights, and so on -- he has only force or deception to help him get it done. Reason has abandoned him. There ARE no reasons demanding anything particular from subjective morality.

Now, if he's content with life as a lone solipsist, then that would be no problem for him...so long as he is also able to live as a hermit, so as to prevent others' different moralities from doing things to him he doesn't want done. But the minute he comes into contract (or contact, even) with another human being, a morality that only reaches the end of his own nose will no longer help him secure his well-being, his property or his other rights. He's going to have to use power or trickery again...if morality is subjective, and everybody knows and acts like it is.

Fortunately, people are blessedly inconsistent about that. Nobody is a real moral subjectivist -- at least, not in action, no matter how many profess it.

I wonder why you keep going back to this nonsense. Part of rational moral judgements is our living together and having to consider other people. We have social moral codes - and laws - to make collective life possible and fruitful. This moral solipsist of yours is a straw man. Of course reason comes into our moral judgements. Your mistake is to assume that the subjectivity of morality must mean amorality or immorality. And that's ridiculous.

I've had enough of this. A feature of being blocked is that we don't know we are - and you're refusing to see something that's really very simple: a moral assertion expresses a value judgement rather than a falsifiable factual claim. That's why morality is subjective: dependent on judgement. I recognise your block, because I took a long time to recognise it in my own thinking. If you keep open-minded and go back over the argument, the penny will drop in the end. Thanks for the craic.

[Immanuel Can]

Of course reason comes into our moral judgements.

No one said it didn't. it "comes into" them after first premises. But reason itself gives us no particular first premises, and no particular moral values at all. Reason needs content in order to operate: and that content comes from our ontology.

Your mistake is to assume that the subjectivity of morality must mean amorality or immorality.

It depend what you mean by "must mean". If, as I said previously, you mean that people will instantly behave immorally, then I agree that they won't. But if you mean that subjectivity justifies or grounds their choice to behave morally, then you're incorrect. All that is consistent with the belief that morality is subjective is...no morality at all. In fact, it makes all morality no more than a subjective impression or preference...and a delusion, since nothing in the material world, as you said earlier, is capable of lending morality its missing justification. All the "is's" in the world will never get a person to one single "ought."

I've had enough of this. A feature of being blocked is that we don't know we are - and you're refusing to see something that's really very simple: a moral assertion expresses a value judgement rather than a falsifiable factual claim.

So you've said, repeatedly. But it hasn't answered the bell, because the inescapable logic of that is that morality is really no more than a fiction. You've said it yourself -- it's not grounded in facts, not in materiality, and not in any objective quality at all. When something fails in all those regards, we have one word for it: "delusion."

For subjectivists, morality is inevitably nothing but a contingently-pleasing delusion.

And you're welcome. I've enjoyed our chat.

[Judaka]

Immanuel Can

I've tried to include other examples of subjectivity to demonstrate that something being subjective doesn't make it meaningless, which is really the centre point of your argument.

Mainly because you view the subjective as synonymous with preference and I would generously describe you as being concerned that subjective morality has no authority to allow it to even really function as morality.

One thing we can surely agree on is that as hammerhead (or w/e) said there are a few moral distinctions that exist as the foundation of functional societies and then it splinters off based on class, nations, cultures, religions and so on and so we can potentially agree that a substantial or majority of moral positions stand in contradiction to each other.

However, it is not obvious to enough people for these differences to evaporate over time, that some answers are truer than others.

Maybe because they all believe they are objectively right and that nobody treats their views as being subjective. I would say it's because they have their own value structures and that their answer is actually the best answer in regards to those value structures - so they can't consider another option as potentially being better or more appropriate.

Whether they believe their morality is objective or subjective, it's a trigger for some to kill, beat, bully, run their households, run their societies and a whole range of things. Morality to some cultures is extremely important but what ideas they would actually share with you or someone who disagrees with their value structure or interpretations would be extremely hit or miss.

Could someone do these things, knowing that their ideas about morality are just their own - or their cultures? Absolutely yes. We've seen that tenfold with political ideas or due to an emotional temperament and many people who believe morality is subjective, still operate under moral precepts.

The validation of value structures is extremely powerful, as are interpretations. I tentatively agree that the subjective nature of these things is not necessarily understood or thought about by the average person, we are not all philosophers and I know of no culture that promotes interest in such things. I don't know what kind of percentages I would put on it and for what thing though morality would be my guess on the thing which was most commonly confused to be objective and that's why it's a hard place to start.

You aren't even really talking about objective morality anymore, but whether people believe their views are objectively true or not. It's an entirely valid argument to make that people are better off believing that their views are objectively true, although I don't agree with it now, it's possible I will change my mind at some point in the future.

I think what Peter and I have said already, are the strongest arguments as to why objective morality is not feasible as a concept. I think this extends to ideas like "God is objective", it simply doesn't make any sense as a concept and it's full of holes. The main problem is that it doesn't invalidate alternatives in the same way that physical truths do. If objective morality were a thing, it would be impossible for us to understand how it works, it simply doesn't follow the same rules that all objective truths do.

There's a lot to talk about regarding subjectivity being extremely deep, influential and dominating all spheres of human life - compared to objective truth which is pretty much just saying "a rock is a rock". The only reason objective truth is such a hotly debated thing is because of competing subjective ideas, fighting for supremacy. That's probably another thread though.

[Peter Holmes]

Thanks, Judaka.

I think what you say is thoughtful and thought-provoking. Your explanation of why we want to believe our moral judgements are factually true makes a lot of sense, at least to me. Following our discussion, here's my summary.

1 Factual assertions express falsifiable claims about features of reality. Their truth or falsehood is independent of anyone's judgement, belief or opinion -so they are, by definition, objective. By contrast, moral assertions express value judgements about people's actions - so, by definition, they are subjective: matters of judgement, belief or opinion. The two kinds of assertion - factual and moral - have completely different functions.

2 Moral objectivists must produce factual (and so falsifiable) moral assertions that don't express value judgements. Until they do, the claim that morality is or can be objective is unjustified. (By definition, they can't, but the attempt and inevitable failure can be educative. And when the penny drops, the enlightenment can be wonderful. I know from experience.)

3 To be rational is to have or seek sound reasons for what we do and believe. So it's rational to want a sound foundation for our moral judgements. For example, we may believe that wanting to promote individual well-being is a good starting point for our collective moral judgements - and I certainly do. To value rationality and individual well-being is, of course, a moral decision. But that we build and repair our moral framework on foundations of our own making doesn't mean the edifice must be shaky.

4 Our social moral progress - such as it is - has come from widening the scope of our moral concerns to include outsiders, women, slaves, LGBT people, and so on - whose oppression is endorsed and never condemned in the Bible, for example. Our collective moral judgements - sometimes codified in laws - have changed and are still changing. And thank goodness for that.