Is morality objective or subjective?

[Dubious]

Morality is a cultural development not conditioned by an OR exclusion. It is, in effect, both objective and subjective; an acknowledgement of reality as perceived and ritualized accordingly.

[Peter Holmes]

How can one not say that Human Rights (UDHR) are not objective and an objection to crimes against people, such as slavery and other?

Further, there are psychological consequences for doing (severe) immorality that I think the OP ignores.

So why Kantian Ethics as objective? Can it be that it compels the World toward greater well-being and more lawful happiness, also for the children as they grow up?

Conclusion: there is no way around Objective Kantian Ethics unless equally good!

Thanks, Necromancer. Kant was wrong about this. Ironically, he made a category error, failing to distinguish between factual and moral assertions - their different functions. I think it was his religious and metaphysical commitments that did it.

[Peter Holmes]

Morality is a cultural development not conditioned by an OR exclusion. It is, in effect, both objective and subjective; an acknowledgement of reality as perceived and ritualized accordingly.

Agreed, morality is a cultural development. That we have developed moral codes is a fact - a true factual assertion. That much is objective.

But that doesn't mean moral judgements and values are objective, because they can't be. 'Reality as perceived' has no intrinsic moral value. Things and events just are the way they are. Values are judgements about reality - for example, judgements about behaviour.

[Belinda]

Peter Holmes wrote:

You're right to say morality only 'appears to be' objective. But my argument is that it isn't the scope question that determines whether morality is objective or subjective. It's more fundamental than that. It's because we mistake moral judgements for facts that we even think morality can be objective. So when we reach (what I call) moral maturity as a species, and our moral concerns become truly and consistently universal, our moral judgements will remain judgements - not moral facts.

If we were not talking about humans but about some wild animal species living in its natural habitat, then if we were omniscient about that animal species could we or could we not claim that some behaviour of one of those wild animals was objectively right or wrong?
If we did so that is if we claimed that individuals of this species, having attained the pitch of perfection in harmonising with its habitat, I submit that we could also claim that each individual of this species should conform to the perfect type of its species.
We humans are of course not wild animals, as we humans are shaped by cultures at least as much as by genetics, whereas wild animals are shaped by genetics(pretty well).

If you agree that the wild species in question contains individuals who can be objectively right or wrong for that species perfect type and for the balance of nature then we have a criterion for differentiating objective right or wrong.

If human cultures depends ultimately upon human habitats (including warring tribes) then harmony with the environment which would naturally include warring tribes seeking power, then those human individuals who harmonise most with the greater environment including other tribes would be objectively the more righteous individuals.
I'm not submitting that the peacemakers/ environmentalists are blessed if they aim for peace and quiet at any price but that harmony is a component of objective morality, and that attaining harmony involves violence and wars. I think that my submission is Rousseau-esque.

[Immanuel Can]

You're right to say morality only 'appears to be' objective.

...we mistake moral judgements for facts that we even think morality can be objective.

So far, Peter, this claim remains at the level of a mere wish, because you haven't demonstrated it. You've asserted it, yes; you've regarded it as plausible, perhaps. But you haven't shown you're right. Why then should a skeptic about your position believe you?

So you're really not able to say if Greta's "right" either, are you?

[Judaka]

The onus is not on Peter to show that moral judgements can't be facts, to describe that assertion as a wish is juvenile. It's absurd to say that because one can't prove a negative, that one ought to give credibility to any such ideas that can't be disproven.

Equally, he can't disprove the existence of fairies, witches and so on, yet has solid grounds to deny their existence.

Unsure of what kind of mindset you must have to believe that Peter needs to disprove the possibility of objective morality in order to say that it isn't/can't be. I suppose you could argue that the lack of belief should be interpreted as uncertainty but there's no reason for this. Such an idea would mean living under the pretence that it could exist which is giving far too much to an idea which lacks any validation.

If moral judgements can't be facts then morality can't be objective. I've had similar debates in other forums, you can choose to be agnostic about it because you can't prove a negative if you want but it isn't really an appropriate position when arguing about the possibility of a possibility.

As I've said earlier, I actually think objective morality can be argued to be impossible but I find your incredulous attitude towards this subject to be more of a problem than anything else.

[Immanuel Can]

The onus is not on Peter to show that moral judgements can't be facts,

Actually, it is...and not because I say so, but because he is the one who advances the argument in the OP. If he has not established the truth of his premises, the main one of which is that moral judgments are subjective and non-factual, then his conclusion can only be a presumption, not a sound argument.

But I'm hoping he can fix that.

...one can't prove a negative,

He's not putting himself in the position of having to do that. There's no "negative" being asserted there, that I can see. Instead, he's made a positive affirmation, namely that morality is merely subjective.

Now, as a rational person, he must surely have some way of knowing that, so we have every right to ask him if we could see what it is.

And that's where we're at. He's brought us there, because it's his argument.

[HexHammer]

..yadda yadda ...bla ..bla ..bla!!

Long winded talkative clueless parroting!!

Few morals are indeed objective, like stealing, killing etc which is the foundation of a sound nation/society, but besides that it will greatly variate from nation to nation, from lower class to upper class etc.

[Judaka]

Actually, it is...and not because I say so, but because he is the one who advances the argument in the OP. If he has not established the truth of his premises, the main one of which is that moral judgments are subjective and non-factual, then his conclusion can only be a presumption, not a sound argument.

You've made the assertion that his assertion is but a wish, whether his arguments are sound or not is another matter. You can criticise his arguments, there's no problem with that. That's not what you did however and that's what I'm calling you out on.

I don't believe you even have an argument for why you believe objective morality is plausible at all, you say "namely that morality is merely subjective" and perhaps that's why you argue as you do. You do not view subjective distinctions as having meaningful authority or beauty, whereas I do and that's why I'm able to live with the reality of morality being solely subjective.

I'm also asking you to be accountable for your own arguments, you've made an assertion that seems like nothing but a wish. Subjective morality doesn't diminish the possibility of objective morality? That's just an agnostic approach, why even argue about this if it's just a difference in necessarily subjective principles? May as well talk about the principles instead.

[Immanuel Can]

Actually, it is...and not because I say so, but because he is the one who advances the argument in the OP. If he has not established the truth of his premises, the main one of which is that moral judgments are subjective and non-factual, then his conclusion can only be a presumption, not a sound argument.

You've made the assertion that his assertion is but a wish,

The word I used was "presumption." He would have only presumption to back his conclusion, in that case.

...whether his arguments are sound or not is another matter.

Not so. It's exactly the same matter. For in logic, for an argument to be "sound," it must have both true premises and correct form. His argument depends on a premise he has not given us reason to agree is true. Therefore, analytically and according to proper terminology, his argument remains unsound.

If you doubt me, here's the proof: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soundness

As you can see, a deductive argument is "sound" if and only if it is both valid in form, and all of its premises are actually true. Otherwise, a deductive argument is called "unsound."

I don't believe you even have an argument for why you believe objective morality is plausible at all...

I didn't advance that claim. I only spoke about what logically would follow necessarily if he were to believe that it's subjective, and everything I said about that was obvious and correct. In any case, since I'm not the one who launched the argument, I bear no rational obligation justify any premises. I didn't present the argument...Peter did. They're his premises, and he'll have to justify them.

You do not view subjective distinctions as having meaningful authority

Then correct me...what is the authority behind a subjective "distinction" as you call it? (Did you mean a subjective moral precept?) And what makes an authority "meaningful," to use your word?

...or beauty,...

Entirely irrelevant. A thing can be beautiful and wrong or even beautiful and deadly. Beauty tells us nothing about morality. (If it did, then I guess all beautiful women would be good.)

[Judaka]

I'm not trying to remove the premises as aspects of his argument, however, you are commenting on the premises as though they are only aspects of his arguments. If you had used the word presumption rather than wish, I would have let it slide, if you insist that what's you meant then I'll treat it as though you did.

I think anyone can be held accountable for their position, irrespective of whether they want to argue about it or not. However, this is a matter of principles, in treating with the unknown. I agree that OP tried to go beyond that and ur within your rights to have an opinion on whether he succeeded or not.

Then correct me...what is the authority behind a subjective "distinction" as you call it? (Did you mean a subjective moral precept?) And what makes an authority "meaningful," to use your word?

I consider morality to be a sub-category of subjective distinctions, a distinction on behaviour and what one ought to do in particular situations. Authority in morality is always argued to be based upon a hierarchical structure of values, whether we are assessing a behaviour in context as intrinsically good or good due to an outcome, all have been assessed using a value structure. It simply says one outcome is superior to another because we value one result over another, due to whatever is regarded by the value structure.

I used "beauty" in the sense of being attractive and inspiring, as anyone can create a value structure, there has to be some reason that this particular one is important. There is beauty in being able to settle disagreements peacefully, in a love blossoming, in people treating each other with respect. It doesn't teach you what to value, it gives you a reason to care. That's essential, especially if you acknowledge your morality and value structures are subjective. It's not only beauty and we don't all see eye to eye on what is beautiful but I'm sure you agree on that.

I don't interpret meaningful authority or beauty to mean something similar to a law of physics or mathematics, it's malleable and full of inconsistencies. Subjective distinctions of all kinds, including morality, aren't simply obligations but necessary to create our meaning in the world. They all depend on hierarchical value structures and for their authority to be meaningful, one must believe in something real about their value structures. Namely, in a moral relativist world, this means that they have either utility or beauty.

There's a great deal about what goes on that genuinely saddens me, in the world and close to home. I believe for example, that people should be able to walk around at night in their hometown, without being scared. It saddens me to hear people say that they are scared to walk outside at night. I genuinely believe in this idea and many others, and they are impactful on me. I can get angry, sad, pleased - all because of my subjective distinctions and I certainly intend to teach any children that I have, a lot about how they should behave and how they shouldn't - even though I know it's not an objective truth.

So these distinctions hold great meaning to me, they restrict me in some ways, compel me in others and it's because I believe that the subjective is actually the far more important category of the two in human life. In contexts like these, it is the only and therefore the most important idea. The potential for utility and harm in particular subjective ideas is limitless and that includes morality, it's important and that's a source of its meaningful authority.

You cannot live a happy life without meaningful value structures, you get the dreaded nihilism of despair and meaninglessness. For those who both acknowledge moral relativism and fail to value subjective distinctions, a bleak future awaits.

Equally though, many problems exist because people cling to age-old ideas about morality, failing to take their own stance on things and become independent by creating their own value structures.

There's a lot at stake here, when you consider that if morality can be objective, so too can value structures, The implications for subjective value structures can be rather devastating, it's a road to nowhere.

[Immanuel Can]

I agree that OP tried to go beyond that and ur within your rights to have an opinion on whether he succeeded or not.

Well, it's not an opinion, J.

An opinion is something based on half-information or taste, not on uncontroversial facts. And here are the available facts, as you can see from the link I gave you: that there are certain basic requirements of a philosophical argument that must be in place before something is allowed to be called "sound." These are a) a correct formal structure of argument, and b) premises that we have sufficient reason to believe are true. In the case of the OP, criterion a) is not definitely met, since he framed his argument as an enthymeme, and criterion b) is definitely not available, since he gave us no reason to believe his basic premise. Those are the straightforward facts.

So I'm not stating an "opinion" there. I'm pointing out that the criteria for a "sound" argument, as specified by formal logic, have not been yet met. And I'm inviting -- even encouraging -- Peter to meet them by reforming the argument, because I'd like to see if he can make it sound.

Then correct me...what is the authority behind a subjective "distinction" as you call it? (Did you mean a subjective moral precept?) And what makes an authority "meaningful," to use your word?

Authority in morality is always argued to be based upon a hierarchical structure of values, whether we are assessing a behaviour in context as intrinsically good or good due to an outcome, all have been assessed using a value structure. It simply says one outcome is superior to another because we value one result over another, due to whatever is regarded by the value structure.

But who is the "we" you mention that gives "authority" (as you say) to any particular "value" (as you call it)? I can't see any way that isn't an argument that power makes right: "we" say it, so you must believe it.

You say that it's based on "hierarchy." But "hierarchies" are just arrangement in which one thing is placed "above" others, by somebody. What makes one "hierarchy" morally correct, and another wrong? Again, I can't see how you're not saying that's merely a matter of preference, and actually has no authority at all -- after all, you insist morality's merely subjective!

If I've got you wrong there, then clear that up for me, if you would.

You cannot live a happy life without meaningful value structures, you get the dreaded nihilism of despair and meaninglessness. For those who both acknowledge moral relativism and fail to value subjective distinctions, a bleak future awaits.

That's all probably true. But subjectivism about morality won't help that -- it'll make it terminal, in fact. You can't end up as anything but a Nihilist, if you pursue the logical consequences of subjectivism to their rational conclusion. That you don't pursue them that far might make you a nice person, but it can only do so at the cost of rendering you an inconsistent arguer. To be fully rationally consistent, a moral subjectivist is going to have to say that all morals are merely the subjective preference of somebody, and are not anchored in any ultimate rightness or wrongness. And he's going to have to accept that things like rape, premeditated murder or slavery are just as morally subjective as every other action, which entails that they would not be more than subjectively wrong...which means they'd be right if someone subjectively believed they were right.

Or rather, it would mean that neither were such things actually right or wrong at all...meaning Nihilism.

The implications for subjective value structures can be rather devastating, it's a road to nowhere.

Absolutely correct. Subjective valuing would leave us nowhere. To avoid that, we'd be forced to backtrack and say, "My subjective values are important....but I don't know why you have to agree that they are." And clearly, no skeptic would let us away with that sort of evasiveness.

[Judaka]

Well, it's not an opinion, J.

The assertion isn't actually controversial to me, you have an opinion that his premise is unsound and I don't, he clearly failed to convince you (or failed to try) that his premise was true but it is, in fact, an opinion that he failed to create a coherent argument for moral relativism. I would say there is sufficient reason to believe in his premise, he simply has yet to make an argument for it that you'll accept. In his OP he did go into some detail about why moral judgements can't be facts, he has agreed with my ideas about why moral judgements can't be facts, it's your opinion that all of this is insufficient for belief.

But who is the "we" you mention that gives "authority" (as you say) to any particular "value" (as you call it)? I can't see any way that isn't an argument that power makes right: "we" say it, so you must believe it.

Individual or groups, although many attempt to force their values on others, this is not actually necessary in the process. It is the beauty or utility or fairness that will convince you of the authority of a value. An easy example is money, popular culture values money like nothing else and it plays a central role in many peoples' value structures. You don't need God to tell you that money is good, the very idea is laughable.

Boiling everything in subjectivity down to preference is an unfortunate tendency only possible for those who do not understand what subjective distinctions are. You are not capable of understanding a single thing going on in your life without them. You often have subjective distinctions that are clearly unfavourable to you, best exemplified by deeply depressed or anxious people. Subjectivity in life is not about what you prefer at all, your subjective ideas very rarely have anything to do with preference.

I can go deeper on this if needed but it will likely derail the thread as it's a very complicated topic. The important point is that just as people don't value money because they "prefer" it, people value many things for many different reasons. I believe preference is rarely a consideration in morality, it's an insufficient reason for it. You can argue that whatever their reasoning. it is only masking the true reason; their preferences but in some cases, such as money, this is pretty much absurd.

That's all probably true. But subjectivism about morality won't help that -- it'll make it terminal, in fact

There's no choice between subjectivity and objectivity in morality, you can only mindlessly follow those who claim to know such as from religion or follow your culture which is pretty much clearly subjective.

Those are the alternatives to having your own ideas.

There is, however, many reasons to think that acknowledging subjectivity in moral distinctions would work long term without any problems. Mainly that as I said earlier, morality is just a sub-group in the larger group of subjective distinctions and most of these are already acknowledged to be subjective and yet survive.

I've already talked about money which is not a moral distinction, however, the obvious utility of money makes it an extreme example. We could consider things like duties, responsibilities, fairness and so on which are closely linked to morality as distinctions of behaviour too, however, maybe that's unfair because it's not clear that everyone agrees these things are subjective.

We could take some existentialist questions like "is life worth living or not", uncontroversially subjective but 99.9% of people will say "yes it is". This won't change, people will continue to feel this way.

Utility, beauty, fairness and some other things, don't rely on objectivity in the slightest. There are endless examples of subjective distinctions which are understood to be subjective but rely on things such as these and experience no problems

Beauty in art, nature, camaraderie, trust, forgiveness, a hero, an underdog achieving victory.
Fairness in what makes something deserved, justified, warranted, inexcusable, unforgivable.
Utility is self-explanatory.

There's many more but these are the most pronounced in my own culture, in Australia.

If your ideas were correct, that people would begin to question the legitimacy of ideas that lacked an objective truth foundation then we'd see it appear in areas outside of morality but we don't.

The main question here is whether you acknowledge the authority of subjective distinctions or not and since most people don't think about it, it depends on the culture and the context. Morality is simply the clear example where many people DO NOT acknowledge the authority of subjective distinctions, they feel these are insufficient and for many reasons, want a more potent and powerful reassurance that their way is the right way.

I would argue morality is not even responsible for meaning. Nihilism (as despair over meaninglessness) is more to do with the literal acknowledgement of no objective meaning for existence. Objective morality is a victim of this idea.

Absolutely correct. Subjective valuing would leave us nowhere. To avoid that, we'd be forced to backtrack and say, "My subjective values are important....but I don't know why you have to agree that they are." And clearly, no skeptic would let us away with that sort of evasiveness.

Nobody would ever give you that kind of response and you probably know it. I have absolutely no difficulty explaining my values and prioritising them over other peoples and neither does anyone else (well at least the prioritising part).

Once again it's important to recognise that while we are talking about whether acknowledging morality as subjective is even feasible, I am not suggesting to replace it without reason. Believing your subjective distinctions are objectively true and that others are objectively wrong has many dangers and not just the obvious ones.

[Immanuel Can]

Well, it's not an opinion, J.

...you have an opinion that his premise is unsound...

Incorrect again, I'm afraid. Look it up: "unsound" refers only to conclusions, not premises. I can see you're unfamiliar with the basic nomenclature in formal logic; and I'm sorry to have to point it out, but I see no other way to clear up the misunderstanding you're having, other than to set the record straight.

"Unsoundness" isn't an insult, and it's not an opinion. It's a factual, verifiable thing. A syllogism that lacks either form or a basis of verification for its propositional content is definitionally "unsound."

... it is, in fact, an opinion ...

Is that a "fact" or an "opinion" ?

But who is the "we" you mention that gives "authority" (as you say) to any particular "value" (as you call it)? I can't see any way that isn't an argument that power makes right: "we" say it, so you must believe it.

Individual or groups, although many attempt to force their values on others, this is not actually necessary in the process.

I'm sorry, but this makes no sense at all. It's far too vague for a reader to derive any clear conception from it.

Who are the "many"? Are they "wrong" to "force their values" on others? What "process"?

I believe preference is rarely a consideration in morality, it's an insufficient reason for it.

The problem is this, though: if subjectivity is what morality is, there is nothing BUT preference behind it. Of course, it can be enforce by power; but why choose one value over another? If preference is insufficient, then subjective morality is ungrounded. It also cannot then be defended.

Let's get to a specific, to see why this is so. Democrats in the 19th Century southern United States owned slaves, preferred to own slaves, believed it was good to own slaves, and that their way of life was elegant, beautiful and worth preserving permanently. They had power to keep it in place. Republicans like Lincoln thought slavery was not beautiful, and that the south should free their slaves. They believed that would be beautiful. They had power to fight for that, but no certainty they would win if they did. The two sides felt so strongly about the issue that they went to war.

My question to you is this: which side was right, and how do you know? Both had strong hierarchies of value, they had power, they believed in beauty, and they were both absolutely convinced they were morally right to hold their positions.

What can "subjective" morality tell us about this situation?

There's no choice between subjectivity and objectivity in morality, you can only mindlessly follow those who claim to know such as from religion or follow your culture which is pretty much clearly subjective.

You say that, but you haven't shown it. Your reasons for insisting it's true are not given. But answer my question above, and you'll see why resorting to subjective morality won't answer the bell here.

If your ideas were correct, that people would begin to question the legitimacy of ideas that lacked an objective truth foundation then we'd see it appear in areas outside of morality but we don't.

Actually, we're seeing it all the time. Consider issues like abortion, euthanasia, transgenderism, migration, and so on. There are always at least two sides, and subjectively there's no way at all to tell who is right, or to decide what we ought to do. Not only that, but both sides are adamant that they are objectively right -- they think the other side should change its mind, and that there are reasons and arguments one can raise to prove it should change its mind.

In other words, while saying they believe in subjective morality, their actions really show they're objectivists on moral matters -- but they lack any authority for being that, not only because they don't know what authority to cite, but because being subjectivists they've denied the existence and even the possibility of binding, universally-rational moral authority.

The main question here is whether you acknowledge the authority of subjective distinctions

You mean "morals." We're not just talking about any kind of "distinctions." Moreover, it matters not a fig whether or not I -- or you --"acknowledge" them. It won't make them exist if they don't, nor stop them existing if they do.

or not and since most people don't think about it, it depends on the culture and the context.

If people "don't think about it," then it depends on no more than their prejudices -- which may be cultural and social, or merely personal. Either way, nobody at all has reason to believe them.

...the authority of subjective distinctions...

Again, you mean "morals," not "distinctions." Nobody's arguing about vague, general distinctions like flavour or ice cream, or whether one pulls for Man Utd or Arsenal.

Subjective morality has no authority, by its own account. Someone's saying otherwise doesn't lend it any. And your "acknowledgement" or mine has no value in the equation there. We're not the authorities behind morality either -- and that would be true whether we were moral subjectivists or objectivists.

[Judaka]

"unsound" refers only to conclusions, not premises

Fair, I substituted a more appropriate or better word with unsound because I was using the language but I understand the difference.

Who are the "many"? Are they "wrong" to "force their values" on others? What "process"?

Who tries to force their values on others? You give an example of it later, many is almost everyone. It doesn't matter whether they are right or wrong, I'm not trying to make a moral judgement and I never said anything about it. The process is of "giving authority to values" that is quoted.

The problem is this, though: if subjectivity is what morality is, there is nothing BUT preference behind it

Your example really forces the use of this word where it isn't appropriate, things such as "southern slave owners preferred to own slaves" which pretty much ignores the entire issue. There are complicated ideas at play, surrounding the dominant value structures, cultural values, scientific understandings and so on that led to why American slave owners believed what they were doing was justified or not immoral. They didn't decide whether it was moral or immoral based on whether they wanted it to be moral or immoral or whether they wanted slaves or not and that's just an absurd way of looking at morality in general.

Not sure how much explanation this requires, do you really believe morality and preferences are synonymous when morality is subjective? I can't even imagine what objective morality is in your view, objective preferences?

My question to you is this: which side was right, and how do you know? Both had strong hierarchies of value, they had power, they believed in beauty, and they were both absolutely convinced they were morally right to hold their positions

It is my position that objective morality is an impossible concept. I am not telling you that subjective morality can now fill the shoes of this fictional idea and transcend the individual to tell us "well who was really right?" because that's a stupid idea to begin with. Who was right? That will depend on who you ask and as for the rest of it, regardless of whether you believe objective morality exists or not, people will always be convinced of conflicting or opposing moral positions. Nothing will ever change that, not even if God came down from the heavens to tell us what is truly right and wrong.

You say that, but you haven't shown it. Your reasons for insisting it's true are not given. But answer my question above, and you'll see why resorting to subjective morality won't answer the bell here.

Are you really insinuating that evidence can be provided that assures us that certain moral positions are objectively correct? Where is this evidence?

You mean "morals." We're not just talking about any kind of "distinctions." Moreover, it matters not a fig whether or not I -- or you --"acknowledge" them. It won't make them exist if they don't, nor stop them existing if they do.

I am using distinctions instead of morals, not to argue that this applies to all distinctions but to say that it applies to more distinctions than simply morality. The authority of subjective distinctions can only be accepted voluntarily, it doesn't exist unless you acknowledge it. Once again, subjective distinctions are not trying to fulfil the role of objectively true distinctions, the way in which you are speaking about them requires a great deal of explanation.

That which is objective exerts itself or exists or is true irrespective of our opinions and that which is subjective does not, it doesn't appear as though you acknowledge this crucial difference.