Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.
Many philosophers claim that moral realism may be dated back at least to Plato as a philosophical doctrine,[3] and that it is a fully defensible form of moral doctrine.[4]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism
Plato takes his argument to support moral realism. That’s the view that the truth of moral beliefs is independent of what anyone thinks, much like the truth about other matters of objective fact.
http://carneades.pomona.edu/2009-PoP/nts-0921.shtml
I do NOT agree with Plato's Moralism because I believe his universal and forms are illusory and fictitious.Realism / objectivism is often defended by appeal to the normative or political implications of believing that there are universal moral truths that transcend what any individual or even an entire culture might think about them (see sections two and eight). Realist positions, however, disagree about what precisely moral values are if they are causally independent from human belief or culture. According to some realists, moral values are abstract properties that are “objective” in the same sense that geometrical or mathematical properties might be thought to be objective. For example, it might be thought that the sentence “Dogs are canines” is true in a way that is independent from what humans think about it, without thereby believing that there is a literal, physical thing called “dogs”— for, dogs-in-general (rather than a particular dog, say, Fido) is an abstract concept.
Some moral realists envision moral values as real without being physical in precisely this way; and because of the similarity between this view and Plato’s famous Theory of Forms, such moral realists are also sometimes called moral Platonists.
According to such realists, moral values are real without being reducible to any other kinds of properties or facts: moral values instead, according to these realists, are ontologically unique (or sui generis) and irreducible to other kinds of properties.
Proponents of this type of Platonist or sui generis version of moral realism include G.E. Moore (1903), W.D. Ross (1930), W.D. Hudson (1967), Iris Murdoch (1970, arguably), and Russ Shafer-Landau (2003). Tom Regan (1986) also discusses the effect of this metaethical position on the general intellectual climate of the fin de siècle movement known as the Bloomsbury Group.
My position is 'Moral is Objective' because there are justified objective moral facts conditioned upon a moral FSK which adopt scientific facts at its major inputs.
Views?