Is morality objective or subjective?

[Terrapin Station]

We don't equate statistic normalcy with normative directly.

Note the meaning of 'normative'


In this case, we have to verify and justify whatever has statistic normalcy qualify to be a normative as defined above.

I want to just focus on this for a moment, because I think this is at the heart of the disagreement here.

If Joe Smith says, "One ought to not supply alcohol to minors," that doesn't imply that one ought to not supply alcohol to minors.

If Joe Smith, Alice Jones and Frank Jackson say, "One ought to not supply alcohol to minors," that doesn't imply that one ought to not supply alcohol to minors.

If we have a society consisting of, say, 100 million people, and there's a group 10,000 strong that says, "One ought to not supply alcohol to minors," that doesn't imply that one ought to not supply alcohol to minors.

And in that society, if 99,999,998 people say "One ought to not supply alcohol to minors," that doesn't imply that one ought to not supply alcohol to minors.

No matter how many people we're talking about, no matter what percentage of a society we're talking about, the fact that they say one ought to not do something doesn't imply that one ought to not do that thing.

Now, we could say with the last example that the society in question has an evaluative standard, where they're going to judge people negatively (and where they're probably going to have laws in line with this) if they supply alcohol to minors, but this doesn't make it a fact, and it doesn't make it true, that (at least in that society) one ought to not supply alcohol to minors.

You are way off tangent with my 'what is morality-proper'.
I have already mentioned this many times, i.e.

• Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615
  Personal judgments and decisions made by individuals [in real life or from thought experiments] related to moral elements are not Morality Per se.
  These are subjective opinions and beliefs of the individual[s] and they are not moral facts.

Thus your "If Joe Smith says, 'One ought to not supply alcohol to minors,' " is not morality proper because it is not claimed to be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a moral FSK as a moral fact.
That is an individual's [Joe's] opinion. Even if Joe's religion or government insist and impose on all followers/citizens, such an 'ought' it is still an opinion and it is not a moral fact.

Even if 100% of all human agrees [could be like the once Flat-Earth-Theory] to it, but it is still not a moral fact until it had been verified and justified empirically and philosophical within a moral FSK.

Note my point earlier;
The Generic Morality-Proper FSK.
viewtopic.php?p=498101#p498101

No, you're completely missing what I was talking about. I'm not talking about whether saying 'One ought to x" counts as moral or anything else like that.

I'm saying that saying "one ought to x" doesn't IMPLY anything, regardless of who says it, regardless of how many people say it. It doesn't even imply the very "ought" that the person is saying.

And in context, the point of this is that the fact that people say these things, that they judge other people on these things, etc. in no way implies any normatives.

[Terrapin Station]

As above, the majority of people has an inherent 'ought-not-to' in their brain to avoid being in places of exposed heights.

This is factually wrong, though. It's not an "ought" as an unconscious state. Whatever unconscious state we'd be referring to wouldn't be making a recommendation or prescription about anything. "Oughts" are conscious dispositions. For one, they're intentional, in the sense of being about something, and only mentality can be about something. "Intentionality is the mark of the mental."

[Veritas Aequitas]

No, you're completely missing what I was talking about. I'm not talking about whether saying 'One ought to x" counts as moral or anything else like that.

I'm saying that saying "one ought to x" doesn't IMPLY anything, regardless of who says it, regardless of how many people say it. It doesn't even imply the very "ought" that the person is saying.

And in context, the point of this is that the fact that people say these things, that they judge other people on these things, etc. in no way implies any normatives.

I don't understand your point.

My view is,
how can 'one ought to breathe' does not IMPLY anything?
Surely it imply something that is good to a human being.

Note normative;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normative
Normative is normally relate to morality.

Why moral facts are normative?
see these [repeated many times]

• What is a Fact?
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486
  
  There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

[Peter Holmes]

What we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case - or a description of such a feature of reality.

So, obviously, the claim that a fact-as-feature of reality can be normative is not just false - it's completely incoherent. And that a description follows contextual linguistic rules (or 'norms') doesn't make the description normative. To describe something isn't to say 'this thing must or should be this way'.

On the other hand, a moral assertion really is normative, which is why it isn't factual.

[Skepdick]

What we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case

So far so good.

or a description of such a feature of reality.

Oooops! Equivocation!

Peter "Retard" Holmes is using the word "fact" to mean both the description AND that which is being described (but he keeps rejecting the correspondence theory ?!?)

So, obviously, the claim that a fact-as-feature of reality can be normative is not just false - it's completely incoherent.

fact-as-feature as a feature of reality may or may not be normative.
facts as "correct" descriptions of a feature is normative. Because the word "correct" implies a judgment (these are your words, not mine).

There is a blue cow on the tree trunk, and there's red grass in the background.

goat.jpg (40.05 KiB) Viewed 154 times

[Veritas Aequitas]

What we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case - or a description of such a feature of reality.

So, obviously, the claim that a fact-as-feature of reality can be normative is not just false - it's completely incoherent. And that a description follows contextual linguistic rules (or 'norms') doesn't make the description normative. To describe something isn't to say 'this thing must or should be this way'.

On the other hand, a moral assertion really is normative, which is why it isn't factual.

1. You are very ignorant and is merely dogmatic to one specific FSK and perspective of philosophy, i.e. the bastardized elements from the logical positivists and analytic philosophy.

2. What I am relying is upon a different FSK which is as credible as that of the Scientific FSK.

Yours is a fallacy of equivocation, you cannot impose your FSK on mine especially you do not have the intellectual and philosophical capacity to understand [not necessary with] what my FSK entails.
To deny the moral facts of the moral FSK is equivalent to deny the scientific facts of the scientific FSK.

[Peter Holmes]

For a long time, something's been festering that I need to vent.

Someone I love was raped. And if the scumbag that did it were caught and eradicated, I'd be happy.

The suggestion that, because I deny the existence of moral facts, I have no right to judge and condemn that scumbag is nauseatingly offensive.

So I say to anyone who has made, or is inclined to make, that argument: you can fuck off back under the rock whence you crawled.

I'm posting this twice, to make assurance double sure.

[Belinda]

What we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case - or a description of such a feature of reality.

So, obviously, the claim that a fact-as-feature of reality can be normative is not just false - it's completely incoherent. And that a description follows contextual linguistic rules (or 'norms') doesn't make the description normative. To describe something isn't to say 'this thing must or should be this way'.

On the other hand, a moral assertion really is normative, which is why it isn't factual.

"

So, obviously, the claim that a fact-as-feature of reality can be normative is not just false - it's completely incoherent

"

Some people believe there is no such thing as reality, and 'reality' is a dream conjured up by humans so they can survive amid ontic chaos.

Others believe there is such thing as ontic reality which is an ordered affair. This is the basic belief where ideas of gods originate.

Nobody will ever know which is the truth of the matter.

[Terrapin Station]

I don't understand your point.

My view is,
how can 'one ought to breathe' does not IMPLY anything?
Surely it imply something that is good to a human being.

Sure. So let's say that Joe Smith says, "One ought to x."

You'd say that that implies that x is "good to a human being"? Do you mean simply that it's good to Joe Smith?

[henry quirk]

The suggestion that, because I deny the existence of moral facts, I have no right to judge and condemn that scumbag is nauseatingly offensive.

It's not about your right to judge; it's about what undergirds that right.

You can legitimately say someone I love was abused and I believe the rapist ought to die. Brother, I'm right there with you in that feeling. You love your friend. Her pain pains you. I get it.

Unfortunately, that feeling, that sympathy, is all you have. What happened to your friend, you can say, was wrong (it was), but you can't say why it was wrong.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I don't understand your point.

My view is,
how can 'one ought to breathe' does not IMPLY anything?
Surely it imply something that is good to a human being.

Sure. So let's say that Joe Smith says, "One ought to x."

You'd say that that implies that x is "good to a human being"? Do you mean simply that it's good to Joe Smith?

Not to Joe Smith alone, but to any entity that fits the definition of what is a human being.

It is based on a general principle and not based on any individual's opinion or beliefs.

Note, any ought that is "good" universally must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK, in this case the scientific FSK and the moral FSK.

[Peter Holmes]

I don't understand your point.

My view is,
how can 'one ought to breathe' does not IMPLY anything?
Surely it imply something that is good to a human being.

Sure. So let's say that Joe Smith says, "One ought to x."

You'd say that that implies that x is "good to a human being"? Do you mean simply that it's good to Joe Smith?

Not to Joe Smith alone, but to any entity that fits the definition of what is a human being.

It is based on a general principle and not based on any individual's opinion or beliefs.

Note, any ought that is "good" universally must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK, in this case the scientific FSK and the moral FSK.

Merriam-Webster has this definition of 'principle': a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or assumption.

Principles - general or otherwise - aren't lying around in reality, anymore than there are categories in reality, outside language. Principles of any kind are things we choose to adopt. As with language: there's no foundation, for our principles, beneath our choices.

Like any so-called abstract thing - any metaphysical fiction - what we call 'the good' doesn't actually exist anywhere, inside or outside our brains. So it can't be 'verified and justified...blah, blah, blah'. Moral realists are profoundly deluded.

[Terrapin Station]

I don't understand your point.

My view is,
how can 'one ought to breathe' does not IMPLY anything?
Surely it imply something that is good to a human being.

Sure. So let's say that Joe Smith says, "One ought to x."

You'd say that that implies that x is "good to a human being"? Do you mean simply that it's good to Joe Smith?

Not to Joe Smith alone, but to any entity that fits the definition of what is a human being.

It is based on a general principle and not based on any individual's opinion or beliefs.

Note, any ought that is "good" universally must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK, in this case the scientific FSK and the moral FSK.

Right, so Joe Smith, or a handful of people, or everyone in existence, saying "One ought to x" and/or judging persons' actions in light of the fact that they're thinking "One ought to x" doesn't imply any of that.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Sure. So let's say that Joe Smith says, "One ought to x."

You'd say that that implies that x is "good to a human being"? Do you mean simply that it's good to Joe Smith?

Not to Joe Smith alone, but to any entity that fits the definition of what is a human being.

It is based on a general principle and not based on any individual's opinion or beliefs.

Note, any ought that is "good" universally must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK, in this case the scientific FSK and the moral FSK.

Right, so Joe Smith, or a handful of people, or everyone in existence, saying "One ought to x" and/or judging persons' actions in light of the fact that they're thinking "One ought to x" doesn't imply any of that.

Not sure of your point, nevertheless,

I have stated whether one, a million or everyone in existence 'saying' 'one ought to x' and judging persons' action is not about morality-proper. They are merely the after-effects of morality-proper. Again;
Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615


What is morality-proper is when one, a million or everyone in existence recognize, cognize and realized they have the inherent oughtness to x within them and let that 'oughtness to x' unfolds naturally and spontaneously.

If anyone is driven by peer pressure, other forces to do x or even reason and rationalize it by oneself, that is not morality-proper. A psychopath can imitate and rationalize what is supposedly 'good' and act such, but that is not morality proper.

What is morality-proper has to be inherently natural and spontaneous.

[Peter Holmes]

Not to Joe Smith alone, but to any entity that fits the definition of what is a human being.

It is based on a general principle and not based on any individual's opinion or beliefs.

Note, any ought that is "good" universally must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK, in this case the scientific FSK and the moral FSK.

Right, so Joe Smith, or a handful of people, or everyone in existence, saying "One ought to x" and/or judging persons' actions in light of the fact that they're thinking "One ought to x" doesn't imply any of that.

Not sure of your point, nevertheless,

I have stated whether one, a million or everyone in existence 'saying' 'one ought to x' and judging persons' action is not about morality-proper. They are merely the after-effects of morality-proper. Again;
Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615


What is morality-proper is when one, a million or everyone in existence recognize, cognize and realized they have the inherent oughtness to x within them and let that 'oughtness to x' unfolds naturally and spontaneously.

If anyone is driven by peer pressure, other forces to do x or even reason and rationalize it by oneself, that is not morality-proper. A psychopath can imitate and rationalize what is supposedly 'good' and act such, but that is not morality proper.

What is morality-proper has to be inherently natural and spontaneous.

This supposed 'inherent oughtness to x' within us is nothing more than Kant's 'moral law within me'. And both amount to nothing more than the claim that humans are (somehow) programmed to behave in certain ways. But judgement as to the moral rightness or wrongness of that behaviour - and therefore that programming - is a separate matter. Your failure to recognise this is at the heart of your mistake.