Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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Advocate
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

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[quote=Atla post_id=480964 time=1605988277 user_id=15497]
[quote=Advocate post_id=480956 time=1605987459 user_id=15238]
Things are exclusively in the phenomenal world. Outside it is only undifferentiated stuff. The differentiation, according to purpose, is the kernel of each thing. Every thing is a set of attributes and boundary conditions, which are themselves phenomenological.
[/quote]
You aren't doing ontology, just a minimalistic, quasi-solipsistic description for practical purposes. Who cares about that?
[/quote]

Being practical, it's clearly well beyond solipcism. The practicality is due to it being an accurate description of our shared experience. Also, it cannot be otherwise because it's logically necessary.
Atla
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by Atla »

Advocate wrote: Sat Nov 21, 2020 9:20 pm Being practical, it's clearly well beyond solipcism. The practicality is due to it being an accurate description of our shared experience. Also, it cannot be otherwise because it's logically necessary.
Yeah I don't know what you mean. Basically things don't exist at all, that's just a way of thinking. If we view the the phenomenal world to be made of things, then it's better to view the assumed noumenon to also be made of things. Doesn't make much sense to stick to this quasi-solipsistic undifferentiated stuff. Practicality also isn't relevant when it comes to basic ontology. Where is the logical necessity about these?
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

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[quote=Atla post_id=480974 time=1605991760 user_id=15497]
[quote=Advocate post_id=480971 time=1605990031 user_id=15238]
Being practical, it's clearly well beyond solipcism. The practicality is due to it being an accurate description of our shared experience. Also, it cannot be otherwise because it's logically necessary.
[/quote]
Yeah I don't know what you mean. Basically things don't exist at all, that's just a way of thinking. If we view the the phenomenal world to be made of things, then it's better to view the assumed noumenon to also be made of things. Doesn't make much sense to stick to this quasi-solipsistic undifferentiated stuff. Practicality also isn't relevant when it comes to basic ontology. Where is the logical necessity about these?
[/quote]

Yes, they're just a way of thinking. That means they're phenomenological. We experience the world in differentiation - things. The noumena has no attributes, just stuff. We differentiate things into being.
Atla
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by Atla »

Advocate wrote: Sat Nov 21, 2020 9:56 pm Yes, they're just a way of thinking. That means they're phenomenological. We experience the world in differentiation - things. The noumena has no attributes, just stuff. We differentiate things into being.
No, phenomena are what we directly experience, and noumena are what we posit beyond this direct experience. Obviously we should extend the cognitive differentiation to the noumena.
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by Advocate »

[quote=Atla post_id=480985 time=1605992558 user_id=15497]
[quote=Advocate post_id=480979 time=1605992184 user_id=15238]
Yes, they're just a way of thinking. That means they're phenomenological. We experience the world in differentiation - things. The noumena has no attributes, just stuff. We differentiate things into being.
[/quote]
No, phenomena are what we directly experience, and noumena are what we posit beyond this direct experience. Obviously we should extend the cognitive differentiation to the noumena.
[/quote]

Have i got those backward?

Phenomena = experience.
odysseus
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by odysseus »

Atla wrote
Get to the part where I was wrong. Veritas's obsession is to claim that Kant and others have shown that 'everything is interdependent with the human conditions' or something like that. Why is that not an extreme misunderstanding of the phenomenon-noumenon thing, bordering on mental disorder?

And do you understand that while on one hand, the kind of "absolute" psychological space and time, through which we naturally experience life, the ones that Kant talked about, are in fact a priori mental functions or whatever. On the other hand however, the Einsteinian spacetime is an entirely different issue, and we can assume if we want, that the noumenal world is behaving according to it.
I like "something like that" and "whatever". We use language like that when we don't know what we're talking about. Did you not read what I wrote? Empirical science and Kant do not in any way disagree; in fact, Kant insists that science is the only wheel that rolls! He just understands that there is another analysis behind all that science does which looks to logic and the apriority of space and time as intuitions. Space and time are ALSO empirically determined concepts! It depends on what you are talking about, but the one presupposes the other, and is more fundamental, which makes is what philosophy is about.
Now believing Kant's argument is horse of a different color. For this you have to take that giant leap from "whatever" to actually reading Kant. Keep in mind there is not an analytic philosopher alive or dead who thinks Kant has been refuted. They all know this is impossible. They simply abide by Wittgenstein's insistence that this empirical reality is all that one can make sense of, so it has to serve as the basis for meaningful philosophical discussion. Who can speak of transcendental noumena? Kant goes to great lengths to say one cannot.
Then there are the existentialists, descendants of Kant (you know talk about Kant ruled philosophy for a hundred years. So exhaustive was the philosophical aftermath that they simply ran away, confident no more could be said). Massively interesting! But you have to abandon science as the foundation for philosophical thought.
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by Atla »

Advocate wrote: Sun Nov 22, 2020 12:05 am
Atla wrote: Sat Nov 21, 2020 10:02 pm
Advocate wrote: Sat Nov 21, 2020 9:56 pm Yes, they're just a way of thinking. That means they're phenomenological. We experience the world in differentiation - things. The noumena has no attributes, just stuff. We differentiate things into being.
No, phenomena are what we directly experience, and noumena are what we posit beyond this direct experience. Obviously we should extend the cognitive differentiation to the noumena.
Have i got those backward?

Phenomena = experience.
Phenomena are the appearances, noumena are what are posited beyond appearances. At least that's how I use them, from what I've seen there are at least 2-3 different uses.
Atla
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by Atla »

odysseus wrote: Sun Nov 22, 2020 2:33 am I like "something like that" and "whatever". We use language like that when we don't know what we're talking about. Did you not read what I wrote? Empirical science and Kant do not in any way disagree; in fact, Kant insists that science is the only wheel that rolls! He just understands that there is another analysis behind all that science does which looks to logic and the apriority of space and time as intuitions. Space and time are ALSO empirically determined concepts! It depends on what you are talking about, but the one presupposes the other, and is more fundamental, which makes is what philosophy is about.
Now believing Kant's argument is horse of a different color. For this you have to take that giant leap from "whatever" to actually reading Kant. Keep in mind there is not an analytic philosopher alive or dead who thinks Kant has been refuted. They all know this is impossible. They simply abide by Wittgenstein's insistence that this empirical reality is all that one can make sense of, so it has to serve as the basis for meaningful philosophical discussion. Who can speak of transcendental noumena? Kant goes to great lengths to say one cannot.
Then there are the existentialists, descendants of Kant (you know talk about Kant ruled philosophy for a hundred years. So exhaustive was the philosophical aftermath that they simply ran away, confident no more could be said). Massively interesting! But you have to abandon science as the foundation for philosophical thought.
I never claimed that Kant and science disagree fundamentally, of course they are compatible. What are you on about?

Science is 100% descriptive, but in the end so is philosophy. In fact you seem to be the one chasing a philosophical illusion, by still looking for a genuine foundation.
Yes it's probably so that there is only access to appearances, which are structured according to the workings of our own individual brain/mind, which Kant called a priori. (I don't think he really explored the individual differences, especially gender differences here though.) And we extrapolate from those appearances a world beyond appearances, but we can never be absolutely sure what it's actually like, or whether it even exists.

Which doesn't mean however that the world beyond appearances is "interdependent with the human conditions". Only our model of it, our extrapolation is "interdependent with the human conditions". There is an important difference between the two.

This is all basic stuff imo, if I got something wrong, then point it out.

And the Einsteinian spacetime is still NOT the same kind of space and time that Kant discussed. The appearances structured by Kantian space and time, happen in a world that behaves according to Einsteinian spacetime. Do you understand this?
odysseus
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by odysseus »

Atla wrote
Do you understand this?
First, you should call other people and their views horrible names. It degrades discussion. Even if the other "started it," to continue it is just as juvenile.

Second, you have Kant wrong. You say some things that are true, but you you say others that are not. Consider:
Science is 100% descriptive, but in the end so is philosophy. In fact you seem to be the one chasing a philosophical illusion, by still looking for a genuine foundation.
Nothing is 100% anything, certainly not philosophy. Philosophy is apriori, it takes what is given, and looks for the underpinnings that are assumed in this given. I observe a planetary anomaly, say, or that my shoe is untied, or any you can imagine in the world. This is given, that is, part of a world that is there prior to inquiry, and in this prior there is education, the bringing forth of latent rational abilities, language acquisition, enculturation, and so on, much of which is grounded in observation. Once this empirical world is in place, then philosophy can begin. For Kant, it is an examination of the form of thought, judgment which is in the everydayness of living. His space and time are apriori forms of intuition. The foundation for claims like this lies not in further observation, but in what has to be the case given what is given in everyday experience, and for this, attention goes to the formal dimension of logic and its "purity" apart from how this plays out in incidental affairs.

Are Kant's apriori claims justified? Apriority is of course everywhere in empirical science. Any extrapolation from what is the case to what has to be the case in order for this to be so is done so apriori. No one has seen the Big Bang, yet it is a sound scientific theory since observations of star spectra indicating trajectories, speeds, suggest some powerful cosmic event, and it remains an empirical theory because the "big banging" is an empirical concept, things banging, that is. Philosophy differs in this because its conclusions are not empirical ideas. Kant's spatial apriority is grounded on the "observations" of geometrical intuitions, a world of necessary conditions about triangles and such, and space itself which possesses these. He does the same with time.
Yes it's probably so that there is only access to appearances, which are structured according to the workings of our own individual brain/mind, which Kant called a priori. (I don't think he really explored the individual differences, especially gender differences here though.) And we extrapolate from those appearances a world beyond appearances, but we can never be absolutely sure what it's actually like, or whether it even exists.
He doesn't extrapolate to a world beyond experiences (unless you are talking about noumena of which he says nothing can be said. He only presents this concept because he has to, not because he wants to reveal its reality. Of this, nothing can be said. See the Transcendental Dialectic). But he insists that this world is representation, and that it is not possible to make knowledge claims outside of the empirical world.

It is not "brain/mind". "Brain" is an empirical concept and so when we observe a brain it is, as with all empirical concepts, in space and time and these are apriori forms of intuition that cannot in any way present something outside of their own intuitive conditions. So no, when you observe a brain, you are not seeing something that is beyond the intuitive conditions of its apprehension. That tree in the forest when all perceptual systems are absent: no tree, no forest, no sound; in fact, no sense at all can be made of such a thing.

Mind is more puzzling. One would have to define it better as it is "given" and what is given in mind is phenomena, ideas, sights and sounds, the temporal nature of this, the anticipatory structure of past, present and future, the pragmatic nature of meaning, affect, and on and on. If by mind you mean the field of givens--reason, intuitions, language, MEANING, as they are presented in thought and experience, then you are not talking about the brain at all. There certainly is a correspondence between brain and mind, but they are very different things. Correspondence does not yield a reduction any more than a volcano's correspondence to a comprehensive account of the subatomic activity contained therein reduces a volcano to subatomic activity. It simply reveals a matching set of parts.

The reason volcanoes can still be volcanoes after such an analysis is that both are phenomena and analyzed as such.
Which doesn't mean however that the world beyond appearances is "interdependent with the human conditions". Only our model of it, our extrapolation is "interdependent with the human conditions". There is an important difference between the two.
This model, for you is meant to be an extrapolation: an extrapolation from what to what? That is, your have before you what is there to be extrapolated from in order to posit something else, something unseen, but presupposed in what is before you. Kant was insanely good at this. What do you have in mind?
And the Einsteinian spacetime is still NOT the same kind of space and time that Kant discussed. The appearances structured by Kantian space and time, happen in a world that behaves according to Einsteinian spacetime. Do you understand this?
No, For our discussion here, I'm afraid you have this backwards. Look at it like this: Einstein might start a conversation on space and time with "Two objects exert a force of attraction on one another known as "gravity" and if we...."" ; then the interruption: Excuse me, but what do you mean by "objects" and "force" and "attraction" and the rest? Einstein, knowing where this goes, would politely respond that this is not a discussion of the phenomenological examination of concepts, or of space and time, but an apriori discussion of the empirical concept of gravity.

If you work within the empirical model, then you get what you say above; and if you work with the phenomenological model, you get the opposite. The phenomenological model is philosophy, physics is not, and the former is what is at issue here. What is NOT on the table here is what Einstein had to say about time and space as a physicist. If it were, this discussion would be very short lived: see Einstein's general theory of relativity. but that is not what this is about. It is about Kantian idealism, which is an examination of the presuppositions of language and logic and experience.
Atla
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by Atla »

odysseus wrote: Sun Nov 22, 2020 4:52 pm
Atla wrote
Do you understand this?
First, you should call other people and their views horrible names. It degrades discussion. Even if the other "started it," to continue it is just as juvenile.

Second, you have Kant wrong. You say some things that are true, but you you say others that are not. Consider:
Science is 100% descriptive, but in the end so is philosophy. In fact you seem to be the one chasing a philosophical illusion, by still looking for a genuine foundation.
Nothing is 100% anything, certainly not philosophy. Philosophy is apriori, it takes what is given, and looks for the underpinnings that are assumed in this given. I observe a planetary anomaly, say, or that my shoe is untied, or any you can imagine in the world. This is given, that is, part of a world that is there prior to inquiry, and in this prior there is education, the bringing forth of latent rational abilities, language acquisition, enculturation, and so on, much of which is grounded in observation. Once this empirical world is in place, then philosophy can begin. For Kant, it is an examination of the form of thought, judgment which is in the everydayness of living. His space and time are apriori forms of intuition. The foundation for claims like this lies not in further observation, but in what has to be the case given what is given in everyday experience, and for this, attention goes to the formal dimension of logic and its "purity" apart from how this plays out in incidental affairs.

Are Kant's apriori claims justified? Apriority is of course everywhere in empirical science. Any extrapolation from what is the case to what has to be the case in order for this to be so is done so apriori. No one has seen the Big Bang, yet it is a sound scientific theory since observations of star spectra indicating trajectories, speeds, suggest some powerful cosmic event, and it remains an empirical theory because the "big banging" is an empirical concept, things banging, that is. Philosophy differs in this because its conclusions are not empirical ideas. Kant's spatial apriority is grounded on the "observations" of geometrical intuitions, a world of necessary conditions about triangles and such, and space itself which possesses these. He does the same with time.
Yes it's probably so that there is only access to appearances, which are structured according to the workings of our own individual brain/mind, which Kant called a priori. (I don't think he really explored the individual differences, especially gender differences here though.) And we extrapolate from those appearances a world beyond appearances, but we can never be absolutely sure what it's actually like, or whether it even exists.
He doesn't extrapolate to a world beyond experiences (unless you are talking about noumena of which he says nothing can be said. He only presents this concept because he has to, not because he wants to reveal its reality. Of this, nothing can be said. See the Transcendental Dialectic). But he insists that this world is representation, and that it is not possible to make knowledge claims outside of the empirical world.

It is not "brain/mind". "Brain" is an empirical concept and so when we observe a brain it is, as with all empirical concepts, in space and time and these are apriori forms of intuition that cannot in any way present something outside of their own intuitive conditions. So no, when you observe a brain, you are not seeing something that is beyond the intuitive conditions of its apprehension. That tree in the forest when all perceptual systems are absent: no tree, no forest, no sound; in fact, no sense at all can be made of such a thing.

Mind is more puzzling. One would have to define it better as it is "given" and what is given in mind is phenomena, ideas, sights and sounds, the temporal nature of this, the anticipatory structure of past, present and future, the pragmatic nature of meaning, affect, and on and on. If by mind you mean the field of givens--reason, intuitions, language, MEANING, as they are presented in thought and experience, then you are not talking about the brain at all. There certainly is a correspondence between brain and mind, but they are very different things. Correspondence does not yield a reduction any more than a volcano's correspondence to a comprehensive account of the subatomic activity contained therein reduces a volcano to subatomic activity. It simply reveals a matching set of parts.

The reason volcanoes can still be volcanoes after such an analysis is that both are phenomena and analyzed as such.
Which doesn't mean however that the world beyond appearances is "interdependent with the human conditions". Only our model of it, our extrapolation is "interdependent with the human conditions". There is an important difference between the two.
This model, for you is meant to be an extrapolation: an extrapolation from what to what? That is, your have before you what is there to be extrapolated from in order to posit something else, something unseen, but presupposed in what is before you. Kant was insanely good at this. What do you have in mind?
And the Einsteinian spacetime is still NOT the same kind of space and time that Kant discussed. The appearances structured by Kantian space and time, happen in a world that behaves according to Einsteinian spacetime. Do you understand this?
No, For our discussion here, I'm afraid you have this backwards. Look at it like this: Einstein might start a conversation on space and time with "Two objects exert a force of attraction on one another known as "gravity" and if we...."" ; then the interruption: Excuse me, but what do you mean by "objects" and "force" and "attraction" and the rest? Einstein, knowing where this goes, would politely respond that this is not a discussion of the phenomenological examination of concepts, or of space and time, but an apriori discussion of the empirical concept of gravity.

If you work within the empirical model, then you get what you say above; and if you work with the phenomenological model, you get the opposite. The phenomenological model is philosophy, physics is not, and the former is what is at issue here. What is NOT on the table here is what Einstein had to say about time and space as a physicist. If it were, this discussion would be very short lived: see Einstein's general theory of relativity. but that is not what this is about. It is about Kantian idealism, which is an examination of the presuppositions of language and logic and experience.
It is necessary to posit a world beyond appearances, and when we do, it becomes obvious that this world isn't a representation. Yes the appearances are a representation, but they are also an inseparable part of the world they are representing. Because inside our head, there is a model of the outside world, and the model is part of that world. Kant seems to have been shallow and didn't realize this.
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

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Atla wrote: Sun Nov 22, 2020 5:25 pm It is necessary to posit a world beyond appearances, and when we do, it becomes obvious that this world isn't a representation. Yes the appearances are a representation, but they are also an inseparable part of the world they are representing. Because inside our head, there is a model of the outside world, and the model is part of that world. Kant seems to have been shallow and didn't realize this.
Kant understood this perfectly, although you express it rather poorly.
You problem is that you do not know that there is a difference between the real worl and the ideal world of your fetid imagination.
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by Atla »

Sculptor wrote: Sun Nov 22, 2020 5:35 pm
Atla wrote: Sun Nov 22, 2020 5:25 pm It is necessary to posit a world beyond appearances, and when we do, it becomes obvious that this world isn't a representation. Yes the appearances are a representation, but they are also an inseparable part of the world they are representing. Because inside our head, there is a model of the outside world, and the model is part of that world. Kant seems to have been shallow and didn't realize this.
Kant understood this perfectly, although you express it rather poorly.
You problem is that you do not know that there is a difference between the real worl and the ideal world of your fetid imagination.
At this point I don't think he realized it, his followers never seem to get it.
And unfortunately I do know the difference, in an ideal world retarded old fools like you don't exist.
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by Atla »

odysseus wrote: Sun Nov 22, 2020 4:52 pm Nothing is 100% anything, certainly not philosophy. Philosophy is apriori
A priori philosophy is limited and not very interesting to me. Aren't you just trying to rationalize the time and energy you've wasted on phenomenology? Psychology gives a better and simpler picture of how human thinking works, without getting into idealism.
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by odysseus »

Atla wrote
It is necessary to posit a world beyond appearances, and when we do, it becomes obvious that this world isn't a representation. Yes the appearances are a representation, but they are also an inseparable part of the world they are representing. Because inside our head, there is a model of the outside world, and the model is part of that world. Kant seems to have been shallow and didn't realize this.
Why go small? Why not do what philosophers do and take what has been offered and go into detail? The devil is IN the details. Even analytic philosophers know that you can never refute Kant. They just got tired of arguing about it after a hundred years. Then the division came with existentialists on one side and analytics on the other. Kant, on the latter's side of this, insisted that all that can be reasonably said is within empirical reality, but this is to be sure, NOT to include ontological assumptions about what reality is. Rather, it is where the assumptions begin to make sense, and there you have a working model that simply assumes an "objective" world independent of the human contribution. This is why analytic philosophy is so bent on abiding by the way physicists and others describe the world, but none of think you can get beyond one form of another of Kant's idealism. Professional analytic philosophers are not stupid at all! They know Kant cannot be refuted. They simply ignore what cannot be talked about.

There is some sense in this, to be sure, though when you read analytic philosophy, it is clear that these guys have long ago reached the limits of meaningful work. Take epistemology: When in order to try to see how the traditional standard for knowledge, which is S knows P iff, S believes P, is justfied in this and P is true, can be amended to respond to Gettier problems, they resort to inventing severed head scenarios and barn facsimile scenarios. The silliest sh** imaginable. Failed in the end, of course: Kant was there staring at these attempts, saying "P?? How does one know that there is a P? How can P's ontology be established if the only way to do so is through knowing P, and knowing P is exactly what is in question!"

Breathtakingly question begging. Kant is always there. You can't get around this, you can only accept it, as the existentialists did in their own way.
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Re: Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

Post by odysseus »

Atla wrote
A priori philosophy is limited and not very interesting to me. Aren't you just trying to rationalize the time and energy you've wasted on phenomenology? Psychology gives a better and simpler picture of how human thinking works, without getting into idealism.
But this is just unschooled vague talk. Bring in the psychology you want to defend, then look at the phenomenology you want to attack, and have at it. Is it Freud? Jung? Skinner? And the phenomenology: Is it Husserl? Heidegger?

It could actually get interesting.
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