I don't think that's quite right, though. Some desires, like, say, the desire to eat, are most probably biochemical in origin. But what about the desire to read a book? What about the preference for one woman rather than several others? What about the decision to be a Rastafarian instead of a Catholic or a Hindu? What about the choice of what to type in this email?
Those are much harder cases in which to show any biochemical or survival-value link. One can probably be invented for each, but it will likely sound very strained indeed. "Walker became a Rastafarian because..." because what?
I've never met anyone who can tell you what the causes for all his choices are. Sometimes all he can say is, "I dunno...that's what I wanted."...one then knows all the causes for why one does things, which ends all confusion...
But I don't think that signals any confusion. If volition can come from the person himself, rather than any prior causes, then it's unsurprising that he can't tell you any prior cause for his choice. It didn't have one. It commenced with his personal volition itself.That's what we mean when we say, "Walker decided to support the Newcastle Magpies instead of the New Orleans Saints." We don't need a prior cause for such a choice. Perhaps for Walker, it was a level playing field between the two, and he simply chose. Why would we think there even needed to be a prior cause for that?
And in point of fact, nobody acts like their choices aren't real. Nobody. Everybody acts as if they are. So I don't think the supposition that there is always a physical or material cause for volition has any grounds for credibitlity. Observably, that's not how we operate. The burden on anybody who thought differently would be very heavy: namely, to show that without exception, all ...and I mean all...decisions are necessarily traceable to nothing but a chain of prior physical causes. That no decision is ever made, even in part, any other way.
And I think that's a burden that the Determinist cannot even come close to meeting.
