Christianity

[Alexis Jacobi]

In "explaining", you only reasserted your own views, with which I'm already familiar. You didn't explain how your response followed from what I'd written …

I suppose then that you will only be able to conclude that in sticking with my declared purposes — I have made it clear this is what I am doing here (mostly) — that I am wrapped up in that project. To be frank I am not sure enough what yours is. And I am not clear about what your aims are.

Is there a way that you could rephrase what you have wanted to express? I will make a (supreme) effort to try and understand. It’s not that you don’t express yourself well but rather that I have my own focus and objectives.

[Alexis Jacobi]

I see that you have abandoned the "philosophers" at ILP. What, you weren't being challenged enough in exchanges with Meno and Ecmandu and Ichthus77 and peacegirl and MagsJ?

Mere children! With dirty knickers.

Here, at least people respect the laws of hygiene.

[iambiguous]

I see that you have abandoned the "philosophers" at ILP. What, you weren't being challenged enough in exchanges with Meno and Ecmandu and Ichthus77 and peacegirl and MagsJ?

Mere children! With dirty knickers.

Here, at least people respect the laws of hygiene.

Well, up in the intellectual clouds anyway.

[Gary Childress]

Looking at it again, I suppose the answer to your question could be that I'm trying to turn others against God because I'm angry at God for making the universe the way it is (if the claims that God is the creator of the universe are true). I suppose it's not right of me to do so. If others think God is a "good" God and/or that a human God created the universe, then maybe I should just let them think what they want to think. Maybe it's not all that important or none of my business what others think about God or the "human condition" (perhaps it's only my condition to fear death anyway). I'm not even sure if I should be on a philosophy forum. Maybe I should just retire from life and mind my own business. Perhaps, I'm just a disciple of "Satan" trying to turn others against God. Fuck it. Maybe the world really would be better off without me in it. Maybe I ought to go stand on a street corner with a sign that says, "Please kill me before I do any more damage" on my forehead.

The only reason I commented was because I can never quite work out if you believe in God and bear him a massive grudge, or you don't believe in God and are having a dig at those who do believe in God and defend him.

As I've stated countless times, I'm agnostic. I don't know what to believe. That's what "agnosticism" means. However, that doesn't prevent me from exploring the implications of what others believe or tell me is "true" (whether there is a God or not a God).

If someone tells me there is a God and that God is "good", then why do I need to be on medication in order to prevent horrible visions of terror from taking over my mind? Medications have side effects and are expensive. Why do I have sleep apnea? Hardly do I ever feel fully rested and refreshed. Instead, I drag myself to work (or wherever I need to be) half asleep and hating life. Why do I need to kill other living beings in order to survive? Why do other living beings need to kill me in order to survive? How am I supposed to do the right thing if I can't even survive unless I do evil to another living being? Something isn't adding up.

If someone tells me there is not a God, then I'm not sure if that's a desirable state of affairs, because technically, a person could do evil and thrive on it if that person is not caught or found out by mortal authorities (the only potentially moral agents who could stop him or her or hold that person accountable). Heck, a mortal authority could get away with being evil merely by managing to have the best weapons or the most cunning mind = might makes right. Or what is to prevent bad luck? What's to prevent the Earth from being smashed by an asteroid or an Earthquake from killing people who have done nothing to deserve such a fate? I think IC, has a point regarding the need for a God in order to make morality foolproof. Otherwise, justice is an imperfect and perhaps even dangerous thing (if punishment is accidentally misdirected toward the innocent, unbeknownst to a mortal judge).

[attofishpi]

Or what is to prevent bad luck? What's to prevent the Earth from being smashed by an asteroid..

Well if we don't see it coming, and everyone dies instantly at least nobody will be blaming God.

...such matters of b_lame do so upset Him.

[Harry Baird]

I am not sure enough what [Harry's purpose] is.

In this context, it is to counter-assert.

As I've made clear multiple times in this thread, I really didn't want to get drawn into a discussion of morality, but, at this point, it seems necessary, so, here goes, and I'll do it properly.

The (pithily paraphrased) assertions:

IC: "If (the Christian) God doesn't exist, then the meaning of words like 'morality' is too vague to apply." No, their meaning is sufficiently clear regardless of the existence or non-existence of (the Christian) God. See below.

AJ: "Without a Story, there is no morality." No, a Story does not determine moral truth; rather, its moral propositions and prescriptions are tested against moral truth.

The moral nihilist[1]: "Morality doesn't mean anything, or doesn't have a referent, or at least is inapplicable." On this view, although we might personally deplore the brutal torture and slaughter of an innocent child for fun, we can't say that there is anything wrong with it. To any sane person, this is obviously untrue, and so, by reductio ad absurdum, moral nihilism is false.

[1] I am not sure to what extent this includes iambiguous, because his position is too... ambiguous... to work out precisely.

My counter-assertion:

Morality is meaningful both in the sense of definition and applicability, and, given what morality does mean, moral truths are objective.

Justification:

Although there are a variety of ways of phrasing, framing, and justifying morality, they all get at and amount to essentially the same thing.

Some of them (pithily paraphrased) are:

Henry quirk (as a libertarian): "All persons have a natural right to their own life, liberty, and property, and to nobody else's."

Jesus Christ (affirming the Golden Rule): "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

The utilitarian: "Maximise well-being and minimise harm and suffering."

The virtue ethicist: "Develop those traits which are characterised by, and which lead to, treating others, and behaving, well."

Me: "Act according to the principles of fairness and of the avoidance of avoidable harm."

And so, what is it that all of these are getting at; what lies behind them? Simply put, that conscious beings can have both positive experiences of well-being, and negative experiences of harm and suffering, and that, given that - from an objective perspective - the experiences of all conscious beings are equally significant, it is obvious given what the words 'well-being', 'harm', 'suffering', and 'ought' actually mean that we ought to conduce to the former and to avoid causing the latter in our treatment of others.

From that understanding, various prescriptions and proscriptions follow that are objectively true in the sense in which I defined that term in this earlier post: true regardless of whether or not any mind is currently apprehending them, and regardless of whether or not any mind knows or even denies that they are true.

Objections and responses:

"But that's so vague, and you, hq, JC, utilitarians, virtue ethicists, and others are bound to disagree on many specific moral truths, so, no genuinely objective moral truth exists beyond your abstraction."

A wedge can immediately be driven into this objection with respect to the example above: the moral proscription that one should not brutally torture and slaughter an innocent child for fun is both (1) specific, and (2) beyond dispute amongst me, hq, JC, utilitarians, virtue ethicists, and any others, and any who do dispute it are, quite clearly and obviously, objectively wrong.

Here's another clear and obvious example: it is objectively wrong to rape another person (notwithstanding the questionable success of any highly dubitable claim to an exception in such highly hypothetical scenarios as that in which declining to rape that person would result in the torture and destruction of all life on planet Earth, or some similar far greater harm).

There are plenty of other obvious examples.

Three other points refute what remains of this objection:

Firstly, the boundary between objectively obligatory behaviour, and optional, voluntary behaviour is blurry; in the border regions, it is reasonable to expect some uncertainty and ambiguity, in which genuine disagreements can occur. That doesn't refute the objective existence of moral obligations any more than the fact that the blurriness of the boundary between a human being and the world beyond that human being refutes the objective existence of human beings (which, clearly, it doesn't).

Secondly, some moral truths depend on empirical truths which themselves are unknown or at least plausibly disputed. For example, whether or not abortion is immoral depends in part on the empirical truth of exactly when a foetus becomes conscious or when its soul enters its body - a truth that is currently unknown or at least plausibly disputed. All this demonstrates is that sometimes we don't know whether or not a moral prescription or proscription is objectively true - but, regardless of our knowledge, and with the exception of the border regions mentioned above, it either is or isn't objectively true.

Thirdly, while there are genuine moral dilemmas, in which (1) we are (seem to be) in real moral territory, not in the border regions, and (2) it genuinely isn't objectively clear what the right choice is, leading to a range of different answers from different people, for the dilemmas I have in mind this is because the candidate choices are of roughly equal moral import - i.e., causing similar harm etc, just in different ways - so that in a real sense it doesn't matter much which one is chosen, and so, even though it seems that we are in real moral territory, in a real sense we aren't after all, because a choice between roughly equal options is morally inconsequential. Though these seem, then, to be cases in which there genuinely is no objective moral truth, in a meaningful sense they're not really in the moral domain at all.

"But different societies, cultures, religions, and other groups have some quite different moral beliefs - some of which are so radically different at the same time as being so fundamental that they definitely aren't in the border regions that you mention - and so, morality is subjective, not objective."

The first two points above help to address this objection too, in that:

Firstly, the members of some groups collectively and voluntarily agree (even if only implicitly) to conform in aspects of their behaviour which are either (1) optional and voluntarily, or (2) in the border regions - and (tautologically) not because it is morally obligatory; instead, they do this for the sake of the harmony, coherence, satisfaction, sense of common purpose etc that come with that shared behaviour. Here, we have not inter-group differences in understanding of objective moral truth, but inter-group differences in preferred, optional (or border region) collective behaviour.

Secondly, radically different fundamental moral beliefs can in the best case be accounted for simply by radically different empirical beliefs - about which one or more of the groups is objectively wrong, either through ignorance, delusion, poor judgement, or some other error - and in the worst case by one or more of the groups simply being wicked - knowingly or not - in one or more aspects of its behaviour. In neither case is the existence of objective moral truth refuted.

A third point might sometimes apply too, although I can't currently bring to mind a compelling example: sometimes, the context in which a group exists determines whether or not a specific behaviour is (still objectively, just in that context) obligatory/permissible, and the different contexts of different groups make the behaviour obligatory/permissible in some but not in others.

And so...

...after at length pointing out and defending the freakin' obvious, I must, in the interests of doin' this proper-like, return to AJ's earlier post so as to point out in the context of the above even more of the freakin' obvious.

My view is that if one focuses on Nature (the Earth the way it is, without man), that one must accept that things, there, function as they do and there can be no *argument* against the natural order.

There can be no argument that the natural order is not as it is: necessarily, the natural order is as it is, and is not as it is not.

To that insipidly tautological extent, I agree, however:

There can be an argument that the natural order would (have) be(en) better if it involved less suffering, and, if the natural order was designed, and if the designer had better choices available, then there can also be an argument that the natural order ought to (have) be(en) better, by, for example, again, involving less suffering.

A story -- and the stories we are referring to -- are ones that reveal, explain or express metaphysical ideas.

I don't know if you've ever clearly enunciated what you mean in this context by a "metaphysical idea" or a "metaphysical principle", but you seem to mean them in the normative sense - so, corresponding to the moral truths that I've argued above are also objective truths. I assume, going forward, that that's the case, and, to reiterate, the purported moral truths in/of/from these stories are only morally relevant to the extent that they are actually true.

But in my view those *metaphysical ideas* come from what I prepositionally am forced to describe as *somewhere else*. They are not, in my view, part-and-parcel of the natural system. In fact, the natural system could not and cannot function with them. They are antithetical to nature.

To the extent that moral truths aren't, so to speak, "written into the laws of physics", I agree.

To the extent that the natural world - in which, often enough, one being has to kill another to live, and there's generally a lot of suffering - was designed, and to the extent to which the designer had better choices, and thus does not seem to have behaved morally, I also agree, but we (or at least I) don't know what that extent is.

To the extent to which you're asserting that the natural world is inanimate and/or deterministic, and thus that, outside of humans, it contains no moral or free agents, I strongly disagree - but I've told you that before.

So in my way of seeing and explaining, if you wish to define 'truth' you have two choices: One, to refer strictly to the natural world of biological and material processes and discover, and define, "laws" of nature. But doing that, I'm afraid, will turn against any and all definitions (admonitions) that we would describe as metaphysical impositions.

Two would be to define 'metaphysical truths' that are perceived at another level and though intellectus.

The cries of "false dichotomy" are deafening...

On what basis, then, are principles and morals true?

See my essay above: they are true simply given what morality means, and that its meaning is both - well, meaningful - and meaningfully applicable.

They are false in Nature, and this much is certain.

True or false simply don't apply in this context: it is a category error to assign a prescriptive truth value to descriptive truths.

I've snipped the rest because I've already addressed it amongst all of the above.

[Gary Childress]

...such matters of b_lame do so upset Him.

That's a shame. One would think a "god" would be more forthcoming in owning up to his/her mistakes. Apparently, God isn't any better than the average mortal, only more powerful and more dangerous.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Far too knotty, intricate, extensive and written in a style that produces, in me at least, a desire to desist.

I really am uncertain what you are on about.

I fear that saying this will frustrate you more and possibly offend you (that is not my intention) but there is nothing I can do.

Can you extract out, in abbreviated form, a kernel that I might respond to?

[Alexis Jacobi]

To the extent to which you're asserting that the natural world is inanimate and/or deterministic, and thus that, outside of humans, it contains no moral or free agents, I strongly disagree - but I've told you that before.

The world of nature is both physical/material and biological. Natural systems, ecological systems, are systems in which life feeds on life predatorily, and there is no ‘morality’ (conscious, willed choice involving intelligent contemplation and often involving a self-negation).

There do seem to be instances of altruism or perhaps “kindness” is the word. But taken on the whole, and majorly, the system is amoral. It also has a terrible and I have said a “cruel” aspect that is constant.

However, maybe if you speak a bit more (and dear God more briefly) about what you see and what you mean, I might at least understand.

[Harry Baird]

Can you extract out, in abbreviated form, a kernel that I might respond to?

Sure. Here's the Cliffs Notes version:

AJ asserts (in my pithy paraphrasing): Without a Story, there is no morality.

I respond: No, a Story does not determine moral truth; rather, its moral propositions and prescriptions are tested against moral truth.

And I counter-assert: Morality is meaningful both in the sense of definition and applicability, and, given what morality does mean, moral truths are objective.

I support that assertion as follows:

Although there are a variety of ways of phrasing, framing, and justifying morality, they all get at and amount to essentially the same thing.

What lies behind them all, simply put, is the understanding that conscious beings can have both positive experiences of well-being, and negative experiences of harm and suffering, and the understanding that, given what all the relevant words mean, we ought to conduce to the former and to avoid causing the latter in our treatment of others.

From that understanding, various prescriptions and proscriptions follow that are objectively true in the sense in which I defined that term in this earlier post: true regardless of whether or not any mind is currently apprehending them, and regardless of whether or not any mind knows or even denies that they are true.

---

I then go on to defend this assertion (in particular, that moral truths are objective truths) and justification from objections.

Finally, I respond to your earlier post. The even shorter Cliffs Notes version of that is:

Although it's true that moral truths aren't, so to speak, "written into the laws of physics", we don't have to choose between descriptive truths and prescriptive (moral) truths. That's a false dichotomy. We can have both.

[Harbal]

If someone tells me there is not a God, then I'm not sure if that's a desirable state of affairs,

Many of IC's arguments seem to be grounded on this, where the implication is that it would be better for us all to believe in God, regardless of whether he exists, or he doesn't. If belief in God makes you feel better about the world, and gives you a sense of purpose, then fine, believe in God, but I don't get the impression that the thought of God is making you feel better about anything.

[Alexis Jacobi]

AJ asserts (in my pithy paraphrasing): Without a Story, there is no morality.

Yet this paraphrase does not accurately encapsulate my thought.

Moral ideas, and ‘higher vision’ as well as principles, pertain to metaphysical categories. They certainly exist, are real, and have effects.

A Story is the vehicle through which metaphysical ideas are expressed — for didactic purposes.

Morals do not depend on a story. How morals are established is another, obviously complex, question.

[Gary Childress]

If someone tells me there is not a God, then I'm not sure if that's a desirable state of affairs,

Many of IC's arguments seem to be grounded on this, where the implication is that it would be better for us all to believe in God, regardless of whether he exists, or he doesn't. If belief in God makes you feel better about the world, and gives you a sense of purpose, then fine, believe in God, but I don't get the impression that the thought of God is making you feel better about anything.

If I understand IC's argument correctly, it seems to be that IC believes without God there can be no "objective" morality or whatever. I'm not sure what IC means by "objective" morality. I suspect for IC it all comes down to, whatever God says is "moral" is "moral", no matter what God says. I don't subscribe to such a position. That is not my understanding of how "morality" works. And I actually think it's a potentially dangerous position where something like schizophrenia or delusional thinking comes into play. I certainly wouldn't want a delusional person thinking that a delusion telling him to torture and kill me is actually God telling him to torture and kill me and therefore the "moral" thing to do. And I would like to think that God (if there is in fact one) wouldn't equip me with an incorrect understanding of how morality works. Therefore, if there is a God, then I would think "morality" = whatever God says, is not the case. But what do I know compared to an expert on God, which IC claims to be by virtue of having read the Hebrew Bible? I imagine IC enjoys the power he wields by virtue of being more knowledgeable on what is written in the Bible than most others. But that's where IC has placed all his eggs. He is going to die defending that hill, whether it's actually true or not because he enjoys the comfort and power that knowledge has so far afforded him.

¯\_(ツ)_/¯

[Harbal]

Moral ideas, and ‘higher vision’

Higher vision is all very well, but while we are gazing towards Heaven we are apt to trip over things we didn't notice here on the ground.

The Wisdom of Harbal, Chapter 6, Termites never look up.

[Gary Childress]

Morals do not depend on a story. How morals are established is another, obviously complex, question.

I don't know "how" morals are "established". I don't know if such knowledge is even possible for any mortal being in this world. I just have them, am generally guided by them, and adhere to them as best as I am able to without shooting myself in the head as a consequence of following them. That seems to be all I am really capable of caring about concerning 'morals'. In case you or anyone else is interested.

¯\_(ツ)_/¯