Free Will and Determinism Necessitate Eachother

[Terrapin Station]

Determinism applies to physical actions in the universe. It does not apply to mental thoughts.

But Determinists think...and have to insist...that it does. Because if "mental thoughts" are a part of the universe, then Materialism insists they must be strictly material, nothing else; and thus they also must be bound by Determinism.

First off, someone saying "Determinism applies to physical actions in the universe. It does not apply to mental thoughts" obviously believes either that (a) "mental thoughts" are not physical (actions), or (b) "mental thoughts" are not (physical actions) in the universe, or both (a) and (b).

Whether that person should really be called a determinist is a different issue. I'd say "No," but that would be simply based on normal usage of the term and the contextual fact that there's not really anyone who argues that nothing is causally determined, so making a distinction there is of negligible utility (and will only tend to confuse).

Finally, as I keep explaining, one can be a materialist and NOT a determinist. Again, I'm an example of one of those people. You should be able to understand how one can be a materialist and not a determinist, despite you thinking that materialism is ridiculous.

[Terrapin Station]

As I say up-thread: cause and effect seems to be in place, everywhere, all the time.

Hence why preliminary stuff is necessary, and at this point, you're getting a swirly if we need to go all the way back to this again.

Again, not everyone believes that (deterministic) cause and effect is how the world uniformly works. So then this would just get back to a dispute over whether "the world is thoroughly deterministic" is supportable.

[henry quirk]

Hence why preliminary stuff is necessary, and at this point, you're getting a swirly if we need to go all the way back to this again.

No, the prelims aren't necessary...I got your spiel...as my waste of time up-thread illustrates, I just don't agree with you.


Again, not everyone believes that (deterministic) cause and effect is how the world uniformly works.

And not everyone believes probabilistic/non-equiprobability is sumthin' other than complex cause and effect (causal determinism).


So then this would just get back to a dispute over whether "the world is thoroughly deterministic" is supportable.

If your notion of free will depends on the world, or some aspect of it, bein' sumthin' other than causally determined, yeah, we're back at square one (or, you are...I got no interest in ridin' the merry go round on this...Mannie does, though).

Bottonline: I'm an outrageous, won't give an inch, incompatibilist; you're a sensible, middle ground-seekin', compatibilist.

[Terrapin Station]

No, the prelims aren't necessary...I got your spiel...as my waste of time up-thread illustrates, I just don't agree with you.

Right, hence why we'd need to instead discuss whether there's good reason to believe that determinism is the case in general, outside of a free will discussion. We're not going to get anywhere if we can't get past that, because you'll always just disagree on the basis that in your view determinism is the case in general.

And not everyone believes probabilistic/non-equiprobability is sumthin' other than complex cause and effect (causal determinism).

Probabilistic phenomena are defined in this case as ontologically probabilistic, not just epistemically probabilistic, so there's only space to disagree on whether there is any such thing.

If your notion of free will depends on the world, or some aspect of it, bein' sumthin' other than causally determined, yeah, we're back at square one

Exactly. Hence why we need to resolve square one prior to moving on. That's why I didn't want to move on at first. It's a waste of time if we don't resolve the prerequisites.

you're a sensible, middle ground-seekin', compatibilist.

??? I'm not at all a compatibilist. I think that compatibilism is either incoherent or simply changing the topic.

[henry quirk]

I'm not at all a compatibilist.

Okay.


...hence why we'd need to instead discuss...Hence why we need to resolve...

You and Mannie can hash that out.

[RCSaunders]

The actions of the "agent", and everything that happens in it, including thinking, processes in neurons, everything obeys the laws of nature, and is "limited" by them. Is there a scientific opinion that something does not obey the laws of nature? After all, no.

What god revealed to you that the only laws of nature were physical laws? There is no mystical necessity for everything to be determined by physical attributes, and no reason to suppose everything must be explained as a physical process, especially if you are conscious. There is no reason to assume that non-physical consciousness is not a perfectly natural attribute of objective existence, unless you just deny it altogether.

[RCSaunders]

There is no reason a machine could not be designed and programmed to make statements like, "I am not conscious and do not have volition," and of course the statement would be correct. Such a machine could be made even to simulate a human being like modern so-called sex-robots and be programmed to make any statement.

That explanation won't work, because the phrase "be programmed" requires a "programmer." So it, too, presupposes volition...not on the part of the automaton, now, but on the part of the creator or programmer of the automaton. Choice again.

Explanation of what? It's not an explanation of anything, just a description of a perfectly possible experiment. What do you think it's trying to explain?

Of course you and I know if the declaration is really being made by a living human being, it is not true, but there is not much point in arguing with someone who denies their own nature, is there?

Well, "programming" is of two types. Literally, as you point out, it refers to the sort of operation we do with computers -- mechanical, and without actual intelligence in the so-called 'dumb terminal'. But metaphorically, we use it of, say, members of a cult victims of propaganda; we speak of "deprogramming" them. Or "red pilling," if you prefer. It just means awakening their slumbering intelligence.

So long as the entity in question does think, at all, there is a window for such deprogramming. And all human beings think, even when they try not to, and even when they deny that they do. For it takes a thought to say such a thing.

So yes, I think there is merit in deprogramming or trying to deprogram a person who is denying his/her own nature. It may work, or it may not; I think it's still the right thing to do.

Well, of course you would. Like any good collectivist you believe some people ought to interfere in other's lives, "for their own good," and of course you are just the one to know what is good for others.

Personally, I regard all such uninvited intrusions into other's lives criminal abuse. Who appointed you savior of the world?

But all of that has nothing to do with my point about the nature of subjective consciousness, but that never stops you from using anything to promote your agenda.

[Immanuel Can]

Determinism applies to physical actions in the universe. It does not apply to mental thoughts.

But Determinists think...and have to insist...that it does. Because if "mental thoughts" are a part of the universe, then Materialism insists they must be strictly material, nothing else; and thus they also must be bound by Determinism.

You don't know that.

Yeah, actually, we do: not because we have to "know what's in their minds." All we have to know is what "Determinism" actually entails.

It's a definitional question, not a matter of empirical knowledge of their feelings or thoughts. If they don't believe that "mental thoughts" are physical, then they aren't actually "Materialists" or "Physicalists," regardless of what they imagine.

Neither view allows that the mental can be anything BUT physical.

[Immanuel Can]

So why do I have to repeat the same thing so many times before you present an objection to it?

I've been presenting that objection since the start.

Quote an earlier instance of it, or any earlier instance of a specific objection against my characterization of determinism.

Page 11, multiple times.

Your view whether materialism is acceptable has nothing at all to do with it being possible (and it should have nothing to do with understanding that it's possible) to be a materialist/physicalist while not being a determinist.

I understand what Materialism and Physicalism entail. That's all I need to know to know that a) they're Deterministic, and b) they are reductional, since I can see that they fail to provide any adequate explanation for phenomena that are routinely observable.

But Materialism has inevitable implications for causality, so let's get to those.

Can you present an argument for that?

Do I need to?

It's very simple. The mechanics of the universe are either entirely preordained by the causal chain, or they are not. Materialism and Physicalism insist that the causal chain is entirely made up of (as you say) physical things and their associated dynamics. These preordain everything. In that scheme, that description of the causal chain, there is no place in either for things like "mind," "cognition," "reason," "science" or "logic" to be anything but the inevitable concatenations of prior physical events, and nothing else.

That's awfully basic. But as you say, let's toddle before we ride, I suppose.

But now, let's ask you the same question I've been asking for a long time now: what's your evidence that Materialism and Physicalism can rationalize non-Determinism?

Go.

[Immanuel Can]

...someone saying "Determinism applies to physical actions in the universe. It does not apply to mental thoughts" obviously believes either that (a) "mental thoughts" are not physical (actions), or (b) "mental thoughts" are not (physical actions) in the universe, or both (a) and (b).

Right. There is no such entity in the Determinist causal chain as "mental thoughts." They don't cause anything. Only physical forces do.

And that's Deterministic.

Whether that person should really be called a determinist is a different issue. I'd say "No,"

I would agree...what JJ is describing is neither Determinism, nor, obviously is it Materialism or Physicalism. He's thinking there can be a special category for "mental thoughts" which is NOT material or physical. That's just not so.

Finally, as I keep explaining, one can be a materialist and NOT a determinist.

You keep asserting and asserting it, yes; and you're tiring us both out by so doing. But you've offered zero proof of that claim. We presently have no reason at all to accept that you're right about that. And I would argue, we have every reason to think you wrong.

You can't blame us for wanting to "see your work" on that. And it's a mystery why you refuse to present it. All along, I've been hoping to see something new or surprising to justify your very odd claim that Materialism or Physicalism are not Deterministic. But all you do is assert the claim again and again, with no justification.

When are you going to answer?

[Immanuel Can]

There is no reason a machine could not be designed and programmed to make statements like, "I am not conscious and do not have volition," and of course the statement would be correct. Such a machine could be made even to simulate a human being like modern so-called sex-robots and be programmed to make any statement.

That explanation won't work, because the phrase "be programmed" requires a "programmer." So it, too, presupposes volition...not on the part of the automaton, now, but on the part of the creator or programmer of the automaton. Choice again.

Explanation of what? It's not an explanation of anything, just a description of a perfectly possible experiment. What do you think it's trying to explain?

Sorry. I thought you were trying to make a point. My mistake, I guess.

Like any good collectivist...

Are you on something?

The last thing I am is a "Collectivist." Wow; it's like you never read anything I said.

[Janoah]

The actions of the "agent", and everything that happens in it, including thinking, processes in neurons, everything obeys the laws of nature, and is "limited" by them. Is there a scientific opinion that something does not obey the laws of nature? After all, no.

non-physical consciousness

these are old wives' tales, or have you heard about such a scientific definition?

[Terrapin Station]

Page 11, multiple times.

Don't be so lazy. Copying and pasting isn't that hard (assuming that what you're claiming is there is actually there. I'm saying it's not.)

I understand what Materialism and Physicalism entail.

I gave you a definition that you agreed to. That definition had nothing about determinism in it.

If you're saying that it's a necessary consequence of that definition, you need to provide an argument for it.

I didn't think you were yet another friggin crank here, but it seems like you're turning out to be. Stop wasting my time with these responses where I have to just keep repeating stuff.

[Janoah]

*That's one way to look at it.

Another...

Agent causation: a being who is not an event but who is an agent can cause events, in particular, his own actions. Agent causation contrasts with event causation, which occurs when an event causes another event. (swiped from the ubiquitous wikipedia)


**That's one way to look at it.

Another...

https://mindmatters.ai/2020/02/why-pion ... the-brain/ (a link I've posted many times, in multiple threads, cuz it's so damn useful)

The actions of the "agent", and everything that happens in it, including thinking, processes in neurons, everything obeys the laws of nature, and is "limited" by them. Is there a scientific opinion that something does not obey the laws of nature? After all, no.

Has it been established that mind, will, intent, purpose, personality, identity, etc. are processes in neurons? If so, then I'd like to see the map of it all along with the relevant explanations of how the brain generates mind, will, intent, purpose, personality, identity, etc.

Higher cerebral functions
The neurons of the cerebral cortex constitute the highest level of control in the hierarchy of the nervous system. Consequently, the terms higher cerebral functions and higher cortical functions are used by neurologists and neuroscientists to refer to all conscious mental activity, such as thinking, remembering, and reasoning, and to complex volitional behaviour such as speaking and carrying out purposive movement.
https://www.britannica.com/science/huma ... -functions

The frontal lobe is associated with executive functions including self-control, planning, reasoning, and abstract thought
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_brain

[Terrapin Station]

Right. There is no such entity in the Determinist causal chain as "mental thoughts." They don't cause anything. Only physical forces do.

Oy vey. I think this stuff is too hard for you.

IF someone is a determinist and IF they're a physicalist who isn't an eliminative materialist, they're going to say that mentality is part of a physical, causal chain.

I'm a physicalist who isn't a determinist, of course. I'd still say that mentality is causal and part of a physical, causal chain in plenty of cases, but as I'm not a determinist, I don't believe that the physical world in general is thoroughly such that only one option is possible from each antecedent state.

But you've offered zero proof of that claim.

What in the f-ing hell? The only "proof" you should need is that if you were to ask me:

"Are you a physicalist?"

I'd answer, "Yes."

But if you were to ask me:

"Are you a determinist?"

I'd answer "No."

How is that not "proof" that I'm a physicalist who is not a determinist?

I mean, we might not understand how someone holds the stances that they do, but to need "proof" that they hold the stances they do seems absurd. Just ask them and they'll tell you what they think.