Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

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Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:43 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:32 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:29 am

lol--that's what you gave as the source of the claim that naive realism claims infallibility.

So what's your alternate source?
When anyone referenced Wiki it is a starting point subject to further verifications and research. Note I added the other points which you ignored.
Your alternate source?
Repeat,

Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32481

I have provided the relevant links therein.

In addition, note
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32814

Why don't you go over Russell's argument point by point and show where he is wrong?
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Prob ... /Chapter_1
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12356
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:43 am Your alternate source?
Here the Russell in Chapter 1 re "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Prob ... /Chapter_1

Suggest you read point 1 to 20 carefully and provide your argument why you think Russell is likely to be stupid in making such a proposal against naive realism.

"Quote"
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER I
APPEARANCE AND REALITY

1. Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight might not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can be asked. When we have realised the obstacles in the way of a straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the study of philosophy—for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realising all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.

2. In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print. By turning my head I see out of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that the sun is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot globe many times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's rotation, it rises every morning, and will continue to do so for an indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other normal person comes into my room, he will see the same chairs and tables and books and papers as I see, and that the table which I see is the same as the table which I feel pressing against my arm. All this seems to be so evident as to be hardly worth stating, except in answer to a man who doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be reasonably doubted, and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true.

3. To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound. Any one else who sees and feels and hears the table will agree with this description, so that it might seem as if no difficulty would arise; but as soon as we try to be more precise our troubles begin. Although I believe that the table is "really" of the same colour all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts, and some parts look white because of reflected light. I know that, if I move, the parts that reflect the light will be different, so that the apparent distribution of colours on the table will change. It follows that if several people are looking at the table at the same moment, no two of them will see exactly the same distribution of colours, because no two can see it from exactly the same point of view, and any change in the point of view makes some change in the way the light is reflected.

4. For most practical purposes these differences are unimportant, but to the painter they are all-important: the painter has to unlearn the habit of thinking that things seem to have the colour which common sense says they "really" have, and to learn the habit of seeing things as they appear. Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy—the distinction between "appearance" and "reality," between what things seem to be and what they are. The painter wants to know what things seem to be, the practical man and the philosopher want to know what they are; but the philosopher's wish to know this is stronger than the practical man's, and is more troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question.

5. To return to the table. It is evident from what we have found, that there is no colour which pre-eminently appears to be the colour of the table, or even of any one particular part of the table—it appears to be of different colours from different points of view, and there is no reason for regarding some of these as more really its colour than others. And we know that even from a given point of view the colour will seem different by artificial light, or to a colour-blind man, or to a man wearing blue spectacles, while in the dark there will be no colour at all, though to touch and hearing the table will be unchanged. Thus colour is not something which is inherent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator and the way the light falls on the table. When, in ordinary life, we speak of the colour of the table, we only mean the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of light. But the other colours which appear under other conditions have just as good a right to be considered real; and therefore, to avoid favouritism, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one particular colour.

6. The same thing applies to the texture. With the naked eye one can see the grain, but otherwise the table looks smooth and even. If we look at it through a microscope, we should see roughnesses and hills and valleys, and all sorts of differences that are imperceptible to the naked eye. Which of these is the "real" table? We are naturally tempted to say that what we see through the microscope is more real, but that in turn would be changed by a still more powerful microscope. If, then, we cannot trust what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we see through a microscope? Thus, again, the confidence in our senses with which we began deserts us.

7. The shape of the table is no better. We are all in the habit of judging as to the "real" shapes of things, and we do this so unreflectingly that we come to think we actually see the real shapes. But, in fact, as we all have to learn if we try to draw, a given thing looks different in shape from every different point of view. If our table is "really" rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it had two acute angles and two obtuse angles. If opposite sides are parallel, they will look as if they converged to a point away from the spectator; if they are of equal length, they will look as if the nearer side were longer. All these things are not commonly noticed in looking at a table, because experience has taught us to construct the "real" shape from the apparent shape, and the "real" shape is what interests us as practical men. But the "real" shape is not what we see; it is something inferred from what we see. And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we move about the room; so that here again the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the table.

8. Similar difficulties arise when we consider the sense of touch. It is true that the table always gives us a sensation of hardness, and we feel that it resists pressure. But the sensation we obtain depends upon how hard we press the table and also upon what part of the body we press with; thus the various sensations due to various pressures or various parts of the body cannot be supposed to reveal directly any definite property of the table, but at most to be signs of some property which perhaps causes all the sensations, but is not actually apparent in any of them. And the same applies still more obviously to the sounds which can be elicited by rapping the table.

9. Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known. Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be?

10. It will help us in considering these questions to have a few simple terms of which the meaning is definite and clear. Let us give the name of "sense-data" to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name "sensation" to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that of which we are immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. It is plain that if we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-data—brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc.—which we associate with the table; but for the reasons which have been given, we cannot say that the table is the sense-data, or even that the sense-data are directly properties of the table. Thus a problem arises as to the relation of the sense-data to the real table, supposing there is such a thing.

11. The real table, if it exists, we will call a "physical object." Thus we have to consider the relation of sense-data to physical objects. The collection of all physical objects is called "matter." Thus our two questions may be re-stated as follows: (1) Is there any such thing as matter? (2) If so, what is its nature?

12. The philosopher who first brought prominently forward the reasons for regarding the immediate objects of our senses as not existing independently of us was Bishop Berkeley (1685–1753). His Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists, undertake to prove that there is no such thing as matter at all, and that the world consists of nothing but minds and their ideas. Hylas has hitherto believed in matter, but he is no match for Philonous, who mercilessly drives him into contradictions and paradoxes, and makes his own denial of matter seem, in the end, as if it were almost common sense. The arguments employed are of very different value: some are important and sound, others are confused or quibbling. But Berkeley retains the merit of having shown that the existence of matter is capable of being denied without absurdity, and that if there are any things that exist independently of us they cannot be the immediate objects of our sensations.

13. There are two different questions involved when we ask whether matter exists, and it is important to keep them clear. We commonly mean by "matter" something which is opposed to "mind," something which we think of as occupying space and as radically incapable of any sort of thought or consciousness. It is chiefly in this sense that Berkeley denies matter; that is to say, he does not deny that the sense-data which we commonly take as signs of the existence of the table are really signs of the existence of something independent of us, but he does deny that this something is non-mental, that it is neither mind nor ideas entertained by some mind. He admits that there must be something which continues to exist when we go out of the room or shut our eyes, and that what we call seeing the table does really give us reason for believing in something which persists even when we are not seeing it. But he thinks that this something cannot be radically different in nature from what we see, and cannot be independent of seeing altogether, though it must be independent of our seeing. He is thus led to regard the "real" table as an idea in the mind of God. Such an idea has the required permanence and independence of ourselves, without being—as matter would otherwise be—something quite unknowable, in the sense that we can only infer it, and can never be directly and immediately aware of it.

14. Other philosophers since Berkeley have also held that, although the table does not depend for its existence upon being seen by me, it does depend upon being seen (or otherwise apprehended in sensation) by some mind—not necessarily the mind of God, but more often the whole collective mind of the universe. This they hold, as Berkeley does, chiefly because they think there can be nothing real—or at any rate nothing known to be real—except minds and their thoughts and feelings. We might state the argument by which they support their view in some such way as this: "Whatever can be thought of is an idea in the mind of the person thinking of it; therefore nothing can be thought of except ideas in minds; therefore anything else is inconceivable, and what is inconceivable cannot exist."

15. Such an argument, in my opinion, is fallacious; and of course those who advance it do not put it so shortly or so crudely. But whether valid or not, the argument has been very widely advanced in one form or another; and very many philosophers, perhaps a majority, have held that there is nothing real except minds and their ideas. Such philosophers are called "idealists." When they come to explaining matter, they either say, like Berkeley, that matter is really nothing but a collection of ideas, or they say, like Leibniz (1646–1716), that what appears as matter is really a collection of more or less rudimentary minds.

16. But these philosophers, though they deny matter as opposed to mind, nevertheless, in another sense, admit matter. It will be remembered that we asked two questions; namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be? Now both Berkeley and Leibniz admit that there is a real table, but Berkeley says it is certain ideas in the mind of God, and Leibniz says it is a colony of souls. Thus both of them answer our first question in the affirmative, and only diverge from the views of ordinary mortals in their answer to our second question. In fact, almost all philosophers seem to be agreed that there is a real table: they almost all agree that, however much our sense-data—colour, shape, smoothness, etc.—may depend upon us, yet their occurrence is a sign of something existing independently of us, something differing, perhaps, completely from our sense-data, and yet to be regarded as causing those sense-data whenever we are in a suitable relation to the real table.

17. Now obviously this point in which the philosophers are agreed—the view that there is a real table, whatever its nature may be—is vitally important, and it will be worth while to consider what reasons there are for accepting this view before we go on to the further question as to the nature of the real table. Our next chapter, therefore, will be concerned with the reasons for supposing that there is a real table at all.

18. Before we go farther it will be well to consider for a moment what it is that we have discovered so far. It has appeared that, if we take any common object of the sort that is supposed to be known by the senses, what the senses immediately tell us is not the truth about the object as it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sense-data which, so far as we can see, depend upon the relations between us and the object. Thus what we directly see and feel is merely "appearance," which we believe to be a sign of some "reality" behind. But if the reality is not what appears, have we any means of knowing whether there is any reality at all? And if so, have we any means of finding out what it is like?

19. Such questions are bewildering, and it is difficult to know that even the strangest hypotheses may not be true. Thus our familiar table, which has roused but the slightest thoughts in us hitherto, has become a problem full of surprising possibilities. The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems. Beyond this modest result, so far, we have the most complete liberty of conjecture. Leibniz tells us it is a community of souls; Berkeley tells us it is an idea in the mind of God; sober science, scarcely less wonderful, tells us it is a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion.

20. Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all. Philosophy, if it cannot answer so many questions as we could wish, has at least the power of asking questions which increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life.

"Unquote"
Atla
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 3:44 am
Atla wrote: Sat May 15, 2021 9:47 am Point is, we can single out anything we want and say that the universe is "conditioned" upon it.

1. Universe is conditioned upon human conditions
2. Universe is conditioned upon stardust
3. Universe is conditioned upon gravity
4. Universe is conditioned upon spacetime
5. Universe is conditioned upon Stalin-ness
6. Universe is conditioned upon cat conditions (my personal favourite)

In the ultimate sense, "human conditions" play no special role. I don't see anything here that would be a flaw in indirect realism.
1 is a universal condition.
2-4 are partial conditions.

5 & 6 is based on lack of intelligence and ignorance.

The concept of "human conditions" is ultimately significant for the progress of humanity in that it implied humans are part-and-parcel-of and contributed to "what is reality".
From this perspective it implies that humans has at least some control over its destiny rather than be independent objects [realists' view] at the mercy of whatever is external and independent to it.

The above is the ultimate sense and this does not mean all humans should abandon the common, conventional and other perspectives of reality.
Again: in indirect realism, 1 is not a universal condition anymore than 2-6. Reality refers to all of reality in the ultimate sense, not just appearances in the human mind. 1-6 are all part-and-parcel of reality, and the progress of humanity is irrelevant here.

Simply restating the massive mistake your philosophy is based on doesn't work, you have to make a case for it. Just because you want it to be true, doesn't automatically make it true.

Perhaps there is no table at all, but our most reasonable guess is that there is one, we just can never know what it's really like.
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Terrapin Station
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 5:40 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:43 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:32 am
When anyone referenced Wiki it is a starting point subject to further verifications and research. Note I added the other points which you ignored.
Your alternate source?
Repeat,

Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32481

I have provided the relevant links therein.

In addition, note
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32814

Why don't you go over Russell's argument point by point and show where he is wrong?
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Prob ... /Chapter_1
In other words, you have no alternate source and you're trying to change the topic, you're trying to deflect to something else.
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Terrapin Station
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Location: NYC Man

Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 7:17 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:43 am Your alternate source?
Here the Russell in Chapter 1 re "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Prob ... /Chapter_1

Suggest you read point 1 to 20 carefully and provide your argument why you think Russell is likely to be stupid in making such a proposal against naive realism.

"Quote"
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER I
APPEARANCE AND REALITY

1. Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight might not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can be asked. When we have realised the obstacles in the way of a straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the study of philosophy—for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realising all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.

2. In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print. By turning my head I see out of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that the sun is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot globe many times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's rotation, it rises every morning, and will continue to do so for an indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other normal person comes into my room, he will see the same chairs and tables and books and papers as I see, and that the table which I see is the same as the table which I feel pressing against my arm. All this seems to be so evident as to be hardly worth stating, except in answer to a man who doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be reasonably doubted, and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true.

3. To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound. Any one else who sees and feels and hears the table will agree with this description, so that it might seem as if no difficulty would arise; but as soon as we try to be more precise our troubles begin. Although I believe that the table is "really" of the same colour all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts, and some parts look white because of reflected light. I know that, if I move, the parts that reflect the light will be different, so that the apparent distribution of colours on the table will change. It follows that if several people are looking at the table at the same moment, no two of them will see exactly the same distribution of colours, because no two can see it from exactly the same point of view, and any change in the point of view makes some change in the way the light is reflected.

4. For most practical purposes these differences are unimportant, but to the painter they are all-important: the painter has to unlearn the habit of thinking that things seem to have the colour which common sense says they "really" have, and to learn the habit of seeing things as they appear. Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy—the distinction between "appearance" and "reality," between what things seem to be and what they are. The painter wants to know what things seem to be, the practical man and the philosopher want to know what they are; but the philosopher's wish to know this is stronger than the practical man's, and is more troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question.

5. To return to the table. It is evident from what we have found, that there is no colour which pre-eminently appears to be the colour of the table, or even of any one particular part of the table—it appears to be of different colours from different points of view, and there is no reason for regarding some of these as more really its colour than others. And we know that even from a given point of view the colour will seem different by artificial light, or to a colour-blind man, or to a man wearing blue spectacles, while in the dark there will be no colour at all, though to touch and hearing the table will be unchanged. Thus colour is not something which is inherent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator and the way the light falls on the table. When, in ordinary life, we speak of the colour of the table, we only mean the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of light. But the other colours which appear under other conditions have just as good a right to be considered real; and therefore, to avoid favouritism, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one particular colour.

6. The same thing applies to the texture. With the naked eye one can see the grain, but otherwise the table looks smooth and even. If we look at it through a microscope, we should see roughnesses and hills and valleys, and all sorts of differences that are imperceptible to the naked eye. Which of these is the "real" table? We are naturally tempted to say that what we see through the microscope is more real, but that in turn would be changed by a still more powerful microscope. If, then, we cannot trust what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we see through a microscope? Thus, again, the confidence in our senses with which we began deserts us.

7. The shape of the table is no better. We are all in the habit of judging as to the "real" shapes of things, and we do this so unreflectingly that we come to think we actually see the real shapes. But, in fact, as we all have to learn if we try to draw, a given thing looks different in shape from every different point of view. If our table is "really" rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it had two acute angles and two obtuse angles. If opposite sides are parallel, they will look as if they converged to a point away from the spectator; if they are of equal length, they will look as if the nearer side were longer. All these things are not commonly noticed in looking at a table, because experience has taught us to construct the "real" shape from the apparent shape, and the "real" shape is what interests us as practical men. But the "real" shape is not what we see; it is something inferred from what we see. And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we move about the room; so that here again the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the table.

8. Similar difficulties arise when we consider the sense of touch. It is true that the table always gives us a sensation of hardness, and we feel that it resists pressure. But the sensation we obtain depends upon how hard we press the table and also upon what part of the body we press with; thus the various sensations due to various pressures or various parts of the body cannot be supposed to reveal directly any definite property of the table, but at most to be signs of some property which perhaps causes all the sensations, but is not actually apparent in any of them. And the same applies still more obviously to the sounds which can be elicited by rapping the table.

9. Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known. Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be?

10. It will help us in considering these questions to have a few simple terms of which the meaning is definite and clear. Let us give the name of "sense-data" to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name "sensation" to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that of which we are immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. It is plain that if we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-data—brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc.—which we associate with the table; but for the reasons which have been given, we cannot say that the table is the sense-data, or even that the sense-data are directly properties of the table. Thus a problem arises as to the relation of the sense-data to the real table, supposing there is such a thing.

11. The real table, if it exists, we will call a "physical object." Thus we have to consider the relation of sense-data to physical objects. The collection of all physical objects is called "matter." Thus our two questions may be re-stated as follows: (1) Is there any such thing as matter? (2) If so, what is its nature?

12. The philosopher who first brought prominently forward the reasons for regarding the immediate objects of our senses as not existing independently of us was Bishop Berkeley (1685–1753). His Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists, undertake to prove that there is no such thing as matter at all, and that the world consists of nothing but minds and their ideas. Hylas has hitherto believed in matter, but he is no match for Philonous, who mercilessly drives him into contradictions and paradoxes, and makes his own denial of matter seem, in the end, as if it were almost common sense. The arguments employed are of very different value: some are important and sound, others are confused or quibbling. But Berkeley retains the merit of having shown that the existence of matter is capable of being denied without absurdity, and that if there are any things that exist independently of us they cannot be the immediate objects of our sensations.

13. There are two different questions involved when we ask whether matter exists, and it is important to keep them clear. We commonly mean by "matter" something which is opposed to "mind," something which we think of as occupying space and as radically incapable of any sort of thought or consciousness. It is chiefly in this sense that Berkeley denies matter; that is to say, he does not deny that the sense-data which we commonly take as signs of the existence of the table are really signs of the existence of something independent of us, but he does deny that this something is non-mental, that it is neither mind nor ideas entertained by some mind. He admits that there must be something which continues to exist when we go out of the room or shut our eyes, and that what we call seeing the table does really give us reason for believing in something which persists even when we are not seeing it. But he thinks that this something cannot be radically different in nature from what we see, and cannot be independent of seeing altogether, though it must be independent of our seeing. He is thus led to regard the "real" table as an idea in the mind of God. Such an idea has the required permanence and independence of ourselves, without being—as matter would otherwise be—something quite unknowable, in the sense that we can only infer it, and can never be directly and immediately aware of it.

14. Other philosophers since Berkeley have also held that, although the table does not depend for its existence upon being seen by me, it does depend upon being seen (or otherwise apprehended in sensation) by some mind—not necessarily the mind of God, but more often the whole collective mind of the universe. This they hold, as Berkeley does, chiefly because they think there can be nothing real—or at any rate nothing known to be real—except minds and their thoughts and feelings. We might state the argument by which they support their view in some such way as this: "Whatever can be thought of is an idea in the mind of the person thinking of it; therefore nothing can be thought of except ideas in minds; therefore anything else is inconceivable, and what is inconceivable cannot exist."

15. Such an argument, in my opinion, is fallacious; and of course those who advance it do not put it so shortly or so crudely. But whether valid or not, the argument has been very widely advanced in one form or another; and very many philosophers, perhaps a majority, have held that there is nothing real except minds and their ideas. Such philosophers are called "idealists." When they come to explaining matter, they either say, like Berkeley, that matter is really nothing but a collection of ideas, or they say, like Leibniz (1646–1716), that what appears as matter is really a collection of more or less rudimentary minds.

16. But these philosophers, though they deny matter as opposed to mind, nevertheless, in another sense, admit matter. It will be remembered that we asked two questions; namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be? Now both Berkeley and Leibniz admit that there is a real table, but Berkeley says it is certain ideas in the mind of God, and Leibniz says it is a colony of souls. Thus both of them answer our first question in the affirmative, and only diverge from the views of ordinary mortals in their answer to our second question. In fact, almost all philosophers seem to be agreed that there is a real table: they almost all agree that, however much our sense-data—colour, shape, smoothness, etc.—may depend upon us, yet their occurrence is a sign of something existing independently of us, something differing, perhaps, completely from our sense-data, and yet to be regarded as causing those sense-data whenever we are in a suitable relation to the real table.

17. Now obviously this point in which the philosophers are agreed—the view that there is a real table, whatever its nature may be—is vitally important, and it will be worth while to consider what reasons there are for accepting this view before we go on to the further question as to the nature of the real table. Our next chapter, therefore, will be concerned with the reasons for supposing that there is a real table at all.

18. Before we go farther it will be well to consider for a moment what it is that we have discovered so far. It has appeared that, if we take any common object of the sort that is supposed to be known by the senses, what the senses immediately tell us is not the truth about the object as it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sense-data which, so far as we can see, depend upon the relations between us and the object. Thus what we directly see and feel is merely "appearance," which we believe to be a sign of some "reality" behind. But if the reality is not what appears, have we any means of knowing whether there is any reality at all? And if so, have we any means of finding out what it is like?

19. Such questions are bewildering, and it is difficult to know that even the strangest hypotheses may not be true. Thus our familiar table, which has roused but the slightest thoughts in us hitherto, has become a problem full of surprising possibilities. The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems. Beyond this modest result, so far, we have the most complete liberty of conjecture. Leibniz tells us it is a community of souls; Berkeley tells us it is an idea in the mind of God; sober science, scarcely less wonderful, tells us it is a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion.

20. Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all. Philosophy, if it cannot answer so many questions as we could wish, has at least the power of asking questions which increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life.

"Unquote"
If only that had anything at all to do with whether any naive realists claim that naive realism is infallible.

What this tells me is that you really don't understand what you're reading very well; you can't contextualize what you're reading very well. The above doesn't even make any claim about any definition of naive realism as a stance on philosophy of perception whatsoever. It never mentions naive realism per se, and yet, with you apparently aware that naive realism is a stance that certain philosophers hold in philosophy of perception, you're taking it to imply something it doesn't even come close to saying about just what those philosophers' stance is, just how they'd define their position.

By the way, naive realism also has absolutely nothing to do with the issue of epistemic certainty.
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by RCSaunders »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am You are SO ignorant.
Oh yes, I am ignorant of many things. In fact, there are more things I don't know than there are that I do, and that always will be so. That's why I never stop studying, thinking about, and learning new things. It's because there is one thing that terrifies me, that I might end up with that kind of intellectual stagnation that results from believing whatever one has been taught and never thinking for themselves, as you have.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am This is laughable.
Then I hoped you laughed. I like to see people happy.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am You are claiming atoms are real because there are real apples, real fruit, real cars, real people, real whatever.
Yes, that's what I said. If there were no real things that can actually be perceived, there would be no atoms.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am What about real atom-bombs that killed millions in Japan?
It is such real atom-bombs that killed millions in Japan that is an indication 'atoms' are real.
You've got it. Good examples. If there were no real atom-bombs, real Japanese, or any other real things one can actually see and feel, there would be no atoms. I'm relieved to see you agree with me.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am To update your knowledge of what are real atoms, just google "real atoms" and the note the numerous researches and images from the search.
I began my study of, "atoms," before you were born and probably before your parents were born. I had my own cloud chamber in 1952, I have stayed pretty much up to date with nuclear physics since. I'll forgive that mistake since there is no way you could have known what I have studied in the past. This is just so you won't make the same ignorant mistake again.

I know you have a little reading comprehension problem, which is nothing to be ashamed of. Lot's of intelligent people have that problem. I never said atoms weren't real. They are as real as momentum or mass. They are explanations of certain aspects of the real physical world we are directly conscious of, just as momentum and mass are, but, if there were no real physical entities that could be perceived, there would be no mass, no momentum, and NO ATOMS.
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by henry quirk »

Note your use of "I" at every corner.
That is a very personal and subjective 'apple' you are dealing not an objective apple out there independent of anyone's beliefs or opinions.


C'mon, guy...you know damn well I'm not just talkin' about me. Direct realism applies to all of us. In fact it applies to all higher life. The penguin, as he bellyslides across the ice, apprehends the ice; the wolf, as he eyes the caribou, apprehends the caribou; the octopus, as he runs his tentacles over the crab, lookin' for a means of entry, apprehends the crab. Not a one of them, not you, not me, not anyone, generates models or representations of the world in their brains.

Playin' around with semantic loopholes: you're better than that, VA.


Generally it is is accepted that the greater the precision, the greater the degree of realness of whatever is real.

No. Precision is only about clarity, not realness. Without my glasses the world is fuzzy. My visual apprehension is flawed. The world is not less real becuz I have crappy eyes.


Model-dependent realism

Don't care about that.

I'm defendin' this (edited to eliminate your semantic exploit)...

Direct Realism

The world exists, exists independent of us, and is apprehended by us as it is (*not in its entirety but as it is). We **apprehend it directly, without the aid of or intervention of [insert hypothetical whatsis] and without constructing a model or representation of the world somewhere in our heads.

*If you take into account perspective (where the observer stands in relation to the observed); intervening, inconstant, possible, distortions (water instead of atmo, for example); and the inherent limits of the observer himself; then what is seen is as it is.

**Direct realism, of course, is not just about sight. Hearing, taste, smell, touch: the entire interface of a person as he's in the world is the concern of the direct realist. That's why I define it as I do. Apprehension covers it all, the whole of a person's direct contact with the world.
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 10:35 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 5:40 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:43 am
Your alternate source?
Repeat,

Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32481

I have provided the relevant links therein.

In addition, note
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32814

Why don't you go over Russell's argument point by point and show where he is wrong?
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Prob ... /Chapter_1
In other words, you have no alternate source and you're trying to change the topic, you're trying to deflect to something else.
Naive realism claim that whatever is observed represent something that is real in itself, i.e. the thing in itself.
The above claim there is no thing in itself.
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 10:38 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 7:17 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:43 am Your alternate source?
Here the Russell in Chapter 1 re "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Prob ... /Chapter_1

Suggest you read point 1 to 20 carefully and provide your argument why you think Russell is likely to be stupid in making such a proposal against naive realism.

"Quote"
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER I
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
...
If only that had anything at all to do with whether any naive realists claim that naive realism is infallible.

What this tells me is that you really don't understand what you're reading very well; you can't contextualize what you're reading very well. The above doesn't even make any claim about any definition of naive realism as a stance on philosophy of perception whatsoever. It never mentions naive realism per se, and yet, with you apparently aware that naive realism is a stance that certain philosophers hold in philosophy of perception, you're taking it to imply something it doesn't even come close to saying about just what those philosophers' stance is, just how they'd define their position.

By the way, naive realism also has absolutely nothing to do with the issue of epistemic certainty.
The main issue we are disputing is the claims by naive realism.
  • In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, naïve realism (also known as direct realism, perceptual realism, or common sense realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.
    According to the naïve realist, the objects of perception are not merely representations of external objects, but are in fact those external objects themselves.
    -Wiki

    In social psychology, naïve realism is the human tendency to believe that we see the world around us objectively, and that people who disagree with us must be uninformed, irrational, or biased. -Wiki
I have provided sources on why the claims by Naive Realism are not realistic in the real sense.

You are very uninformed of General Philosophy?
It is well known that Russell argued strongly against naive realism.
Russell's [a notable indirect realist] argument against naive realism is humans are never acquainted with the supposedly real objects out there. Humans are only acquainted with the sense-data of the supposedly real objects. Thus there is no whether there is really a supposedly real object out there or not. Therefore a naive realist's claims do not have any solid grounds.
Suggest you counter Russell's points in the reference I linked.

The question of naive realist making basic mistakes or errors in perception is a side issue.

My point with natural inevitable unavoidable illusion related to perception is one counter to naive realism's claims which is added to other more solid counters as I have referenced.
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon May 17, 2021 5:02 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 10:35 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 5:40 am
Repeat,

Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32481

I have provided the relevant links therein.

In addition, note
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32814

Why don't you go over Russell's argument point by point and show where he is wrong?
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Prob ... /Chapter_1
In other words, you have no alternate source and you're trying to change the topic, you're trying to deflect to something else.
Naive realism claim that whatever is observed represent something that is real in itself, i.e. the thing in itself.
The above claim there is no thing in itself.
Russell clearly disagrees with you, have you actually read him? He says we can conjecture anything we want about the thing in itself, including the conjecture that there is no thing in itself at all.
The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems. Beyond this modest result, so far, we have the most complete liberty of conjecture. Leibniz tells us it is a community of souls; Berkeley tells us it is an idea in the mind of God; sober science, scarcely less wonderful, tells us it is a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion.

20. Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

RCSaunders wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 12:31 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am You are SO ignorant.
Oh yes, I am ignorant of many things. In fact, there are more things I don't know than there are that I do, and that always will be so. That's why I never stop studying, thinking about, and learning new things. It's because there is one thing that terrifies me, that I might end up with that kind of intellectual stagnation that results from believing whatever one has been taught and never thinking for themselves, as you have.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am This is laughable.
Then I hoped you laughed. I like to see people happy.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am You are claiming atoms are real because there are real apples, real fruit, real cars, real people, real whatever.
Yes, that's what I said. If there were no real things that can actually be perceived, there would be no atoms.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am What about real atom-bombs that killed millions in Japan?
It is such real atom-bombs that killed millions in Japan that is an indication 'atoms' are real.
You've got it. Good examples. If there were no real atom-bombs, real Japanese, or any other real things one can actually see and feel, there would be no atoms. I'm relieved to see you agree with me.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 4:30 am To update your knowledge of what are real atoms, just google "real atoms" and the note the numerous researches and images from the search.
I began my study of, "atoms," before you were born and probably before your parents were born. I had my own cloud chamber in 1952, I have stayed pretty much up to date with nuclear physics since. I'll forgive that mistake since there is no way you could have known what I have studied in the past. This is just so you won't make the same ignorant mistake again.

I know you have a little reading comprehension problem, which is nothing to be ashamed of. Lot's of intelligent people have that problem. I never said atoms weren't real. They are as real as momentum or mass. They are explanations of certain aspects of the real physical world we are directly conscious of, just as momentum and mass are, but, if there were no real physical entities that could be perceived, there would be no mass, no momentum, and NO ATOMS.
Your above is based on ignorance that there are atoms because there are real apples.
What you learned in 1952 of Physics are now the dinosaurs of Physics and it is not easy to keep up with the latest in Physics especially when you are THAT old.

You should have known the consequences of Big Bang, then subatomic particles, atoms, and smaller elements that enable things like "apples" to emerge much later in time.

'What is apple' is merely what humans name a cluster of atoms [and other particles] in a certain configuration.
There is no real apple-in-itself but merely apple-via-humanselves, i.e. what is apple is conditioned within human conditions.
When apples rot what is still left are the molecules, atoms, sub-atomic particles which in this case are more real than the apple-itself.

Whilst the molecules, atoms, finer particles are more realistic than the "apple," they themselves are not real in the ultimate sense without being conditioned upon human conditions.
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Mon May 17, 2021 5:31 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon May 17, 2021 5:02 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 10:35 am
In other words, you have no alternate source and you're trying to change the topic, you're trying to deflect to something else.
Naive realism claim that whatever is observed represent something that is real in itself, i.e. the thing in itself.
The above claim there is no thing in itself.
Russell clearly disagrees with you, have you actually read him? He says we can conjecture anything we want about the thing in itself, including the conjecture that there is no thing in itself at all.
The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems. Beyond this modest result, so far, we have the most complete liberty of conjecture. Leibniz tells us it is a community of souls; Berkeley tells us it is an idea in the mind of God; sober science, scarcely less wonderful, tells us it is a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion.

20. Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all
What is the difference in conjecturing God and anything else which at the end remained a conjecture?

Naive realists claim of real thing directly corresponding to what is perceive are not conjectures.
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

henry quirk wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 2:08 pm Note your use of "I" at every corner.
That is a very personal and subjective 'apple' you are dealing not an objective apple out there independent of anyone's beliefs or opinions.


C'mon, guy...you know damn well I'm not just talkin' about me. Direct realism applies to all of us. In fact it applies to all higher life. The penguin, as he bellyslides across the ice, apprehends the ice; the wolf, as he eyes the caribou, apprehends the caribou; the octopus, as he runs his tentacles over the crab, lookin' for a means of entry, apprehends the crab. Not a one of them, not you, not me, not anyone, generates models or representations of the world in their brains.

Playin' around with semantic loopholes: you're better than that, VA.
Not to "ALL" of us.
I do not accept the naive realists' claims of what is reality. Note the links I provided from Wiki above.

Suggest you read [a short one] Chapter 1 from Russell which I linked above. You will get an idea when we reflect deeper into reality, the appearance of things are not what we think they are.

Note re animals,
while you see an apple on a tree as whatever an apple is to a human, a blind bat will only perceive a blurry fuzzy cluster image of something which to the blind bat is real since it can eat it to survive.
There is no way you can assume what is perceived by other animals is the same of how you perceive the same object.

Also, you cannot assume human beings has the final authority on deeming what a thing is as real or most real.

Thus what is real is heavily dependent on the model of reality within the brains of the respectively living things.

Point is there is no way one can jump to the conclusion what they assumed is real is really real.

Thus it is false for the naive realist to claim what is real is what is perceived [even correctly].

Generally it is is accepted that the greater the precision, the greater the degree of realness of whatever is real.

No. Precision is only about clarity, not realness. Without my glasses the world is fuzzy. My visual apprehension is flawed. The world is not less real becuz I have crappy eyes.
Within ordinary common sense, there is a difference between seeing something with and without glasses or binoculars. That is not my point.

What I meant is the difference between seeing something with the best eyesight and the the best electron microscope.
Within common or conventional sense what you can see is a real drop of water.
However if we look through that real drop of water using an electron microscope we can see that it comprised of X quantities of hydrogen and oxygen in the ration of 2:1.
Obviously in this case, the latter is more realistic than seeing a drop of water.


Model-dependent realism

Don't care about that.

I'm defendin' this (edited to eliminate your semantic exploit)...
Note my point above.
Ultimately regardless of whether humans or animals, what is real is dependent on the model each is evolved with.
Direct Realism

The world exists, exists independent of us, and is apprehended by us as it is (*not in its entirety but as it is). We **apprehend it directly, without the aid of or intervention of [insert hypothetical whatsis] and without constructing a model or representation of the world somewhere in our heads.

*If you take into account perspective (where the observer stands in relation to the observed); intervening, inconstant, possible, distortions (water instead of atmo, for example); and the inherent limits of the observer himself; then what is seen is as it is.

**Direct realism, of course, is not just about sight. Hearing, taste, smell, touch: the entire interface of a person as he's in the world is the concern of the direct realist. That's why I define it as I do. Apprehension covers it all, the whole of a person's direct contact with the world.
Note the definition for direct realism;
  • In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, naïve realism (also known as direct realism, perceptual realism, or common sense realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.[1] When referred to as direct realism, naïve realism is often contrasted with indirect realism.[2]

    According to the naïve realist, the objects of perception are not merely representations of external objects, but are in fact those external objects themselves. - Wiki
Note
"the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are."

Your definition here do not seem to align with naive realism.
Naive realists do not have any 'direct contact' with the world as you are claiming.

Why don't you try
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enactivism
instead.
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon May 17, 2021 5:02 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 10:35 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 5:40 am
Repeat,

Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32481

I have provided the relevant links therein.

In addition, note
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32814

Why don't you go over Russell's argument point by point and show where he is wrong?
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Prob ... /Chapter_1
In other words, you have no alternate source and you're trying to change the topic, you're trying to deflect to something else.
Naive realism claim that whatever is observed represent something that is real in itself, i.e. the thing in itself.
The above claim there is no thing in itself.
The issue was that you took naive realism to be claiming infallibility of perception. It doesn't claim that.

Aside from that, what you just wrote above is a mess, because naive realists don't say that perceptions merely represent anything. Naive realism isn't representationalism.
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Re: Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon May 17, 2021 5:25 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 10:38 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 16, 2021 7:17 am
Here the Russell in Chapter 1 re "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Prob ... /Chapter_1

Suggest you read point 1 to 20 carefully and provide your argument why you think Russell is likely to be stupid in making such a proposal against naive realism.

"Quote"
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER I
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
...
If only that had anything at all to do with whether any naive realists claim that naive realism is infallible.

What this tells me is that you really don't understand what you're reading very well; you can't contextualize what you're reading very well. The above doesn't even make any claim about any definition of naive realism as a stance on philosophy of perception whatsoever. It never mentions naive realism per se, and yet, with you apparently aware that naive realism is a stance that certain philosophers hold in philosophy of perception, you're taking it to imply something it doesn't even come close to saying about just what those philosophers' stance is, just how they'd define their position.

By the way, naive realism also has absolutely nothing to do with the issue of epistemic certainty.
The main issue we are disputing is the claims by naive realism.
  • In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, naïve realism (also known as direct realism, perceptual realism, or common sense realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.
    According to the naïve realist, the objects of perception are not merely representations of external objects, but are in fact those external objects themselves.
    -Wiki

    In social psychology, naïve realism is the human tendency to believe that we see the world around us objectively, and that people who disagree with us must be uninformed, irrational, or biased. -Wiki
I have provided sources on why the claims by Naive Realism are not realistic in the real sense.

You are very uninformed of General Philosophy?
It is well known that Russell argued strongly against naive realism.
Russell's [a notable indirect realist] argument against naive realism is humans are never acquainted with the supposedly real objects out there. Humans are only acquainted with the sense-data of the supposedly real objects. Thus there is no whether there is really a supposedly real object out there or not. Therefore a naive realist's claims do not have any solid grounds.
Suggest you counter Russell's points in the reference I linked.

The question of naive realist making basic mistakes or errors in perception is a side issue.

My point with natural inevitable unavoidable illusion related to perception is one counter to naive realism's claims which is added to other more solid counters as I have referenced.
If only any of that helped the fact that the Russell passage in question doesn't address naive realism per se, and that it especially has nothing to do with a claim that naive realism is infallible, etc.
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