Nicholas F. Stang
First published Fri Mar 4, 2016
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Kant ... -idealism/
Instead of focusing on what Transcendental Idealism is as in accordance to Kant, this article deviated into mainly asking the question, 'Is Kant a Phenomenalist?' especially of the Berkelyan genre.
In the end, Stang is inconclusive of Kant's position, note his conclusion;
Those who failed to understand [not necessary agree] Kant's Transcendental Idealism properly, is because most of them are realists thus stuck with the idea that there is something real external out there [ontologically] independent of the human conditions.7.0 Conclusion
This article has traced the meaning of transcendental idealism, sometimes referred to as “critical” or “formal” idealism, through the text of the Critique of Pure Reason and various interpretive controversies.
Historically, the main question dividing different interpretations is whether Kant is a phenomenalist about object in space and time and, if so, in what sense.
The phenomenalist interpretation of Kant, dominant among Kant’s immediate predecessors and later German idealists, was challenged in twentieth century Anglophone scholarship by, among others, Graham Bird, Gerold Prauss, and Henry Allison.
Some later scholars have retained a central idea of these scholars’ reading—that the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction is a distinction between distinct aspects of objects, not distinct kinds of objects—while jettisoning the purely epistemological interpretation of Kant’s idealism.
The meaning and philosophical significance of “transcendental idealism” has been debated by Kant’s readers since 1781, and this debate shows no sign of abating any time soon.
Whereas Kant's view which is leveraged on a Copernican Revolution approach
Kant's Copernican Revolution
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32906
do not align with the realist's external independent world.
In this sense Kant's approach is NEVER focused nor targeted on the ontological thing/object at all.
The Kantian approach is focused on the epistemological approach never the ontological.
Meanwhile the realists are brainwashed with the idea of the ontological object, that is why they cannot understand Kant's Transcendental Idealism.
They either denounced Kant Transcendental Idealism as similar to Berkeley's or insist Kant is AGNOSTIC with the ontological thing-in-itself.
My point;
Kant only identified his views are transcendental idealism because critiques condemned his views as similar to Berkeley's [heavy derogated and "mocked" during his time]. He also named his work as formal idealism and critical idealism to distance his from Berkeley's.
Actually Kant need not have to identify his work as 'idealism' at all [to avoid hasty generalization by others] but merely presented whatever is his philosophies which are merely anti-philosophical_realism and let his books speak for him.
Question;
1. Is Kant Transcendental Idealism identical with Berkeley's idealism?
2. Is Kant agnostic with the ontological thing-in-itself?