A Realist is also an Idealist

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Veritas Aequitas
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A Realist is also an Idealist

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Most philosophical realists [an independent external world exists] who so often condemned [derogatory at times] so-called 'idealism' do not realize they are also an idealist.
Conde Lucanor wrote: Mon Apr 19, 2021 10:34 pm Sure, idealists saw there the opportunity to leverage their nonsense. Unfortunately for them, undermining the materialist project has always implied an anti-foundationalism that ultimately kills their own project. They cannot peddle any type of physics, classical or quantum, without assuming the key principles of materialism and scientific realism.
Don't be too hasty and simply condemned 'idealism' in general.
Your views of philosophical realism is Empirical Idealism.
Therefore if you condemn idealism in general without qualification, you are also condemning your own philosophical views, i.e. Empirical Idealism.

Here is how Kant view your Empirical Idealism; [mine]
Kant defined 'Idealist' as;
The term 'Idealist' is not, therefore, to be understood as applying to those who deny the Existence of External Objects of the Senses,
but only to those who do not admit that their Existence [of External Objects of the Senses] is known through immediate Perception, and
who therefore conclude that we can never, by way of any Possible Experience, be completely certain as to their Reality.
A368
The Transcendental Idealist is, therefore, an Empirical Realist, and allows to Matter, as Appearance, a Reality which does not permit of being inferred, but is Immediately Perceived.

Transcendental Realism, on the other hand, inevitably falls into difficulties, and finds itself obliged to give way to Empirical Idealism, in that it regards the Objects of Outer Sense as something distinct from the Senses themselves, treating mere Appearances as Self-Subsistent Beings, existing outside us.
On such a view as this [Empirical Idealism], however clearly we may be conscious 1 of our Representation of these Things, it is still far from certain that, if the Representation exists, there exists also the Object corresponding to it.

In our System [Transcendental Idealism aka Empirical Realism], on the other hand, these External Things, namely Matter, are in all their Configurations and Alterations nothing but mere Appearances, that is, Representations in us, of the Reality of which we are Immediately Conscious. A371
What Kant implied above is the Philosophical Realist also a Transcendental Realist, Empirical Idealist is only acquainted with the sense-data of a supposedly real object, thus
"it is still far from certain that, if the Representation exists, there exists also the Object corresponding to it".
Where the philosophical realist [you] reify that supposedly-real-object, then you are clinging onto an illusion.

As I had stated, why philosophical realists [like you] are reifying, chasing and clinging on to the illusion is due to desperate psychology within.

On the other hand for the Transcendental Idealist aka empirical realists, external matters are the the Reality of which we are Immediately Conscious and entangled and embraced as one in unity with reality.

So from the above, the philosophical realists also a Transcendental Realist, is an idealist, i.e. an Empirical Idealist.
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Sat Jul 22, 2023 4:57 am, edited 3 times in total.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: A Realist is also an Idealist

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Here are some relevant points from Kant on the above.

Kant introduced 2 types of Idealism and explained what they entailed;
Kant in CPR wrote:Before exhibiting our Paralogism in all its deceptive illusoriness, I have first to remark that we must Necessarily distinguish two types of Idealism,
1. the Transcendental [Idealism] and
2. the Empirical [Idealism].

By Transcendental Idealism, I mean the Doctrine that Appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, Representations only, not Things-in-Themselves,
... and that Time and Space are therefore only Sensible Forms of our Intuition, not Determinations Given as existing-by-themselves, nor Conditions of Objects viewed as Things-in-Themselves.
A369
346 KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

To this [Transcendental] Idealism there is opposed a Transcendental Realism which regards Time and Space as something Given in-themselves, independently of our Sensibility.
The Transcendental Realist thus interprets Outer Appearances (their Reality being taken as granted) as Things-in-Themselves, which exist independently of us and of our Sensibility, and which are therefore Outside us the phrase 'outside us' being interpreted in conformity with Pure Concepts of Understanding.
It is, in fact, this Transcendental Realist who afterwards plays the part of Empirical Idealist.

[The Transcendental Realists] After wrongly supposing that Objects of the Senses, if they are to be External, must have an Existence-by-themselves, and independently of the Senses, he finds that, judged from this point of view, all our sensuous Representations are inadequate to establish their Reality.
A Transcendental Idealist is an Empirical Realist;
The Transcendental Idealist, on the other hand, may be an Empirical Realist or, as he is called, a dualist; that is, he may admit the Existence of Matter without going outside his mere Self-Consciousness, or assuming anything more than the certainty of his Representations, that is, the cogito, ergo sum.

For he [Empirical Realist] considers this Matter and even its Inner Possibility to be Appearance merely; and Appearance, if separated from our Sensibility, is nothing.

Matter is with him [Empirical Realist], therefore, only a Species of Representations (Intuition), which are called External, not as standing in Relation to Objects-in-themselves, External, but because they relate Perceptions to the Space in which all Things are External to one another, while yet the Space itself is in us.

Here Kant explained how the Empirical Idealist [aka philosophical realist] can realize the existence and actuality of the object except only be acquainted with sense-data.
Kant in CPR wrote:Since, so far as I know, all psychologists who adopt Empirical Idealism are Transcendental Realists, they have certainly proceeded quite consistently in ascribing great importance to Empirical Idealism, as one of the problems in regard to which the human mind is quite at a loss how to proceed.

For if we [as empirical idealists] regard Outer Appearances as Representations produced in us by their [outer] Objects,
and if these Objects be Things existing in-themselves outside us,
it is indeed impossible to see how we can come to know the Existence of the Objects otherwise than by Inference from the effect to the Cause;
and this being so, it must always remain doubtful whether the Cause in question be in us or outside us.
A372
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: A Realist is also an Idealist

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Kant declared himself as a Transcendental Idealism aka empirical realist.
Kant in CPR wrote:From the start, we have declared ourselves in favour of this Transcendental Idealism; and our Doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the Existence of Matter on the unaided testimony of our mere Self-Consciousness, or of declaring it to be thereby proved in the same manner as the Existence of myself as a Thinking Being is proved.
There can be no question that I am conscious of my Representations; these Representations and I myself, who have the Representations, therefore exist.
External Objects (bodies), however, are mere Appearances, and are therefore nothing but a Species of my Representations, the Objects of which are something only through these Representations.
Apart from them they are nothing. A371
Thus External Things exist as well as I myself, and both, indeed, upon the immediate witness of my Self-Consciousness.

PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON (A) pg. 347
The only difference is that the Representation of myself, as the Thinking Subject, belongs to Inner Sense only, while the Representations which mark Extended Beings belong also to Outer Sense.
In order to arrive at the Reality of Outer Objects I have just as little need to resort to Inference as I have in regard to the Reality of the Object of my Inner Sense, that is, in regard to the Reality of my thoughts.
For in both cases alike the Objects are nothing but Representations, the immediate Perception (Consciousness) of which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their Reality.
Above quotes are from the Norman Kemp Smith translation.
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Terrapin Station
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Re: A Realist is also an Idealist

Post by Terrapin Station »

There are epistemological and ontological idealists. The latter denies that there is an external world period. The former only denies knowledge of it (at least knowledge by acquaintance; there's not a standard distinction based on whether they only deny knowledge by acquaintance but not propositional knowledge or whether they deny both, but there should be such a standard distinction as well).

There are only ontological realists. (Epistemological realism wouldn't make sense as a distinction.)

Ontological realists can be epistemological idealists, but they can't be ontological idealists.
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Terrapin Station
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Re: A Realist is also an Idealist

Post by Terrapin Station »

Re this, by the way:
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Apr 20, 2021 4:59 am who therefore conclude that we can never, by way of any Possible Experience, be completely certain as to their Reality.
Again, certainty is a stupid thing to worry about when we're doing epistemology.
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Conde Lucanor
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Re: A Realist is also an Idealist

Post by Conde Lucanor »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Apr 20, 2021 4:59 am
What Kant implied above is the Philosophical Realist also a Transcendental Realist, Empirical Idealist is only acquainted with the sense-data of a supposedly real object, thus
"it is still far from certain that, if the Representation exists, there exists also the Object corresponding to it".
Where the philosophical realist [you] reify that supposedly-real-object, then you are clinging onto an illusion.

As I had stated, why philosophical realists [like you] are reifying, chasing and clinging on to the illusion is due to desperate psychology within.

On the other hand for the Transcendental Idealist aka empirical realists, external matters are the the Reality of which we are Immediately Conscious and entangled and embraced as one in unity with reality.
What phenomenologists fail to see is that when they call objects "illusions" they are including among those illusions other humans as themselves, thus, calling themselves illusions, being only supposedly-real-objects, but not quite so. And they pretend to found their philosophy on such illusion. All their roads ultimately lead to solipsism and "anything goes".
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: A Realist is also an Idealist

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Tue Apr 20, 2021 2:01 pm There are epistemological and ontological idealists.
The latter denies that there is an external world period.
The former only denies knowledge of it (at least knowledge by acquaintance; there's not a standard distinction based on whether they only deny knowledge by acquaintance but not propositional knowledge or whether they deny both, but there should be such a standard distinction as well).

There are only ontological realists. (Epistemological realism wouldn't make sense as a distinction.)

Ontological realists can be epistemological idealists, but they can't be ontological idealists.
Kant defined Idealism as [.. I agree],
The term 'Idealist' is not, therefore, to be understood as applying to those who deny the Existence of External Objects of the Senses,
but only to those who do not admit that their Existence [of External Objects of the Senses] is known through immediate Perception, and
who therefore conclude that we can never, by way of any Possible Experience, be completely certain as to their Reality. A368
As such idealism-in-general [Kantian] do not deny the existence of the external world.
But idealism whilst recognizes the existence of the independence of the existence of the externa world [thus is empirical realism] is ultimately subsumed within Transcendental Idealism [the human conditions].

Thus epistemological realism is possible, i.e. as empirical realism.

Yes ontological realists can be epistemological idealists [sense-data only], but their ontological realism is chasing an illusion [which cannot be proven to be true], if claimed otherwise, then
Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32481
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: A Realist is also an Idealist

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Wed Apr 21, 2021 4:58 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Apr 20, 2021 4:59 am
What Kant implied above is the Philosophical Realist also a Transcendental Realist, Empirical Idealist is only acquainted with the sense-data of a supposedly real object, thus
"it is still far from certain that, if the Representation exists, there exists also the Object corresponding to it".
Where the philosophical realist [you] reify that supposedly-real-object, then you are clinging onto an illusion.

As I had stated, why philosophical realists [like you] are reifying, chasing and clinging on to the illusion is due to desperate psychology within.

On the other hand for the Transcendental Idealist aka empirical realists, external matters are the the Reality of which we are Immediately Conscious and entangled and embraced as one in unity with reality.
What phenomenologists fail to see is that when they call objects "illusions" they are including among those illusions other humans as themselves, thus, calling themselves illusions, being only supposedly-real-objects, but not quite so. And they pretend to found their philosophy on such illusion. All their roads ultimately lead to solipsism and "anything goes".
This is about Kantianism and its TI and Kant was NEVER a phenomenologist.
It is true from certain perspective Kantianism appear to be similar to phenomenalism but in its full and proper perspective Kantianism is not phenomenologism.

As I had explained in the other thread
viewtopic.php?p=512678#p512678
viewtopic.php?p=512680#p512680
you claimed that I believe humans themselves are illusory, is a strawman.
I have never claimed that at all nor my arguments implied that.
  • VA: "It is so absurd to assume I take my spouse, children, friends and all other humans as illusory things."
There is no way you can deny you are an idealist [by definition], i.e. an empirical idealist.
Can you counter my claim why you are an empirical idealist?

Graham Bird justified extensively in his book, Kant's Theory of Knowledge, in one chapter on why Kant is not a phenomenologist;
THERE is no one passage in the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant develops his account of perception.
Such an account is nonetheless implicit in Kant's use of perceptual terms, and especially of his key term 'Erscheinung', which it is natural to translate either as 'appearance' or as 'phenomenon'.
This lack of systematic development reflects important differences of aim and emphasis between Kant and modern philosophers of perception, which make it hard to attach any modern label to his account without adding some qualification.
Yet both natural translations of the term 'Erscheinung' in English, as well as some of the ways in which Kant uses the term, strongly encourage the assumption that Kant must be a phenomenalist of some kind.
Many philosophers, including Kemp Smith, Paton, Vleeschauwer, and Ayer, have indeed ascribed such a theory [phenomenalism] to Kant, although there is no guarantee that they have all understood this attribution in precisely the same way.
For these reasons it is as well to be careful before classing Kant as an adherent of this, or any other, theory, however firmly such labels have stuck to him.
In this chapter I want to indicate some difficulties in the way of at least some attributions of such a theory [phenomenalism] to Kant.
...
Kant does not dispute that some arrangement of this presented manifold is required for our knowledge, and this is why a synthesis is said to be necessary, but this claim by itself does not commit him to phenomenalism.
...
Although there is some evidence on which to hang an attribution of phenomenalism to Kant, it has been argued that he should be regarded as an incidental and unorthodox adherent.
...
It is nevertheless worthwhile to stress this evident divergence between the aims and assumptions of Kant and modern philosophers of perception.
For it may help to explain some of the difficulty of attaching to him a modern label such as that of phenomenalism.
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