English pleaseAdvocate wrote: ↑Thu May 27, 2021 1:03 pmI've given necessary and sufficient answers to everything y'all are talking about. Apparently basic logic isn't the problem here, but that is being used unwisely to expand the exploration of the opposite direction of Truth.Atla wrote: ↑Thu May 27, 2021 12:05 pmIt continues to amaze that you see your idiotic take on Kant as "deep". Do you really think he wrote a 800 pages book just to say that "there can't be anything beyond appearances"? You spent 50000 years reading Kant full-time for this?Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 27, 2021 5:16 am Why Kant rejected that something-X beyond appearance and experience
Fyi, correctly rejecting substance theory doesn't mean that there can't be any thing-in-itself. It just means that if the thing-in-itself exists, then it either isn't made of any'thing' ("made of" is old spiritual/religious nonsense), or we can't know what it's made of. You need lessons in basic logic.
Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
You are the ignorant gnat. You are making stupid noises.Atla wrote: ↑Thu May 27, 2021 12:05 pmIt continues to amaze that you see your idiotic take on Kant as "deep". Do you really think he wrote a 800 pages book just to say that "there can't be anything beyond appearances"? You spent 50000 years reading Kant full-time for this?Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 27, 2021 5:16 am Why Kant rejected that something-X beyond appearance and experience
Fyi, correctly rejecting substance theory doesn't mean that there can't be any thing-in-itself. It just means that if the thing-in-itself exists, then it either isn't made of any'thing' ("made of" is old spiritual/religious nonsense), or we can't know what it's made of. You need lessons in basic logic.
Substance theory as above is grounded on the thing-in-itself.Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory
If substance theory is rejected, then there is no thing-in-itself as claimed within substance theory.
Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
More logic fail, you ignorant gnat. A thing-in-itself doesn't cover every kind of thing-in-itself. There are things-in-themselves outside substance theory.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri May 28, 2021 5:33 amYou are the ignorant gnat. You are making stupid noises.Atla wrote: ↑Thu May 27, 2021 12:05 pmIt continues to amaze that you see your idiotic take on Kant as "deep". Do you really think he wrote a 800 pages book just to say that "there can't be anything beyond appearances"? You spent 50000 years reading Kant full-time for this?Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 27, 2021 5:16 am Why Kant rejected that something-X beyond appearance and experience
Fyi, correctly rejecting substance theory doesn't mean that there can't be any thing-in-itself. It just means that if the thing-in-itself exists, then it either isn't made of any'thing' ("made of" is old spiritual/religious nonsense), or we can't know what it's made of. You need lessons in basic logic.
Substance theory as above is grounded on the thing-in-itself.Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory
If substance theory is rejected, then there is no thing-in-itself as claimed within substance theory.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
More stupidity.Atla wrote: ↑Fri May 28, 2021 5:58 amMore logic fail, you ignorant gnat. A thing-in-itself doesn't cover every kind of thing-in-itself. There are things-in-themselves outside substance theory.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri May 28, 2021 5:33 amYou are the ignorant gnat. You are making stupid noises.Atla wrote: ↑Thu May 27, 2021 12:05 pm
It continues to amaze that you see your idiotic take on Kant as "deep". Do you really think he wrote a 800 pages book just to say that "there can't be anything beyond appearances"? You spent 50000 years reading Kant full-time for this?
Fyi, correctly rejecting substance theory doesn't mean that there can't be any thing-in-itself. It just means that if the thing-in-itself exists, then it either isn't made of any'thing' ("made of" is old spiritual/religious nonsense), or we can't know what it's made of. You need lessons in basic logic.
Substance theory as above is grounded on the thing-in-itself.Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory
If substance theory is rejected, then there is no thing-in-itself as claimed within substance theory.
What is basic in things-in-themselves is the ultimate thing-in-itself.
Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
According to you maybe, but Kant didn't say that. Again, he wouldn't have needed to write a 800 pages book to make such an idiotic claim. "ultimate" isn't "substance"Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri May 28, 2021 7:03 am More stupidity.
What is basic in things-in-themselves is the ultimate thing-in-itself.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
I don't know how to say this without sounding rude, but when are you going to argue for yourself? I mean, we were discussing what it takes to be a realist or an idealist, and how we should address the issue of ontology, for which I advanced some arguments and you seemed to be onboard to discuss what were your stances on the issue. But then, just as you are doing right now, you come back with things like "Kant said this, Kant believed that, etc." It's the kind of answer one gets from preachers when they are caught off-guard with their dogmatic arguments, they feel lost and resort immediately to the sacred scriptures. I am expecting your own answer.Veritas Aequitas wrote:You assumed I am that stupid to respond to your argument with your statement "Kant didn't believe that"?
When I refer to Kant's Copernican Revolution, it imply I am referring to its whole context [which I had presented many times] in addressing my point.
It appears you do not understand the essentials of Kant's Copernican Revolution which I had mentioned and explained many times.
In the full context of the above, Kant claimed "all attempts" by the philosophical realists for the ultimate external things has "ended in failure".
When he proposed "that Objects must conform to our Knowledge" it is implied that he wanted to start with knowledge and experience to justify whether there is an object-in-itself and NOT to take it the object-in-itself is GIVEN.
Your problem is you are stuck in the philosophical realist dogmatic stance thus cannot understand Kant's proposals.
I said there are TWO alternatives. Why couldn´t any of those be the case? What is your own take?Veritas Aequitas wrote: There you go, you are being rhetoric based on your rigid perspective, i.e. the only alternative to stuff is "non stuff".
Why must that be the the case?
I want to hear counterarguments, not what doctrine of Kant's sacred scripture you want to hang on to.Veritas Aequitas wrote: Note very sure of your point.
What I can say is Kant [me included] do not have any problem justifying empirical realism and transcendental idealism.
Within empirical realism, the subject is independent of the object thus there exists and external reality independent of the human mind [at that level]. However all the above are subsumed within transcendental idealism, i.e. not independent of the human conditions.
Since it is the point of departure, isn't that just begging the question?Veritas Aequitas wrote: From the transcendental idealism POV, it can be justified there isn't really something X beyond the appearance of X.
Explain the difference, then. What is it?Veritas Aequitas wrote: There is a big difference if "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" as something real without there is the thing-in-itself beyond sensation.
What would make hallucinations less real? The experience is the same, isn't it?Veritas Aequitas wrote: From an empirical realist POV, Kant accept experience itself is really real.
Verifying and justifying against what? The scientific framework only works with the ontology of materialism. The framework on its own is nothing without it. It would be the equivalent of making the "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" the real things in themselves.Veritas Aequitas wrote: The reality of "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" are verifiable and justifiable by science within the scientific FSK.
There is a part of the discussion that deals with how Kant should be interpreted. But that's not the topic of the OP, so you should focus on arguing on your own without making everything an issue about Kant, especially if you're only goint to say: "that's what transcendental idealism entails".Veritas Aequitas wrote: Note Kant's CPR is one long argument of >800 pages, thus I cannot present that whole argument to substantiate my point. You'll need to understand the whole argument before you condemn it as silly.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
Your point fails once it is shown that not all ontologies are substance ontology, which was your argument for defending the view that Kant did not need an ontology. He's stuck with ontology no matter what.Veritas Aequitas wrote:My intent was to point to you is your stance of ontology is that of substance-ontology, the thing-in-itself ontology and the realists' ontology of an external independent object.
But you have claimed that empirical objects are mere epistemological objects, they lack any substance. They are things that appear in the experience of...well, in the experience of mere epistemological objects that lack any substance. Many problems with that, starting by how you justify the belief that other epistemological objects (humans like you) have experiences as well, since all you have access is to your own experience.Veritas Aequitas wrote: If you insist, the ontology to the human being is, the living human person is just an empirical object with consciousness.
So, should we end this thread, pack and go home? Physical things exist, therefore a mind-independent reality. Do I get a certificate?Veritas Aequitas wrote: A human person is a physical thing, you insist it is not?
OK then, but you're acknowledging you have an ontological position, a stance about beings, which is different than mine. Mine is the materialist ontology, what is yours? I claimed the other alternative is a non-realist ontology, which implies no distinction between subject and objects, and objects are subsumed within subjects. The last time you denied this, so what is the ontology you propose?Veritas Aequitas wrote: Remember, there are may perspectives to what is ontology from the broadest sense to the narrowest sense.
What I deny is the sort of specific ontology [substance, thing-in-itself, philosophical-realist] your are claiming.
After one admits idealism, all that follows is unjustifiable, nothing makes real sense. The only view compatible with idealism is "anything goes".Veritas Aequitas wrote: Why people claimed about the ultimate source [the next and ultimate cause] is due to their psychology? If you bother to dig deep it is related to a very desperate existential crisis.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
Even if I give my own answers I will still revert to Kant who had presented the established and very rigorous argument I agree with. Why invent the wheel?Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Sat May 29, 2021 3:04 amI don't know how to say this without sounding rude, but when are you going to argue for yourself? I mean, we were discussing what it takes to be a realist or an idealist, and how we should address the issue of ontology, for which I advanced some arguments and you seemed to be onboard to discuss what were your stances on the issue. But then, just as you are doing right now, you come back with things like "Kant said this, Kant believed that, etc." It's the kind of answer one gets from preachers when they are caught off-guard with their dogmatic arguments, they feel lost and resort immediately to the sacred scriptures. I am expecting your own answer.Veritas Aequitas wrote:You assumed I am that stupid to respond to your argument with your statement "Kant didn't believe that"?
When I refer to Kant's Copernican Revolution, it imply I am referring to its whole context [which I had presented many times] in addressing my point.
It appears you do not understand the essentials of Kant's Copernican Revolution which I had mentioned and explained many times.
In the full context of the above, Kant claimed "all attempts" by the philosophical realists for the ultimate external things has "ended in failure".
When he proposed "that Objects must conform to our Knowledge" it is implied that he wanted to start with knowledge and experience to justify whether there is an object-in-itself and NOT to take it the object-in-itself is GIVEN.
Your problem is you are stuck in the philosophical realist dogmatic stance thus cannot understand Kant's proposals.
My answer would be this,
Realists take that there a really real something X beyond appearance, sensation and experience, i.e. something X that exists as real and independent of the human conditions.
I as a non-realist [transcendental idealist] do not agree with the above view.
My approach is dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience and understanding what the whole process of cognition is about without a care/damn for any something X beyond appearances, sensation and experience.
Since Kant had presented the argument which I agree and support my views, I am thus relying on Kant as the authority and thus refer to his argument in the Critique of Pure Reason.
I don't see any problem with the above which is typical within the philosophical community.
Your two alternatives are only applicable to a realist's view. You assumed there is the realist's something-X [stuff], if otherwise there is no X [non-stuff].I said there are TWO alternatives. Why couldn´t any of those be the case? What is your own take?Veritas Aequitas wrote: There you go, you are being rhetoric based on your rigid perspective, i.e. the only alternative to stuff is "non stuff".
Why must that be the the case?
From the transcendental realist view, I don't accept your basis of the two alternatives as a premise for my argument. Rather I begin my premise with appearances, sensation and experienced without accepting there is a thing-in-itself that is given.
I don't see anything wrong with the above.I want to hear counterarguments, not what doctrine of Kant's sacred scripture you want to hang on to.Veritas Aequitas wrote: Note very sure of your point.
What I can say is Kant [me included] do not have any problem justifying empirical realism and transcendental idealism.
Within empirical realism, the subject is independent of the object thus there exists and external reality independent of the human mind [at that level]. However all the above are subsumed within transcendental idealism, i.e. not independent of the human conditions.
Who is the philosophical community has ever declared Kant's CPR as some sort of sacred scripture?
It is very common for Kantian philosophers to quote Kant in supporting their argument.
If I ever to produce my view on such issues, it would exactly be the same as Kant's main theme. So why waste my time instead of referring to Kant's CPR.
I stated it can be justified subject to producing the actual justification which we have to refer to Kant's CPR.Since it is the point of departure, isn't that just begging the question?Veritas Aequitas wrote: From the transcendental idealism POV, it can be justified there isn't really something X beyond the appearance of X.
Since I am referring to justification from primary sources, where is the begging the question?
When realists take it as a philosophical principle there is something X beyond "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" even before justifying and proving it, they are really begging the question.Explain the difference, then. What is it?Veritas Aequitas wrote: There is a big difference if "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" as something real without there is the thing-in-itself beyond sensation.
On the other hand, the non-realist [me] merely focus on what is "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" without consideration of something x and let the evidence points to the direction of what is justified.
What is real is specific to Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK].What would make hallucinations less real? The experience is the same, isn't it?Veritas Aequitas wrote: From an empirical realist POV, Kant accept experience itself is really real.
When a hallucination is subject to the scientific method, it is not real per se relative to the scientific FSK.
Note the scientific framework merely ASSUMED the ontology of materialism and NOT all scientific frameworks assume the ontology of materialism.Verifying and justifying against what? The scientific framework only works with the ontology of materialism. The framework on its own is nothing without it. It would be the equivalent of making the "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" the real things in themselves.Veritas Aequitas wrote: The reality of "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" are verifiable and justifiable by science within the scientific FSK.
In any case, the assumption of ontology is science is not critical to science per se since science is science as per its FSK and science is not philosophy per se.
When scientists produced scientific knowledge the question is whether it is testable, repeatable and useful, has potential use, or merely for knowledge sake.
Scientists don't give a damn with any ontology of materialism. It is only some philosophers of Science who bring in the ontology of materialism in their Philosophy of Science and not all philosophers agree with that.
As I had stated, I am the one who raised the OP and it significantly entailed the reference to Kant's thing-in-itself.There is a part of the discussion that deals with how Kant should be interpreted. But that's not the topic of the OP, so you should focus on arguing on your own without making everything an issue about Kant, especially if you're only goint to say: "that's what transcendental idealism entails".Veritas Aequitas wrote: Note Kant's CPR is one long argument of >800 pages, thus I cannot present that whole argument to substantiate my point. You'll need to understand the whole argument before you condemn it as silly.
In any of your attempt to prove an independent reality-in-itself exists as real, I will counter you with the arguments from Transcendental idealism which is essentially from Kant.
You may insist I interpret Kant [a non-realist] wrongly and insist philosophers like Guyer [realist] has the right interpretation. Did you see the mismatch [& inherent confirmation bias] there i.e. a realist interpreting a non-realist's book?
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
I was the one who pointed out to you that not all ontologies are substance ontology and there are many perspectives to ontology.Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Sat May 29, 2021 3:40 amYour point fails once it is shown that not all ontologies are substance ontology, which was your argument for defending the view that Kant did not need an ontology. He's stuck with ontology no matter what.Veritas Aequitas wrote:My intent was to point to you is your stance of ontology is that of substance-ontology, the thing-in-itself ontology and the realists' ontology of an external independent object.
Regardless of the very loose term 'ontology' Kant rejected your sort of realist's ontology which is related to substance theory and the thing-in-itself.
When referring to humans that lack substance, that is related to the claim the human has a soul or a permanent self.But you have claimed that empirical objects are mere epistemological objects, they lack any substance. They are things that appear in the experience of...well, in the experience of mere epistemological objects that lack any substance. Many problems with that, starting by how you justify the belief that other epistemological objects (humans like you) have experiences as well, since all you have access is to your own experience.Veritas Aequitas wrote: If you insist, the ontology to the human being is, the living human person is just an empirical object with consciousness.
The scientific FSK is the most reliable to represent what is real. Thus to justify whatever is real of human I will rely on Scientific knowledge of humans.
Note my consideration of empirical realism and transcendental idealism.So, should we end this thread, pack and go home? Physical things exist, therefore a mind-independent reality. Do I get a certificate?Veritas Aequitas wrote: A human person is a physical thing, you insist it is not?
I have already stated, a mind independent reality exists within empirical realism but such a reality is ultimately subsumed with transcendental idealism which is not independent of the human conditions.
From what you have been posting, you appear to have problem understanding the above seemingly contradiction.
I have already stated, if you insist, my ontology is that of process-ontology without consideration for any material of substance ontology.OK then, but you're acknowledging you have an ontological position, a stance about beings, which is different than mine. Mine is the materialist ontology, what is yours? I claimed the other alternative is a non-realist ontology, which implies no distinction between subject and objects, and objects are subsumed within subjects. The last time you denied this, so what is the ontology you propose?Veritas Aequitas wrote: Remember, there are may perspectives to what is ontology from the broadest sense to the narrowest sense.
What I deny is the sort of specific ontology [substance, thing-in-itself, philosophical-realist] your are claiming.
Note I do claim there is a distinction between subjects and objects but only qualified within empirical realism. Obviously there is a difference between the tree I see out there in the jungle and me inside my house. But within transcendental idealism, there is no absolute independence between me and the tree I see out there in the jungle.
There you go again, i.e. hasty generalization.After one admits idealism, all that follows is unjustifiable, nothing makes real sense. The only view compatible with idealism is "anything goes".Veritas Aequitas wrote: Why people claimed about the ultimate source [the next and ultimate cause] is due to their psychology? If you bother to dig deep it is related to a very desperate existential crisis.
There are many types of idealism and not all are the same.
As I had stated you are an idealist as well, i.e. an empirical idealist.
Thus your "all that follows is unjustifiable, nothing makes real sense. The only view compatible with idealism is "anything goes" " condemnation applies to your own idealism.
To the extreme of "anything goes" is how God, the soul are reified as real by your empirical realist brethren.
In my case, my transcendental idealism [which subsumes empirical realism] is very special and totally different from all other idealisms.
Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
Looks like your existential crisis made you run away from the possibility of a real world beyond the appearances. You are too afraid to deal with a real world. Kant wasn' afraid like that, he didn't deny the possibility of a world beyond the appearances.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat May 29, 2021 4:33 am My approach is dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience and understanding what the whole process of cognition is about without a care/damn for any something X beyond appearances, sensation and experience.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
Here is one important point to note [gathered from what I am reading at present]
- KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
An Outline of One Central Argument in the Critique of Pure Reason
by
Graham Bird
- Kant exploits the same distinctions for the same purpose in a passage in the Prolegomena (Sect. 2 la, Ak., Vol. 4, p. 304) where he says:
- 'To put all this in a nutshell, it is first necessary to remind the reader that we are not here talking of the origin (Entstehen) of experience, but of what is in it.
The former task belongs to empirical psychology, and would never be able to be developed but for the latter, which belongs to a critique of knowledge, and especially of understanding.'
- 'To put all this in a nutshell, it is first necessary to remind the reader that we are not here talking of the origin (Entstehen) of experience, but of what is in it.
*Kant had mentioned the realists' project of searching for something X that exists as real and external to the human mind has ALL ended in failure.
Note this very critical point in the discussion re Kant's project and about reality-in-itself and thing-in-itself related to the OP.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
The only way to conclude that this is a failure is to insist on some sort of idealist/representationalist interpretation of experience, but that interpretation isn't justifiable.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 30, 2021 8:33 am *Kant had mentioned the realists' project of searching for something X that exists as real and external to the human mind has ALL ended in failure.
Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
[quote="Terrapin Station" post_id=512449 time=1622380766 user_id=12582]
[quote="Veritas Aequitas" post_id=512424 time=1622360036 user_id=7896]
*Kant had mentioned the realists' project of searching for something X that exists as real and external to the human mind has ALL ended in failure.[/quote]
The only way to conclude that this is a failure is to insist on some sort of idealist/representationalist interpretation of experience, but that interpretation isn't justifiable.
[/quote]
Real enough "for all intents and purposes" is anything that replicates 100% of the time, and there's plenty of it. The eventual actual full transcendent truth is neither available or necessary.
[quote="Veritas Aequitas" post_id=512424 time=1622360036 user_id=7896]
*Kant had mentioned the realists' project of searching for something X that exists as real and external to the human mind has ALL ended in failure.[/quote]
The only way to conclude that this is a failure is to insist on some sort of idealist/representationalist interpretation of experience, but that interpretation isn't justifiable.
[/quote]
Real enough "for all intents and purposes" is anything that replicates 100% of the time, and there's plenty of it. The eventual actual full transcendent truth is neither available or necessary.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
You don't seem to understand the background of the problem.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sun May 30, 2021 2:19 pmThe only way to conclude that this is a failure is to insist on some sort of idealist/representationalist interpretation of experience, but that interpretation isn't justifiable.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 30, 2021 8:33 am *Kant had mentioned the realists' project of searching for something X that exists as real and external to the human mind has ALL ended in failure.
This philosophical realists' view of an independent reality [looking for something X independent of the human conditions] has been questioned since >2500 years ago to Parmenides and way back to >5000 years within Eastern Philosophy.
Humans since the beginning has evolved with "philosophical realism" as the default state of awareness with a focus on external things "out there" which is very critical for survival, i.e. looking outward for food, for an opposite sex to f..k, for threats [of all sorts] etc.In his poem, Parmenides prescribes two views of reality. In "the way of truth" (a part of the poem), he explains how all reality is one, change is impossible, and existence is timeless, uniform, and necessary. In "the way of opinion", Parmenides explains the world of appearances, in which one's sensory faculties lead to conceptions which are false and deceitful, yet he does offer a cosmology.
In his poem, Parmenides prescribes two views of reality. In "the way of truth" (a part of the poem), he explains how all reality is one, change is impossible, and existence is timeless, uniform, and necessary.
In "the way of opinion", Parmenides explains the world of appearances, in which one's sensory faculties lead to conceptions which are false and deceitful, yet he does offer a cosmology.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parmenides
If all the humans then [even now] had focused too much on their internal self rather than the external independent world, humanity may not have survive to the present.
It is only with later self-development that SOME humans started to look into their own inner self and recognizing the role they are involved in what is reality, i.e. reality is entangled with the human conditions, thus in contrast to philosophical realism. Such a view of anti-philosophical_realism [note I don't want to use the ambiguous term 'idealism'] has started with Eastern Philosophy [Jainism, Buddhism, etc.].
In Western Philosophy we have Protagoras 'Man is the measure of all things' and Heraclitus' "No man ever steps into the same river twice."
The problem is the present philosophical realists are naturally stuck with the inherent instinct of externality and the focus on the external world, thus unable to step into the shoes of the relevant anti-Philosophical_realists to understand [not necessary agree with] their views.
There is so much evidence to support Kant's assertion that the philosophical realists stance has all ended in failure.
Here is Kant's challenge for philosophical realists to prove their claim of an independent external reality:
Faith = without proof nor sufficient reason.Kant in CPR wrote:it still remains a scandal to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of Knowledge, even for our Inner Sense) must be accepted merely on Faith,
and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their Existence, we [the philosophical realists] are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.
Preface 2nd Edition Bxxxix
The "we" above refer to the philosophical realists.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists
That the world had people like bahman 2500 years ago doesn't imply anything about those views being justifiable.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon May 31, 2021 3:56 am This philosophical realists' view of an independent reality [looking for something X independent of the human conditions] has been questioned since >2500 years ago to Parmenides and way back to >5000 years within Eastern Philosophy.
In his poem, Parmenides prescribes two views of reality. In "the way of truth" (a part of the poem), he explains how all reality is one, change is impossible, and existence is timeless, uniform, and necessary. In "the way of opinion", Parmenides explains the world of appearances, in which one's sensory faculties lead to conceptions which are false and deceitful, yet he does offer a cosmology.