Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

[Conde Lucanor]

If one is dead, how could one disentangle from reality.

By ceasing to exist. When things don't exist, they are not part of reality. If they used to exist, but then they don't, they have effectively been disentangled from reality.

I understand your 'theory' even if the human race disappear the universe still exists but a theory is not reality.

We have been through this before. Remember the age of the moon? It is not a just-so story, but a fact confirmed by hard evidence: there was a universe before humans showed up, and humans showed up as result of processes going on in that universe. It is an indisputable known fact of reality that the universe can exist without humans in it.

There are various anti-realists views.
My view from an anti-realist's POV is that of empirical realism, i.e. the external empirical reality exists as real [not an illusion] but it is conditioned by the human conditions.

It is the realists who are delusional when they reify the external empirical reality as ABSOLUTELY real, i.e. reality exists even when there are no more humans.

If you reflect and philosophize at the highest possible level, you will find you just CANNOT conclude anything realistically about reality with absoluteness.

There are various realist views as well. And not all realist views are absolutists, and by that is meant that no proposition can obtain absolute knowledge, but that applies to any view, anti-realism included. So, if an anti-realist proclaims absolute knowledge about the non-existence of an objective, mind-independent reality, the anti-realist is being as delusional as the absolute realist he's opposing. In fact, he's just reifying illusion as real and taking his supposed knowledge of this illusion as very much real, too. OTOH, a so-called anti-realist that acknowledges the existence of a reality that is "external" to the subject, is already committed to some form of realism. He will have no justification for denying the realism of others, when he's not willing to abandon his own.

That the conditions of knowledge are set up by humans does not mean that the conditions of existence of what is known are dependent of them. And it is precisely because we have devised methods (conditions of knowledge) that allow us to determine the objective, mind-independent, existence of things. So, it's not that realism arises despite epistemological constraints, but because those epistemological constraints are organized in methods of inquiry to discover the truth. Sure, one can always say that truth is a human construction, but that applies to any anti-realist view as well. It is the central contradiction of that philosophical view: by denying access to reliable truths, they are denying the reliability of their own truth.

This is why Wittgenstein's asserted,
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”
i.e. one has to literally 'shut up' and resist insisting in mind or words epistemologically or ontologically there is always 'something' independent of the human conditions.

But why one doesn't have to literally 'shut up' and resist insisting, in mind or words, epistemologically or ontologically, that there is always 'nothing' independent of the human conditions? How can one speak of that as knowledge that is certain, if the advocate of that philosophical view has shut the door and claimed there's no way to know?

I don't see any direct, necessary relationship, between philosophical realism and deism or theism. That things in the world exist independent of human consciousness does not entail that nature, the universe itself, can be thought to be separated from other (supernatural) domains. The proposal of supernatural domains may well be a response to our need to escape from our real existential sufferings, but it is by all means an unrealistic view, a set of illusions. And the best antidote against this self-deception is to look at the world as it actually is, independently of how we would like it to be.

Philosophical Realism and theism both assume [i.e. no valid nor sound proofs] there is a reality that is independent of the human conditions.

Philosophical realism is .. about a certain kind of thing (like numbers or morality) is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.[1][2][3] This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding.
-wiki

Theism claim God has mind-independent existence.

That's a fallacy of spurious correlation. Just because theism makes claims about gods being real, that is, about entities which have mind-independence existence, does not entail that all realists must endorse the idea that gods are real, nor it is necessary to believe in gods or any such other entity to be a realist. Realism is not the philosophical view that anything conceived is real. I can deny the real existence of many things and still be a realist.

By clinging to realism you are indirectly providing support to theists with the same claim of their God having mind-independent existence.
Anti-realism directly destroyed the independent power of a God, thus shifting their claim of whatever God as a human construct.

Bishop Berkeley, a well-known anti-realist, believed that God was real. Most anti-realists I have debated are also advocates of philosophical Idealism, since their anti-realism is instrumental for denying materialism and, along the way, introducing notions of an Absolute Spirit.

[Conde Lucanor]

So then, what would be the point of a character in this farce asking for any distinctions between reality and illusion?

This is a very good question! Go ahead and perform the thought experiment. Assume that it is is indeed the case: no possible criteria to define truth from falsehood exist. Anything really does go.

It seems to me, then that you are in a perfectly good position to answer your very own question. WHY do you want to distinguish between "reality" and "illusion"? WHY do you want to draw distinctions?

Seeming as the entire field of Philosophy is built upon this distinction and that, I think the question is worth examining.

First of all, it is not my thought experiment. You brought it up as a response to my mention of two well established facts that point to the mind-independent existence of things, but you haven't demonstrated how this in any way refutes my claim. It only says that it could be the case that everything is an illusion, but you have no way to provide that it is the case.

Secondly, as I already explained, the logical consequence of accepting that it is the case that everything is an illusion, is to abandon all certainties, which of course will have to include the certainty that everything is an illusion. There would be simply no way to find out the truth about anything. Anything goes. And since you are the one advancing this argument as a response to my claim, you're at the same time denying the possibility of truth and looking for it, which is of course a contradictory stance.

To assume that the 5-minute hypothesis is true is to assume that you and I actually don't exist, that we're not writing in a forum, that nothing we think or do is a reliable actuality, that we are just characters in a farce.

What? That's not at all the conclusion I am arriving at! I AM writing on a forum. Obviously! You are reading this very text right now! Obviously!

If the universe is indeed 5 minutes old, then the inference I make out of that is "Wow! Our perception of the passage of time is really misguided!".

See? You're not following the logical consequences of your own arguments. If all events in the history of the universe are nothing but an illusion, so are the causal relationships among them. Remember, this is the card you are using to cast doubt on the possibility that the moon existed in a time period prior to the existence of humans. If that were the case, if the unfolding of events in the universe is all an illusion, then the whole societal setting that we perceive to be living in, is all a farce, including our own existence. No one is supposed to have spent 9 months inside their mother's womb, it is a false memory implanted in a perceiving mind.

The 5-minute hypothesis is just another version of solipsism, which is, of course, the real subject of this thread.

No, it isn't. It's a version of a universe in which your perception/conception of time is an illusion.

Ok, fine, let's try that. Let's try that only the perception of the length of time changes, but the events actually do happen, and they keep happening in the order that causality requires for them to come about. Then I go back to my initial statement that there's substantial evidence that the moon existed prior (by 4.5 billion years or 4.5 seconds, it doesn't matter now) to humans. It is now even more obvious that your 5-minute universe thought experiment is completely useless to refute my point.

Sure! There is no point in arguing. The trouble with philosophical debates is that you want context-free truth. A foundation!

A foundation is the very opposite of a context-free scenario.

Anything does go. IN PHILOSOPHY.

Talk about foundations!! This in an attempt to establish one, although not a realistic one.

But no, anything does not go. For anything to go, it is complete chaos and arbitrariness. No one serious about philosophy would want that.

There is no foundation. When you face daily life constraints/goals/objectives/uncertainties (CONTEXT!) emerges. We have a bunch of models, and we have a bunch of instruments.

Once you have models, instruments, methodologies, etc., you are already committed to some foundational principles that organize these.

For the purpose of argument we have Science experiment number 1: What experiment could we perform, what measurement could we devise or take to distinguish whether we are in a "real" universe or an "illusionary" one?

But the point still is: if any type of evidence is presented, do you take it as the validating criteria for determining whether something is real or not? Remember, it is you who is arguing that the appearance of truth is not a reliable criteria for determining the real truth of the universe, which means you're left only with the advocacy of epistemological nihilism, because, well...anything goes, right?

[Veritas Aequitas]

If one is dead, how could one disentangle from reality.

By ceasing to exist. When things don't exist, they are not part of reality. If they used to exist, but then they don't, they have effectively been disentangled from reality.

You don't seem to realize you are talking about "being disentangled from reality" while being entangled with reality.

I understand your 'theory' even if the human race disappear the universe still exists but a theory is not reality.

We have been through this before. Remember the age of the moon? It is not a just-so story, but a fact confirmed by hard evidence: there was a universe before humans showed up, and humans showed up as result of processes going on in that universe. It is an indisputable known fact of reality that the universe can exist without humans in it.

I had defined 'what is fact' is framework and system [FSK] dependent.
A FSK is a human construct, i.e. dependent on the collective minds of humans.
Therefore whatever indisputable known fact you claim are ultimately minds dependent.

What is a Fact?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486

There are various anti-realists views.
My view from an anti-realist's POV is that of empirical realism, i.e. the external empirical reality exists as real [not an illusion] but it is conditioned by the human conditions.

It is the realists who are delusional when they reify the external empirical reality as ABSOLUTELY real, i.e. reality exists even when there are no more humans.

If you reflect and philosophize at the highest possible level, you will find you just CANNOT conclude anything realistically about reality with absoluteness.

There are various realist views as well.
And not all realist views are absolutists, and by that is meant that no proposition can obtain absolute knowledge, but that applies to any view, anti-realism included. So, if an anti-realist proclaims absolute knowledge about the non-existence of an objective, mind-independent reality, the anti-realist is being as delusional as the absolute realist he's opposing. In fact, he's just reifying illusion as real and taking his supposed knowledge of this illusion as very much real, too. OTOH, a so-called anti-realist that acknowledges the existence of a reality that is "external" to the subject, is already committed to some form of realism. He will have no justification for denying the realism of others, when he's not willing to abandon his own.

By 'absolute' I did not meant absolutely absolute e.g. 100% certainty, but relatively absolute to the extent the realists' claim is in direct opposite to the anti-realists.

I had stated I am an empirical realist [external world exists externally] that is conditioned upon the human conditions. This externalness is within the human conditions. This is the concept of Transcendental Idealism.
As such whilst I am committed to some form of realism, it is not the absolute realism that typical realists are claiming.

Meanwhile the typical realist is an empirical-idealist and at the same time a transcendental realist as in naive realism. A realist who is transcendental is delusional.

That the conditions of knowledge are set up by humans does not mean that the conditions of existence of what is known are dependent of them. And it is precisely because we have devised methods (conditions of knowledge) that allow us to determine the objective, mind-independent, existence of things. So, it's not that realism arises despite epistemological constraints, but because those epistemological constraints are organized in methods of inquiry to discover the truth. Sure, one can always say that truth is a human construction, but that applies to any anti-realist view as well. It is the central contradiction of that philosophical view: by denying access to reliable truths, they are denying the reliability of their own truth.

The word 'dependent' is a bit confusing in this case.
What is really intended is 'what is reality' is always intricately and intrinsically entangled with the human conditions.

Note this argument,

• Reality is ALL-there-is.
  All-there-is intricately included human beings.
  Reality is entangled with human beings.

This is why Wittgenstein's asserted,
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”
i.e. one has to literally 'shut up' and resist insisting in mind or words epistemologically or ontologically there is always 'something' independent of the human conditions.

But why one doesn't have to literally 'shut up' and resist insisting, in mind or words, epistemologically or ontologically, that there is always 'nothing' independent of the human conditions? How can one speak of that as knowledge that is certain, if the advocate of that philosophical view has shut the door and claimed there's no way to know?

'Literally shut up' is merely in theory and reflect the seriousness of the issue.
In practice, one should not reify whatever one cannot speak of, i.e. impossible to be real.

Philosophical Realism and theism both assume [i.e. no valid nor sound proofs] there is a reality that is independent of the human conditions.

Philosophical realism is .. about a certain kind of thing (like numbers or morality) is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.[1][2][3] This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding.
-wiki

Theism claim God has mind-independent existence.

That's a fallacy of spurious correlation. Just because theism makes claims about gods being real, that is, about entities which have mind-independence existence, does not entail that all realists must endorse the idea that gods are real, nor it is necessary to believe in gods or any such other entity to be a realist. Realism is not the philosophical view that anything conceived is real. I can deny the real existence of many things and still be a realist.

You missed my point.
I did not imply all realists must believe in a God because both are physical realists.

What I stated was,
since both realists and theists are physical realists, they are reifying a transcendental illusion [not empirical illusions].

By clinging to realism you are indirectly providing support to theists with the same claim of their God having mind-independent existence.
Anti-realism directly destroyed the independent power of a God, thus shifting their claim of whatever God as a human construct.

Bishop Berkeley, a well-known anti-realist, believed that God was real. Most anti-realists I have debated are also advocates of philosophical Idealism, since their anti-realism is instrumental for denying materialism and, along the way, introducing notions of an Absolute Spirit.

Berkeley was in a way a pseudo anti-realist i.e. his subjective idealism is backed ultimately by an independent real God.
Note Berkeley argument is in two parts, i.e.
1. against materialism - which is anti-realist
2. a real God exists - physical realism.

As I had stated, if you claim to be a typical realist, then you are actually a transcendental realist but is an empirical idealist of the external world.
This meant what is empirically real is restricted to what your mind interpret and realize [empirical idealism] but what is ultimately real to you is beyond your mind, thus transcendental realism.
Agree?

[Conde Lucanor]

If one is dead, how could one disentangle from reality.

By ceasing to exist. When things don't exist, they are not part of reality. If they used to exist, but then they don't, they have effectively been disentangled from reality.

You don't seem to realize you are talking about "being disentangled from reality" while being entangled with reality.

It is never my contention that knowledge concerning disentanglement from reality, such as knowledge of things that don't exist or ceased to exist, arises from something different than entanglement with reality.

I had defined 'what is fact' is framework and system [FSK] dependent.
A FSK is a human construct, i.e. dependent on the collective minds of humans.
Therefore whatever indisputable known fact you claim are ultimately minds dependent.

I'm perfectly OK with the notion of fact as human construct and framework-dependent, but that things are epistemologically-dependent does not necessarily entail that they are also ontologically-dependent. To assert that the ontological status of everything is mind-dependent is, in any case, also the product of a particular epistemological framework and an attempt to establish indisputable truths from that framework. It is therefore a stance that bites its own tail. There is, after all, no notion of mind-dependency as a given, it is also a construct.

By 'absolute' I did not meant absolutely absolute e.g. 100% certainty, but relatively absolute to the extent the realists' claim is in direct opposite to the anti-realists.

"Relatively absolute" is an oxymoron, a classical contradictio in adjecto. It simply cannot be.

I had stated I am an empirical realist [external world exists externally] that is conditioned upon the human conditions. This externalness is within the human conditions. This is the concept of Transcendental Idealism.
As such whilst I am committed to some form of realism, it is not the absolute realism that typical realists are claiming.

All such concessions to realism are nothing but holes in the anti-realist stance, because anti-realism is simply untenable. The only true anti-realism is the "anything goes" stance, to which no so called anti-realist is willing to commit to. What we can have only are different forms of realism and one which denies material reality is the one that anti-realists (aka idealists) represent. That's all they care about: to acknowledge a non-material reality, that is to be treated as external to the conscious subject but at the same time subordinate to that consciousness.

Meanwhile the typical realist is an empirical-idealist and at the same time a transcendental realist as in naive realism. A realist who is transcendental is delusional.

A self-proclaimed realist, in whatever flavor they might come, is necessarily committed to the core principle of realism: that there is a reality independent of one's mind. One is either committed to this or is not, and if not, then we have a typical idealist. Some idealists, like Plato, were also realists, but your typical modern idealist (aka anti-realist) is committed to the idea that consciousness is the fundamental principle of the universe, and that there's no material world, or that what is called the material world is a product of consciousness.

The word 'dependent' is a bit confusing in this case.
What is really intended is 'what is reality' is always intricately and intrinsically entangled with the human conditions.

Not as long as there are no human conditions. It is part of our human-centered perspective of the world the certainty that there's still a world functioning under the same principles, or having the same properties, before and after human existence. Our epistemic entanglements do not entail an ontological entanglement.

Note this argument,

• Reality is ALL-there-is.
  All-there-is intricately included human beings.
  Reality is entangled with human beings.

The second premise is false. We have to look at the nature of our entanglements, either epistemological or ontological. Humans construct the knowledge of all there is, but this does not entail that all there is, as it is, is constructed by the human mind.

I did not imply all realists must believe in a God because both are physical realists.

What I stated was,
since both realists and theists are physical realists, they are reifying a transcendental illusion [not empirical illusions].

One, you are indeed implying what you deny to be implying, that is, finding a meaningful correlation. Otherwise, you would be merely describing two separate events that have no relation between them, which would mean you are not making any point. But you surely are trying to.

Two, theists, or at least all who have systematized theistic views in the Western canon, are by definition contrary to the idea of God being a physical entity of nature, but more prone to the idea of a supernatural, non-physical entity. There's no way they could be included among physical realists.

Berkeley was in a way a pseudo anti-realist i.e. his subjective idealism is backed ultimately by an independent real God.
Note Berkeley argument is in two parts, i.e.
1. against materialism - which is anti-realist
2. a real God exists - physical realism.

You are equating realism with physicalism. If there's a representative of the strongest opposition to physicalism, it is Berkeley.

As I had stated, if you claim to be a typical realist, then you are actually a transcendental realist but is an empirical idealist of the external world.

I'm just the typical materialism monist and realist, which means I acknowledge the existence of one and only mind-independent, physical reality. Humans and their conscious processes are products of the physical organization of nature. No transcendental, spiritual realms here, ontologically speaking, as one expects from idealists. Epistemologically speaking, what is often called transcendental realism is compatible with material monism, but material monism is not compatible with idealism. Also, empirical idealism, also known as subjective idealism:

"... is a form of philosophical monism that holds that only minds and mental contents exist. It entails and is generally identified or associated with immaterialism, the doctrine that material things do not exist. Subjective idealism rejects dualism, neutral monism, and materialism;" (Wikipedia)

This meant what is empirically real is restricted to what your mind interpret and realize [empirical idealism] but what is ultimately real to you is beyond your mind, thus transcendental realism.
Agree?

No, I cannot endorse your classifications, as explained above. I do find appealing the philosophical stance of transcendental realism as advocated by critical realists, but that of course has very little to do with what you call here transcendental realism.

[Veritas Aequitas]

By ceasing to exist. When things don't exist, they are not part of reality. If they used to exist, but then they don't, they have effectively been disentangled from reality.

You don't seem to realize you are talking about "being disentangled from reality" while being entangled with reality.

It is never my contention that knowledge concerning disentanglement from reality, such as knowledge of things that don't exist or ceased to exist, arises from something different than entanglement with reality.

The contention here is 'does the universe exists if there are no humans'. Your claim is 'yes' while I claim 'no' in the sense of no disentanglement from human conditions.
This is reducible to the the contention between Philosophical Realism versus Philosophical Anti-Realism, mine is Empirical Realism aka Transcendental Idealism.
I am arguing Philosophical Realism is not realistic nor tenable.
I believe I have raised a thread for my claim and in various threads.

I had defined 'what is fact' is framework and system [FSK] dependent.
A FSK is a human construct, i.e. dependent on the collective minds of humans.
Therefore whatever indisputable known fact you claim are ultimately minds dependent.

I'm perfectly OK with the notion of fact as human construct and framework-dependent, but that things are epistemologically-dependent does not necessarily entail that they are also ontologically-dependent. To assert that the ontological status of everything is mind-dependent is, in any case, also the product of a particular epistemological framework and an attempt to establish indisputable truths from that framework. It is therefore a stance that bites its own tail. There is, after all, no notion of mind-dependency as a given, it is also a construct.

At the same time, to assert the ontological status of everything is mind-independent must also be dependent of a particular framework.
The epistemological framework is the most credible, e.g. the scientific framework.
Thus if you are not relying an an epistemological framework then you are likely to be dependent of a lesser credible framework which in a way is still of human construct.

When you "assert the ontological status of everything is mind-independent" you are relying on the groundless "Speculative Philosophy" framework which is from a human construct.

As such whatever which way, you are stuck with the human conditions.

I had stated I am an empirical realist [external world exists externally] that is conditioned upon the human conditions. This externalness is within the human conditions. This is the concept of Transcendental Idealism.
As such whilst I am committed to some form of realism, it is not the absolute realism that typical realists are claiming.

All such concessions to realism are nothing but holes in the anti-realist stance, because anti-realism is simply untenable. The only true anti-realism is the "anything goes" stance, to which no so called anti-realist is willing to commit to. What we can have only are different forms of realism and one which denies material reality is the one that anti-realists (aka idealists) represent. That's all they care about: to acknowledge a non-material reality, that is to be treated as external to the conscious subject but at the same time subordinate to that consciousness.

Not all anti-realism are the same.
Mine is transcendental idealism which is Empirical Realism. It is likely you are not aware of this sort of anti-realism.
Empirical Realism is not "anything goes" but claim what is real must be verified and justified empirically. But since the human conditions are involved in this verification and justification, what is empirically real cannot be independent of the human conditions.

You may not be aware,
a realist so claimed is actually a true idealist, i.e. an empirical idealist.
Because if you are either a naive realist or indirect realist, what is real to you empirically is only upon the sense-data in the mind.
You are never in touch with the supposed-real-object out there which is assumed to send waves to your brain via an intermediary which can mislead and corrupt.
There is always a reality-gap between you and the supposed[assumed] object.

Meanwhile the typical realist is an empirical-idealist and at the same time a transcendental realist as in naive realism. A realist who is transcendental is delusional.

A self-proclaimed realist, in whatever flavor they might come, is necessarily committed to the core principle of realism: that there is a reality independent of one's mind. One is either committed to this or is not, and if not, then we have a typical idealist. Some idealists, like Plato, were also realists, but your typical modern idealist (aka anti-realist) is committed to the idea that consciousness is the fundamental principle of the universe, and that there's no material world, or that what is called the material world is a product of consciousness.

Note the term 'realist' is a hijacking by some philosophers to represent their view of reality, but it does not necessary confirm what they claim as real is really real.
As I had stated, my anti-realism [opposing philosophical realism] acknowledge empirical reality of an external physical [Physics] world but this reality is overridingly encompassed within the human conditions.

The word 'dependent' is a bit confusing in this case.
What is really intended is 'what is reality' is always intricately and intrinsically entangled with the human conditions.

Not as long as there are no human conditions. It is part of our human-centered perspective of the world the certainty that there's still a world functioning under the same principles, or having the same properties, before and after human existence. Our epistemic entanglements do not entail an ontological entanglement.

Note my point above, whatever is ontological [mind-independent or mind dependent] must ultimately fall within a human constructed framework, i.e. in your case a speculative philosophical framework.

Note this argument,

• Reality is ALL-there-is.
  All-there-is intricately included human beings.
  Reality is entangled with human beings.

The second premise is false. We have to look at the nature of our entanglements, either epistemological or ontological. Humans construct the knowledge of all there is, but this does not entail that all there is, as it is, is constructed by the human mind.

I did not claim all there is is constructed by the human mind.
What I claimed is all there is cannot be disentangled from the human mind[s].

I did not imply all realists must believe in a God because both are physical realists.

What I stated was,
since both realists and theists are physical realists, they are reifying a transcendental illusion [not empirical illusions].

One, you are indeed implying what you deny to be implying, that is, finding a meaningful correlation. Otherwise, you would be merely describing two separate events that have no relation between them, which would mean you are not making any point. But you surely are trying to.

Two, theists, or at least all who have systematized theistic views in the Western canon, are by definition contrary to the idea of God being a physical entity of nature, but more prone to the idea of a supernatural, non-physical entity. There's no way they could be included among physical realists.

My point is, both the physical realists and theists believe things exist independent of the human mind. ''Things" in the loosest sense can be entity of physical or otherwise as long as there is no contradiction. The majority of theists, i.e. the Abrahamic believe in a God that has agency to listen and answer their prayers and promise them eternal life in heaven.
In both cases, there is a reality-Gap.

Berkeley was in a way a pseudo anti-realist i.e. his subjective idealism is backed ultimately by an independent real God.
Note Berkeley argument is in two parts, i.e.
1. against materialism - which is anti-realist
2. a real God exists - physical realism.

You are equating realism with physicalism. If there's a representative of the strongest opposition to physicalism, it is Berkeley.

As I had stated, if you claim to be a typical realist, then you are actually a transcendental realist but is an empirical idealist of the external world.

I'm just the typical materialism monist and realist, which means I acknowledge the existence of one and only mind-independent, physical reality. Humans and their conscious processes are products of the physical organization of nature. No transcendental, spiritual realms here, ontologically speaking, as one expects from idealists. Epistemologically speaking, what is often called transcendental realism is compatible with material monism, but material monism is not compatible with idealism. Also, empirical idealism, also known as subjective idealism:

"... is a form of philosophical monism that holds that only minds and mental contents exist. It entails and is generally identified or associated with immaterialism, the doctrine that material things do not exist. Subjective idealism rejects dualism, neutral monism, and materialism;" (Wikipedia)

But your acknowledgement of "the existence of one and only mind-independent, physical reality" is based on assumption and speculation and there is a reality-gap between you and that physical reality.

This meant what is empirically real is restricted to what your mind interpret and realize [empirical idealism] but what is ultimately real to you is beyond your mind, thus transcendental realism.
Agree?

No, I cannot endorse your classifications, as explained above. I do find appealing the philosophical stance of transcendental realism as advocated by critical realists, but that of course has very little to do with what you call here transcendental realism.

I am interested to know what is "transcendental realism as advocated by critical realists", any references to that.
But the term 'transcendental' itself is already very suspicious as that which is beyond the empirical.

[Eodnhoj7]

You keep creating strawmen.

I mentioned 'substance theory' above.
Can you confirm that you understand what 'substance theory' is about?

If yes, demonstrate substance theory [thing-in-itself] is realistic and tenable, then you would have proven the thing-in-itself is true and real.

• Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory

I don't have too and it is far from a strawman. If anything your point is a strawman as a thing in itself can exist without substance theory. You are diverting the argument away from my simple point:

The change in observation necessitates a phenomenon as unobserved then observed. This movement from unobserved to observed accounts for a change in observation, the thing in itself accounts for a change in observation. The unobserved moving to the observed, as the change in observation, necessitates a thing in itself as proven through change.

Note I raised this OP so I know what is supposed to be on topic.
You are the one who is going off tangent from the OP.

No it addresses and independent thing in itself. You are blatantly ignoring the problem of change and a thing in itself:

"The change in observation necessitates a phenomenon as unobserved then observed. This movement from unobserved to observed accounts for a change in observation, the thing in itself accounts for a change in observation. The unobserved moving to the observed, as the change in observation, necessitates a thing in itself as proven through change."

[Skepdick]

First of all, it is not my thought experiment. You brought it up as a response to my mention of two well established facts that point to the mind-independent existence of things, but you haven't demonstrated how this in any way refutes my claim.

it's not my job to refute you. it's your job to refute yourself. Science is about intellectual honesty about the limits of your assumptions. Philosophy is about burdening other people with refuting you.

It only says that it could be the case that everything is an illusion, but you have no way to provide that it is the case.

Strawman. I am pointing out that there exist multiple conceptual possibilities and no experiment you can perform to eliminate any of them.
Every experiment confirms all possibilities. No experiment disconfirms any possibilities.

So I am asking you to tell me how and why you've chosen the one you've chosen despite the alternatives.

Secondly, as I already explained, the logical consequence of accepting that it is the case that everything is an illusion, is to abandon all certainties, which of course will have to include the certainty that everything is an illusion. There would be simply no way to find out the truth about anything.

Anything goes. And since you are the one advancing this argument as a response to my claim, you're at the same time denying the possibility of truth and looking for it, which is of course a contradictory stance.

Exactly. Logically speaking even the impossible is possible - we are just generating untestable theories. That's why we need empiricism and falsification.

Non-contradictions don't matter. That's just an axiom as arbitrary as any.

There is a Logical system and a corresponding universe in which P and ~P is false.
There is a Logical system and a corresponding universe in which P and ~P is true.

How do you empirically determine the truth about which universe you are in?

See? You're not following the logical consequences of your own arguments.

So what? You are conflating the world of logic with the world that we find ourselves in. They are separate worlds.

In the world I exist in contradictions do exist - if they didn't, how could I possibly contradict myself when I choose to?

Logic is a good servant but a terrible master.

If all events in the history of the universe are nothing but an illusion, so are the causal relationships among them.

Whether your memories/experiences are an illusion or not has absolutely no bearing on the fact that you have memories/experiences.

As long as my experiences don't deviate (too much) from my expectations - all's OK.

Remember, this is the card you are using to cast doubt on the possibility that the moon existed in a time period prior to the existence of humans. If that were the case, if the unfolding of events in the universe is all an illusion, then the whole societal setting that we perceive to be living in, is all a farce, including our own existence. No one is supposed to have spent 9 months inside their mother's womb, it is a false memory implanted in a perceiving mind.

Let it be a farce! Nothing changes in practice. We are stuck in the condition that we are stuck in. How we narrate this condition .... who cares?

Ok, fine, let's try that. Let's try that only the perception of the length of time changes, but the events actually do happen, and they keep happening in the order that causality requires for them to come about.

You can't determine causal order if the light cones of two spacetime coordinates don't intercept. This is relativity 101.

Or if you want a more time-centric approach to this, do some homework on Lamport clocks. Time is relative to the observer - not absolute.

Then I go back to my initial statement that there's substantial evidence that the moon existed prior (by 4.5 billion years or 4.5 seconds, it doesn't matter now) to humans. It is now even more obvious that your 5-minute universe thought experiment is completely useless to refute my point.

Precisely! The human time-scale is unfalsifiable - obviously! Because we, humans, define what 1 second IS, and then we interpret our experiences of time through the lens of our very own definitions.

But I already said that: to any scientists perception is reality!

It's only Philosophers who disagree with that. They will tell you that to the best of our knowledge/belief the Moon only seems to have existed for 4.5 billion years, but ontologically that could be false.

Our beliefs could be mistaken AND unfalsifiable - those are the limits of epistemology.

Talk about foundations!! This in an attempt to establish one, although not a realistic one.

The absence of a foundation is a foundation! Anything goes - pick your poison.

But no, anything does not go. For anything to go, it is complete chaos and arbitrariness. No one serious about philosophy would want that.

You have this exactly backwards. Philosophy does PRECISELY that. Any foundation that you arbitrarily choose will be summarily rejected and attacked.

If I choose anti-foundationalism (which I have done) - Philosophy will reject and attack that too.

Philosophy is Kobayashi Maru: a game you cannot win. It's by design - it tests your character where the odds are stacked against you.

Once you have models, instruments, methodologies, etc., you are already committed to some foundational principles that organize these.

You are doing what all Philosophers do.

Any foundation is a foundation.
The rejection of foundations is also a foundation.

OK then...

But the point still is: if any type of evidence is presented, do you take it as the validating criteria for determining whether something is real or not?

I have no practical use for the real/non-real distinction.

What is real? Everything.

Remember, it is you who is arguing that the appearance of truth is not a reliable criteria for determining the real truth of the universe, which means you're left only with the advocacy of epistemological nihilism, because, well...anything goes, right?

It's not epistemological nihilism. It's anarchism. Anything goes. If it's useful - it goes (bar ethical considerations)

If it generalizes in a manner that it's useful to others - tell us.
If your observations hold outside the context of your controlled laboratory and generalise well - tell us.

[Terrapin Station]

You are never in touch with the supposed-real-object out there . . .

What do you take to be a good reason to believe this?

[Skepdick]

What do you take to be a good reason to believe this?

What do you take to be good reasons to believe the inverse?

[Veritas Aequitas]

You are never in touch with the supposed-real-object out there . . .

What do you take to be a good reason to believe this?

It is because you cannot prove and justify it.
Otherwise prove it to me?

At present I am refreshing on Russell's Problem of Philosophy with a fine-tooth comb.

Here is what he said of the mind independent external world,

Of course it is not by argument that we originally come by our belief in an independent external world.

We find this belief ready in ourselves as soon as we begin to reflect: it is what may be called an instinctive belief.

We should never have been led to question this belief but for the fact that, at any rate in the case of sight, it seems as if the sense-datum itself were instinctively believed to be the independent object, whereas argument shows that the object cannot be identical with the sense-datum.

This discovery, however -which is not at all paradoxical in the case of taste and smell and sound, and only slightly so in the case of touch -- leaves undiminished our instinctive belief that there are objects corresponding to our sense-data.

Since this belief does not lead to any difficulties, but on the contrary tends to simplify and systematize our account of our experiences, there seems no good reason for rejecting it.
We may therefore admit -- though with a slight doubt derived from dreams -- that the external world does really exist, and is not wholly dependent for its existence upon our continuing to perceive it.

Russell Problem of Philosophy Chapter II

From Russell's POV we cannot prove by argument [justification] an independent external world exists as real.
Rather we believe it is real merely by instinctive beliefs.
Why this instinctive beliefs is preferable is because it is more simpler than the other views, i.e. there is no ultimate independent external world, thus, reality entangles with the human conditions.

Note I don't deny an independent external world in the common and conventional sense. If there is an oncoming car toward me, I will avoid it.

However I believe "there is no ultimate independent external world, instead I believe reality entangles with the human conditions."
It is so obvious humans are embedded within reality and entangle with reality, i.e. 'dances with reality.'
Note the principle of non-absolute determinism, i.e. everything is connected from since the Big Bang. This would give us a clue we are all connected as one whole.

This concept of a non-independent external world will contribute critical and significant positive utilities to the progress of mankind.

First it will crush the idea of an external independent God which has contributed terrible evil and violent acts throughout the history of mankind. Therefrom humanity will be saved from all possible theistic driven evil and violence.

When it is recognized that humans are part and parcel of reality, there is then room for humans to manage themselves rather than, for certain critical sufferings, they will blame independent external things beyond their control, thus facing inefficiencies.
This is Buddhism's focus on "sufferings" especially the terrible existential pains.
There are many more positives from recognizing reality is not an independent external world.

[Terrapin Station]

What do you take to be a good reason to believe this?

It is because you cannot prove and justify it.

What in the world???

"A good reason to believe that P is that one can not prove and justify that P."

Is that seriously what you just suggested?

So in other words, "For all empirical claims, one has an equally good reason to believe both P and not-P, therefore one believes both" (because no empirical claim is provable).

Is that your view?

[Skepdick]

So in other words, "For all empirical claims, one has an equally good reason to believe both P and c, therefore one believes both" (because no empirical claim is provable).

Is that your view?

Dumb! Fucking! Philosopher!

That is literally how empiricism works. Your belief about P and not-P is in superposition prior to an empirical measurement.

Believing both is necessary for empiricism.

If you ONLY believed P; or you ONLY believed not-P then you've already made up your mind and you have no use, need or reason to do any empiricism.

To actively pursue the empirical falsification of P is to believe THAT not-P (despite the evidence for P)

[tillingborn]

Your belief about P and not-P is in superposition prior to an empirical measurement.

Believing both is necessary for empiricism.

That is nonsense. Many experiments are done by scientists confident that their beliefs will be vindicated. Equally, many experiments are done precisely because other scientists' data are not believed. That scientists are completely impartial is a fantasy that can only be believed by someone who has never met a scientist. Dumb! Fucking! Fantasist!

[Terrapin Station]

Your belief about P and not-P is in superposition prior to an empirical measurement.

Believing both is necessary for empiricism.

That is nonsense. Many experiments are done by scientists confident that their beliefs will be vindicated. Equally, many experiments are done precisely because other scientists' data are not believed. That scientists are completely impartial is a fantasy that can only be believed by someone who has never met a scientist. Dumb! Fucking! Fantasist!

Not disagreeing with you, tillingborn, just commenting on your post, partially because it's the only way I see any Skepdick content:

In general, people have very few contradictory beliefs--at least not where they parse the beliefs as contradictory (as opposed to someone else concluding that they're contradictory at least in their implications).

Of course, some people have some contradictory beliefs--this is the whole idea behind cognitive dissonance, which some people have about some issues, but most people do not hold contradictory beliefs about most things. If they did, we'd never be able to explain any actions they undertake, because their contradictory beliefs couldn't motivate action.

No one can prove any empirical claim. So no, people do not believe both P and not-P on the basis of not being able to prove either.

[tillingborn]

In general, people have very few contradictory beliefs--at least not where they parse the beliefs as contradictory (as opposed to someone else concluding that they're contradictory at least in their implications).

I think the key here is whether people parse/analyse/deconstruct their beliefs and whether they care about the implications. Two of the pillars to western philosophy, Christianity and science, each maintain completely antithetical beliefs. Christianity holds that a person who would tolerate eternal torture is a bad person, but a god who does so is a good god. In science, special relativity says space is a void, general relativity says it's a smooth substance, quantum mechanics says it's lumpy. There are people who are pragmatic; Christians might say 'Meh, God works in mysterious ways', scientists can pick up whatever instrument works best; but there are people who can't let it go; Christian apologists and theoretical physicists for example. The difference is that the former have a book as their source material, the latter a universe. Christians who worry about contradictions are stuck with cognitive dissonance, scientists can try something completely different.

No one can prove any empirical claim. So no, people do not believe both P and not-P on the basis of not being able to prove either.

It depends what you mean by 'prove'. Logical or mathematical 'proofs' don't necessarily apply to the world as studied by physics. You can't logically or mathematically 'prove' that heavier than air objects will fall, but you can prove it to most people's satisfaction by dropping one.