Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 4:48 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am The point is I am very well aware Transcendental Idealism I is CENTRAL and critical as a backbone to the whole theme of Kant's CPR. SO if TI is defunct so is Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. There is no way I would have accepted that!

In contrast the analytic philosophers treat Kant's TI as a separate part of Kant's main philosophy. That is why they claim TI is defunct because they faced their own invented controversies in Kant's TI.
Actually, analytic philosophy has ignored Kant's overall program as it has ignored idealism in general, because idealism has nothing to offer there. Besides, ever since the first edition of CPR came out, there's simply no consensus about what Kant's TI actually entails.
Actually, the philosophical realists had already condemned Kant's overall program as like Berkeley's idealism. [note Stang's SEP Article].
Stang wrote:The first published review of the Critique of Pure Reason, by Feder and Garve (1782), accuses Kant of holding a basically Berkeleyan phenomenalist conception of objects in space.2.0 - Stang SEP
That was why Kant wrote the Prolegomena, the refutation of Idealism therein and in the CPR.

Here [in preface to 2nd edition] is where Kant implied his critics failed to understand his full work by merely cherry picking partial issues;
Kant in CPR wrote:A philosophical work cannot be armed at all points, like a Mathematical treatise, and may therefore be open to objection in this or that respect, while yet the Structure of the System, taken in its Unity, is not in the least endangered.
Few have the versatility of mind to familiarise themselves with a new System; and owing to the general distaste for all innovation, still fewer have the inclination to do so.

If we take single passages, torn from their contexts, and compare them with one another, apparent contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in a work that is written with any freedom of expression.

In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others, such contradictions have the effect of placing the work in an unfavourable light; but they are easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the Whole.
Bxliv
The point is the philosophical realists [now analytic] continue to interpret Kant's work wrongly to the present.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am Kant's TI has no practical values to humanity?
You are just ignorant on this.
Kant is touted as a godfather of Cognitive Science and respected in many other fields of Knowledge.
Kant would be as much of a godfather of cognitive sciences as Aristotle would be a godfather of biology. Just because they contributed with early speculations on the subject, does not mean those ideas made it into contemporary sciences.
Kant would not be regarded as 'Godfather of cognitive science' if cognitive scientists had not benefited from Kant's ideas which they transposed into their work.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am
  • Through nineteenth-century intermediaries, the model of the mind developed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) has had an enormous influence on contemporary cognitive research. Indeed, Kant could be viewed as the intellectual godfather of cognitive science.
    https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... Kantianism#:
An important distinction is necessary: we should be talking about modern cognitive sciences, not just any theoretical pre-scientific approaches to the subject.
Kant's ideas of cognition were interesting and actually were reasonably fine at the basic level one can expect from pure speculation, but the most ambitious concepts that form the core of his speculations are at worst confusing and not useful, and at best completely distanced from scientific realism.
Science without an ontological commitment to a mind-independent reality is simply not science, and the very first problem that anti-realists encounter in order to advance a systematic, coherent approach within their doctrines, is to solve the puzzle of other minds. They can't.
Now you are changing tune.
Earlier you claimed TI is defunct and useless.
I have countered your claim, that TI has at least some use, i.e. not useless.
If you research further, you will note Kant contributed greatly and very much to philosophy and other fields of knowledge.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am
Conde Lucanor wrote: You forget again that your request implied that you knew the content of the article. You were so sure that you even said I was likely mistaken. The key point is that you never thought there could be contentious issues about TI among Kant's scholars, but you always said that it was just me not understanding it. That is not an argument you can advance any more. Not only that, but I have shown that your understanding of Kant's work and its scholarship is fundamentally wrong.
This is pointless speculation on your part.
Having done such extensive coverage of Kant's CPR I am well aware of the contentious issues re TI among Kant's scholars.
No, I'm not speculating anything. It is a pretty straightforward logical argument derived from actual statements of yours in this thread, and you are (again) not responding to it.
Note my earlier response to such a question.
BTW, that you may have "done extensive coverage of Kant's CPR" is by no means an indication that you have secured a proper understanding of what CPR entails.
Re the main themes, I had stated you can test me or get some expert to test me on that.
I have drawn up more than 50 very detailed Flowcharts re each chapter/theme and an overall summary and ensure all the flowcharts cohere into one main summary chart.
From this it is unlikely I will miss out on the main, sub- and sub-sub-themes of the CPR.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 4:48 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am This is where I think you are wrong in understanding the article.
Kant never positioned himself as a 'realist' [philosophical realism] against the idealism of Berkeley. Rather he differentiated his Transcendental Idealism from Berkeley's problematic or subjective idealism.
First of all, what I said was not my take on Stang's article, it is my understanding of Kant's positions as almost universally agreed, which is therefore also supported by Stang's article. Stang did not make it up as an interpretation of his own.

You seem to be too much dogmatically entangled with labels and philosophical schools, instead of trying to understand and deal with what is entailed in them.
So I said realism and you immediately associated it with what you understand as philosophical realism, but realism in general simply expresses a commitment with the actual existence of some things that have objective properties, even if they are Platonic entities.
So this notion of realism shows two aspects: one about existence of things, and another one about the objectivity (mind-independence) of those things.
Philosophical realism is simply a commitment about those things being mind-independent entities.
The opposite stance, represented by subjective idealism, advances the notion that all there is are only mind-dependent entities.
Whoever expresses the view that there are only mind-dependent entities is then associated with the philosophical anti-realism of subjective idealism, represented (although there's controversy on that) by Berkeley.
So, by Kant distancing himself from Berkeley and his stance against mind-independent things, he was rejecting his philosophical anti-realism and therefore positioning himself as a realist of mind-independent things, aka an empirical realist:
You inferred wrongly, i.e.
Berkeley was against mind-independent things, thus he was an idealist.
Since Kant distance himself from Berkeley’s idealism, therefore Kant was a realist, i.e. an empirical realist.

First there are many types of idealism, as such, that Kant distanced himself from Berkeley do not imply Kant was a realist in that sense.
Kant was mainly an idealist, i.e. a transcendental idealist, which is different from Berkeley’s subjective idealism.

Point is a transcendental idealist is also an empirical realist in another sense.

You stated,
“So this notion of realism shows two aspects: one about existence of things, and another one about the objectivity (mind-independence) of those things.”

If you are not a philosophical realist [mind independent reality], then what sort of ‘realism’ stance do you adopt?
There is no middle-way, you are either a philosophical realist or anti-philosophical_realist.

I believe you are a philosophical realist aka a transcendental realist which is also an empirical idealist in another sense.

Britannica wrote: Britannica: Realism-philosophy
The 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant recognized that Berkeley’s “dogmatic idealism” involved denying the independent reality of space.
Berkeley’s arguments, he thought, were effective against metaphysical positions which assumed that space is a property of “things in themselves,” as opposed to their representations, or “appearances,” in the mind.
Kant argued to the contrary that space as well as time are forms of “sensible intuition,” or the mode in which the mind is affected by sensible objects.
Thus, the reality of objects external to the mind (objects in space) is guaranteed, because being in space and time is a condition of being an object of sensible experience at all.
Kant’s combination of transcendental idealism—the doctrine that what is given in experience are only appearances—with empirical realism—the view that there are objects external to the mind—allowed him to reject the conception of external objects as “lying behind” appearances and as knowable only (if at all) by a problematic and ultimately indefensible inference from what is given in experience to its hidden causes.


It's a fact that Kant denied the objective existence of space and time, and that is the core of Transcendental Idealism. Those things, according to him, could never be things in themselves, mind-independent realities. However, whether Kant rejected the possibility of existence (ontology) of the objects “lying behind” appearances or not, is somehow disputable, depending on whether one advocates the epistemological, non-ontological interpretation, or the ontological one.
The epistemological one, advocated by the likes of Allison, entails no assertion or denial of the objects “lying behind” appearances, the things in themselves, but an ontological agnosticism.
Kant's assertions are merely about our claims of knowledge of the reality of things, which he thinks is indefensible (the claim of knowledge, not the reality of things).
The ontological one entails the assertion of actual existence of the objects “lying behind” appearances, the non-spatiotemporal things in themselves, of which we would know nothing else.
His agnosticism remains as to how these things actually are.

The position that you're defending in this forum, however, is that Kant advanced the ontological statement that things in themselves do not, and cannot, exist independent of minds (the two aspects of realism mentioned above), which is actually Berkeley's view, from which Kant moved away.
Nope, the position I am defending is that of Transcendental Idealism which is Kant’s central theme which is not Berkeley’s subjective idealism.

Kant’s as with Allison and my view was not ontological agnosticism.
For Kant what is the thing-in-itself is merely an intelligible or transcendental object which is in a way an intellectual object which can never be real in any sense of reality.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 4:48 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am Kant did claim that things-in-themselves do not exist as real in the spatio-temporal sense within human conditions.

However things-in-themselves can ONLY exist as transcendental objects which are merely intelligible entities. These are something like Plato's universals and forms which cannot exists as real at all albeit has some uses.
One thing is to claim that time and space only exist in minds and that therefore objects appearing in time and space do not exist,
and another thing is to claim that objects as independent realities of minds do not exist at all.
Kant evidently argued for the first, but he did not argue for the second, which would imply that he had obtained the intellectual intuition that he denied humans had.
Not sure of your point above?

Note Kant did not claim time and space only exist in minds.
What Kant claimed is space and time are imperative human-conditions of human cognition of reality [things, objects, etc.]
As such whatever are things in time and space cannot be independent of the human conditions.

What is real must exist within space and time.
Things in time and space cannot be independent of the human conditions.
The thing-in-itself the supposedly unknowable thing is beyond space and time, thus is independent of the human conditions.
Since the thing-in-itself do not exists within space and time, it cannot be real at all.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am As far as ontology in the realists [yours et al] sense, Kant condemned ontology, i.e. things existing as real objectively in the independent external world.
Not really, he condemned those who claimed to have knowledge of how things in themselves actually are by virtue of how they appear to our cognition, as spatiotemporal objects. So he condemned a spatiotemporal ontology, while remained agnostic or skeptic about what the actual ontology is.
As mentioned above all of reality that is actual and real is within space and time.
If there is no spatiotemporal ontology, there is no ultimate ontology.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am You are conflating the perspectives I proposed.

I am claiming as with Kant,
  • 1. A mind-independent reality exists - as evident.
    2. BUT ultimately this "mind-independent reality" cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions. [Kant Copernican Revolution].
Note what each statement entails:
"1. A mind-independent reality exists" ==> A reality independent of humans exists.
"2. A [...] "mind-independent reality" cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions" ==> A reality independent of humans does not exist.
One sentence contradicts the other. It's an absurd construction, and notwithstanding all the problems with Kantian doctrines, that is not what Kant argued.
What is a contradiction is only if p and not-p are claimed as true within the same time and same sense.
My 1 and 2 are at the same time but in different senses/perspectives.

Generally realism is contrasted with idealism, but
Kant argued there is empirical-realism within transcendental-idealism.
You need to read up Kant's CPR to understand the above.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am Note the point is humans [observers] are NEVER acquainted with objective reality [things-in-themselves].
What humans are acquainted are only the sense-data of a supposed-thing-in-itself[Russell].
As such, ultimately, whatever is supposedly mind-independent, is always in entanglement with the human conditions.
The third statement does not follow from the first two.
If there are mind-independent things that cannot be cognized as they actually are, all that could be derived from this is that humans are always entangled with things as they appear in cognition.
It doesn't mean that mind-independent things, things in themselves, are always necessarily entangled to cognition.
I see the Moon as a spatiotemporal object and perhaps it is not quite like that, it is just the appearance of the Moon to my cognition, an illusion in Kantian terms, but even if I accepted those terms, one could not guarantee that there really isn't a Moon at all, and that it didn't exist before my experience or anyone's else experience of it.
And I could also argue, against Kant, that the Moon I'm seeing can be indeed a spatiotemporal object actually existing independent of that experience, as this does not violate the dependency of knowledge from sense-data.
You got it wrong with Kant.

Kant never asserted 'the appearance of the Moon to my cognition, is an illusion.'
You will never be able to produce any reference from Kant to support your claim.

What Kant claimed as real is that whole experience of the cognition of the Moon which include the appearance and the whole shebang connected with the experience, knowledge and cognition as expressed in the whole of CPR and transcendental idealism.

It is an illusion when you claim the appearance of the Moon is corresponded with an unknowable moon-in-itself.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am As Russell doubted, perhaps there is no real table out there at all.
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
He could perhaps doubt it, but he could not make the assertion that there isn't.
[/quote]
As with theists, it is cowardly to resort to asking one to prove a negative.

Russell conceded,
Russell wrote:Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy;
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves;
-Problems of Philosophy.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am Since I have done extensive research on Kant's works, I am well aware there are loads of non-consensus on the interpretations of Kant's CPR.
There are two main camps, i.e. those I agree with and those I do not agree with.
Obviously I believe I have interpreted Kant's main theme in the CPR correctly.
It seems you are putting yourself alongside Kant's scholars. Your interest is praiseworthy, but that's not how it works. Kant's scholarship is not divided by the agreement or disagreement with your views, but the agreement or disagreement among scholars themselves, which is diverse.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am I am also well aware those whom I do not agree with did not interpret Kant's work correctly. The reason is they are stuck in an old paradigm [Allison called this
transcendentalistic realism POV] and could not step into the shoes of Kant to grasp his points.
What actually happens, as I have said before, is that you defend against any dissent to your points of views claiming that people didn't understand the texts you're referencing to support them. The truth is that it is you forcing interpretations that do not match those of scholars.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am
Conde Lucanor wrote:So in the end you're actually saying humans don't exist as mind-independent things, as things in themselves. Not only I would be an illusion for you, you would be an illusion for yourself. Then, how do you know anything? Who or what is having the illusion of you?
I believe I have answered the above in detail.
Based on the empirical realism of Kant, humans and everything exist in the external world is real but this is ultimately subsumed within transcendental idealism.
Thus if there is an oncoming car I will step aside to avoid the real car crushing the real me.
Since you keep going in circles: "Humans exist, but ultimately they actually don't exist", let me put it this way: do humans exist as non-spatiotemporal objects?
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am
Conde Lucanor wrote:There are plenty of subjects in SEP, for example, ancient atomism. Does that mean that ancient atomism is not a defunct doctrine? How about the entries on physicalism, dualism or eliminative materialism? Does that mean that they are for you doctrines still doing just fine?
If any subjects as discussed in SEP are defunct, the author will definitely mention it or implied by various qualifications therein.
I am well aware TI [i.e. a central point of the CPR] is not defunct, thus where TI it is mentioned in SEP is not supposed to be defunct.
So you'll agree then that physicalism, metaphysical realism and scientific realism are still doing fine? They are mentioned in SEP as subjects of current discussions.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am Kant would not be regarded as 'Godfather of cognitive science' if cognitive scientists had not benefited from Kant's ideas which they transposed into their work.
The claim that Kant is the 'Godfather of cognitive science' appears to be constrained to the circles of Kant's fans. Any serious account of modern cognitive sciences doesn't even mention Kant as an intellectual reference:

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Cognitive Science
Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary study of mind and intelligence, embracing philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. Its intellectual origins are in the mid-1950s when researchers in several fields began to develop theories of mind based on complex representations and computational procedures. Its organizational origins are in the mid-1970s when the Cognitive Science Society was formed and the journal Cognitive Science began. Since then, more than one hundred universities in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia have established cognitive science programs, and many others have instituted courses in cognitive science.

Perhaps there are Kantians among these cognitive scientists. You let me know:
Gallery of Cognitive Scientists
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am Now you are changing tune.
Earlier you claimed TI is defunct and useless.
I have countered your claim, that TI has at least some use, i.e. not useless.
I still claim TI is defunct and useless, and I have not stated anything differently than that. Many philosophical doctrines were important contributions at their time, challenged some orthodoxy and brought up points worth discussing, but eventually could not live up to their earlier reputation.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am If you research further, you will note Kant contributed greatly and very much to philosophy and other fields of knowledge.
Kant contributed to idealism. Peddling idealism is peddling anti-realism, a reactionary view that goes contrary to the advances of science. It is pure nonsense.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am Re the main themes, I had stated you can test me or get some expert to test me on that.
I have drawn up more than 50 very detailed Flowcharts re each chapter/theme and an overall summary and ensure all the flowcharts cohere into one main summary chart.
From this it is unlikely I will miss out on the main, sub- and sub-sub-themes of the CPR.
I applaud your hard work, but unfortunately, this by no means is yet an indication that you have secured a proper understanding of what CPR entails.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am You inferred wrongly, i.e.
Berkeley was against mind-independent things, thus he was an idealist.
Since Kant distance himself from Berkeley’s idealism, therefore Kant was a realist, i.e. an empirical realist.

First there are many types of idealism, as such, that Kant distanced himself from Berkeley do not imply Kant was a realist in that sense.
Kant was mainly an idealist, i.e. a transcendental idealist, which is different from Berkeley’s subjective idealism.

Point is a transcendental idealist is also an empirical realist in another sense.
I never said Kant had moved to the camp of non-idealist realists. What I said, as Kant himself said, is that his version of idealism, apparently distinguished from that of Berkeley, implies a realistic stance against his anti-realism, in other words he opposes a kind of objective idealism to subjective idealism. This is something Stang addressed in his article:
Kant extensively revised certain sections of the Critique for the second edition (B), published in 1787. It is widely accepted that a main consideration in these revisions was to avoid the misunderstanding of his view that had led to the Feder-Garve review. However, some scholars think that, on this point, there is a difference in doctrine between the A and B editions: made aware of the problematic Berkeleyan consequences of the first edition, Kant endeavored to develop a more realistic view in the B Edition.[14] Other scholars think the difference is largely a matter of presentation: in the B edition, Kant highlights the more realistic aspects of his view and downplays its phenomenalistic sides, but the view is basically the same (e.g., Allison 2004).
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am You stated,
“So this notion of realism shows two aspects: one about existence of things, and another one about the objectivity (mind-independence) of those things.”

If you are not a philosophical realist [mind independent reality], then what sort of ‘realism’ stance do you adopt?
There is no middle-way, you are either a philosophical realist or anti-philosophical_realist.
You seem to think one cannot be an idealist and at the same time a realist. Plato is a well-known idealist who was also a realist. I'm a materialist realist.

Now I ask you: Berkeley believed there isn't a realm of objects separate from the realm of mind, that there's only the realm of mind. What do you think Kant believed?
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am I believe you are a philosophical realist aka a transcendental realist which is also an empirical idealist in another sense.
I don't endorse Kant's classifications, and given that he was a bit misguided about what philosophers like Berkeley were up to, I think it would be wise to completely ignore him on that. Empirical idealism is associated with Berkeley and I'm not even close to endorsing such a thing.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am Nope, the position I am defending is that of Transcendental Idealism which is Kant’s central theme which is not Berkeley’s subjective idealism.

Kant’s as with Allison and my view was not ontological agnosticism.
For Kant what is the thing-in-itself is merely an intelligible or transcendental object which is in a way an intellectual object which can never be real in any sense of reality.
That may be your view, I'm not sure that it is Allison's, but it is certainly not the view of all scholars about what Kant's TI entails.
Transcendental Idealism and Ontological Agnosticism
Therefore, on this interpretation, transcendental idealism, as a doctrine exclusively about how things are known (i.e. as they appear), and justified by arguments which refuse such knowledge any traction on things in themselves, is free from any ontological commitments since its denial of knowledge of things in themselves amounts to an agnosticism about how things are. In other words, appearances have a purely epistemic, non-ontological status since they reflect transcendental idealism’s disavowal of any claims concerning things as they are. This is what constitutes transcendental idealism’s ontological agnosticism. Importantly, this is also what allows transcendental idealism to be distinguished from something like Berkeley’s subjective idealism, for the fact that transcendental idealism restricts knowledge to appearances does not mean that it restricts all things to appearances.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Conde Lucanor wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 3:43 am Since you keep going in circles:
Hence why I don't often write long posts as you guys have been doing. If someone wants to keep arguing/debating via endless lengthy replies, there's no way I'm putting the time and effort and material into long posts until the person demonstrates that they can and will attentively respond to specific points, questions and objections in a pointed/focused, detailed, cogent way that can progress the conversation (and that suggests that they're truly responsive and capable of contemplation and learning).
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 3:43 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am Since I have done extensive research on Kant's works, I am well aware there are loads of non-consensus on the interpretations of Kant's CPR.
There are two main camps, i.e. those I agree with and those I do not agree with.
Obviously I believe I have interpreted Kant's main theme in the CPR correctly.
It seems you are putting yourself alongside Kant's scholars. Your interest is praiseworthy, but that's not how it works. Kant's scholarship is not divided by the agreement or disagreement with your views, but the agreement or disagreement among scholars themselves, which is diverse.
I have already stated, I am not into the academic, if that is what 'scholars' refer to.
If you researched into Kant's work, as I had said there are two 'main' camps.
What is the issue where I agree more with one camp from the other?
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am I am also well aware those whom I do not agree with did not interpret Kant's work correctly. The reason is they are stuck in an old paradigm [Allison called this
transcendentalistic realism POV] and could not step into the shoes of Kant to grasp his points.
What actually happens, as I have said before, is that you defend against any dissent to your points of views claiming that people didn't understand the texts you're referencing to support them. The truth is that it is you forcing interpretations that do not match those of scholars.
I am relying on Kant's view, i.e. even the wisest will inevitably misinterpret him, i.e. falling into the illusions he presented. note B397 which I quoted often.
From this I am confident those who do not agree with the camp I agree with, definitely have not understood Kant thoroughly.
Note for example the analytic philosophers merely focus [with blinkers] on the analytic section of the CPR and ignored the rest which is essential to the completeness of the CPR.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am
Conde Lucanor wrote:So in the end you're actually saying humans don't exist as mind-independent things, as things in themselves. Not only I would be an illusion for you, you would be an illusion for yourself. Then, how do you know anything? Who or what is having the illusion of you?
I believe I have answered the above in detail.
Based on the empirical realism of Kant, humans and everything exist in the external world is real but this is ultimately subsumed within transcendental idealism.
Thus if there is an oncoming car I will step aside to avoid the real car crushing the real me.
Since you keep going in circles: "Humans exist, but ultimately they actually don't exist", let me put it this way: do humans exist as non-spatiotemporal objects?
I never said "Humans exist, but ultimately they actually don't exist."
Humans do exist as empirical objects or entities.
Humans do not exist as non-spatiotemporal objects such as souls that can survives physical death.

.. will continue the rest later.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am There is no middle-way, you are either a philosophical realist or anti-philosophical_realist.
All that reading of Wittgenstein, Rorty, and whoever your "Ash Heap of History" dude is has gone completely to waste if you can't see a problem with that statement.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Eodnhoj7 »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 11:52 am
Conde Lucanor wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 3:43 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am Since I have done extensive research on Kant's works, I am well aware there are loads of non-consensus on the interpretations of Kant's CPR.
There are two main camps, i.e. those I agree with and those I do not agree with.
Obviously I believe I have interpreted Kant's main theme in the CPR correctly.
It seems you are putting yourself alongside Kant's scholars. Your interest is praiseworthy, but that's not how it works. Kant's scholarship is not divided by the agreement or disagreement with your views, but the agreement or disagreement among scholars themselves, which is diverse.
I have already stated, I am not into the academic, if that is what 'scholars' refer to.
If you researched into Kant's work, as I had said there are two 'main' camps.
What is the issue where I agree more with one camp from the other?
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am I am also well aware those whom I do not agree with did not interpret Kant's work correctly. The reason is they are stuck in an old paradigm [Allison called this
transcendentalistic realism POV] and could not step into the shoes of Kant to grasp his points.
What actually happens, as I have said before, is that you defend against any dissent to your points of views claiming that people didn't understand the texts you're referencing to support them. The truth is that it is you forcing interpretations that do not match those of scholars.
I am relying on Kant's view, i.e. even the wisest will inevitably misinterpret him, i.e. falling into the illusions he presented. note B397 which I quoted often.
From this I am confident those who do not agree with the camp I agree with, definitely have not understood Kant thoroughly.
Note for example the analytic philosophers merely focus [with blinkers] on the analytic section of the CPR and ignored the rest which is essential to the completeness of the CPR.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 5:50 am
I believe I have answered the above in detail.
Based on the empirical realism of Kant, humans and everything exist in the external world is real but this is ultimately subsumed within transcendental idealism.
Thus if there is an oncoming car I will step aside to avoid the real car crushing the real me.
Since you keep going in circles: "Humans exist, but ultimately they actually don't exist", let me put it this way: do humans exist as non-spatiotemporal objects?
I never said "Humans exist, but ultimately they actually don't exist."
Humans do exist as empirical objects or entities.
Humans do not exist as non-spatiotemporal objects such as souls that can survives physical death.

.. will continue the rest later.
The existence of the soul after death does not contradict it moving from one context of existence to another. The emptiness of the soul on it's own terms necessitates it as a state which transitions from one context to another and as surviving through newer contexts. It exists through contexts and as the contexts change so does the state of the soul.

The survival of the soul after death is the transition of being from one dimension to another.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:50 am
Conde Lucanor wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 2:27 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 7:18 am However Kant stated things-in-themselves can only be thought of thus only in mind

Note according to Kant's main approach i.e. Copernican Revolution, the things-in-themselves are only epistemological things not ontological things.
The mistake with realists like you is they ASSUMED things-in-themselves are ontological things that has objective reality.

It is this wrong assumption of the ontological things-in-themselves that lead realists to their idea of 'affection', there must be things-in-themselves to affect representations. Thus leading the 'problem of affection' below.
This is what you get wrong, assuming that the denial of knowing the things in themselves immediately implies the denial of the actual existence of things in themselves.
This is not Kant's agnostic criticism, which simply states that the assertion of knowledge of the actual existence of things in themselves has no foundation.
Realists will disagree, but that's not the point, since Kant's criticism is about the epistemological certainties that imply ontological commitments, while he disregards (at least in the epistemological interpretation of Kant) any ontological commitments at all.

The other interpretation, the ontological one, leads to Berkeleyan subjectivism. And Berkeleyan subjectivism leads inevitably to solipsism.
I don't agree with your term 'agnostic criticism' with reference to Kant.

But I do agree with your
"the assertion of knowledge of the actual existence of things in themselves has no foundation" i.e. presumably ontological foundation.

Realists will disagree with the above and that is the whole point of what the OP is about.

Realists claim the knowledge of things imply the actual and ontological existence of independent things-in-themselves in the external world.
Note: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
But realists are unable to prove such supposedly ontological things-in-themselves exist as real.

If you think otherwise then address the OP,
Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Realists will never be able to prove their claims re philosophical realism.
The reason is they are unable to realize they are caught in a psychological entrapment [which Kant implied] that led them to speculate there are supposedly real independent things-in-themselves out there.
That's the whole problem of the OP. It asks for a response to an ontological problem, somehow already knowing the answer, in order to advance against it the Kantian argument (waiting in the corner) that denies the possibility of solving ontological problems. But this is just dogmatic reinforcement for Kantians, and those who don't buy the TI argument are not limited by that constraint. Perhaps the OP should have asked "prove that you can know that an independent reality in itself exists", which at least would have given ground to discuss some Kantian epistemology denying the possibility to know such thing, being at the same time forced to admit that the same argument could apply to the problem "prove that you can know that an independent reality in itself does not exist" . Of course, the OP is so eager to show that an independent reality does not exist that it forgot that Kant himself did not and could not take that ontological commitment.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Tue May 11, 2021 3:49 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:50 am
Conde Lucanor wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 2:27 am This is what you get wrong, assuming that the denial of knowing the things in themselves immediately implies the denial of the actual existence of things in themselves.
This is not Kant's agnostic criticism, which simply states that the assertion of knowledge of the actual existence of things in themselves has no foundation.
Realists will disagree, but that's not the point, since Kant's criticism is about the epistemological certainties that imply ontological commitments, while he disregards (at least in the epistemological interpretation of Kant) any ontological commitments at all.

The other interpretation, the ontological one, leads to Berkeleyan subjectivism. And Berkeleyan subjectivism leads inevitably to solipsism.
I don't agree with your term 'agnostic criticism' with reference to Kant.

But I do agree with your
"the assertion of knowledge of the actual existence of things in themselves has no foundation" i.e. presumably ontological foundation.

Realists will disagree with the above and that is the whole point of what the OP is about.

Realists claim the knowledge of things imply the actual and ontological existence of independent things-in-themselves in the external world.
Note: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
But realists are unable to prove such supposedly ontological things-in-themselves exist as real.

If you think otherwise then address the OP,
Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Realists will never be able to prove their claims re philosophical realism.
The reason is they are unable to realize they are caught in a psychological entrapment [which Kant implied] that led them to speculate there are supposedly real independent things-in-themselves out there.
That's the whole problem of the OP.
It asks for a response to an ontological problem, somehow already knowing the answer, in order to advance against it the Kantian argument (waiting in the corner) that denies the possibility of solving ontological problems.

But this is just dogmatic reinforcement for Kantians, and those who don't buy the TI argument are not limited by that constraint.

Perhaps the OP should have asked "prove that you can know that an independent reality in itself exists", which at least would have given ground to discuss some Kantian epistemology denying the possibility to know such thing, being at the same time forced to admit that the same argument could apply to the problem "prove that you can know that an independent reality in itself does not exist" .

Of course, the OP is so eager to show that an independent reality does not exist that it forgot that Kant himself did not and could not take that ontological commitment.
I raised the above OP to support my point [within the discussion in the Ethical Theory section] that there is no fact-in-itself, thus no moral-fact-in-itself.
What could make morality objective? by Peter Holmes
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=24601

Since there are no moral-fact-in-itself, the moral-fact-deniers are merely denying an illusion.
Since there are no moral-fact-in-itself, what we have are moral-fact-in-FSK, i.e. human-based moral "facts".

Obviously I know the answer and is confident one cannot Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists.
Therefore there is no moral-fact-in-itself, and so the moral-fact-deniers are merely denying an illusion.
Of course, the OP is so eager to show that an independent reality does not exist that it forgot that Kant himself did not and could not take that ontological commitment.
It is clear in the text of the CPR, Kant rejected the traditional sense of ontology.
Did you read the article you referenced earlier, i.e.
Transcendental Idealism and Ontological Agnosticism

Therein Mcwherter acknowledged Kant rejected traditional ontology but he countered Kant was not successful with his claims in his TI arguments in the CPR.
I have read the whole article thoroughly and Mcwherter's conclusion is based on his failure to understand Kant's CPR fully since he was restrained by his rigid dogmatic transcendental realistic perspective.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 12:51 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am There is no middle-way, you are either a philosophical realist or anti-philosophical_realist.
All that reading of Wittgenstein, Rorty, and whoever your "Ash Heap of History" dude is has gone completely to waste if you can't see a problem with that statement.
Point is when Wittgenstein, Rorty, and that "Ash Heap of History" dude rejected the philosophical realists' position, they are automatically anti-philosophical_realist, albeit with their different philosophies.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 3:43 am Since you keep going in circles: "Humans exist, but ultimately they actually don't exist", let me put it this way: do humans exist as non-spatiotemporal objects?
Actually it is your ignorance that think I am going in circle.
I should be one who is complaining you are not getting out of the circle.
So you'll agree then that physicalism, metaphysical realism and scientific realism are still doing fine? They are mentioned in SEP as subjects of current discussions.
As stated, surely one is not that dumb without referring to the context and one's philosophical knowledge.
Physicalism, metaphysical realism and scientific realism are still active philosophical topics and in general not recognized and considered defunct like logical positivism.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am Kant would not be regarded as 'Godfather of cognitive science' if cognitive scientists had not benefited from Kant's ideas which they transposed into their work.
The claim that Kant is the 'Godfather of cognitive science' appears to be constrained to the circles of Kant's fans. Any serious account of modern cognitive sciences doesn't even mention Kant as an intellectual reference:
Nah, it is not restricted to Kant's fan but the fact that the concepts and themes introduced by Kant are incorporated in various theories of cognitive science.
Here is a quickie reference; there are loads more..
Three ideas define the basic shape (‘cognitive architecture’) of Kant’s model and one its dominant method. They have all become part of the foundation of cognitive science.
These three ideas are fundamental to most thinking about cognition now. Kant’s most important method, the transcendental method, is also at the heart of contemporary cognitive science.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/
Perhaps there are Kantians among these cognitive scientists. You let me know:
Gallery of Cognitive Scientists
Off-hand, Lakoff and Varela therein the list are fans of Kant.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am If you research further, you will note Kant contributed greatly and very much to philosophy and other fields of knowledge.
Kant contributed to idealism. Peddling idealism is peddling anti-realism, a reactionary view that goes contrary to the advances of science. It is pure nonsense.
Your claims above is based on ignorance. That you claim it is 'pure nonsense' is purely a fundamentalist and dogmatic view.
Kant transcendental idealism supports science.
Wherein it is stated in the CPR that it is anti-science?
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:31 am Re the main themes, I had stated you can test me or get some expert to test me on that.
I have drawn up more than 50 very detailed Flowcharts re each chapter/theme and an overall summary and ensure all the flowcharts cohere into one main summary chart.
From this it is unlikely I will miss out on the main, sub- and sub-sub-themes of the CPR.
I applaud your hard work, but unfortunately, this by no means is yet an indication that you have secured a proper understanding of what CPR entails.
That is your opinion which is obviously biased because you adopt the opposite view, i.e. a transcendental realist on Kant's view whereas I am a genuine Kantian transcendental idealist.
In addition, you have not read Kant's CPR thoroughly, thus has no credibility to make the above judgment.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am You inferred wrongly, i.e.
Berkeley was against mind-independent things, thus he was an idealist.
Since Kant distance himself from Berkeley’s idealism, therefore Kant was a realist, i.e. an empirical realist.

First there are many types of idealism, as such, that Kant distanced himself from Berkeley do not imply Kant was a realist in that sense.
Kant was mainly an idealist, i.e. a transcendental idealist, which is different from Berkeley’s subjective idealism.

Point is a transcendental idealist is also an empirical realist in another sense.
I never said Kant had moved to the camp of non-idealist realists. What I said, as Kant himself said, is that his version of idealism, apparently distinguished from that of Berkeley, implies a realistic stance against his anti-realism, in other words he opposes a kind of objective idealism to subjective idealism. This is something Stang addressed in his article:
Kant extensively revised certain sections of the Critique for the second edition (B), published in 1787. It is widely accepted that a main consideration in these revisions was to avoid the misunderstanding of his view that had led to the Feder-Garve review. However, some scholars think that, on this point, there is a difference in doctrine between the A and B editions: made aware of the problematic Berkeleyan consequences of the first edition, Kant endeavored to develop a more realistic view in the B Edition.[14] Other scholars think the difference is largely a matter of presentation: in the B edition, Kant highlights the more realistic aspects of his view and downplays its phenomenalistic sides, but the view is basically the same (e.g., Allison 2004).
Hey.. you got it wrong.
"A more realistic view in the B-Edition" above do not imply "realism" in any sense or "a realistic stance against his [Bekerley's] anti-realism."
Note the phrase above, i.e. the more realistic aspects of his view.

I have argued Kant's stance is dominantly 'idealistic' i.e. transcendental idealism with its sub-version of empirical realism.
Empirical realism is not philosophical realism at all.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am You stated,
“So this notion of realism shows two aspects: one about existence of things, and another one about the objectivity (mind-independence) of those things.”

If you are not a philosophical realist [mind independent reality], then what sort of ‘realism’ stance do you adopt?
There is no middle-way, you are either a philosophical realist or anti-philosophical_realist.
You seem to think one cannot be an idealist and at the same time a realist. Plato is a well-known idealist who was also a realist. I'm a materialist realist.

Now I ask you: Berkeley believed there isn't a realm of objects separate from the realm of mind, that there's only the realm of mind. What do you think Kant believed?
Where did I say, one cannot be an idealist and at the same time a realist.
Note this thread I raised;
A Realist is also an Idealist
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32913

Plato was an empirical idealist and at the same time a material realist which is the same as you, i.e. you are a material-realist and at the same time an empirical-idealist.

Berkeley believed existence is perception;
Wiki on Berkeley wrote:All knowledge comes from perception; what we perceive are ideas, not things in themselves; a thing in itself must be outside experience; so the world only consists of ideas and minds that perceive those ideas; a thing only exists so far as it perceives or is perceived.[59] Through this we can see that consciousness is considered something that exists to Berkeley due to its ability to perceive.
"'To be,' said of the object, means to be perceived, 'esse est percipi'; 'to be', said of the subject, means to perceive or 'percipere'."

One refutation of his idea was: if someone leaves a room and stops perceiving that room does that room no longer exist? Berkeley answers this by claiming that it is still being perceived and the consciousness that is doing the perceiving is God. (This makes Berkeley’s argument hinge upon an omniscient, omnipresent deity.) This claim is the only thing holding up his argument which is "depending for our knowledge of the world, and of the existence of other minds, upon a God that would never deceive us."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Be ... aterialism
Both Berkeley and Kant do not believe the things-in-themselves exist as real things.
However Kant justifications of what is real is very complex [within the whole of the CPR] and is totally different from Berkeley's, especially not depending on God as the ultimate.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am I believe you are a philosophical realist aka a transcendental realist which is also an empirical idealist in another sense.
I don't endorse Kant's classifications, and given that he was a bit misguided about what philosophers like Berkeley were up to, I think it would be wise to completely ignore him on that. Empirical idealism is associated with Berkeley and I'm not even close to endorsing such a thing.
You are merely guessing what Berkeley's is up to.
Note the quote I referenced to Berkeley's main argument. Have you even read Berkeley's book?

You are ignorant that you are the one who is endorsing empirical idealism as a material realist. This is because what is empirical to you is depending only upon sense-data in the mind, thus your empirical is idealistic.
Actually Berkeley can be an empirical realist but a theological-realist resorting to God as the ultimate.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am Nope, the position I am defending is that of Transcendental Idealism which is Kant’s central theme which is not Berkeley’s subjective idealism.

Kant’s as with Allison and my view was not ontological agnosticism.
For Kant what is the thing-in-itself is merely an intelligible or transcendental object which is in a way an intellectual object which can never be real in any sense of reality.
That may be your view, I'm not sure that it is Allison's, but it is certainly not the view of all scholars about what Kant's TI entails.

Transcendental Idealism and Ontological Agnosticism
Therefore, on this interpretation, transcendental idealism, as a doctrine exclusively about how things are known (i.e. as they appear), and justified by arguments which refuse such knowledge any traction on things in themselves, is free from any ontological commitments since its denial of knowledge of things in themselves amounts to an agnosticism about how things are.
In other words, appearances have a purely epistemic, non-ontological status since they reflect transcendental idealism’s disavowal of any claims concerning things as they are. This is what constitutes transcendental idealism’s ontological agnosticism.
Importantly, this is also what allows transcendental idealism to be distinguished from something like Berkeley’s subjective idealism, for the fact that transcendental idealism restricts knowledge to appearances does not mean that it restricts all things to appearances.
I have read the above article thoroughly.
I don't think you have read it thoroughly.
The author, Dustin Mcwherter, belongs to the transcendental realists camp which has an "ontological" bias, thus the transcendental realists imposed 'ontology' in their reading of Kant's CPR.

As I had mentioned, transcendental realists actually acknowledge Kant rejected ontology in the CPR. He stated in the abstract and many times elsewhere in the article.
Within these debates, Kant’s rejection of ontology (of the kind exemplified by Wolff and Baumgarten) has received comparatively little treatment, although it is often acknowledged.
The fact is Kant's CPR is grounded on the absence of any traditional ontological elements.
If there is any reference of 'ontology' to the CPR, it has nothing to do with the traditional ontology as it is generally understood, note Allison,
Allison wrote:Uncontroversially, Kant’s doctrine of transcendental ideality involves a denial of the traditional ontologies of space and time (the alternatives available to Transcendental Realism), but it does not follow from this that it is itself an alternative ontology.
It may also be seen as an alternative to ontology, according to which space and time are understood in terms of their epistemic functions (as forms or conditions of outer and inner sense, respectively) rather than as “realities” of one sort or another. Allison 2004 Chapter 5 -Intro
Note the overriding 'Copernican Revolution' of Kant precludes any elements of traditional ontology to his Transcendental Idealism and the whole theme of the CPR.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue May 11, 2021 5:14 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 12:51 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:36 am There is no middle-way, you are either a philosophical realist or anti-philosophical_realist.
All that reading of Wittgenstein, Rorty, and whoever your "Ash Heap of History" dude is has gone completely to waste if you can't see a problem with that statement.
Point is when Wittgenstein, Rorty, and that "Ash Heap of History" dude rejected the philosophical realists' position, they are automatically anti-philosophical_realist, albeit with their different philosophies.
You didn't understand at least two of those writers then. Perhaps you didn't draw enough flow charts.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Veritas Aequitas wrote:
Note Kant did not claim time and space only exist in minds.
What Kant claimed is space and time are imperative human-conditions of human cognition of reality [things, objects, etc.]
As such whatever are things in time and space cannot be independent of the human conditions.

What is real must exist within space and time.
Things in time and space cannot be independent of the human conditions.
The thing-in-itself the supposedly unknowable thing is beyond space and time, thus is independent of the human conditions.
Since the thing-in-itself do not exists within space and time, it cannot be real at all.
"Human conditions" is a mislabeling and substitute term for "human cognition", ergo, what you really mean is minds. That's what the ideality of time and space is, something constructed a priori in minds. That is not to say, according to most Kant scholars, that objects do not exist independently of human minds, it just means that the way we know them, as spatiotemporal objects, is not how they really are, and we cannot know how they really are. It's pure nonsense, but that's what Kant's doctrine is about.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:
As mentioned above all of reality that is actual and real is within space and time.
If there is no spatiotemporal ontology, there is no ultimate ontology.
One is tempted to ask: then what makes something "a reality"?, what are the conditions for defining it as "actual and real"?, and what guarantees its reality as not being illusions? And what ultimately makes the difference between considering the appearance of objects an actual, real "appearance of the object" and considering its appearance as the appearance of a real, actual object, independent of its cognition.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:
What is a contradiction is only if p and not-p are claimed as true within the same time and same sense.
My 1 and 2 are at the same time but in different senses/perspectives.
Well, you need to settle for the perspective that anwers the question: do humans, flesh and bone humans, exist as mind-independent objects?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: You got it wrong with Kant.

Kant never asserted 'the appearance of the Moon to my cognition, is an illusion.'
You will never be able to produce any reference from Kant to support your claim.

What Kant claimed as real is that whole experience of the cognition of the Moon which include the appearance and the whole shebang connected with the experience, knowledge and cognition as expressed in the whole of CPR and transcendental idealism.

It is an illusion when you claim the appearance of the Moon is corresponded with an unknowable moon-in-itself.
You just said what you said Kant didn't say.

If the Moon is real, its existence predates the existence of the humans that at one moment cognized it. If that was not the case, the Moon would be an illusion. You cannot say it's real and at the same time say it does not correspond to reality. Saying that what amounts for being real is the experience itself is what starts all the trouble for TI and explains why even though Kant tries to distance himself from Berkeley, he doesn't quite achieve it.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: As with theists, it is cowardly to resort to asking one to prove a negative.
The difference is that theists assume as criteria of proof the same realist ontological framework and they fail to deliver the positive proof. Once you assume an anti-realist framework in which there can't be no ontological proof because the proof criteria itself is not legitimized by epistemological positions, then it is a different ball game and the anti-realist can basically say nothing and ask nothing. Anything goes.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Terrapin Station wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 11:42 am
Conde Lucanor wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 3:43 am Since you keep going in circles:
Hence why I don't often write long posts as you guys have been doing. If someone wants to keep arguing/debating via endless lengthy replies, there's no way I'm putting the time and effort and material into long posts until the person demonstrates that they can and will attentively respond to specific points, questions and objections in a pointed/focused, detailed, cogent way that can progress the conversation (and that suggests that they're truly responsive and capable of contemplation and learning).
Every one chooses his own battles, for sure. It's true that engaging in long discussions demands a lot of time and some effort, and that's why I try to focus on just 1 or 2 threads that I find worth discussing, because they deal with fundamental issues. Most, if not all philosophical debates, boil down to idealists desperately trying to smuggle their spiritual nonsense into the fields dominated by sciences.
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